The Docket - March 2023

FEATURES

8 Contributory Negligence of a

A publication

300 Grand Avenue, Suite A Waukegan, Illinois 60085 (847) 244-3143 • Fax: (847) 244-8259 www.lakebar.org • info@lakebar.org

THE DOCKET EDITORIAL BOARD

Jeffrey A. Berman,Co-Editor

Hon. Charles D. Johnson,Co-Editor

Jennifer C. Beeler

Kevin Berrill

Hon. Bolling W. Haxall

Hon. Daniel L. Jasica

Hon. Christopher M. Kennedy

Jennifer Luczkowiak

Kevin K. McCormick

Shyama Parikh

Stephen J. Rice

Neal A. Simon

Hon. James K. Simonian

Rebecca J. Whitcombe

Alex Zagor

STAFF

Greg Weider Executive Director

Jose Gonzalez

Assistant Executive Director

Nancy Rodriguez Receptionist

Advertising Rates

To place an ad or for information on advertising rates, call (847) 244-3143. Submission deadline: first day of month preceding the month of publication. All submissions must be made in electronic format (high resolution PDF or JPG format at a resolution of 300 pixels per inch or more.) See www.lakebar.org/page/Docket_Advertising

The Docket is the official publication of the Lake County Bar Association, 300 Grand Avenue, Suite A, Waukegan, Illinois 60085 (847) 2443143, and is published monthly. Subscriptions for non-members are $45.00 per year.

Reproduction in whole or part without permission is prohibited. The opinions and positions stated in signed material are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Association or its members.

All submitted manuscripts are considered by the Editorial Board. All letters to the editor and articles are subject to editing. Publications of advertisements is not to be considered as an endorsement of any product or service advertised unless otherwise stated.

Strategies for settlement, before filing suit

As a litigator, specifically as a Plaintiff’s attorney, I think there is a misconception that we always believe it’s in the client’s best interest for a case to be filed or for

there to be litigation and ultimately a trial. In some circumstances, yes, it is in our client’s best interest to file a lawsuit, litigate the claim, and go to a jury, but in many instances, it is in our client’s best interests, as well as opposing parties’ best interests, to try to resolve the matter pre-suit without prolonged litigation. Litigation, as we all know, eats up time, money, and a lot of energy.

So here are some strategies I’ve learned over the years to put you in the best position to try to resolve a matter pre-suit.

Tip #1: Do the opponent’s job for them. What do I mean by this?

Your goal is to provide the opposing party with all of the information, all of the evidence, everything that you need to substantiate what you’re asking for.

For example, in a personal injury case, if you are

going to want to settle pre-suit and you’re going to be asking for a certain amount of money for medical bills, wage loss, and non-economic damages of pain and suffering, you need to get them the documents to substantiate your claim for liability and damages. You need to get the police report, medical records, medical bills, and you need to attach photographs and/or videos that would substantiate your claim and damages. The goal is to make it easy for them. You’ve provided it all to them so that there’s no need for them to delay or waste time having to order or gather additional information. They can review and rely upon what you provided to them and recognize that it is thorough and complete. Since you have already done all of the work, they will know that all that

BY TARA R. DEVINE PRESIDENT

stands between them and a lawsuit is a pleading and filing fee.

Tip #2: Talking to the right person. You need to make sure you are talking and negotiating with the right person or attorney, meaning the person with authority to settle the claim. It’s very easy to find out who would represent the other side, or who is going to represent the other side, whether that be opposing counsel in a divorce case or who opposing counsel will likely be in a medical negligence case for a certain hospital or facility. You want to talk with them as early as possible to let them know of your involvement, your representation of your client, and give them a heads up that you will be providing them with information soon, and to keep a look out for it. It opens the lines of com-

President’s Page

munication sooner than later, which will ultimately help down the road when you are ready to start the negotiations.

Tip #3: Provide information that they typically can only get through litigation. The next strategy would be to give opposing counsel information that they otherwise would not be able to obtain but through depositions and litigation. For example, if you have a wrongful death case, you and you alone pretty much have had the opportunity to speak with the heirs and understand what a close-knit family they were, or how wonderful the family is, and you need to be able to provide to opposing counsel photographs and detailed information about who your heirs are, where they live, what they do for a living, and describe the nature and extent of the relationship that they had with the decedent. This is important because unless you file a lawsuit, typically the defense doesn’t get an opportunity to depose and actually speak to the heirs, which are the ones who ultimately will be seeking damages in a wrongful death case.

Tip #4: Draft pleadings. Prove to the other side that you are serious about putting the case into suit or litigation in the event you are unable to resolve the matter. In this type of circumstance, it is not a threat but simply reality, and to show how serious you are, I find it very helpful to draft a complaint and attach it to any settlement demands

that you are putting out there. It shows that you’ve taken the time and effort to draft the complaint, that you understand the facts that need to be pled, and that really the only thing that stands between your client and a lawsuit is a filing fee—all of which can be avoided if they just negotiate and settle the case.

Tip #5: Deadlines. Another way to make sure to settle a case presuit is to put reasonable and timely deadlines on demands that are made or timeframes in which you are waiting to get information back from opposing counsel. This is important because you’ll be able to determine pretty early on how responsive opposing counsel is, and it also lets them know that this is not a claim that you are going to allow to float about in the atmosphere of potential settlements forever. So make sure you put in reasonable time limits on your demands so that you have some certainty, and then you’ll also know well before deadlines are approaching whether the likelihood of reaching a successful settlement is going to happen.

Tip #6: Use the media/press. Two other strategies that I would recommend—and these are probably a bit more plaintiff-counsel oriented (as you can imagine)—but plaintiffs sometimes have certain things on their side that you can use as leverage. One of them is the press, or the media more generally. This can be used as leverage prior to something going to suit,

because the matter is not in the public arena (yet) and it’s not on the news or any websites (yet). You can let opposing counsel know that if the claim cannot be successfully resolved presuit, you will take advantage of this very newsworthy story getting press, and potential interviews and articles. In the world of lawsuits, not all publicity is good publicity.

Tip #7: Everything is admissible pre-litigation. First and foremost, there are no rules of evidence that apply during pre-suit settlement negotiations, so I like to say “everything is admissible pre-suit.” And what that means is that if you do have information that may or may not make the light of day at a trial, it could be hearsay on top of hearsay, it could be bad information about a defendant that happened well over ten years ago, but in the negotiation phase, pre-suit, it really doesn’t matter. You can still use all of that as leverage as it relates to pointing out deficiencies or problems that this same defendant has previously had.

