ISSN 2294-1274
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 3 - Issue 7, July 2013
NATO and Post-Soviet Space Formal relations between NATO and Russia began in 1991 when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1997 the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security led the development of a bilateral program of consultation and cooperation, soon magnified by the NATO-Russia Council. However, in the recent years, this relationship has become increasingly tense. The debate over Western influence in Eastern Europe has always been at the core of the NATO-Russia relationship and in this month’s edition of Atlantic Voices our contributors analyze this discussion in depth and present recommendations for future NATO-Russian cooperation.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (Photo: Kyiv Post)
Contents: NATO and Post-Soviet Space Dr. Tatyana Parkhalina discusses the role of NATO in the Post-Soviet region and the nature
The interaction between NATO and
of the NATO-Russia relationship today. She describes at length the current problems facing
Russia will continue to be of vital im-
NATO and Russia while highlighting key areas of cooperation and concludes that a continued
portance to security and defense around the
step by step approach towards cooperation is critical to relieving tension between the two.
globe even as former-Soviet countries continue to refine their own relationship within the international community’s security architecture.
Ukraine: A Working Relationship? Paul Pryce looks at the precarious role of Ukraine in modern NATO-Russian relations. He explores whether Ukraine is a Russian satellite, a buffer zone between Russia and the West
By: Cassandra Lewis
or something else all together? Pryce argues that Ukraine needs to take advantage of its posiAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
tion within the OSCE, while NATO needs to raise its expectation of the former Soviet-state. 1
NATO and Post-Soviet Space By: Dr. Tatyana Parkhalina
A
fter the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the situation concerning post-Soviet space became one of the priorities of NATO. There were several
reasons for this : regional instability, potential for social revolution and civil war, securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal from for-
Kiev’s appeal to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO-countries invented a formula that stipulated how both countries could eventually become NATO members. This step was initiated by Moscow officials to push Russia away from its traditional zone of influence and interests. For the first time after 1991, Russia had parted
mer Soviet states and
from the territorial status-quo,
arms control (in 1990 Conventional
defined by the collapse of the
Armed
former Soviet Union and thus
Forces Treaty in Europe
demonstrated that there are
(CFE) was signed but in
limits to NATO’s enlargement
1991 the security environment
within post-Soviet space.
dramatically
There are three main reasons
changed). The
for NATO presence in the
NATO
Commonwealth of Independent
response was an elaboration of the concept of partnership. In 1994 the
States (CIS) space: Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Russian President Vladimir Putin (Photo: Radio Free Europe)
“Partnership for Peace”
1) the success of the partnership and cooperation policy has con-
program was launched with the main aim of giving Central and
tributed to stability and the spirit of democracy in former re-
Eastern Europe (CEE) countries (first) and post-Soviet states
publics of the Soviet Union, especially in Eastern Europe;
(second) the opportunity to integrate in, or cooperate with,
2) the global fight against terrorism, especially in Central Asia
Euro-Atlantic institutions in the field of security. From the very
(Afghanistan, Pakistan);
beginning, some post-Soviet states demonstrated their willingness to become full members of the Alliance (Baltic states). Others – such as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan (before 2005) declared themselves NATO’s allies –
3) the search for the new role of the Alliance in the situation of “unfinished business” between USA-Europe-Russia after the cold war.
while some (Georgia, Ukraine) set their medium or long term
The main forms of NATO’s presence in post-Soviet
goals to joining the Alliance in the future. All others, including
Space are various and presuppose cooperation in the format of
Russia, did not want to be integrated into NATO, but at the
partnerships as well as different forms and levels of treaties on
same time understood the necessity of cooperation and signed
military-technical cooperation. This includes different types of
the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program.
coordination amongst CIS military activities and the prepara-
During the same period, post-Soviet space became a field of competition between NATO, the EU and Russia who still perceived security in terms of geopolitics rather than in terms of integration. The most demonstrative example of such geopolitical competition became the Russia-Georgia War of 2008. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, answering Tbilisi and Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
tion of a number of states for the process of integration into NATO. One of the forms of military-political integration for post-Soviet states was the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) (shaped in 1997) which unified Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Uzbekistan (before 2005), some of whom declared themselves as NATO allies with the plan of becoming future members. A driving force in CIS is the idea of NATO member2
ship being one of the political instruments in domestic political
ing present in Central Asia, NATO distances itself from coopera-
fighting. At the same time, the authorities and political move-
tion with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
ments in a number of CIS countries try to use problems be-
which is assessed by NATO analysts and politicians as “non-
tween NATO and Russia in post-Soviet space as leverage by
democratic”. The Alliance prefers to develop bilateral contacts
playing on disagreements (between Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbeki-
with such CIS states as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
stan, Byelorussia) in order to position themselves as either “for
Georgia, solving tactical problems like the creation of a transpor-
posts of Western democracy,” or as Russia’s allies.
