The Docket - January 2023

DOCKET THE

DECEMBER 5TH SWEARING-IN:

The Official Publication of the Lake County Bar Association • Vol. 30 No. 1 • January 2023

(left to right) Judge Michael Nerheim; Judge Jorge Ortiz; Judge Victoria Rossetti; Justice Christopher Kennedy; Chief Judge Mark Levitt; Judge Sharmila Manak; Judge John Joanem; Judge R. Christopher Ditton; Judge Reginald Mathews.

THE DOCKET • Vol. 30 • No. 1 • January 2023

BY AMBER DESSELLES

BY JEFFREY BERMAN, SECRETARY

A publication of the 300 Grand Avenue, Suite A Waukegan, Illinois 60085 (847) 244-3143 • Fax: (847) 244-8259 www.lakebar.org • info@lakebar.org

THE DOCKET EDITORIAL BOARD

Jeffrey A. Berman,Co-Editor

Hon. Charles D. Johnson,Co-Editor Jennifer C. Beeler

Kevin Berrill

Hon. Bolling W. Haxall

Hon. Daniel L. Jasica

Hon. Christopher M. Kennedy Jennifer Luczkowiak Kevin K. McCormick

Hon. Raymond J. McKoski

Shyama Parikh

Stephen J. Rice

Neal A. Simon

Hon. James K. Simonian Rebecca J. Whitcombe Alex Zagor

STAFF

Greg Weider Executive Director Jose Gonzalez Assistant Executive Director Nancy Rodriguez Receptionist

BY RUTH LOFTHOUSE

BY DAVID KERPEL

BY JUDGE JAMES SIMONIAN

BY GREG WEIDER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

TARA R. DEVINE, PRESIDENT

BY CHIEF JUDGE MARK L. LEVITT

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The Docket is the official publication of the Lake County Bar Association, 300 Grand Avenue, Suite A, Waukegan, Illinois 60085 (847) 2443143, and is published monthly. Subscriptions for non-members are $45.00 per year.

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Reflecting Back and Looking Forward

As I sit here today, I find it hard to believe that I am already at the halfway point of my LCBA Presidency’s term. I wanted to take a minute to reflect back on

the past six months and what I hope the next six months hold. I remember when I got sworn in—in early June—that a yearlong presidency seemed like such a long time. I remember being reminded by our Executive Director, Greg, as well as Joe Fusz, that to the contrary, the presidency is more similar to the movie franchise “Fast and Furious.” They were right.

This is our first full year after the heart of the Covid pandemic. The last six months have been filled with board meetings, committee meetings, member receptions, seminars, and social events. I can say with certainty what the past few months have demonstrated is that we are better together. We are stronger together, greater leaders together, and are more effective serving our legal community together. All of us together, make a real difference.

The

President’s Page

What is so amazing about the LCBA is that all of the different specialties and types of lawyers and judges get an opportunity to interact and learn from each other, and to have this real sense of a legal community right here in our own backyard, where many of us work and live. I carry a lot of pride when we host events that bring all different types of personalities together, which leads to all different types of ideas and brainstorming. I find that these events lead us to using our collective strengths to get things accomplished, move things forward, or learn from a mistake. Simply having conversations face-to-face—even sometimes having nothing to do with the law, a case, or a client—makes this community grow together. It is these communications and this type of engagement that create the connections

BY TARA R. DEVINE PRESIDENT

that are the foundation and fabric of the LCBA.

Although it is not an accomplishment of the LCBA per se, another noteworthy event worth reflecting on is the election of Justice Elizabeth Rochford to the Illinois Supreme Court, as well as Justice Christopher Kennedy to the Illinois Second District Appellate Court. These victories were definite 2022 highlights and are significant for our entire legal community. It is spectacular that two judges who are members of our LCBA were both elected to higher courts. Both Justice Rochford and Justice Kennedy are not just members of the LCBA, but rather they are active members of the Association. I was fortunate enough to receive an invitation to attend the swearing-in of Justice Rochford as the new Illinois Supreme Justice for the Second District. I felt

Tara Devine

President

Katharine Hatch

First Vice President

Danny Hodgkinson Second Vice President

Kevin Berrill Treasurer

Jeffrey Berman Secretary

Joseph Fusz

Immediate Past President

Hon. Jacquelyn Melius

Craig Mandell

Sarah Raisch

Jeffrey O’Kelly

Jeremy Harter

Judy Maldonado

really privileged to be there. It was an honor to be invited, and even more importantly, for the Lake County Bar Association to receive recognition when Judge Charles Smith, as the Master of Ceremonies, announced many friends, family, judges, and justices that were there. I was humbled to be there as the President of the LCBA. So many lawyers and judges from our amazing Association were present to bear witness to this momentous ceremony.

I am trying to think of another phrase besides “exciting times” for the LCBA,

but the past few months really have been such times. The election results increased that excitement, and the feelings that the members of our Lake County community are experiencing is because we all feel a connection. We are all part of a bigger organization that is trying to do great things dayin and day-out, together.

By the time you read this article, my New Year’s resolutions should already be in place (and hopefully not broken). I’m looking forward to the next six months, and hope that we are able to continue—and

hopefully even increase— the amount of interaction and engagement we provide to our members. I’m hopeful that we will continue to celebrate the successes of the Association and the Foundation and continue to recognize our judges who are retiring or have recently retired. Last, I look forward to continuing to celebrate the new positions of Justice Rochford, Justice Kennedy, and all of the new judges in our Courthouse.

In the next six months the LCBA is going to offer more brown bag CLE lunches. We have some great

seminars and events coming up, more judicial candidate reviews, committee meetings and member receptions, and the LCBF Battle of the Bands on February 23.

I hope that the next six months are as busy—dare I say, chaotic—as the past six months, and that there are even more opportunities for everyone to get together. As I write this article and think about how “I’m halfway there,” all I can do is finish the lines in my head to Bon Jovi’s “Living on a Prayer” . . . but I digress!

I look forward to the next 6 months, together.

HOFFMAN RETIREMENT

OCTOBER 2022

A State Rock, a State Snake, and Oh Yes: The Safe-T Act Comes to the Courthouse

Traditionally the new year brings with it feelings of hope, optimism, and commitment to achieving greater success in the year to come. For those of us in the legal profession it also brings with it a host of new laws to digest. A few of the more interesting laws merit attention here.