Tip #8: Trust and reputation. Reputation is the most important thing that we have in this legal community, and it’s important that you stay true to your word in the demands that you make or the offers that you accept, and you need to be ethical at all times during your negotiations. If you tell someone that something is going to get the case to resolve or will be enough to get it done, then you have to stand by that.

Being true to your word is what will help you not only in that current negotiation, but in all future negotiations that you have with others.

In our field, which is based on the premise of being adverse, it is important to try and find common ground and civility in pre-suit negotiations so that litigation can be avoided in the cases where it should and can be.

New LCBA Members

Merit Badge Day at the Courthouse

This month marks the third anniversary of the pandemic shutdown. As our courthouse operations continue to normalize, so too does a return to in-person events and

Grapevine

efforts to increase meaningful access to justice in the 19th Judicial Circuit. To that end we have been working to increase our involvement in opportunities for interaction with outside groups and increase resources for our self-represented litigants (SRLs).

The 19th Judicial Circuit has provided mediation services to SRLs for many years. This service has provided invaluable assistance to individuals proceeding through the eviction process.

One of the many unfortunate byproducts of the pandemic has been a marked increase in eviction filings. Since October 2021 eviction filings have increased nearly 60%. As a result, we saw a need to step in and help those proceeding through the process, and to try to develop creative ways to

ChiefPageJudge’s

transform the process. Included in those efforts has been an increase in funding for help desks and mediation opportunities to support all litigants and landlords with eviction cases. Our Eviction Mediation Program is an attempt to transform eviction court into a problem-solving court. This program emphasizes holistic solutions by providing litigants with resources for housing problems. The program utilizes locally trained attorneys to serve as mediators. The 19th is currently working to expand this program because of the success we have experienced.

When the program first began, attorneys served as pro bono mediators. Because of the significant increase in mediations, the 19th moved to a model allow-

BY CHIEF JUDGE MARK L. LEVITT

ing for compensation for our mediators. In addition, our program now serves cases with attorneys representing parties rather than only SRLs. Mediation has resulted in reaching agreements in 79% of cases. In these cases, litigants and landlords have been able to access funding resources to resolve their cases. Although we anticipate that new eviction case filings will increase, we are confident that we will be able to meet the demands.

The increased activity in the courthouse isn’t limited to the business of the court. We are also welcoming members of the community back into the courthouse for educational and interactive experiences, especially for the youth of Lake County.

One of these activities “merits” special attention. On March 4, we

The Tara R. Devine has been appointed to the Supreme Court of Illinois Committee on Jury Instructions in Civil Cases.

Shyama S. Parikh has been appointed to the Supreme Court of Illinois Committee on Equality.

Michael Strauss has been appointed to the Finance Committee of the Illinois Supreme Court’s Commission on Access to Justice.

are hosting an assembly dedicated to Scouting in Lake County. The 2023 Law Merit Badge Day is an opportunity for over 100 participants to spend a day immersed in the law and viewing law-related activities. The goal of the day is to give the scouts a broad overview of courthouse functions, with the added bonus of earning a merit badge.

The day includes tours of the courthouse and Coroner’s Office, and an introduction to the Sheriff’s Canine Unit complete with a meet-and-greet with Boomer—the star of the show! Following the tours, the scouts will have the opportunity to participate in classroom sessions with several of our judges and local attorneys.

Judge Jasica will lead a

discussion on the law. He will cover topics including the origin of law, and an overview of the Justinian Code and the Magna Carta. He will also dissect several famous historical trials, and conclude by comparing and contrasting criminal and civil law.

Judge Bruno will talk about practical matters in the daily work of the courthouse. She will provide a broad overview of everything from how people interested in the law can become lawyers, how lawyers get involved in cases, and the internet and the law. She will also explain the function of the Illinois Judiciary.

Judge Salvi will then preside over a mock trial. The trial participants include Assistant State’s Attorney Tyler Dyson, As -

sistant Public Defenders Samantha Vonspreecken, Molly Leimback, and Gabriel Conroe, and Official Court Reporter Katelyn Boyce, along with deputy sheriff Brad Meister.

The day will conclude with presentations from each of the trial participants about careers in their respective fields.

(Deputy Brian Kilpatrick

will lead the discussion on the K9 unit, instead of Boomer!)

I want to express my sincere thanks on behalf of the entire circuit to all those who will make this day informative, educational and, most of all, fun!

Resolute Systems Welcomes

JUDGE DAVID BRODSKY, ret.

to Our

Team of Dispute Resolution Professionals

Resolute Systems is pleased to welcome Judge David Brodsky, Ret. to our team of dispute resolution professionals. Judge Brodsky will concentrate his mediation practice in the areas of:

We congratulate Judge Brodsky on his outstanding judicial career where he developed a reputation as an extremely effective pre-trial mediator. To schedule mediation with Judge Brodsky, please contact Mike Weinzierl at 312.346.3770, x125 or go to our Web Pages at davidbrodskymediation.com

• Personal Injury

• Wrongful Death

• Medical Malpractice

• Legal Malpractice

• Commercial

• Products Liability

• Contract

• Mechanics Lien Litigation

• Eminent Domain

• Probate

• Nursing Home

• Premises Liability

• Defamation

• Divorce & Family

Meet the Board

JACQUELYN MELIUS

Jacquelyn Melius, Associate Judge, is a long-time member of the Lake County Bar Association. She joined the LCBA in 2000 at the start of her legal career. Over the years, she has served the Association in various capacities, including acting as chairperson and co-chairperson of the Civil Trial and Appeals Committee; serving as a Director on the LCBA Board of Directors; presenting at different seminars and CLE events;

and being a member of an array of committees. Judge Melius is a graduate of Northwestern University, where she was a member of the golf team, as well as the University of Illinois – Chicago Law School, formerly known as John Marshall Law School. Judge Melius began her legal career in 2000 at Trobe and Dudley in Waukegan, which later became Dudley & Lake. Judge Melius was named partner in 2012, becoming the first female

partner at the firm, and she remained at Dudley & Lake practicing plaintiff’s personal injury and medical malpractice law until she was appointed to the bench in 2018. In her five years on the bench, Judge Melius has presided over cases in traffic court, Domestic Violence/OP court; Small Claims and in the Law Division. In addition to her involvement in the LCBA, she is a member of the Illinois Judges Association, where she serves as

the co-chairperson of the Wellness Committee, as well as the Jefferson Inn.