tation corridor on the territory of the Trans Caucasus to support International Security Assistance Force
NATO tries not to be involved in the confrontation with Russia and to distance itself from the complicated domestic political problems of CIS. This is one of the reasons why, in 2008
In the case of Georgia, the unsettled territorial conflicts became real obstacles to NATO integration.
case of Georgia, the unsettled territorial conflicts became real obstacles to NATO integration. Military conflict in Southern Ossetia and the RussianGeorgian War in August 2008 demonstrated the limits of NATO’s capabilities in post-Soviet space. In August 2008 NATO leadership issued a declaration in support of Georgian President, M. Saakashvilli – and by this limited their potential to support Georgia due to their conflict with Russia. After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and the shaping of new, independent states – Abkhazia and South Osethia – the question of Georgian integration into NATO lost its relevance. After presidential elections in Ukraine in November
NATO and Russia The main objective of NATO – after the dissolution of the USSR - was and still is
at the Bucharest NATO Summit, the Alliance decided not to give MAP to Georgia and Ukraine. In the
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.
the creation of a strategic partnership with Russia, which was reaffirmed in all key NATO-Russia documents: Founding Act, Rome Declaration, Lisbon Summit, and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Declaration. Although it was declared many times, a strategic partnership did not happen. It could be explained by several realities. First, the absence of trust – let us not forget that the U.S. and Russia remain hostage to the paradigm of mutual nuclear deterrence. Second, there are serious value gaps, as well as differing political and strategic cultures. Third, the domestic political situation in the various NATO-Russia Council countries has been forcing political leaders to take into consideration the moods of their populations. For example, when U.S. Republicans blamed President Barack Obama for certain concessions given to the Russians in the process of stra-
2009, the new leadership took a neutral position regarding the
tegic arms limitations talks,
status of the country and its MAP to NATO. At the same time,
blamed the then President Dmitry Medvedev for being cheated by
President Yanoukovitch decided not only to stop cooperation
the U.S. and NATO when promising Russia would take part in a
with NATO, but increased a number of cooperation projects
common missile defense system in Europe.
with the Alliance . Now the question of potential Ukranian integration into NATO is not on the agenda. It is absolutely evident that the Russian factor was the key element in the process of decision-making on this important issue. At the same time, the Alliance’s stance on the position of its “open door policy” in general and the cases of Tbilisi and Kiev in particular, have allowed NATO to influence their foreign policy while Georgia and Ukraine were able to avoid fulfilling their concrete obligations. The Russia-Georgia War demonstrated one more factor – NATO does not want to take responsibility for the security of the region. The Alliance avoids concrete obligations in other
the national-conservative forces
The lack of trust from the Russian side has been conditioned not only by the traditional anti-western phobia and stereotypes of the Cold War period, but also by the state of relations between Russia and the Alliance in the post-Soviet era. In the last decade and a half, the key factors that spoiled Russia-NATO relations were the 1999 Kosovo crisis, NATO enlargement to the East, the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008, and NATO’s recent operation in Libya. It is well known that the consensus inside NATO regarding Russia is very fragile. Concerns articulated by a number of NATO states are connected not only with their historical past,
regions that maintain different military-political structures. BeAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
3
but also with Russian policies regarding the Northern and Southern Caucasus, vis-à-vis a number of states in the postSoviet space (especially in the field of gas supplies), with Russia’s position on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the Con-
tory. NATO and Russia have decided to open a transit point on Russian territory (Ulyanovsk) for non-lethal cargoes to be reloaded from aircraft to trains (using purely commercial/civilian companies).
ventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). 3. Cooperative Air-space Initiative (CAI). The Thus, traditional stereotypes and mistrust are combined with new misunderstandings, different threat assessments, and renewed geopolitical competition. As a result, both
CAI has been directed to develop cooperation among NRC states in the field of air-traffic transparency and the early notification of suspicious air activities. The main goal is to facilitate
sides have different definitions
transparency, predictability and
when it comes to basic no-
cooperation in the realm of air-
tions such as “the indivisibility
space management. In 2011, the
of security.” The notion of
operational readiness of the CAI
security is interpreted by
system was demonstrated during a
some through the prism of
counter-terrorism
integration, and by others
exercise
“Vigilant Skies 2011”. It was the
through the prism of geopoli-
first real-time counter-terrorism
tics.
exercise, and incorporated RusAt the same time –
sian, Polish, and Turkish fighter
bearing in mind the lack of
jets acting together in response to
progress on BMD following
Training with NATO Sorbet Royal submarine rescue system
Lisbon, Russia and NATO
(Photo: thebrigade.com)
were more amenable than in the past to establishing cooperative activities through mutual relations. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the following:
the simulated hijacking of a passenger aircraft.