Beginning January 1, the Secretary of State will be required to offer a new assortment of professional sports teams’ license plates. Great news for fans of the Chicago Sky, the Chicago Fire, and the Chicago Red Stars. Fans of the old St. Louis Rams, however, will no longer have the option of obtaining that plate. (Was anyone really asking for one?)

The state’s Designation Act was amended making the Eastern Milksnake the official snake of the state of Illinois. They can be found across the state and will vi-

brate their tails rapidly, hiss, and strike when disturbed. Killing prey by constriction, the snake was named because people at one time incorrectly believed that they could milk cows. (Seriously?!?)

The Designation Act was also modified to include a new category. Effective January 1 the dolostone will be our official state rock. We all owe a great debt of gratitude to the students from Pleasantdale Middle School in Burr Ridge and Maplebrook Elementary School in Naperville for helping to eliminate the void we had for the lapidists in our community!

For the hunters, starting on January 1, they will be able to hunt deer using a single-shot centerfire rifle. In the past, only shotguns, handguns, and muzzleloading rifles were allowed.

For those who don’t know,

The

ChiefPageJudge’s

centerfire rifles only fire a single round of ammunition, which has primer in the center of the cartridge and not in the rim of the cartridge. (But you already knew that!)

But the biggest change in Illinois law—and the topic I’ve been avoiding for the last 312 words—is of course the effective date of the much discussed SAFE-T Act. The Act’s acronym stands for Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity Today and will certainly affect parts of our court’s day-to-day operations.

Our justice partners have been meeting for well over a year to prepare for court operations after the effective date of this law. Representatives from the State’s Attorney’s Office, The Law Office of the Public Defender, the private bar, the Sheriff’s Office, the Circuit Clerk, members of court administration, Lake

BY CHIEF JUDGE MARK L. LEVITT

County Board Members, and representatives from county administration have been working to gauge the potential impact on court operations, all while developing our day-to-day plan for implementation.

Most of the attention to the Act has centered on the abolition of cash bail. That change will in and of itself affect operations systemwide, altering how the Circuit Clerk, the Sheriff, the Court, and attorneys operate within the system. Increases in personnel will be essential in the offices of each stakeholder to facilitate continued operations.

The Act addresses issues that occur prior to arrest, at arrest, and post arrest for officers on the street. It separates all offenses into categories with rules dictating how and under what circumstances in-

Lake County Bar Association Holiday Party

December 2, 2022

Estate Planning – It’s Important

BY AMBER DESSELLES

Acommon understanding is that an estate plan is a compilation of legal documents created to predetermine the disposition of one’s real and personal property upon his or her death. A comprehensive estate plan will certainly establish a schedule for distribution of assets, but if done properly will accomplish much more.

A thorough estate plan will help establish guidance for an individual’s loved ones during incapacitation, help to avoid probate, and make sure a trusted fiduciary is appointed to make it all happen. The ideal estate plan ensures that a person’s intentions are fulfilled and that he or she can pass the maximum amount of assets to beneficiaries while incurring the least amount of taxes and costs. If a person dies without a formal plan, his or her assets will instead be disposed of according to state statutes. This article discusses some of the most commonly cited goals given by clients for initiating estate planning and the commonly used tools implemented to achieve these goals.

Some of the most often used estate planning tools include wills, trusts, transfer-on-death instruments, and powers of attorney. The decision on which tools to implement will vary based on the client and should be need oriented and goal based. A great way to

Amber L. Desselles is an Associate Attorney with Churchill, Quinn, Hamilton & Van Donselaar, Ltd. where she practices in Estate Planning, Probate, and Guardianship law. Amber practiced Corporate and Tax law prior to joining her current firm.

identify a client’s goals is to explore what initially brought them in to discuss the matter. A common reason clients give is that they have experienced a life-event that has challenged their mortality. They may have experienced a tragedy and have seen first-hand what can happen when someone dies without an estate plan, or they may have been diagnosed with a serious illness that has caused them to think critically about what their absence would look like for their loved ones. Determining what led them to contact an attorney for estate planning assistance is often an excellent way to initiate the conversation.

I. GOAL: AVOIDING PROBATE.

A goal frequently cited by clients is the desire to avoid probate. This can be accomplished several ways. The Illinois Probate Act states that formal probate is not required where the decedent owned no real property in his or her name individ-

ually and the personal property of the decedent did not exceed $100,000.1 Thus, the goal to avoid probate can be achieved by: (1) ensuring real property transfers by title or contract upon death; and (2) making sure the individual’s assets transfer automatically (either by contract or via trust instrument) so as to guarantee that the fair market value of the individual’s assets that need to be transferred after death total less than $100,000. So long as this is true, the decedent’s heirs can transfer assets via the use of a small estate affidavit.

1. Removing Real Property from the Probate Estate. There are several ways to remove real property from one’s probate estate, or otherwise ensure the property automatically transfers upon death. The first consideration can be found on the face of the deed itself. If the property is held in joint tenancy, or in the case of the primary marital residence “tenancy by the entirety,” the decedent’s interest will transfer to the surviving co-owner automatically upon death. A possible issue that can arise with this method of planning is that if the co-owners die simultaneously then the property is no longer protected from probate. Additional methods commonly implemented to accomplish this goal of avoiding probate are the trust and the transfer-on-death instrument.

a. Trust. The benefits of having a living trust are plentiful. Trusts can work to avoid probate, provide an instrument for tax planning, allow for the intentional distribution of assets, and provide for the immediate appointment of a fiduciary to take control of the trust assets and management upon the settlor’s death or incapacity. Transferring real property into a living trust avoids probate by removing the property from an individual’s estate. When the individual dies, the successor trustee named in the trust instrument has automatic authority to continue managing the property. The real property is not considered as having been owned by the decedent individually for probate purposes.

b. Transfer-on-Death Instrument. A Transfer-onDeath Instrument, or a “TODI,” does exactly what it sounds like: provides for the automatic transfer of real property upon the death of the individual owner. A TODI is similar to a deed and requires recordation with the local county recorder’s office. Additionally, the recipient of the real property must file an acceptance of transfer to complete the transaction after the owner-transferor’s death. Since the transfer is auto -

1 755 ILCS 5/25-1.

matic, the requirement of probate is unnecessary.