Both

Whether you have a potential liability issue, need advice on managing your practice, or an ethical question…we are here to help

Contributory Negligence of a Minor

BY JENNIFER L. ASHLEY

As a Plaintiff’s attorney, I was recently faced with a case in which my client (14 years old) was riding his bicycle when he was struck by a car and injured. There is a question of who was negligent, the minor bicyclist and/or the adult driver. I researched the issue and concluded that Illinois law has determined that once a minor turns 14 years old, he/she is held to the same standard of care as an adult.

Since 1886, Illinois courts have applied the tender years doctrine to prevent children under the age of 7 from being found contributorily negligent.1 In 1902, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly adopted the “tender years doctrine,” which states that a child is incapable of contributory negligence if he/she is less than 7 years old.2 The rationale is that a child under the age of 7 is incapable of recognizing and appreciating risk, and as such is deemed incapable of negligence as a matter of law.3 The child›s immaturity limits his/her liability regardless of whether he/she is a

1 Chicago, St. Louis Pittsburgh R.R. Co. v. Welsh, 118 Ill. 572 (1886); Mort v. Walter, 98 Ill. 2d 391 (1983).

2 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy, 196 Ill. 410, 422 (1902).

3 Chu v. Bowers, 275 Ill. App. 3d 861, 864 (3d Dist. 1995).

plaintiff or defendant.4

A child of “tender years” is defined as a “person of such immature years as to be incapable of exercising the judgment, intelligence, knowledge, experience and prudence demanded by the standard of the reasonable man applicable to adults” and “who, by reason of his youth, lacks the capacity to know or realize the danger”.5 The Restatement 2nd of Torts provides that “[i]f the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”6 Comment b to section 283A further provides in

Jennifer Ashley is a partner at Salvi, Schostok & Pritchard, P.C. and represents clients in the areas of personal injury and wrongful death. She is an active member of the LCBA and has been a Trustee of the LCBF since 2016.

4 Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 Ill. App. 2d 350, 352 (1st Dist. 1963).

5 See Restatement 2nd of Torts § 283 (1971)

6 Restatement 2nd of Torts §283A (1965).

relevant part:

Some courts have endeavored to lay down fixed rules as to a minimum age below which the child is incapable of being negligent, and a maximum age above which he is to be treated like an adult. Usually, these rules have been derived from the old rules of the criminal law, by which a child under the age of 7 was considered incapable of crime, and one over 14 was considered to be as capable as an adult.7

Illinois courts conclusively presume that children under the age of 7 years cannot be contributorily negligent because they cannot foresee the consequences of their actions, which is the state of mind required for negligence.8 When children are between the ages of 7 and 14, their capacity to be contributorily negligent is a question of fact.9 When a child is between 7 and 14 years old, the trier of fact must consider the “age, capacity, intelligence, and experience of the child” in light of the rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of 7 and 14 is incapable of negligence.10 When a child is 14 years old, he is held to the same degree of care as an adult.11

It is settled law in Illinois that a minor under 14 can also be held to the same standard as an adult, if engaging in an adult activity.12 However, Illinois courts have held that riding a bicycle is not an adult activity.13

In Chu v. Bowers, plaintiff (6 years old) was a bicyclist who filed suit against the driver that struck her. Defendant asserted the affirmative defense of comparative negligence, claiming plaintiff was negligent in violating section 11-1502 of the IL Vehicle Code, Section 11-1502 holds bicyclists to the same duties as drivers of motor vehicles. On appeal the court had to determine the effect of section 11-1502 on the tender years doctrine. The court stated that traffic laws do not create or expand civil liabilities and there was no evidence of legislative intent

7 Restatement 2nd of Torts §283A, Comment b (1965).

8 See Jorgensen v. Nudelman, 45 Ill. App. 2d at 352-54

9 Seaburg v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 2d 295, 300 (2d Dist. 1958), citing Maskaliunas v. Chicago Western Indiana R.R. Co., 318 Ill. 142, 149-50 (1925).

10 Savage v. Martin, 256 Ill. App. 3d 272, 281 (1st Dist. 1993).

11 Id.

12 Dawson v. Hoffmann, 43 Ill. App. 2d 17 (2d Dist. 1963). See also Betzold v. Erickson, 35 Ill. App. 2d 203 (3d Dist. 1962) (13 year old riding a motorcycle engages in an adult activity).

13 See Kronenberger v. Husky, 38 Ill. 2d 376 (1967); King v. Casad, 122 Ill. App. 3d 566 (4th Dist. 1984); Conway v. Tamborini, 68 Ill. App. 2d 190 (3d Dist. 1966).

to abrogate the doctrine. As such, the court held that the tender years doctrine prohibits the admission of evidence to establish a child’s negligence, including a violation of a traffic ordinance.

At trial, the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction 11.03 would be given to the jury to instruct them on the tender years doctrine. IPI 11.03 states: You must not consider the question of whether there was contributory negligence [on the part of [name]], because, under the law, a child of the age of [the plaintiff] [name] is incapable of contributory negligence.

In my case, the child bicyclist had just turned 14 and his standard of care is the same as an adult. While such a bright line rule may seem arbitrary in using the age of 14, Illinois courts have reasoned that a bright line rule gives litigants predictable results and judicial economy. Further, a bright line rule that relieves the jury of determining to what standard a particular child should be held. Id.

The Illinois Second Appellate Court came close to abandoning the tender years doctrine. The court described the tender year doctrine as “antiquated” and “arbitrary” but nevertheless found that it could not overturn the rule.14 The Appellate Court found the argument that children have become more sophisticated and more thoroughly educated on safety issues was persuasive. Further, the court agreed with the argument that the tender year doctrine is arbitrary and supports its abandonment, but reluctantly reasserted the doctrine otherwise it would create a split in appellate authority and create uncertainty for future litigants.

For now, the tender years doctrine remains, but could be subject to abandonment if the right case were to go up on appeal. Contributory negligence on behalf of a minor was an interesting topic to research. As with any law that was first codified by the Illinois Supreme Court over 100 years ago, there are factors of modern society that may prove to be its downfall. A minor child in 1902 is much different from one in 2022. Most Illinois children today have television, video games, computers, internet, and often have cell phones, which serve to educate and entertain. But for now, the tender years doctrine continues to be the law in Illinois.

14 See Appelhans v. McFall, 325 Ill. App. 3d 232 (2d Dist. 2001).

It is settled law in Illinois that a minor under 14 can also be held to the same standard as an adult, if engaging in an adult activity.

A Legal Overview of the Secondary Ticket Market

BY KEVIN BERRILL

In 1989, my family took a summer driving vacation through the state of New York, culminating in crossing the border to Toronto. We were, for lack of a better term, a baseball family, so in addition to seeing such natural wonders as Howe Caverns and Niagara Falls, this trip included a visit to the Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York. The destination that was most exciting to me, however, was the home of the Blue Jays—the newly minted Toronto Sky Dome.