4. Counter-Piracy. On this track, coordination of NATO and Russian activities has been achieved through practical cooperation whereby both sides facilitate the exchange of
1. Fight against terrorism. Cooperation has been
information in regards to operations off the coast of Somalia, in
realized through a permanent exchange of information, consul-
addition to discussing eventual scenarios of common efforts
tation, planning, and the use of civil services in the event of
(including improving coordination and communication, coop-
terrorist attacks. There is a serious dialogue at the highest level
erating on medical support, logistics and refueling).
on the role of military forces in the fight against terror, as well as technical and scientific cooperation in the fields connected with anti-terror operations, e.g., border control, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), air-space management, nuclear safety etc.
5. Search and Rescue at Sea. In 2003, a framework agreement on cooperation was signed. Following the agreement Russia took part in NATO’s “Sorbet Royal” exercise in 2005. Since then, a Russian navy submarine was fully integrated into a NATO-led exercise “Bold Monarch 2011,” which
2. Cooperation on Afghanistan. The NRC pilot
took place off the southern coast of Spain. Three additional
project for counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central
Russian ships supported the Russian Navy’s Alrosa submarine
Asian personnel has been realized through the Russian Ministry
including a submarine rescue vessel, a salvage vessel, and a
of Interior since December 2005. The Helicopter Maintenance
heavy-lifting vessel.
Trust Fund (over $5 billion USD) was created in March 2011. There is a plan that, by 2016, Afghanistan will have 140 helicopters and 8,000 personnel through the trust fund. Transit to and from Afghanistan in support of ISAF
6. Military-to-Military Cooperation. In January 2011 (then in 2012 & 2013), a plan aimed at enhancing military cooperation in six fields was adopted. These six fields were: fighting terrorism, logistical coordination , search and rescue
(land transit of non-lethal goods) is provided via Russian terriAtlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
4
at sea, in-theatre missile-defense systems and military academic
U.S. Congress of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
exchange (including preparation of the glossary on the subject
(START), the proposal was interpreted by Moscow as an invi-
of cooperation, which should contain 7,000 terms in Russian
tation to shape jointly a common MD system. This interpreta-
and English in the key spheres of political and military coopera-
tion however, became thereafter an obstacle in the negotiation
tion between Russia and NATO).
process.
Despite these new developments of NATO-Russian
At the NATO-Russia Lisbon Summit, President
cooperation at the practical level, the political level remains
Medvedev launched the idea of sectorial defense and/or legal
much less developed. The main reason for this is the lack of
obligations to the effect that NATO would not direct its MD
progress in negotiations on missile defense and on conventional
system against Russian strategic nuclear forces. Russia proposed
forces in Europe.
to include in its sector NATO countries such as Baltic States
One may wonder why, merely one year after Lisbon
and Poland, along with offering certain security guarantees.
(when there was hope that the reset was going to move us be-
Those countries, given their historical experience, are the least
yond the Cold War), the United States and NATO declared
likely to accept any Russian security guarantees. As for legal
that they would develop their MD system in spite of Russia’s
obligations from NATO, this would have required a specific
numerous concerns, while Russia threatens to retaliate through
treaty that would be unfeasible from the outset, which would
“adequate measures,” thus leading to a possible new arms race.
have had to be ratified by the parliaments of 28 countries. This
On March 2010, in his speech devoted to the shaping of a new European security architecture at a forum organized
was questionable, bearing in mind the difficulties that President Obama had in the U.S. Congress during the process of ratifying START
by the German Marshall Fund in Brussels, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said: “We need a mis-
(encountering re-
sistance from the Republicans
“We need a missile defense system that includes not just all countries of NATO, but Russia too.” - Secretary General Rasmussen
sile defense system that includes not just all countries of NATO, but Russia too. One security roof that we build together, that we support together, and that we operate together. One security roof that protects us all… One security would be
who perceived the treaty as more in line with Russian than American security interests). Moreover, the Europeans were
not able to ratify their own treaties, and were still facing the challenge of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. So the process of ratification alone could have potentially taken years or decades.
a very strong political symbol that Russia is fully part of the
We now must recognize that negotiations have
Euro-Atlantic family, sharing the benefits and the costs – not
reached a deadlock on missile defense. There were hopes that
outside but very much inside.”