2. Removing Personal Property from the Estate. The methods used to ensure that the total fair market value of the individual’s personal property does not exceed $100,000 are similar to those used to remove real property from the individual’s estate. Many clients will transfer assets to intended beneficiaries through gifts during their lifetime. Others will transfer assets by a trust, joint tenancy, or a pay-on-death assignment.

a. Trust. Assets with significant value, such as valuable art collections, boats, airplanes, mobile homes, etc., should be assigned or retitled into the trust. The trust instrument can name specific beneficiaries for these valuable assets or can provide for the sale and distribution of proceeds to beneficiaries. It may make sense to transfer savings accounts, brokerage accounts, and even business interests into the trust as well. The goal is to ensure that the fair market value of the client’s estate outside of their trust totals less than $100,000 so that the use of a small estate affidavit is possible, and probate can be avoided.

b. Pay-on-Death. Another way to remove personal assets from an individual’s estate is by having named beneficiaries on accounts. Retirement accounts such as IRA’s and 401k’s, life insurance policies, and other accounts where there are named beneficiaries operate as third-party contracts and are distributed directly to the beneficiaries outside of the decedent’s individual estate. It is a good idea to ensure the account has contingent beneficiaries listed in the event the named beneficiaries predecease the owner, and the term “per stirpes2” should be included where possible. In some cases, it may make sense to name the individual’s living trust as beneficiary or contingent beneficiary.

II. GOAL: ENSURING INTENTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS.

Not all clients wish to avoid probate. In some cases, probate proceedings may be desirable to protect beneficiaries by ensuring potential creditors are barred from making unexpected demands past the statutory claims period ending 6 months after the publication initiated during the probate proceedings. Avoiding probate may not be necessary for all clients as they may not own real property and may have less than $100,000 in assets that

2 The term “per stirpes” is Latin for “by branch” and stipulates that a share of an estate shall be given to an individual or their heirs (down the branch of their family tree) if they predecease the testator.

If a person dies without a formal plan, his or her assets will instead be disposed of according to state statutes.

require transferring. In these cases, a simple will may be the best solution.

Every estate plan should include a will as the initial document. A will acts as a guide that lays out the testator’s intentions for the post-mortem distribution of assets. It also nominates an executor to act as a fiduciary in charge of ensuring the decedent’s final wishes are met, however, the document itself does not grant authority to the named executor to transfer assets. That authority comes from the court and is granted by the judge in response to a petition to open probate and appoint an executor. Once approved, the court will issue “Letters of Office” to the petitioner, which is the formal document of authority used to access accounts and sign transfer documents to move assets from the decedent’s estate to a third party.

III. GOAL: PLANNING FOR INCAPACITATION.

Incapacitation can happen to any of us and at any time. Often it comes unexpectedly, so every client should be prepared by having an established plan to guide their loved ones during unforeseen incapacitation. Tools commonly used for this purpose include powers of attorney3 and living trusts. Both trusts and powers of attorney provide the ability to name successor fiduciaries in the event the named individual is unable or otherwise unavailable to act.

1. Power of Attorney for Property. The power of attorney for property is a powerful legal document intended to grant broad authority to the individual’s agent to handle their financial affairs. The document goes into effect the day the individual signs it and terminates upon their death. The powers and discretions granted to the agent, defined in the power of attorney act, notably include the power and authority to effect real property transactions, access financial institution accounts and safety deposit boxes, and make decisions for the individual regarding claims and litigation, to name a few. The document also nominates a named individual (the acting agent at the time) to act as a guardian should the

3 Powers of Attorney are governed under the Illinois Power of Attorney Act, 755 ILCS 45.

individual be adjudicated disabled with the appointment of a guardian of their estate being necessary.

2. Power of Attorney for Healthcare. Like the property power of attorney, the healthcare power of attorney also becomes effective upon execution and terminates upon death. There are a few purposes for which the document survives the decedent, including the power to authorize anatomical gifts and an autopsy, as well as authorization for the disposition of remains. The named agent also has decision-making authority regarding life-sustaining treatment and end-of-life care. The document also nominates a named individual (the acting agent at the time) to act as a guardian should the individual be adjudicated disabled with the appointment of a guardian of their person being necessary.

3. Living Trust. While the power of attorney for property allows the named agent to access accounts held individually, only the acting trustee can access accounts held in the trust. A well-drafted trust instrument provides a procedure for the appointment of a successor trustee during the settlor’s incapacitation. Upon the appointment, the successor trustee will have immediate access to the trust assets and the ability to manage the individual’s affairs using trust assets during their incapacitation.

III. GOAL: ENSURING ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS: PASSWORDS, KEYS, CRYPTO ACCOUNTS.

Digital assets include more than just electronic currencies. The term encompasses an array of electronic assets such as social media accounts, emails, online financial account information, digital photographs, and more. The Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act4 provides authority to fiduciaries to access and manage these electronic assets, but the language authorizing access must be included in the documents themselves. The documents should include specific language authorizing the fiduciary to exercise authority regarding all digital assets and accounts. It is important to include the language in wills, trusts, and property power of attorneys.

An estate plan is important for every person to have, not just to ensure their final wishes are met but to provide for their incapacitation as well. Having a thorough, well-organized, and intentional plan in place is something everyone can use and can bring peace of mind to clients who have been putting off the task for any number of reasons. Encourage your clients to plan ahead and seek out the advice of an experienced estate planning attorney; they will thank you once it’s done!

The Community Caretaking Doctrine and a Warrantless Search of a Home

BY RUTH LOFTHOUSE

The question of whether the community caretaking doctrine provides a basis for a warrantless search of a home was before the United States Supreme Court in Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596 (2021), and before the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037. This article will address this new precedent as it pertains to a warrantless search of a home.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 Not all government searches are unreasonable however, and the courts have recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, such as “reasonable” searches pursuant to consent, to provide emergency aid, or when exigent circumstances exist.

THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE

An additional exception applies to the search of a vehicle under the “community caretaking doctrine,” first recognized by the United States Su-

1 U.S. Const. amend. IV Illinois adopted this Amendment. See Ill. Const. art. I, § 6. “This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in ‘limited lockstep’ with its federal counterpart.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 15.

Ruth Lofthouse is an Assistant State’s Attorney assigned to the General Felony division. She has practiced criminal law for four years and prior to that she practiced family law for 12 years.

preme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski 2 The Supreme Court in Cady upheld a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle by a local officer after the vehicle had been towed due to an accident (the officer found a revolver in the car’s trunk). The Court reasoned that state and local police officers are often tasked with “community caretaking functions,” relating to the regulation of vehicles and traffic that are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” such as the removal of a disabled vehicle from a public highway. In those instances, the search of a vehicle is reasonable and is standard and necessary police procedure out of concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if, for example, “an intruder removed a firearm or other

2 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).

dangerous weapon from the vehicle.”3 Any “plain view” evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime recovered during that search would not be barred under the Fourth Amendment.4 Thus, Cady established the community caretaking doctrine, sometimes referred to as an inventory search.