In 1989, my family took a summer driving vacation through the state of New York, culminating in crossing the border to Toronto. We were, for lack of a better term, a baseball family, so in addition to seeing such natural wonders as Howe Caverns and Niagara Falls, this trip included a visit to the Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York. The destination that was most exciting to me, however, was the home of the Blue Jays—the newly minted Toronto Sky Dome.

We weren’t Blue Jays fans—we were and are Mets fans, unfortunately—but the Sky Dome had just opened that summer and was touted as the first stadium to feature a fully retractable roof. Our stop in Toronto coincided with a home series for the Blue Jays, but there was a problem: we

didn’t have tickets. This was, of course, before the prevalence of the internet, so my parents’ plan was to walk up to the ticket window and buy tickets for them, my sister, and me. The rub here was that, since the Blue Jays were a first-place team and the Sky Dome was hyped as a mustsee park, they were sold out.

My father ended up buying tickets on the street. He, a letter-of-thelaw-abiding citizen, was nervous to do so; the legality of buying scalped tickets felt questionable. However, a few minutes later we had four in hand, and were happily headed into the stadium. Looking back on the way my father tepidly bought tickets outside the park, though, has made me wonder—were his concerns legitimate? Was purchasing “scalped” tickets legal? Have the laws changed

Kevin Berrill is an Assistant State’s Attorney in the Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office, where, currently, he prosecutes felony financial crimes. Mr. Berrill is also the current Treasurer of the Lake County Bar Association.

in the last 33 years?

Times have indeed changed. Thanks to the ubiquity of StubHub, SeatGeek, and the like, buying tickets on the secondary market is a common—and open—part of our lives. Had the above scenario played out in 2023, we’d have had our tickets lodged within our phones with just the tap of a finger. Other than market price, there are few barriers to one buying his or her way into the concert or sporting event of his or her choosing. Yet this again begs the question: Is it legal?

Yes and no. Much like laws relating to the sale and purchase of cannabis, laws relating to the sale and purchase of event tickets on the secondary market is not uniform across jurisdictions. In the United States, there are no federal prohibitions on ticket reselling. The State of Illinois, in an effort to protect consumers from predatory resellers, is among many locales with specific allowances for who may resell tickets above face value, and where they may sell them. Specifically, Illinois law provides, in the Ticket Sale and Resale Act, in pertinent part and with exceptions:

it is unlawful for any person, persons, firm or corporation to sell tickets for baseball games, football games, hockey games, theatre entertainments, or any other amusement for a price more than the price printed upon the face of said ticket, and the price of said ticket shall correspond with the same price shown at the box office or the office of original distribution.1

The Act further provides that a violation is “a Class A misdemeanor,” subject to a fine of up to $5,000 for each offense and the potential for restitution “to all injured consumers.”2 So, in Illinois it is illegal to sell on the street tickets above face value, except for registered ticket brokers.3 While the record of enforcement against individuals for reselling tickets outside the purview of Illinois law is scant, it is not unprecedented. In 1990, a man was arrested, tried by jury, and convicted of selling two tickets to a New Kids on the Block concert held at the University of Illinois Assembly Hall for $40 each, “rather than $25 each as printed on the tickets.”4 Had George Costanza been pinched for hawking prime seats to Pagliacci, he likely would have had no defense, because challenges to the constitutionality of such laws against ticket scalping have

1 815 ILCS 414/1.5.

2 815 ILCS 414/2.

3 815 ILCS 414/1.5.

4 People v. Waisvisz, 221 Ill.App.3d 667, 668–69 (4th Dist. 1991).

repeatedly been rejected.5 However, there are no apparent prohibitions against purchasing tickets in this manner.

As for those exceptions, Illinois has carved out a relatively complicated licensing system to regulate who may resell tickets, and how they may be resold. The most relevant of these regulations to the modern-day eventgoer is that the Act:

does not apply to the sale of tickets of admission to a sporting event, theater, musical performance, or place of public entertainment or amusement of any kind for a price in excess of the printed box office ticket price by a reseller engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce on an Internet auction listing service duly registered with the Office of the Secretary of State on a registration form provided by that Office.6

In other words, subject to assurances that the given Internet ticket market website protects its users, in Illinois, one is legally permitted to buy and sell tickets online. Such assurances include the requirement that regulated ticket exchanges must “maintain[] a toll free number specifically dedicated for consumer complaints and inquiries regarding ticket resales made through the website.”7 I bid you good luck in trying to get a live person on the phone in such a circumstance.

It took until 2013 for these Internet-relevant regulations to be enacted in Illinois. The new laws came in the wake of City of Chicago v. StubHub, Inc., 8 when the City of Chicago sued the major Internet ticket exchange in an attempt to collect taxes on its sales. There, the Illinois Supreme Court held that municipalities such as Chicago “may not require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets.”9 The Illinois legislature followed up with its still-current licensing and regulation scheme relating to secondary ticket sales on the Internet.

The sale and regulation of tickets to sporting and other events has long been the subject of scrutiny and legal developments, particularly when it comes to professional scalpers. College football, often considered the most passionate of American sporting pastimes, has

5 Id.; see also New Jersey Ass’n of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 226 N.J. Super. 155, 172, 543 A.2d 997, 1006 (App. Div. 1988).

6 815 ILCS 414/1.5(c).

7 815 ILCS 414/1.5(e)(4).

8 2011 IL 111127 (2011).

9 Id. at ¶ 44.

In Illinois it is illegal to sell on the street tickets above face value, except for registered ticket brokers.

repeatedly been the subject of court rulings addressing whether season ticket holders—particularly those who double as scalpers—have an enforceable property right in access to tickets. In Kully v. Goldman, 10 the Supreme Court of Nebraska found that a University of Nebraska ticket holder’s prior purchases of tickets did not create a contractual right with the university to purchase future tickets. In State Block, Inc. v. Poche, 11 a Louisiana appeals court found that the language Louisiana State University’s football ticket renewal form did give a purchaser a contractual right to future tickets. With In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 12 a U.S. Bankruptcy Court rejected the claim of a corporation that had purchased 110 (!) season tickets to University of Notre Dame football games for almost 40 straight years, that it had a contractual right to buy future tickets.

In 1992, in Soderholm v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc., 13 an (alleged) ticket scalper sued the Cubs after the team sent to him a sternly worded letter warning that if he continued to resell his season tickets (of which he owned 24), his tickets might not be renewed. The court

10 208 Neb. 760, 305 N.W.2d 800 (1981).