after presidential elections in Russia and in the USA, both sides
The way this proposal was formulated could be interpreted either as an invitation for cooperation between two MD systems under one common roof (although there has been no elaboration so far on what this roof could be), or the shaping of a joint MD system. In the latter case, this could lead to real Russian integration in the formation of a new Euro-Atlantic security system, stopping short of institutional integration. This is hardly possible now for numerous reasons from both sides. The proposal could also lead to Russia’s access to new technologies, and a new format of relations within the Euro-Atlantic community. Given that the proposal was made in the context of the U.S.-Russia Reset, and at the time of ratification by the Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
could find a compromise. But it did not happen. Now two presidents exchange letters: president Obama suggested to sign a legally-binding executive document on transparency in the field of MD, but Russia did not accept the idea using the argument that without ratification by the US Congress this document will remain relative only under Obama’s presidency while at the same time asking for preventive transparency from the Kremlin, which meant providing preventive data on the speed of missiles and other military-technical characteristics. In both countries, the opponents of the reset have controversially exploited the suspicion and mistrust on both sides for political capital. However, it would be overly simplistic to equate all
5
these problems to purely domestic political reasons alone. In Russia there is strong opposition towards a potential rapprochement with the United States and NATO. This can be witnessed through three very significant discrepancies:
assessments (irrespective of a number of common documents), different interests in a number of regions, opposite positions on a number of issues (Kosovo, Georgia, Iran, Syria) and only one common agenda – disarmament – which is in fact a Cold War agenda.
Despite the reset, the Russian
The basis for a strategic
bureaucracy, educated and fed anti-
partnership in transatlantic rela-
western principles for decades, have
tions requires three components
understood that it is impossible to
and depends on the evolution of
develop their career if they openly
these factors: values, security,
declare their support for a partner-
and economics. Last but not
ship with the Euro-Atlantic commu-
least is indeed economic coopera-
nity;
tion and interaction. The United Despite the reset, there are
three key Russian documents (the
Patriot anti-missile batteries (Photo: NATO)
States and Russia will not change the paradigm of their relations
concept of national security, the concept of Foreign Policy, the
(since the paradigm is one of mutual nuclear deterrence) with-
Military Doctrine) where NATO and the United States are per-
out further developing their economic cooperation. NATO and
ceived to be the main threats to Russian national security;
Russia will not change the paradigm of mutual mistrust without
Irrespective of Russian foreign policy, Russian domestic
developing military-technological cooperation that could lead
policy shows that the majority of Russian political forces use anti-
to real confidence building. In the case of NATO-Russia, there
Western rhetoric, and resist the shaping of effective working insti-
is already bilateral military-technological cooperation between
tutions, hence these institutions being perceived as a challenge to
the Russian Federation and individual countries of the Alliance
Russia’s own survival.
(such as France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and the majority
What are these political forces? Any Russian leader who opposes a strategic partnership with the West, can count on the support of conservative minded military officers (a considerable portion of the military-industrial complex), national-conservatives within the political spectrum, and a portion of the regional elites. All of them continue to exploit old perceptions of the West, inherited from the period of bi-polar confrontation. when n fact, they are seeking the realization of their own economic and political interests. The Declaration on missile defense delivered by President Medvedev 10 days before the Russian parliamentary elections was not only a message to the Russian public, but also was a message to the United States and NATO, calling for a compromise on missile defense in order to make use of all possible opportunities before the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit to undermine NATO’s MD initiative.
of former Warsaw Pact members). To a certain extent however, these special relations have caused concerns from other NATO countries, as was illustrated by the Mistral deal between Russia and France. In fact, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen expressed hopes that Russia “…will not use new French techniques against some of its neighbor-countries.” He also stressed that NATO was not involved in this deal, and that the French President had not informed him about it beforehand. Potential perspectives for NATO-Russia militarytechnological cooperation were analyzed and discussed at the Conference of National Directors on armaments of NATO countries in Brussels in October 2009. During the Conference, not only did the politicians discuss potential areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia in this field, but a list of practical measures for the years to come were also considered, such as industrial cooperation in the fields of aviation, a common
At the end of the day, one has to ask: is there any possi-
project regarding heavy tactical transport helicopters, tech-
bility for strategic partnership when the two sides (NATO and
niques for Afghanistan and Russian participation in the techno-
Russia) have different perceptions of security, different threat
logical program of the fight against terrorism, including
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
6
measures of detection and neutralization of explosive materials. Coming back to the old (Cold War) security agenda of disarmament dominated by old tactics of negotiations, new levels
they will ultimately decide to unite their efforts in search of common answers to non-traditional security threats and become real partners.