CANIGLIA V. STROM

Fifty years later, the community caretaking doctrine was again before the United States Supreme Court in Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1601 (2021). This time however, the issue was whether the community caretaking doctrine applied to a search of a home in addition to the search of a vehicle. The United States Supreme Court unanimously held in Caniglia that it does not and refused to extend the doctrine.

In Caniglia, Edward Caniglia and his wife were in an argument when Caniglia retrieved a handgun from the bedroom, put it on the dining room table, and asked his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.” The wife left for the night. The following morning, the wife asked the police to perform a welfare check after she could not reach her husband and was concerned for his safety. When they arrived, the police determined that Caniglia was a danger to himself and asked that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Caniglia voluntarily agreed to do so and left in an ambulance. After he was gone, the officers entered the home and seized Caniglia’s two guns without consent.

Caniglia argued that the officers unconstitutionally seized his guns. The district court disagreed and ruled that that the officers lawfully entered the home without a warrant under the community caretaking doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed and Caniglia appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court and held that the police officer’s seizure of Caniglia’s guns from his home violated his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court rejected

3 Id. at 441–442.

4 Id. at 442.

the First Circuit’s rationale that the officers were acting in their role as community caretakers, for which no warrant was required. The U.S. Supreme Court stated,

“True, Cady also involved a warrantless search for a firearm. But the location of that search was an impounded vehicle - not a home - a constitutional difference’ that the [Cady] opinion repeatedly stressed… this recognition that police officers perform many civic tasks in modern society was just that - a recognition that these tasks exist, and not an open-ended license to perform them anywhere.”5

Once again, the Court emphasized the highest Fourth Amendment protection afforded to homes.

The U.S. Supreme Court criticized the district court’s failure “to consider whether anyone had consented to the government’s actions; whether these actions were justified by ‘exigent circumstances,’ or whether any state law permitted this kind of mental-health intervention.”6

The opinion noted that the government did not argue exigency, and forfeited this point, but suggested that Caniglia’s suicidal ideations coupled with the presence of a firearm may have presented exigent circumstances under Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), wherein a warrant is not required by an officer to enter a home in situations where there was a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”7 Justice Cavanaugh explained, “the exigent circumstances doctrine allows officers to enter a home without a warrant “to fight a fire and investigate its cause; to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon or prevent a suspect’s escape; to address a threat to the safety of law enforcement officers or the general public; to render emergency assis5 Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599-1600 (2021). 6 Id. at 1599. 7 Id. Note that Justice Sotomayor stated during oral argument that there were not exigent circumstances because Caniglia had left in the ambulance thereby removing the threat of any immediate harm to himself or others.

The Justices also raised the question of whether the search would have been allowed under the numerous states’ red-flag laws and the constitutionality of those laws. In Illinois, we have such a red-flag law – The Firearms Restraining Order Act, Section 430 ILCS 67/1 et seq.

tance to an injured occupant; or to protect an occupant who is threatened with serious injury.”8

The Justices also raised the question of whether the search would have been allowed under the numerous states’ red-flag laws and the constitutionality of those laws. In Illinois, we have such a red-flag law – The Firearms Restraining Order Act, 430 ILCS 67/1, et. seq. The Act permits a family member or law enforcement officer to petition for the issuance of an emergency order and search warrant for the seizure of a respondent’s firearms based on an affidavit establishing “probable cause to believe that the respondent poses an immediate and present danger of causing personal injury to himself, herself, or another by having in his or her custody or control, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm[.]”9 The search warrant may “direct the law enforcement agency to search the respondent’s residence and other places where the court finds there is probable cause to believe he or she is likely to possess the firearms.”10 Thus, in Illinois, there is an avenue for law enforcement to obtain a search warrant for the seizure of firearms out of concern for the immediate safety of an individual and those in contact with the individual, even where there is no criminal investigatory purpose, exigency or need for emergency aid.

PEOPLE V. ALJOHANI

Our Illinois Supreme Court also had the community caretaking doctrine before it as it concerned a warrantless search of a home in People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037. In that case, there was a 911 call of a violent fight in the defendant’s apartment. The police went to the residence and spoke to the defendant who stated that the victim was sleeping. The police left briefly to confirm the 911 report. When the police returned the defendant was not there. The defendant’s gate, garage door and door to the residence were open. The police entered the home

8 Id. In Illinois, the exigency exception is different from the emergency aid exception. The exigency exception requires probable cause and concerns the search for crime-related evidence (to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, hot pursuit of a fleeing felon) and is analyzed separately from the emergency aid exception (to fight a fire, to render emergency aid or protection). See People v. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016 and People v. Whimbley, 314 Ill. App. 3d 18 (1st Dist. 2002).

9 430 ILCS 67/35.

10 Id.

The Chief Judge’s Page continued from page 4

dividuals can be “detained.” The Act accomplishes this by separating offenses into groups of “detainable” and “non-detainable” offenses. This will have an immediate impact on court operations.

Effective January 1, we will have a new First Appearance Courtroom, which will operate in T-020. Cases heard in this courtroom will have conditions of pretrial release determined where the offenses are non-detainable, or for those detainable offenses where

without a warrant, searched the rooms and found the victim lying dead. The defendant was found and arrested. The defendant moved to suppress the warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court upheld the warrantless search under the community caretaking doctrine. The case came before the Illinois Supreme Court, which found that the community caretaking doc trine could not apply based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Caniglia, but nonetheless affirmed the search under the emergency aid exception.11 The Illinois Supreme Court delineated a two-part test in Illinois to determine whether the emergency aid exception applies:

“First, the police must have ‘reasonable grounds’ to believe there is an emergency at hand; and sec ond, the police must have some reasonable basis, ‘approximating probable cause,’ associating the emergency with the area to be searched or entered. [Citation.] The reasonableness of the officers’ beliefs as to the existence of an emergency is deter mined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry. [Citation.] The United States Supreme Court has held that emergency situations include instances when someone may be injured or threatened with injury.”12

Based on Caniglia and Aljohani, the community caretaking doctrine does not create a stand-alone doctrine to justify warrantless searches and seizures in the home. The Supreme Courts of the United States and Illinois stressed that searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different and emphasized the importance of a fact-drive analysis to determine which, if any, exception to the warrant requirement applies to a search. Further, neither opinion did anything to change the established emergency-aid warrant exception for injury or threats of injury, despite the Courts refusal to extend the community caretaking doctrine to a home. Lastly, the Supreme Courts reminded the legal community to be thorough and familiar with the warrant exceptions and the importance of their designations when presenting facts and argument as to any exception(s) that apply.