11 444 So.2d 680 (La.App.1984).

12 Case No. HK83–02391, Adv.Pro.No. 84–0381 (Bankr. W.D. Mich., July 30, 1984).

13 225 Ill.App.3d 119 (1st Dist. 1992).

there denied his assertion that he had a right to future tickets. Putting aside jokes about the wisdom of building a business around the reselling of tickets to see the Cubs in the early 1990s, it is evident that courts and lawmakers are wary of business operations that hinge on the predatory reselling of event tickets. Of course, one could cite the Cubs for being a bit hypocritical, as the club itself, when under the ownership of the Tribune Company, was permitted to resell its own tickets through a team-owned brokering service.14

As for my Dad, it would seem as though he is, and was, in the clear. In 1989, there were no Torontonian, Ontarian, or Canadian laws prohibiting the purchase of tickets on the secondary market. However, until 2015, “[s]calping tickets—reselling tickets for above their face value—had always been illegal in Ontario.”15 Thank you, Dad, for getting us in to see that game—although the person on the other side of that transaction may want to look into the statute of limitations.

14 Cavoto v. Chicago Nat. League Ball Club, Inc., No. 1-03-3749, 2006 WL 2291181, at *8 (1st Dist. July 28, 2006).

15 Robin Levinson King, “How the government made ticket-scalping legal in Ontario,” June 3, 2016, https://www.thestar.com/ news/canada/2016/06/03/hip-fallout-or-how-the-governmentmade-ticket-scalping-legal-in-ontario.html.

Risk management is not a do-it-yourself job.

Risk is a delicate issue. You know you should find the right balance between risk and opportunity, but how does that translate into investment choices?

As a Morgan Stanley Financial Advisor, I have the experience, knowledge and resources to help you maintain that balance within your investments. Call us today.

The use of the CDFA designation does not permit the rendering of legal advice by Morgan Sta nley or its Financial Advisors which may only be done by a licensed attorney. The CDFA designation is not intended to imply that either Morgan Stanley or its Financial Advisors are acting as experts in this field. Certified Financial Planner Board of Stand ards Inc. owns the certification marks CFP®, CERTIFIED FINANCIAL PLANNER™ and federally registered CFP (with flame design) in the US. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC. Member SIPC. CRC 5343473 01/2023

Pictured above (from the left): Karina A. Elperin (Wealth Management Associate), David J. Gordon (Senior Portfolio Management Director, Executive Director, Financial Advisor), Rafal Fidowicz (Registered Associate)

Be a part of

Jennifer Ashley

Tara Devine

Jaclyn Kurth

John Mennie

Polling The Jury in a Criminal Case: Purpose, Procedure, and People v. Jackson

BY HON. RAYMOND J. MCKOSKI (RET.)

The right of a defendant in a criminal case to poll the jury after the return of a verdict has a long history in Illinois. Seven years after achieving statehood, the new state’s highest court affirmed the common law right of a ”prisoner” to verify the verdict by polling the jurors.1

1Ninety years before the Illinois Supreme Court’s pronouncement, Sir Mathew Hale recognized a harsher corollary to the rule: “Now touching the giving up of their verdict, if the jury say they are agreed, the court may examine them by poll, and if in truth they are not agreed, they are fineable.”2 The polling process is not all that complicated and logic dictates that after one hundred and ninety-seven years the kinks would have been worked out. But last year the Illinois Supreme Court found it necessary to examine whether a polling mistake, inquiring of only eleven of the twelve jurors, constituted a structural error in the proceedings requiring reversal of a defendant’s conviction.3 People v. Jackson instructs judges and lawyers in the application

1 Nomaque v. People, 1 Ill. 145 (1825).

2 United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting 2 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 299 (1st Am. ed., Stokes and Ingersoll, 1847)).

3 People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256.

of the plain error doctrine to defects in the polling process to which no objection is made. To put the Supreme Court’s decision in context, it is helpful to review the purposes and procedures in polling jurors in criminal cases.

THE PURPOSES OF POLLING

Polling the jury serves several important purposes including (1) confirming that the verdict is unanimous; (2) ensuring that no juror has been pressured into joining a verdict by coercion occurring in the deliberation room; (3) imposing responsibility for the verdict upon each juror; and

(4) protecting against mistakes like signing the wrong verdict form. The object of polling is not to reopen deliberations or to invite jurors to reconsider their decision but is designed only to provide an “opportunity to disclose any coercion, mistake, or dissention from the verdict

Raymond J. McKoski is a retired Lake County judge currently serving as an adjunct professor at the University of Illinois Chicago School of Law. rmckoski@uic.edu

announced.”4 To accommodate these important goals, the trial judge must afford a criminal defendant a polling opportunity before discharging the jury. The consequences of failing to take advantage of that opportunity in a timely fashion, however, falls on the defendant. While the method of polling is largely left to a judge’s discretion, certain aspects of the procedure are mandatory to ensure that jury polling achieves its purposes.

Polling Procedure

There is no constitutional or statutory requirement that a judge poll the jury. It is the “opportunity” to poll the jurors that the common law guarantees to criminal defendants. To safeguard that “opportunity” a judge is not required to directly ask the lawyers if they wish to poll the jury after return of the verdict. The judge is only required to provide the lawyers with a “reasonable opportunity” to make the request. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that a one and a half second delay between reading the verdict and beginning a sentencing hearing before the jury was not a reasonable opportunity to make a polling request.5 Similarly, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, held that reading the guilty verdict followed by the judge’s momentary glance at defense counsel was insufficient, observing that “[a] defendant exercising his right to poll the jury is not a quiz show contestant who must anticipatorily press the buzzer before the host is finished asking the question or risk losing points.”6 To avoid missing the “opportunity” and thereby waiving the right to poll, lawyers need to be attuned to the trial judge’s practice.

Some Illinois judges directly broach the issue after reading the verdict by asking the lawyers if they would like the jury polled. Other judges are more indirect asking the lawyers if there is “anything further of the jurors.” Still other judges give no indication that it is time for polling. With the latter group of jurists, a lawyer must be

4 People v. Williams, 97 Ill. 2d 252, 308 (1983); United States v. Mathis, 535 F.2d 1303, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1976), (quoting Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 88-89 (7th Cir. 1965)); United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d at 725.

5 United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 1992).

6 People v. Wheat, 383 Ill. App. 3d 234, 239 (2d Dist. 2008).

ready to request polling before discharge of the jury. If the judge provides a reasonable opportunity to request a poll and counsel fails to act the issue is usually waived.7 A lawyer unsure of the judge’s practice may decide to advise the judge before trial that polling is requested in the event of an unfavorable verdict.

