Licence to Clear: The Dark Side of Permitting in West Papua

Page 170

License to Clear: The Dark Side of Permitting in West Papua

170

Methodological notes Group and ownership attributions There is no publicly available database containing full details of Indonesia’s plantation concessions and the groups that control them. Many concessions do belong to formally established, stock-listed companies with conventional parent-subsidiary structures that list their subsidiaries and/or estates more or less comprehensively on their websites or in their annual reports – sources on which Greenpeace has based its characterisation of these as groups, supplemented by information taken from permit documents and elsewhere. However, other concessions have much less straightforward ownership and control, belonging to complex networks of companies owned by individuals or families whose links are not (or only in part) publicly acknowledged. In some cases a well-known, high-profile company may have a cluster of clandestinely linked ‘shadow companies’ in addition to its acknowledged plantation subsidiaries; in others there is no single ultimate parent company and the group consists largely of privately held companies, not listed on any stock exchange. Different family members may be the ultimate shareholders in different companies, or parts of the group may be held offshore, rendering the ultimate owner unknowable. In other cases named legal shareholders may be nominees, where arrangements exist with other beneficial owners that have not been publicly disclosed. It is necessary to take a broad view of what constitutes a group, going beyond straightforward ownership links to include other forms of control (financial, managerial, operational or other). This must be done to get around these ways in which unscrupulous owners obscure their ownership of plantation operations engaged in forest destruction, which they may do in order to avoid compromising the market access of their publicly acknowledged subsidiaries.


Articles inside

References

34min
pages 175-196

Methodological Notes

9min
pages 170-174

Glossary

4min
pages 168-169

Recommendations

7min
pages 162-167

Failure to monitor beneficial ownership

4min
pages 156-158

Food estates: paving the way for future land grabs

13min
pages 147-155

The new Omnibus Law: consolidating oligarchic power

9min
pages 142-146

International financial support despite Indonesia’s failures

6min
pages 159-161

Transparency at stake

5min
pages 139-141

Part 4: The scale of the challenge ahead

1min
page 138

Case Study 9: Merauke, PT Merauke Rayon Jaya

5min
pages 134-137

Case Study 8: Mimika, Salim Group/PT Tunas Agung Sejahtera

8min
pages 128-133

Case Study 1: Boven Digoel, Menara Group/Hayel Saeed Anam Group

25min
pages 88-102

Case Study 6: Mimika, PT Prima Sarana Graha

5min
pages 122-124

Case Study 3: Boven Digoel, PT Indo Asiana Lestari

5min
pages 108-111

Case Study 5: Mappi, Himalaya Group

6min
pages 118-121

Case Study 7: Jayapura/Sarmi, Musim Mas Group

3min
pages 125-127

Case Study 2: Boven Digoel, Digoel Agri Group

8min
pages 103-107
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