11 People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037

12 Id., citing People v. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016.

the state has elected not to seek detention. Where the state seeks detention, and after the filing of a petition for detention, cases will be transferred to T-121 for a detention hearing. Matters will thereafter be sent to the assigned courtroom for all future proceedings. This

is, and will continue to be, a work in progress. I will work to provide updates as necessary. I want to express my deep appreciation to all those who have worked so hard to make this transition as seamless as possible.

I wish you all a healthy and happy new year!

Andrew Kelleher with the winners

of the 2022

LCBA

Golf Outing: Donald Morrison, James

Bertucci,

Robert Holland

How it all started…

BY DAVID KERPEL

Why would a perfectly successful attorney want to open up a dog sanctuary? For anyone who has ever owned a dog, the answer is a simple one: dogs are one of the world’s kindest, most compassionate, and loyal animals on Planet Earth.

My connection to dogs started when I was a youth. Always wanting to own a dog but never able to due to my family’s allergies, I was content to approach all dogs and ask their owners if I could pet theirs. And I did! Every dog I came across, I wanted to pet; and so, my passion for dogs was born.

Growing up, I often traveled with my family to thirdworld countries. During these visits, I would observe dogs on the streets- many of them foraging for food in discarded garbage, doing everything they can just to survive. I often raised money or volunteered for dog shelters; but this philanthropy was never enough to satisfy my desire to help all dogs in need.

Why should any dog in a shelter spend the rest of their lives in a 4x6 cage because no one wants to adopt them; or worse, be euthanized simply because there is no room in a shelter? The answer is they shouldn’t; and I wanted to do something about it. I decided many years ago that when I retired, I would open up a dog sanctuary. Why a sanctuary, versus a dog shelter that fosters and adopts out their dogs? Because a sanctuary allows me to rescue dogs who others might not deem “adoptable” based on how they look, how old they are, or what kind of medical ailments they suffer from. It is these dogs who spend their entire lives in a confined space. I thought, “there has to be a better alternative!”

Well, in November, 2021, I visited my first animal sanctuary in Texas. At this sanctuary, I saw first-hand how

dogs could spend their days running around in large, open enclosures, playing and socializing with other dogs, and enjoying the day laying out under the sun. That is when I decided I couldn’t wait until I retired to make my vision become a reality. Two months later, in January, 2022, after returning from a vacation where my daughter and I resorted to buying dog food just to feed starving dogs trying to survive on the street, I decided I could wait no longer.

In early January, 2022, my search for land for the Sanctuary began. I then started recruiting a team of acquaintances who I knew had a passion and a purpose for rescuing dogs. They shared my vision, and I was lucky to know them. Once we created a Board and incorporated the Furever Home Dog Sanctuary, we then went about making our mission a reality.

And here is where you come in. We are a 501(c)(3) nonprofit, and are currently 100% volunteer operated. That means that we depend on others like you—others who share our vision—to donate funds where every penny will allow us to pay for everything from dog structures, supplies, medications, food, toys and all the little extras that go into making this their furever home. Please find it in your heart to help us out, and you can feel good about providing a better life for dogs all over the country, and to help them feel Forever Safe. Forever Loved. Forever Home.

David Kerpel practices law at david@kerpellaw.com. More information about the dog sanctuary is at https:// fureverhomedogsanctuary.org.

Does Cannabis Still Matter as Probable Cause?

BY JUDGE JAMES SIMONIAN

Arecent appellate ruling that would have been unthinkable a few years ago proves something entirely expected: the ever-changing legal status of small amounts of cannabis affects more than just its possession.

In 2020, Illinois legalized the possession of small amounts of cannabis, or marijuana, in most circumstances. Now, there are 19 other states including Washington, D.C. that have essentially legalized recreational marijuana use within limits.

Most earlier Illinois precedent comes from cases decided at a time when cannabis was illegal and criminal. A few years ago, cases confronted issues posed by the newer statute which made small amounts of cannabis illegal but decriminalized. That important distinction changed little in search-and-seizure cases. Now that small amounts of cannabis are essentially legalized, however, even more precedent may change.

The recent appellate court case of People v. Stribling, 1 affirmed a trial

1 2022 IL App (3d) 210098. Since this was written, another vehicle search based upon “burnt cannabis” was suppressed and affirmed by the same appellate district. See People v. Redmond, 2022 IL App (3d) 210524.

court order suppressing the fruits of a vehicle search based upon the smell of burnt cannabis, a search which not long ago would have been upheld easily. The court reasoned that since cannabis is now legal in small quantities in most circumstances, the analysis must change because its precedent was based on pre-legalization fact patterns and law.2

Judge James Simonian has been an associate judge in Lake County since 2010 and is currently assigned to the Misdemeanor/ Traffic Division. In addition to private practice, he served in the Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office as chief of the Drug Prosecutions Division. He is also a member of the Docket Editorial Board.

Is this search based upon the smell of burnt cannabis something that obviously deserves another look following cannabis legalization? Is it an interesting ruling of one appellate district on an issue that has not been ruled upon by the Illinois Supreme Court since the legalization of small amounts of cannabis? Is it a fact-based inquiry which must be analyzed by the circumstances and the precedent in effect when made? “Yes” to all of the above so far, since decades of appellate precedent have

2 See id., ¶ 15.

taught us that small changes of fact and law can have a big impact in Fourth Amendment interpretation.

This article will survey the law on vehicle searches based on the smell of cannabis prior to legalization and look at the possibility of significant changes now that cannabis is legal in small quantities under most circumstances.

CANNABIS LAW GENERALLY

The Stribling opinion took a deep dive into the historical context of cannabis statutes in Illinois, some of which this article will utilize.

Our state first made cannabis illegal in 1931, with the modern Cannabis Control Act3 passed in 1978 providing for the structure of today’s laws on cannabis possession and delivery/ intent to deliver. In 2014, the State of Illinois legalized the possession of cannabis for people to whom the State had granted a license to use cannabis for medical purposes. In 2016, Illinois decriminalized the possession of less than 10 grams of cannabis, which kept it still illegal but a “civil law violation.”