Once counsel makes a polling request, the judge is under a duty to inquire of each juror individually. Individual questioning is necessary to fulfill polling’s purpose of assigning both individual and collective responsibility for the verdict. The jurors cannot be polled as a group, or in panels of four, or even two at a time. Once again, however, individual polling may be waived, if, for instance, counsel fails to object to a judge’s direction that all jurors who agree to the verdict raise their hands.8 The questions asked by judges (or sometimes clerks) vary. The old-fashioned, long standing inquiry asks “was this then and is this now your verdict (or verdicts).”9 This form of the question satisfies court decisions explaining that the poll must confirm that the verdict accurately represents the juror’s decision in the jury room and that the juror’s decision had not changed since.10 To clarify what the term “then” means in the question, some courts modify the inquiry to “was this your verdict when you signed it and is it still your verdict.”11 A review of Illinois appellate court decisions indicates that the most popular form of the polling question includes some variation of the “then and now” language. That is probably because, while not sanctioning any particular question, the Illinois Supreme Court found “nothing wrong” with the traditional “double-barreled” question.12 Some minimalist judges simply ask, “Is this your verdict.”13

After asking the question, the judge must give each ju-

7 People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 462 (1995).

8 People v. Taylor, 2018 IL App (4th) 160001-U, ¶ 83.

9 People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d 524, 527 (1979); see also People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 461 (“[W]as this and is this now your verdict?”).

10 See, e.g., State v. Boger, 163 S.E. 877, 878 (N.C. 1932).

11 People v. Carter, 2020 IL App (3d) 170745, ¶ 15.

12

13

People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d at 528.

E.g., United States v. Banks, 982 F.3d 1098, 1101 (7th Cir. 2020).

To avoid missing the “opportunity” and thereby waiving the right to poll, lawyers need to be attuned to the trial judge’s practice .... If the judge provides a reasonable opportunity to request a poll and counsel fails to act the issue is usually waived.

ror a chance to “freely assent or dissent to the verdict without the fear, errors, or coercive influences that may have prevailed in the jury’s private collective deliberations.”14 The judge may not coerce an affirmative answer. People v. Kellogg illustrates the wrong way to conduct a poll.

Clerk: Susan M. Vesecky, was this then and is this now your verdict?

Juror: Yes. Can I change my vote?

Court: The question is, was this then and is this now your verdict?

Juror: (No response.)

Court: Was this then and is this now your verdict?

Juror: Yes, Sir.15

Although not sure of her verdict, the juror was sure of the answer that the judge wanted and so gave it to him.

Another example of a judge defeating the laudatory purposes of the polling procedure is demonstrated by the following colloquy.

Court: Is this and was this your verdict?

Juror: Well, it wasn’t exactly, no.

Court: Did you sign this?

Juror: Yes, I did.

Court: Then it’s your verdict.“16

Instead of demanding the “correct” answer as the judge did in Kellogg, the judge here cut out the middleman and provided the answer himself.

EQUIVOCAL JUROR RESPONSES

If a juror affirms agreement with the verdict by answering “yes” to the court’s question, the judge simply moves on to the next juror. If a juror answers “no” indicating a lack of assent, the court has a choice between two fairly well settled courses of action. The judge may declare a mistrial or send the jurors back to continue their deliberations.17 A problem arises, however, when a juror does not answer yes or no but remains silent or gives a narrative answer that is equivocal or could be interpreted as equivocal. When a juror equivocates as to whether they assent to the verdict the judge has a duty to either (1) clarify the juror’s position, or (2) return the jury to the deliberation room.18

Determining whether a juror’s response is equivocal or unequivocal can be a difficult task. Take these juror’ responses to various forms of the standard polling question.

Juror: Reluctantly, yes your Honor. 19

Juror: Yes, barely.20

Juror: Um—I have to say, yes, I guess.21

Juror: Compromise.22

Juror: Crying. [After 30 seconds the juror still visibly shaken answered “yes”].23

In the first two cases, the courts held that the jurors’ answers, “Reluctantly, yes your honor,” and “Yes, barely,” expressed unequivocal assent to the verdicts. In the courts’ view neither the reluctance of a juror nor the fact that the evidence “barely” surpassed the reasonable doubt threshold turned an otherwise unequivocal “yes” into an equivocal response.24 On the other hand, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, determined that in answering “Um—I have to say yes, I guess,” the juror expressed “some hesitancy or ambivalence” requiring clarification by the judge or a return of the jury to deliberations.25 The Fourth District most likely was also

17 People v. Kellogg, 77 Ill. 2d at 528-29.

18 People v. Gunn, 237 Ill. App. 3d 508, 509-10 (3d Dist. 1992).

19 People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 461-63.

20 United States v. Lowe, 2 F.4th 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2021).

21 People v. Beasley, 384 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1044, 1049 (4th Dist. 2008).

22 People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 285-86 (1979).

23 People v. Epps, 197 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379-81 (5th Dist. 1990); also see People v. Rowry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150782-U, ¶¶ 48, 49, 100-06.

24 People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 462-63; United States v. Lowe, 2 F.4th at 658.

25 People v. Beasley, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 1049.

concerned with allowing guesswork to play any part in a criminal conviction. On the other hand, the First District found that it was not unreasonable for the trial judge to accept a juror’s response of “compromise” as a voluntary assent to the verdict without need for clarification.26 On appeal, the supreme court sidestepped the issue by assuming that further questioning was required by the juror’s response of “compromise” but that the trial judge satisfactorily met that responsibility.27 The real difficulty with a response like “compromise” is that it is not responsive to the judge’s question and so the judge needs to obtain a responsive answer and failing that return the jurors to the deliberation room.