of transparency and additional confidence-building measures
About the author
(including verifications) should be elaborated and introduced into the process. At the same time the principles of mutual nuclear
Dr. Tatyana Parkhalina is a Russian expert on European
deterrence should be transformed. The negotiations could achieve
Security problems, on NATO-Russia relations and on Russian
some results only after a compromise between USA and Russia is
foreign policy. She is an author of a number of books and articles (more than 100) on the
reached. We can still expect that a joint political declaration toward safeguarding strategic stability could allow for the untying of the antimissile knot. One could still realistically achieve an integration of
It would be rational to increase the level of transparency in data exchanges, and to shape a clear and detailed mechanism of coordination for two systems.
aforementioned issues. Since 2003 she has been a Member of Expert Council on International Affairs at the Council of Federation of the RF, and since 2011, she has been Deputy Chair of
missile defense information systems. This goal could be achieved through 10 exercises of MD in
Expert Council on International Affairs there. In 2013, she
the format of 5 U.S.-Russian exercises and 5 NATO-Russian exer-
became the President of Russian Association for Euro-Atlantic
cises (the most recent exercise with NATO happened at the end of
Cooperation.
March 2012 in Germany). There are still serious differences in missile threat assessments creating a need for both sides to increase intelligence data exchanges on nuclear potentials, as well as joint research and development (R&D) in this field among countries that already have nuclear weapons. Some time ago, NATO discussed a proposal with Russia on creating two common MD centers: the Center for Data Exchanges, and the Centre for Operational Cooperation. Russia was skeptical about this proposition. It would be rational to increase the level of transparency in data exchanges, and to shape a clear and detailed mechanism of coordination for two systems. In conclusion, the fact that emerging security challenges and threats, new developments in a number of regions, as well as the ongoing economic crisis, are pushing both NATO and Russia to change the paradigm of their relationships and exit the vicious circle of mutual suspicion and mutual accusations is a welcomed development. 2012 marked two anniversaries in NATO-Russia relations: 15 years since the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 10 years since the Rome Declaration. Both sides should remember that the clock of history is implacable: either these two countries work
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4 Gradirovsky S., Esipova N., Ray J. The decisive factor : post-Soviet states’ attitudes toward NATO. Harvard International Review. Wntr, 2010, Vol. 31, Issue 4. 5
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Kostandinova T. East European Public Support for NATO Membership: Fears and Aspirations. Journal of Peace Research, March 2000; vol. 37; pp. 235-249.
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9 Shlapentokh D. Post-Soviet History and NATO Geographical Expansion. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations. January 1999; 25(1):93-120.
Атанесян, А. (2004). ʺСтратегия ʺперетягиванияʺ и перераспределение сил на постсоветском пространствеʺ // Международный научно-общественный журнал ʺМир Переменʺ, Москва, Институт международных экономических и политических исследований Российской академии наук, N 2, сс. 129-140.
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separately less efficiently, spend more money, remain locked in the same paradigm, scattering their forces to deter each other; or Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
7
Ukraine: A Working Relationship? By Paul Pryce
F
ollowing electoral victories by Viktor Yanu-
end of 2013, Ukraine is also expected to contribute a frig-
kovych and the Party of Regions, Ukraine has
ate to Operation Ocean Shield, which constitutes NATO’s
dropped its formal bid for NATO membership
response to the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The
and adopted legislation prohibiting the country from join-
Russian Navy has also made some modest contributions to
ing any military alliance. This has prompted many observ-
Ocean Shield and Active Endeavour, though it has re-
ers to now deem Ukraine as a buffer zone at best and a
frained from participating on the scale that Ukraine has.
Russian satellite at worst. Those leaning toward the latter
Outside the auspices of NATO operations, the
view cite the renewal of the Russian Federation’s lease on
Ukrainian military has also enjoyed close cooperation with
naval facilities in Crimea until 2042 as an indication that,
the forces of NATO member states on international peace-
while officially non-aligned, the current Ukrainian govern-
keeping deployments. Particularly noteworthy here is the
ment is willing to extend vital support to Russia.
Ukrainian involvement with KFOR, the NATO-led inter-
Yet these characterizations of Ukrainian foreign
national peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Since 2000, the
policy are overly simplistic. Rather than serving as a buff-
Polish-Ukrainian Peace Force Battalion has served an im-
er, Ukraine has sought to become a balancer, attempting
portant role in securing Kosovo’s borders with neighbour-
to avoid full security dependency upon either of the inte-
ing territories. This contingent has tended to be comprised
grating bodies to its west and east – the European Union
of approximately 500 Polish ground troops and slightly less
(EU) and NATO on the one hand, or the Eurasian Eco-
than 200 Ukrainian soldiers. Meanwhile, since 2002,
nomic Community (EEC) and the
Ukraine has also been contributing troops to a smaller
Collective Security Treaty Organi-
multinational battalion within
zation (CSTO) on the other. This
KFOR, which is comprised of
difficult balancing act should be
military personnel also drawn
seen as an opportunity for the
from Belgium, Luxembourg,
North Atlantic Alliance to deepen
and Romania.