Then, in 2020, Illinois legalized small “user amount” possessions of cannabis under most circumstances for Illinois residents 21 and older by amending the Cannabis Control Act to include exceptions for Personal Use of Cannabis, 410 ILCS 705/10-5 and a possession limit (30 grams generally), 410 ILCS 705/10-10. There are also limitations involving the prohibition of cannabis within schools, correctional facilities, day care and social service care facilities, among other places. See 410 ILCS 705/10-35, which also prohibits the use of cannabis in a public place or, relevant to the topic of this article, a motor vehicle.

VEHICLE SEARCHES BASED ON SMELL OF CANNABIS

Prior to 1985, the odor of cannabis alone had yet to be held sufficient by the Illinois Supreme Court as a basis to search a vehicle. But it was getting closer. For example, in 1970, the Second District reviewed a search which started with a vehicle already stopped and then investigated for petty traffic violations.4 While there was more to the search in Erb than just the “plain smell” of cannabis in a vehicle, the appellate court still believed that was enough.

3 See 720 ILCS 550/1, et seq

4 See People v. Erb, 128 Ill.App.2d 128 (2d Dist. 1970). Truth is stranger than fiction, and precedent involving the smell of cannabis really comes from a defendant named “Erb.”

“Testimony of the ‘odor of marijuana emitting from the vehicle and from all of the persons,’ justified the further belief that more than a traffic violation was involved.

Where the smell of contraband is established to the satisfaction of the court, it is a sufficient basis under proper circumstances for officers to believe that a crime is being committed in their presence.”5 Interestingly, the Erb court cited quite a bit of national precedent but few cases from Illinois, since most of the Illinois precedent was cited by the defendants as support for their effort to throw out the search.

Two other appellate courts followed Erb to uphold a truck search based upon the smell of cannabis.6 Yet the Third District reached the opposite conclusion in other cases.7 It rejected the uncorroborated testimony of law enforcement in the Argenian decision and reasoned “[t]o hold otherwise would be to give an unlimited license to any police officer to search and all vehicles merely on his uncorroborated testimony that he was an expert marijuana sniffer and that he smelled marijuana in the car.”8

The Illinois Supreme Court in 1985 resolved the conflict within the appellate courts on the issue in People v. Stout 9 It found that the odor of cannabis alone may provide sufficient basis to search a vehicle since all possession of cannabis was illegal. This holding has never been overturned by the high court.

In Stout, the arresting officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a petty traffic violation and testified that he detected the odor of “burning cannabis.” A subsequent search revealed cocaine among other drugs. The question was whether the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant based solely upon the smell of “burning cannabis.”

The Supreme Court began its analysis in Stout that probable cause must be determined from the standpoint of the arresting officer, with his skill and knowledge, and not that of the ordinary citizen. The Court also pointed out that vehicles, by their nature, are mobile and operated in plain view, thus distinct constitutionally from homes.10

5 Erb, 128 Ill.App.2d at 132.

6 See People v. Laird, 11 App.Dist.3d 414 (5th Dist. 1973) and People v. Loe, 16 Ill.App.3d 291 (3rd Dist. 1973).

7 See People v. Argenian, 97 Ill.App.3d 592 (3rd Dist. 1981) and People v. Wombacher, 104 Ill.App.3d 812 (3rd Dist. 1982

8 Argenian, 97 Ill.App.3d at 594.

9 People v. Stout, 106 Ill.2d 77 (1985).

10 Id. at 87.

Decades of appellate precedent have taught us that small changes of fact and law can have a big impact in Fourth Amendment interpretation.

The Supreme Court also addressed the important is sue of detection of “burnt,” “burning” or “fresh” cannabis by the witness, usually a police officer. It held there is no quantifiable qualification which is a prerequisite to such detection. ‘[T]his court will not bite at the defendant’s lure to define the exact number of training hours or employment years necessary to render an officer’s belief reliable. As stated earlier, what constitutes probable cause for searches and seizures must be determined from the standpoint of the officer, with his skill and knowledge being taken into account, and the subsequent credibility determinations must be made by the trial court.” Stout, the Court ruled for the first time in Illinois that a qualified arresting officer does not need corroboration to search a vehicle based upon the probable cause of “burn ing” cannabis.

The Second District appellate court relied on in its decision to uphold a search involving a patrolman’s detection of “fresh cannabis” within a vehicle in Smith 12 As in Stout, the Smith court summarized, “there was no corroboration of the officer’s olfactory evidence,” unbothered by the fear expressed by the now-overruled Third District in Argenian. The Second District then held fresh cannabis was certainly indicative of a crime

11 Id. (emphasis in original).

12 People v. Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 120307.

13 Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 120307, at ¶ 14.

Hill urged the Illinois Supreme Court to recognize that since cannabis use was no longer a criminal activity, it was no longer contraband, and therefore insufficient to establish probable cause. Instead, Hill encouraged the Court to treat cannabis like alcohol, tobacco and guns. The Court addressed each of those alternatives.

Regarding the decriminalization of cannabis, Hill argued that the status of cannabis as contraband was changed by reducing its penalty for small amounts to a civil violation, while the State argued that it remains contraband. The Hill decision upheld the search because in 2017 any amount of cannabis was illegal, even if it had been decriminalized. The Hill Court harkened back nearly a century to the United States Supreme Court decision in Carroll v. United States, 21 which recognized the “automobile exception” to the search requirement, at a time when cars were about as new as i-phones are now. The offense addressed in Carroll, the illegal transportation of liquor possessed during Prohibition, was a federal misdemeanor punishable by fine only for the first offense. The Carroll Court rejected the argument that the character of the offense negated the necessity of arrest, since the contraband liquor had to be found and seized. 22 Similarly, the Court in Hill found that nobody possesses a legitimate privacy interest in an item which is prohibited.23 For the same reason, the Court thus found that Hill’s argument regarding the decriminalization of small amount possession of cannabis was “fatally flawed.”24

The Court then turned to Hill’s argument that since medical users are capable of legally possessing cannabis, the officers needed more facts to suggest the cannabis was illegally owned or connected to another criminal activity before probable cause existed. The Court disagreed, reasoning that “such users must possess and use cannabis in accordance with the Act,”25 under the statute, no driver or passenger may possess medical cannabis in something other than a sealed, odor proof, and child-resistant medical cannabis container, and a violation of that provision is a Class A misdemeanor.26

The Supreme Court further concluded in Hill that its holding comported with its treatment of alcohol. 27 Alcohol, it points out, is lawful under some circumstances but remains unlawful under others, like possession by those under 21, or in the passenger area of a vehicle in other than its original, unopened container.28

21 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

22 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154.