PLAIN ERROR

No shortage of mistakes occur during polling. Since most of the errors go unnoticed or at least pass without objection, the doctrine of plain error governs whether counsel can successfully raise most polling missteps on

26 People v. Preston, 60 Ill. App. 3d 162, 172 (1st Dist. 1978).

27 People v. Preston, 76 Ill. 2d at 286.

appeal. As a general rule, a defendant forfeits the right to raise an error in a reviewing court unless the defendant makes a timely objection at trial and raises the issue in a posttrial motion. The reason for the forfeiture rule is no mystery. A timely objection gives the court a chance to correct the mistake and blocks counsel from knowingly permitting an error to occur with the hope of obtaining a reversal on appeal. The forfeiture rule applies to errors in the polling process.28 To avoid the harsh consequences of forfeiture principles, courts developed an exception to the rule—the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine permits review of “clear or obvious” errors not objected to in the trial court if one of two circumstances exist. First, the doctrine can be invoked when the evidence is so closely balanced that the guilty verdict may have resulted not from the evidence but rather from a “clear or obvious” mistake in the proceedings. Second, the exception to the forfeiture doctrine applies “when a clear or obvious error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

28 People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 15.

challenged the integrity of the judicial process.”29

So, can a polling mistake rise to the level of plain error? The supreme court addressed this question in People v. Jackson. The court began its analysis by determining whether the error in that case, polling only eleven of the twelve jurors, was a “clear or obvious error.” A finding that a clear or obvious error occurred is a requisite to moving on to determine if either prong of the plain error doctrine applies. The court had no problem finding a clear and obvious error since polling is “rooted deep in our common law,” to help ensure a unanimous verdict.30 With the “clear or obvious” hurdle met, the court moved on to consider (1) whether the evidence was so closely balanced that the error may have caused the guilty verdict, or alternatively, (2) whether the error threatened the integrity of the judicial process. The first prong of the plain error test, requiring a review of the weight evidence, was not raised by the defendant and thus not considered by the court.

While recognizing that prejudice is not necessary to succeed under the second prong of the plain error rule, the court confirmed that the error must not only be clear or obvious but also must constitute a “structural error” in the proceedings, that is, an error that “erode[s] the integrity of the judicial process and undermine[s] the fairness of the defendant’s trial.”31 The court found that the error

29 Id. at ¶¶ 17-24.

30 People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 34 (quoting People v. McGhee, 2012 IL App (1st) 093404, ¶ 15).

committed by the trial judge in polling only eleven jurors was a mere error in the trial process and did not undermine the structure or “framework within which the trial proceeds.”32 In finding the polling error nonstructural, the court relied on the fact that the right to a jury poll is not embodied in the federal constitution, state constitution, or any state statute.33 Further, the court observed that polling is not the only safeguard to ensure juror unanimity. Other protections include mandatory jury instructions that the verdict must be unanimous, the rule that each juror must sign the verdict form, and the process by which the signed verdict form is returned in court and read in the jury’s presence.34 Interestingly, Kellogg approvingly cites three Illinois appellate court decisions all refusing to apply plain error principles to polling mishaps. In one case the judge polled eleven of twelve jurors. In the second case the judge polled ten jurors and in the third case the judge failed to conduct a poll even though requested by defense counsel.35 Further pointing to the apparent frequency of unobjected to polling mistakes, the court discussed a series of out of state cases dealing with the same polling oversights.36

While Jackson makes it difficult to employ the plain error doctrine to reverse a conviction because of a polling error, it does not foreclose all challenges. First, the decision does not interfere with the opportunity to argue

32 People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 31.

33 Id. at ¶ 44.

34 Id. at ¶ 46.

the first prong of the plain error test where the evidence is so closely balanced that the “clear or obvious” error may have controlled the result. In addition, the court left room for challenging the conviction under the second prong even though the issue has been forfeited by a lack of a timely objection. The court was careful to emphasize that a polling error by itself does not justify reversing a conviction “[w]hen the record is otherwise devoid of any indication of a lack of juror unanimity.”37 The court added that a polling mistake “does not make it inevitable that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous, particularly when there is no indication in the record giving rise to such a concern.”38 So, defense counsel may succeed in arguing a structural defect if counsel points to evidence in the record in addition to the poll mishap that might suggest a lack of unanimity. That could include, among many other things, answers to questions during jury selection that demonstrate a juror’s lack of understanding or misunderstanding of fundamental trial principles, questions sent to the judge during deliberations, and closing arguments by the prosecutor that misstate, or could be interpreted as misstating, the burden of proof or other fundamental legal principles.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, the well-established polling framework does not preclude an array of missteps often overlooked by judges and lawyers. Maybe once the verdict is read the trial participants feel the trial is over and are less focused on the proceedings. Or maybe defense counsel is thinking about post-trial motions or thinking about speaking with the defendant or the defendant’s family about the adverse verdict. But that does not excuse failing to take to heart the life lesson learned by Diane Sawyer that “there is no substitute for paying attention.”39 Paying close attention may even result in a defense lawyer deciding not to request a poll. That was the lesson learned by a Washington State lawyer when the judge pronounced the jury’s not guilty verdict in court. The lawyer either misheard the judge’s words or was so used to losing that he requested that the jury be polled. The judge complied. When the first juror responded to the judge’s polling question by announcing that she did not agree with the not-guilty verdict, the jury was instructed to resume deliberations. The jury later returned with a guilty verdict confirmed, of course, by a second poll of the jurors.40

This Article highlights a few of the issues that

37 Id. At ¶ 47

38 Id

39 Wikiquote, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Diane_Sawyer (attributed to Diane Sawyer in Ellen Sue Stern, I Do: Meditations for Brides (New York: Dell, 1993), p. 9).

40 Martha Neil, After Trial Win, Defense Lawyer Polls Jury, Gets Guilty Verdict, ABA J., October 22, 2009, https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/after_trial_win_defense_lawyer_polls_ jury_gets_guilty_verdict.

lawyers and judges confront in the jury polling process. Fixed aspects of the process include an opportunity to request a poll, mandatory individual questioning of the jurors, and the need for unequivocal answers without help from an overbearing judge. In People v. Jackson, the Illinois Supreme Court defined the narrow reversal portal that the plain error doctrine creates for jury polling errors. Many of the polling oversights, like missing a juror or two during the polling, can be avoided by adopting Diane Sawyer’s maxim. This article describes only a few problematic aspects of polling. Judges and lawyers face numerous other polling issues. For instance, does a judge need to separately poll the jury on each verdict returned by a jury in multiple count cases?41 What position should the prosecutor and defense attorney take on continuing the poll after a juror gives an equivocally answer to the judge’s question. Should the judge continue with the poll until all jurors respond or stop the poll and return the jurors to deliberation at the first sign of trouble?42

41 See Fed. R. CRim. P. 31(d) (leaving I to the judge’s discretion whether to conduct a separate poll for each defendant and each count of the charging document).

42 See People v. Rowry, 2017 IL App (1st) 150782-U, ¶¶ 83-96; see also United States v. Banks, 982 F.3d 1098, 1103-04 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e have endorsed the “wise” approach of terminating the poll as soon as a lack of unanimity is revealed.”).