with
Clearly, the Ukrainian
Ukraine, though full membership
authorities are not adverse to
may never be back on the agenda.
close security cooperation with
security
Ukraine’s
cooperation
Participation
NATO Operations
in
Ukrainian soldiers serving with KFOR on parade in 2009
NATO member states and the
(Photo: Major Petro Gasay, Ukrainian Army)
Alliance itself. While it is cer-
At the same time, while Ukraine has withdrawn
tain that the Ukrainian commitment to KFOR was made
from the Membership Action Program, the country none-
prior to the rise to power of Yanukovych and the Party of
theless participates in a number of NATO operations.
Regions, the new government has continued to approve
Since 2007, the Ukrainian Navy has contributed several
the deployment of new rotations for KFOR. Furthermore,
corvettes and frigates to Operation Active Endeavour,
these multinational units may present an opportunity for
which was initiated in response to the terrorist attacks of
deepening NATO cooperation with Ukraine, even if they
September 11th, 2001, and which is responsible for moni-
are not formally affiliated with NATO itself. For example,
toring maritime traffic in the Mediterranean Sea. By the
an agreement is expected by the end of 2013 on the for-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
8
mation of a Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade that would consist of 4,500 troops and which could deploy on short notice as part of a United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping operation
only ever with a focus on preparing troops for deployment as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. As the role of ISAF is reduced, the focus on preparing forces specifically for deployment to Afghanistan
anywhere in the world.
can be shifted toward a comprehensive harmonization of
The Interoperability Challenge Through projects like the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, trust in NATO may deepen to such an extent that the Ukrainian authorities will abandon their balancing act in favour of integration into the Alliance or, more likely, a sub-regional
standards and doctrine. With an increase in size and a potentially more open-ended mandate, Maple Arch 2013 could prove to be an important step in fostering common standards both strategically and operationally. Even so, a marked increase in the number and diver-
security arrangement with Poland and
sity of opportunities for joint training
Lithuania. Alternatively, a change in Ukrainian government may build on the success of the KFOR collaboration and
Interoperability is a problem; much of the equipment utilized by the Ukrainian military is incompatible...
the joint brigade by pursuing NATO membership. In such a scenario, the integration of Ukraine into the Alliance or into an alternative arrangement would still be a challenging prospect. As has been noted from previous collaboration with Ukrainian forces, interoperability is a problem; much of the equipment utilized by the Ukrainian military is incompatible, but more importantly the training and doctrine does not meet NATO standards. Thus far, projects pursued under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace, of which Ukraine remains a member, have not been sufficient alone to help the Ukrainian military meet the standards for NATO membership. Preemptively addressing the gap in capabilities will be necessary in order to prevent a long and drawn-out process of integration that leaves the Ukrainian public even further disillusioned with membership in either NATO or some hypothetical association with Poland. Fortunately, there does seem to be a means by which to achieve interoperability in the Army, though not yet necessarily the Air Force and Navy, but through initiatives associated with the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade. To test the readiness of the units to be included in this brigade, Exercise Maple Arch 2013 has been scheduled for September. This large -scale, brigade-level military exercise will see Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian personnel operating alongside one another with assistance and guidance from Canadian military experts. Maple Arch has been held consistently on an annual basis, though never on the scale expected for the 2013 edition and
will be necessary if the stage is to be set successfully for Ukraine’s accession to NATO membership at a later date and under conditions much more favourable
to such an accession. The United States Navy holds annual exercises with their Ukrainian counterparts, known as Exercise Sea Breeze, but this focuses primarily on disaster response and emergency preparedness rather than on building up either the expeditionary or defensive capabilities of the Ukrainian naval forces. Meanwhile, there are no joint NATO and Ukrainian Air Force exercises. This year has brought an expansion in the number of joint exercises, but countries like Poland or the United States, which are already cultivating strong relationships military-wise, will need to drastically build on this momentum in future years to ensure that Ukrainian leaders view the NATO member states as a preferred model for military development, Securing a Consensus With Kyiv This is not to say that NATO and its member states should seek to kowtow to the Ukrainian leadership. While practical cooperation on a number of fronts has clearly been positive, Ukrainian political cooperation has not been as forthcoming. A clear example of this can be found in Ukraine’s disappointing performance thus far as the Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). When the 57 members of this important institution for European security approved the Ukrainian bid for leadership, Yanukovych emphasized that a lasting resolution to the Transnistrian conflict would be a priority of the Ukrainian Chairmanship.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
9
This ‘frozen conflict’ emerged when the largely
fence systems in Romania, Russian authorities have sug-
ethnic Russian and ethnic Ukrainian region of Transnis-
gested that early warning radar facilities may be established
tria attempted to break away from the newly independ-
in Transnistria. The ambiguous status of Transnistria also
ent Moldova in 1992, and it has remained a lingering
complicates any plans Moldova may have for NATO and
threat to European security and stability ever since.