23 Hill, 2020 IL 124595, at ¶ 29.

24 Id. at ¶ 31.

25 Id. at ¶¶ 32-34.

26 Id. at ¶ 34; see 625 ILCS 5/11-502.1 (b) and (c).

27 Id. at ¶ 36. One should note that the statutes regulating possession of medical cannabis and “adult use” cannabis within a vehicle are found next to the statute on Transportation or Possession of Alcohol of Alcoholic Liquor in a motor vehicle.

See 625 ILCS 5/11-502, 502.1 and 502.15, which are sequential statutes.

28 Hill, 2020 IL 124595, at ¶ 36.

THE STRIBLING CASE ITSELF

Then came legalization. As of 2020, the possession of a small amount of cannabis is no longer unlawful generally. And that change led to the critical conclusion in Stribling: “We hold that the smell of the burnt cannabis, without any corroborating factors, is not enough to establish probable cause to search the vehicle, and the court did not err in granting the motion to suppress. This finding comports with the supreme court’s holding in Hill and its treatment of the analogous situation regarding alcohol. … Thus, the supreme court’s holding in Stout is no longer applicable to post-legalization fact patterns.”29

Obviously, in light of legalization and the decision in Stribling, the legal landscape for a vehicle search based upon the smell of cannabis alone may have changed. But it is possible the analysis has not changed entirely. In Stribling, the facts of the 2020 stop are uncontroverted. The police officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle based on a violation of ordinary non-jailable traffic laws. The officer smelled a strong odor of burnt cannabis from inside the vehicle. The defendant/driver told the officer that someone had smoked inside the vehicle “a long time ago.” Based on these observations, the officer searched the vehicle and found an illegal weapon.30 The appellate court held that the smell of burnt cannabis coupled with the defendant/driver’s statement that “someone” smoked in the vehicle “a long time ago” was not enough to conclude there was a crime being committed in the officer’s presence, and thus there was no probable cause to search the vehicle.31

Importantly, the precise fact pattern presented in Stribling is critical to the Court’s decision. The appellate court found it decisive that it was legal to possess cannabis in small amounts, and that there was no reason to believe the driver was impaired, or that anyone in the car was currently smoking cannabis; there was no cannabis paraphernalia observed, and none of the vehicle occupants made any furtive movements.32 From the specific facts presented, the Court concluded “there was no evidence that would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity afoot.”33 It logically follows that the analysis, and outcome, easily could change based on different circumstances in a future case.

In a quizzical observation, the Court also appeared to find relevant that it is legal to have smoked cannabis and then drive as long as the concentration in the driver’s blood or urine did not pass the threshold amount.34 One might wonder why the Court found that technically correct observation relevant to its discussion within this search-and-seizure context, particularly since it then

29 Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, at ¶ 29.

30 Id. at ¶ 4.

31 Id. at ¶ 28. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id.

Cost

proceeded to knock down the straw man, stating “the evidence presented does not show that the officer had any concerns with the defendant’s blood concentration or any impaired driving.”35 If the officer had noticed reasonable grounds of impairment by cannabis in addition to the smell of cannabis, it is possible the detainment and search would be constitutionally valid, regardless of the driver’s eventual guilt or innocence of the DUI (Cannabis) charge.

The opinion also failed to address the fact that it remains illegal to possess cannabis in a motor vehicle under most conditions.36 That is legally relevant to a Fourth Amendment analysis since, if the trier of fact believed the officer smelled fresh cannabis within the vehicle, that may be probable cause for the search, since possession of cannabis today still must be in an odor-proof container. Similar to a broken seal of a bottle of liquor, the amount of alcohol/cannabis may be legal, but the method of transportation within a vehicle would be illegal and allow for the search.

Still, the stipulated facts of Stribling were for “burnt,” i.e, already smoked and not fresh or burning, cannabis. So, is the lesson of Stribling then that the aroma of “burnt” cannabis is irrelevant but fresh cannabis possibly may be relevant? It is hard to reconcile this opinion and the statute criminalizing possession of cannabis in a vehicle without concluding that the Stribling court believes

35 Id.

36 See Possession of Cannabis in Motor Vehicle, 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15, which is a Class A misdemeanor.

the exception allowing for vehicle searches upon smell of cannabis hinges upon the distinction between “burnt” and “fresh” cannabis.

Moreover, the holding of Stribling might be reexamined. The Stribling court asserted that it applied Hill and its reasoning, but also concluded that “the supreme court’s holding in Stout is no longer applicable to post-legalization fact patterns.”37 In fact, the officer in Hill detected “raw” cannabis. But Stout involved detection of “burning” cannabis, which was held to justify the search, and it is still illegal to smoke cannabis within a vehicle.38 So does Stout really not apply to post-legalization fact patterns?

Stribling, of course, is just one opinion from one appellate panel under one set of factual circumstances. Once additional courts, including the Illinois Supreme Court, weigh in, we may get a more definitive answer. When a state Supreme Court in a state that has legalized recreational cannabis use decides a case like this, moreover, it is entirely possible that the United States Supreme Court will weigh in. Until then, certainly, we will likely see a number of decisions where small changes in the operative facts yield a wide variety of results.

37 Stribling, 2022 IL App (3d) 210098, at ¶ 29.

38 Even the law that limited penalties on simple possession reiterated that same law keeps it illegal to smoke cannabis within a vehicle: 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a) (3) (D).

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Board of Directors’ Meeting

November 15, 2022

Minutes of the regular meeting of the Board of Directors of the Lake County Bar Association held via zoom video conference, on Tues -

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Tara Devine President

Katharine Hatch

First Vice President

Daniel Hodgkinson Second Vice President

Kevin Berrill Treasurer

Jeffrey Berman Secretary Joseph Fusz Past President

Hon. Jacquelyn Melius Director

Craig Mandell Director

Jeffrey O’Kelley Director

Sarah Raisch Director

Jeremy Harter Director

Judy Maldonado Director

Greg Weider Executive Director

day, November 15, 2022

CALL TO ORDER

President Devine called the meeting to order at 10:44 a.m.

ROLL CALL

Roll call indicated a quorum was established, with the following individuals present on Zoom: Tara Devine, President; Katharine Hatch, First Vice President; Kevin Berrill, Treasurer; Craig Mandell, Director; Jeremy Harter, Director; Judy Maldonado, Director; Hon. Jacquelyn Melius, Director; Jeffrey O’Kelley, Director; Sarah Raisch, Director; Greg Weider, Executive Director.

