in excluding a doctor's expert witness testimony on whether the defendants had breached their standard of care. Id. at 800. However, the opinion does not set forth the number of other experts, if any, that had also testified on this issue. Furthermore, given our conclusion in Lake that the excluded testimony was “critical to the plaintiffs' case,” it is difficult to determine whether or not the above-quoted language the Appellant relies upon was dicta. * * * We conclude that under the facts of this case, the trial court's determination that each party be limited to one expert on the standard
1960)). However, as the Brown court also warned, the instruction based on the statute must not mislead the jurors. Id. Further, such an instruction must not violate other longestablished principles such as the right of a defendant to have a jury trial free from comment or intimation by the trial judge on the weight, character, or credibility of the evidence. In 1896, we cautioned in Lester v. State, 20 So. 232 (Fla. 1896): [G]reat care should always be observed by the judge to avoid the use of any remark in the hearing of the jury that is capable, directly or indirectly, expressly, inferentially, or by innuendo, of conveying any intimation as to what view he takes of the case, or that intimates his opinion as to the weight, character, or credibility of any evidence adduced. All matters of fact, and all testimony adduced, should be left to the deliberate, independent, voluntary, and unbiased judgment of the jury, wholly uninfluenced by any instruction, remarks, or intimation, either in express terms or by innuendo, from the judge, from which his view of such matters may be discerned. Any other course deprives the accused of his right to trial by jury, and is erroneous.
of care and one expert on causation did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Lion Plumbing Supply, Inc., 844 So. 2d at 770 (holding that trial court may limit number of experts per side so as to prevent presentation of cumulative testimony). Our greater concern is the failure of the trial court to notify the parties of its decision to impose restrictions on expert testimony at an earlier time. Litigants are entitled to fair notice of restrictions on expert witness testimony so that they may prepare their case accordingly. Id. at 770-71. ● Using a Petition for Writ of Prohibition, the petitioners in Forehand v. Walton County, et al., 40 Fla. L. Weekly,
* * * Judge Evander... agreed with the Brown court that the “no corroboration” instruction is improper because it is likely to confuse and mislead the jury. Gutierrez, 133 So. 3d at 1132 (Evander, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). He also noted that Florida Standard Jury Instruction 3.7 (Criminal) provides that “[a] reasonable doubt as to the guilt of a defendant may arise from the evidence, conflict in the evidence, or the lack of evidence.” [Citations omitted.] Judge Evander aptly noted: Thus, a juror can properly conclude that an alleged victim's testimony in a particular case is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, that juror may conclude that without “corroborating evidence,” a reasonable doubt exists because of the lack of evidence. It is readily foreseeable that such a juror may be misled or confused by an ensuing, and arguably inconsistent, instruction that the alleged victim's testimony need not be corroborated. * * * Accordingly, we quash the deci-
D1855d (Fla. App. 1st Dist., August 7, 2015), sought unsuccessfully to disqualify the trial judge based upon his rulings adverse to petitioners, and his comments on his knowledge of rainstorms that had affected areas in the Florida Panhandle. On appeal, it was noted and decided: A motion for disqualification is legally sufficient “when the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The party seeking disqualification bears the burden to show a
(Continued on next page) sion of the Fifth District in Gutierrez, approve the decision of the Second District in Brown, and remand for a new trial at which the jury is properly instructed. ● A recent appellate case sheds some light on the term “original, ongoing investigation”—at least in the context of attempts to extend the statute of limitations in certain cases that have become, by comparison, “inactive.” In Therlonge v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly, D1646d (Fla. App. 4th Dist., July 15, 2015): On October 7, 2011—after the statute of limitations period expired as over three years had passed since the crime was reported to law enforcement—Appellant was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a person under sixteen years of age. Despite the time lapse, the State argued that it was permitted to continue the prosecution under section 775.15(16)(a), which provides an extension to the statute of limitations period in certain circumstances: In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for [a lewd or lascivious offense] may be commenced at any time after the date on which
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