EU accession. In short, the preservation of the current
The momentum for a breakthrough in the conflict was
situation allows the Russian Federation to keep Moldova
apparent when Ukraine assumed the leadership of the
firmly in its orbit.
OSCE. In 2012, during Ireland’s tenure at the head of
In light of this, one may conclude that Ukrainian
the organization, peace talks were resumed and a num-
mismanagement of the Transnistrian issue in 2013 is an
ber of agreements on border management and other
indication that Russia still continues to hold sway over
issues in the Region were finalized.
Ukraine’s foreign policy. However, reluctance on the part
Ukraine, which shares a border with Moldova
of Ukrainian authorities to pursue a lasting resolution to
and the breakaway territory of Transnistria, has also
the Transnistrian conflict may simply reflect a belief on the
been heavily involved in previous efforts to end the
part of the Yanukovych government that the current situa-
conflict. In 2005, then President Viktor Yushchenko
tion affords the greatest degree of stability in Ukraine’s
successfully hosted comprehensive peace talks and set
geopolitical neighbourhood. In their view, pressing too
out his own proposal for a lasting resolution called the
hard for the normalization of relations between Moldova
‘Vinnitsa Plan’. Though the proposal was ultimately
and separatist Transnistria may embolden hardliners within
rejected, it marked the closest the conflict has come to
the breakaway region, resulting in the renewal of hostilities
a peaceful end. Rather than achieving a breakthrough,
or some other form of instability detrimental to the securi-
however, the Ukrainian Chairmanship has presided
ty of Ukraine. If so, Russian interests have not co-opted
over deepening tensions
Ukrainian
between Moldova and
merely
Transnistria.
Transnistrian case.
In
April
interests; coincide
in
they the
2013, a dispute over the
Plenty of divergence
establishment of security
between Ukraine and Russia
checkpoints in one border
can in fact be found on the
town resulted in such an
political level, even under
escalation of tensions that
the leadership of Yanu-
the Ukrainian Chairman-
kovych. While Ukraine has
ship was left urging both Russian soldiers: Putin's 1,300 men in Transnistria are key to the future of not recognized the independparties to avoid the use of
Moldova and CFEII (Photo: Wikipedia)
ence of Kosovo, it has also
violence. In many respects, relations between Moldova
refrained from recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
and the separatists are at their lowest point since the
independent, in part because of concerns that a precedent
civil war that fractured the country in 1992.
might be set for the unilateral declaration of Crimean inde-
It has been noted that the status quo in Moldova
pendence. It also appears that Ukraine has supplied arms to
is of strategic benefit for the Russian Federation. Under
rebels in Syria, even as the Russian Federation supplies
the pretense of peacekeeping, Russia maintains a pres-
arms to the regime of Bashar al-Assad. It appears that for-
ence of 1,200 soldiers in Transnistria. In response to
eign policy decisions are being made in Kyiv not on the
proposals for the installation of NATO anti-missile de-
basis of what appeases Moscow, but rather on what is in
Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
10
the immediate interest of Ukraine. This has prompted
participation so that it is beneficial to all actors involved.
Ukraine to engage in its balancing act, attempting to ex-
This relationship will undoubtedly be more complicated
tract concessions from both Russia and the Atlantic com-
than previous phases of NATO enlargement, but to expect
munity. Beyond expanding opportunities for practical cooperation, NATO member states
it to be otherwise would be to succumb to
The country is seeking to forge a path of its own...
might induce better political
the same chauvinism with which Russia has pursued its relationship with Ukraine. In fact, by regarding Ukraine as ‘Little Russia’, Putin has been confounded by Ukraine at
cooperation from Ukraine by using a ‘tough love’ ap-
every turn. Avoiding such tropes will allow NATO and the
proach. The Ukrainian authorities sought international
EU to secure a productive partnership with Ukraine.
prestige and domestic favour by bidding for the OSCE
About the author
Chairmanship. It has received both, while the failures on the Transnistrian front indicate that Ukraine is not making
Paul Pryce is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic
a valid contribution in this new role. Recently, Ukraine
Council of Canada. With degrees from the University of
indicated that it wishes to obtain a non-permanent seat on
Calgary and Tallinn University, he has previously worked
the UN Security Council in 2016-2017. NATO and EU
in conflict resolution as a diplomatic aide at the OSCE
member states should respond by setting out conditions
Parliamentary Assembly.