ACTION ITEMS

Consent Agenda Items

• October 20, 2022 Board of Directors Meeting Minutes

The Draft minutes from the October 20, 2022 meeting of the Board of Directors was included

The

Meeting Minutes

in the agenda packet. There were no requests for additions, corrections, or changes to the draft minutes.

• November 2, 2022 Special Board of Directors Meeting Minutes

The Draft minutes from the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors held on November 2, 2022 was included in the agenda packet. There were no requests for additions, corrections, or changes to the draft minutes.

• October New Members

The New Members report for September was included in the agenda packet. A motion was made and seconded to approve the Consent Agenda. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The Consent Agenda is approved.

Treasurer’s Report

The October 2022 Financial Report and supporting materials were included in the Agenda packet. Discussion fol-

BY JEFFREY A. BERMAN SECRETARY

lowed. In sum, we are still tracking the budget.

A motion was made and seconded to approve the Treasurer’s Report. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The Treasurer’s Report is approved.

OLD BUSINESS Harassment Training Executive Director

Weider and President Devine made a presentation regarding the Anti-Harassment Training required for all members of the LCBA Board. Discussion followed.

LCBA Holiday Party

President Devine made a presentation regarding the upcoming Holiday Party on December 2nd. Discussion followed.

NEW BUSINESS Past Due Membership Calls Executive Director

Weider and President Devine made a presentation regarding on-going efforts by the Executive Board to

call members who have not yet paid to renew their membership for the current year. Discussion followed.

OTHER MATTERS

Committee Liaison Reports Board members provided Committee updates.

Executive Director Report

Executive Director Weider presented his Executive Director Report for October, including updates on the status of the LCBA Employee Handbook.

ADJOURNMENT

A motion was made to adjourn. Upon unanimous voice vote, the motion was declared carried. The meeting concluded at 11:11 a.m. The next Board of Directors Meeting is scheduled to take place on Thursday, December 15, 2022.

JUDGES’ SWEARING IN DECEMBER 5, 2022

What’s in it for me?

Irecently met with a potential LCBA member. We had a pleasant conversation about the legal profession in Lake County and the new normal of post pandemic America.

The 2 2 2 2

Calendar of Events

Community Outreach & Diversity Committee Meeting

January 3, 2023

12:15 PM Zoom

Free Legal Advice Clinic 1/17/2023

5:00 PM - 7:00 PM

Waukegan Public Library

Family Law Committee Meeting January 18, 2023

12:00 PM Zoom

Local Government Committee Meeting January 24, 2023

12:15 PM Zoom

2023 Annual Family Law Conference

February 17 - 19, 2023 Savannah, GA

Battle of LCBA Bands

February 23, 2023 6-9 PM 28 Mile Highwood, IL

We discussed the benefits of active involvement in the bar association and the legal educational opportunities available through membership. As enjoyable as the conversation was, I could not shake the “what’s in it for me” look on his face. In all fairness it is a justifiable question. The economic pressures people face today require all to consider the best use of their resources. Career and family demands on our time make it challenging to put more on our plates.

Later that evening, I stumbled across a quote from a speech Dr. Martin Luther King gave in 1957 in Montgomery, Alabama. He said, “Life’s most persistent question is what are you doing for others?” That gave me pause. My days are often busy responding to questions and (occasionally) complaints. I find myself focusing on budgets, managing timelines, and generally maintaining the day-to-day business of the LCBA. On any given day there are a number of balls in the air, and it can make thinking beyond organizational self-interest challenging.

I took a few moments to reflect on my time with

Director’s Chair In the

the LCBA. One the most rewarding parts of my job has been working with the Community Outreach and Diversity Committee. Under the leadership of Karissa Anderson and Judge John Joanem, the Community Outreach and Diversity Committee has engaged the LCBA membership to provide meaningful service to the public at large. In 22 short months, the committee has: organized seven food drives benefiting local food pantries; offered six free legal advice clinics for the general public; benefited local school children with school supply and equity-based book drives; helped to facilitate two holiday gift drives; supported a local nonprofit with a professional clothing drive; promoted a blood drive during the pandemic; offered continuing legal education on diversity; and celebrated pro bono legal service with two Wayne Flannigan Awards. Membership in the

BY GREG WEIDER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Lake County Bar Association provides significant opportunities for career development, but it is more than a professional association. It is about service to the community. Not just the legal community, but the Lake County community as a whole. An effective and thriving legal system benefits us all. Fair and equitable access to justice is fundamental. But the reach of the LCBA goes far beyond the practice of law. Our impact can be measured by the time and energy LCBA volunteers dedicate to endeavors benefiting others. It is not about self-interest, but a genuine desire to improve other people’s lives. It has been a true pleasure to assisting them in their work.

As we celebrate Dr. King’s birthday this January, let us take a moment to set aside “what’s in it for me.” Let us instead reflect on his question and strive to make a positive difference in the lives of others.

November 11, 2022 Veterans History Project

Monthly

Committee Meetings

DAY MEETING LOCATION TIME

1st Tuesday

Diversity & Community Outreach

Virtual Until Further Notice 12:15-1:15

1st Thursday Real Estate VUFN 5:30-6:30

1st Thursday (Even Mo.) Docket Editorial Committee VUFN 12:15-1:15

2nd Tuesday Criminal Law VUFN 12:15-1:15

2nd Tuesday (Odd Mo.) Immigration VUFN 4:30-5:30

2nd Wednesday Family Law Advisory Group (FLAG) VUFN 12:00-1:00

2nd Wednesday Civil Trial and Appeals VUFN 4:00-5:00

2nd Thursday Young & New Lawyers VUFN 12:15-1:15

2nd Thursday Trusts and Estates VUFN 12:15-1:15

3rd Monday (Odd Mo.) Solo & Small Firms VUFN 12:00 noon

3rd Tuesday Local Government VUFN 12:15-1:15

3rd Tuesday LCBF Board of Trustees VUFN 4:00

3rd Wednesday Family Law VUFN 12:00-1:00

3rd Thursday LCBA Board of Directors VUFN 12:00 noon

3rd Thursday Debtor/Creditor Rights VUFN 5:30-6:30 As Needed Employment Law VUFN 5:15-6:15

• RSVP to a meeting at www.lakebar.org.

• Meetings subject to change. Please check your weekly e-news, the on-line calendar at www.lakebar.org or call the LCBA Office @ (847) 244-3143.

• Please feel free to bring your lunch to the LCBA office for any noon meetings. Food and beverages at restaurants are purchased on a individual basis.