Board of Directors’ Meeting

January 19, 2022

Minutes of the regular meeting of the board of directors of the Lake County Bar Association held in the executive conference room

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Tara Devine President

Katharine Hatch

Daniel Hodgkinson

Vice President

Kevin Berrill Treasurer

Jeffrey Berman Secretary

Joseph Fusz

Hon. Jacquelyn Melius Director

Craig Mandell Director

Jeffrey O’Kelley Director

Sarah Raisch Director

Jeremy Harter Director

Judy Maldonado Director

Greg Weider Executive Director

of the Lake County Bar Association, 300-A Grand Avenue, Waukegan, Illinois, on Thursday, January 19, 2023

CALL TO ORDER

President Devine called the meeting to order at 12:10 p.m.

ROLL CALL

Roll call indicated a quorum was established, with the following individuals present: Tara Devine, President; Katharine Hatch, First Vice President; Kevin Berrill, Treasurer; Jeffrey Berman, Secretary; Joseph Fusz, Past President; Craig Mandell, Director; Jeremy Harter, Director; Judy Maldonado, Director; Hon. Jacquelyn Melius, Director; Sarah Raisch, Director; Greg Weider, Executive Director.

ACTION ITEMS

Consent Agenda Items

• December 15, 2022

Board of Directors Meeting Minutes

The Draft minutes

The

Meeting Minutes

from the December 15, 2022 meeting of the Board of Directors was included in the agenda packet. The Secretary noted one typo would be corrected. There were no other requests for additions, corrections, or changes to the draft minutes.

• October New Members

The New Members report for December was included in the agenda packet.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the Consent Agenda. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The Consent Agenda is approved.

• Treasurer’s Report

The December 2022 Financial Report and supporting materials were included in the Agenda packet. There are no material deviations or concerns vis-à-vis the budget. Discussion followed.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the Treasurer’s Report. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was de -

BY JEFFREY A. BERMAN SECRETARY

clared carried. The Treasurer’s Report is approved.

OLD BUSINESS

• Free CLE Update

President Devine made a presentation regarding scheduled Free CLE programs and the need for additional volunteer presenters to expand the scope of programming. Discussion followed.

NEW BUSINESS

• JSRC Update

President Devine provided an update regarding the status of the ongoing efforts of the Committee, and the appointment of new Committee members. Discussion followed.

• LCBA Spring Events and Deadlines

President Devine and Executive Director Weider made a presentation regarding the large number of upcoming events and deadlines for Spring, 2023. Discussion followed.

• Kid’s Korner Request

President Devine made a presentation regarding

the request from the 19th Judicial Circuit for the LCBA to assist in efforts to raise awareness of the free children’s’ waiting room at the courthouse by including information in LCBA publications. Discussion followed. A motion was made and seconded to approve

the request. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The request is approved.

OTHER MATTERS

• Committee Liaison Reports

Board members provided Committee updates.

• Executive Director Report Executive Director

Weider presented his Executive Director Report for January.

ADJOURNMENT

A motion was made to adjourn. Upon unanimous

voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The meeting concluded at 12:41 p.m. The next Board of Directors Meeting is scheduled to take place on Thursday, February 23, 2023.

Jeffrey A. Berman Secretary

LCBA 2023 FAMILY LAW SEMINAR

FEBRUARY

17-19

• SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

Words Have Power

Irecently returned from my first LCBA Family Law Travel Seminar. I had the opportunity to visit the historic City of Savannah with over 60 members of our family law committee. The event was a bit of an undertaking and I want to express my appreciation to some of the key players.

First and foremost, thank you to our family law committee chairs Craig Mandell and Michael Strauss. The post-COVID restart of this seminar was not without its difficulties. Craig and Michael made the necessary pivots and provided the energy and leadership to insure a highly successful seminar.

I would like to also recognize Lindsay Roalfs for all her efforts working with our presenters to make sure all the materials were received

and ready to go. Thank you to our twenty speakers who took the time to develop outstanding presentations and share their expertise with their colleagues. My sincerest gratitude to our seventeen seminar sponsors. Without their generous support the seminar would not have been possible. Thank you to all our conference attendees for taking time out of their busy schedules to travel and participate. A special thank you to LCBA Assistant Executive Director Jose Gonzalez for going the extra mile to make sure each attendee had the best possible experience.

One of the benefits of a travel seminar is the opportunity to visit another part of the country. Savannah Georgia is a beautiful city. I was able to carve out some time to enjoy Savannah’s out-

door spaces and historical landmarks. Late one afternoon I had the opportunity to tour the Owens-Thomas House & Slave Quarters. As I waited for my tour to begin, I noticed a sign on the wall of the welcome center. It stated: “words have power.” They express meanings, ideas, and relationships. They impact how we relate to the past and to one another. This sentiment was continuously conveyed by our tour guide Jordan, as she presented the history of the property, the families who lived there, and of the individuals who, through bondage, served there. Throughout the tour, Jordan used words that were empathic to those whose contributions and personal journeys had been marginalized by the language of history. As I walked down Broughton Street on my way back to the hotel, I reflected on my tour experience. Words truly do have power, not only in how we interpret

BY GREG WEIDER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

history, but also in how we navigate our day-to-day lives. Words can motivate or deflate. Words have the power to inspire or create fear. They can be a source of inspiration or a catalyst for anger and disenfranchisement. In many ways we are at a crossroads of how we communicate.

Technology has created vehicles for instant and often impersonal communication. In return, civility and accountability have suffered. We have allowed ourselves to become polarized. Lecturer and writer M.P. Hall is credited for saying “Words are potent weapons for all causes, good or bad.” For me the road forward is understanding the power of what we say and how we say it. It is a matter of embracing language as behavior and being accountable for our words. Dignity and civility are in everyone’s best interest. The choice for good or bad is our own, and history is watching.

Director’s Chair

Monthly

Committee Meetings

• RSVP to a meeting at www.lakebar.org.

• Meetings subject to change. Please check your weekly e-news, the on-line calendar at www.lakebar.org or call the LCBA Office @ (847) 244-3143.

• Please feel free to bring your lunch to the LCBA office for any noon meetings. Food and beverages at restaurants are purchased on a individual basis.

300 Grand Avenue, Suite A

Waukegan, IL 60085

Tel: 847-244-3143

Fax: 847-244-8259

MEMBER RECEPTION

MEMBER

Your $500 sponsorship includes:

• Recognition in advertising before the event and on signage at the event

•Reception from 4:30 – 6:30 p.m.

• Complimentary beer and wine. Upgrades available for additional fee.

LCBA Member Receptions will generally be held on the 4th Thursday of every month. Contact info@lakebar.org to add your name to a reception.