that Ukraine must meet in order to receive support in this bid for a seat on the Security Council. For example, prior to the vote on seat allotments for the 2016-2017 term in the Security Council, Ukraine should be expected to hold talks and produce tangible results on the Transnistrian conflict. Only when these conditions are satisfied can Ukraine expect to receive votes supporting its bid. Meeting these terms will be exceedingly difficult, but necessary to demonstrate to the Ukrainian leadership that not only does their geopolitical situation not constitute a blank cheque but that Ukraine must also demonstrate its capacity to be a reliable and earnest partner in order to receive further assistance on the modernization and professionalization of its military forces. The Next Steps for NATO As has been discussed here, Ukraine is not a Russian buffer nor is the country beholden to Russian interests alone. Rather, the country is seeking to forge a path of its own, balancing the competing influences of Russia and the Atlantic community. In the course of this, Ukraine has become involved in NATO operations and regional arrangements that also involve NATO member states. The next step is to develop more opportunities for Ukrainian Atlantic Voices, Volume 3, Issue 7
Bibliography Interfax. (2013, May 20). Russian Navy Favours Novorossiysk Base Over Sevastopol. http://www.militarynews.ru/fcl_l/enews.asp?id=202115 .
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NATO. (2010, November 12). Ukrainian ship joins NATO’s counter-terrorism surge in eastern Mediterranean. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_68152.htm. 3RIA Novosti. (2013, February 22). Ukraine Joins NATO’s Counter-Piracy Operation. http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130222/179631923.html. 4NATO. (2008, July 31). KFOR Chronicle Issue 7. http://www.nato.int/kfor/ chronicle/2008/chronicle_07/chronicle_07.pdf 5NATO-Ukraine Commission. (2003, June 12). Statement, Meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03067e.htm. 6Interfax-Ukraine. (2013, March 26). Poland’s minister: Treaty on Formation of Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian battalion may be signed in Q3 2013. http:// www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/polands-defense-minister-treaty-onformation-of-lithuanian-polish-ukrainian-battalion-may-be-signed-in-q2-2013322292.html . 7Simons, Greg. (2010). Ukraine’s Peacekeeping Activities: United Nations and Partnership for Peace. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. p.7 8Ukrainian News Agency. (2013, May 13). Ukraine to participate in 24 combined military exercises in 2013. http://un.ua/eng/article/449273.html . 9Kyiv Post. (2013, February 12). Sea Breeze 2013 participants to focus on evacuation. http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/sea-breeze-2013participants-to-focus-on-evacuation-320296.html . 10OSCE. (2013, April 27). OSCE Chairperson calls on Chisinau and Tiraspol to preserve stability and keep calm in the region. http://www.osce.org/ cio/101095. 11Novinite. (2012, April 17). Russia to Deploy Missile Defence Radar in Transnistria. http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=138577 12Kuzio, Taras. (2012, December 14). “Ukraine’s Arms to Syria Set to Grow, While Ukrainian Nationals are Targeted by Anti-Assad Forces” Eurasia Daily Monitor. http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews% 5 B t t _ n e w s % 5D=40251&cHash=dc1ee159354f36364d507f55fabde69d#.UbBOUEA4uSo . 13Interfax-Ukraine. (2013, June 4). Foreign minister: Ukraine wants to be nonpermanent UN Security Council member in 2016-2017. http:// en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/155586.html . 2
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ATA Programs From 27-30 June, the Azerbaijan Youth Atlantic Treaty Association hosted a successful workshop in Novkhani on “NATO and the
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.
South Caucasus—Challenges and Opportunities from the Perspec-
The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-
tives of Azerbaijan and Georgia.” The event was extremely success-
governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global
ful, featuring representatives throughout the region and beyond.
networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with
From 6-7 September, the Latvian Transatlantic Organization
academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes
(LATO) is hosting the
the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,
annual and international
Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37
renowned
“Riga Con-
countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996,
ference.” The confer-
the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially
ence will feature states-
include to the successor generation in our work.
men and international
Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and
officials from the highest levels to discuss issues of key concern to
understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security
Europe, NATO and the Baltic region. Check out the LATO web-
through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern
site to learn more at: www.rigaconference.lv.
European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform. In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the
From 6-8 June 2013, the Atlantic Council of Montenegro hosted the very successful To Be Secure (2BS) Forum in Budva, Mon-
constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:
◊
tenegro. Check out the review and videos online at: www.2bs.me.
security issues.
◊
Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editor: Jason Wiseman Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.
the establishment of new and competitive programs on international
the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.
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activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.
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