in terms of engaging NATO in costly asymmetric arms races,
geting strategies and other policies which are liable to have direct
where relatively cheap ballistic missiles (as discussed earlier, the
implications for the relative safety and security of NATO citi-
cruder the better) pitted against expansive and complex defense
zenry. Arguably such a shield encourages a regression in terms of
systems. In addition, more technologically capable states are likely to
targeting priorities. Faced with a real possibility that when calcu-
increasingly rely on the development of countermeasures such as
lating the impact of a strike, it cannot be guaranteed that weap-
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capa-
ons will get through, or that larger numbers of cruder weapons
ble ballistic missiles, which, due to their fragmentation into mul-
may be required to counter the threat of a defense shield, states
tiple warheads (or decoys and warheads), are infinitely more
are more likely to opt for strategies which focus on counter-
difficult for NATO systems to neutralize, requiring the develop-
value (i.e. the targeting of civilian population centers) opera-
ment of far more complex and invasive “boost phase” intercep-
tions. This goes for all ballistic missile deployable weapons, be
tors in order to deal with such a threat.
they non-conventional weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or conventional warheads. As an addition to
States are almost certain to seek to develop alternative strategies to outflank a missile shield. During the 2003 Iraq war it was noted that ballistic missile defense systems are poorly equipped to
At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security provided to NATO citizens; more likely is it actually undermines that security.
deal with the threat of cruise missiles and
this, the potential for such a capability in the possession of NATO may have worrying consequences in terms of lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons, and encouraging their proliferation.
light aircraft. Both of which are actually more effective mecha-
States may consider the use of ballistic missiles a safe method of
nisms for the deployment of chemical and biological agents.
“signalling” resolve and intentions to NATO powers. Whilst this
Whilst light aircraft attacks may seem highly unlikely and easy to
may be seen as a somewhat extreme idea, with more states in
counter with conventional air-power, the threat of cruise mis-
possession of such weapons (as a result of the active proliferation
siles developed for long range attacks is certainly not one to be
of technologies by NATO’s global strategic “rivals”) the possibili-
taken so lightly. These systems are potentially cheaper to manu-
ties become more likely. In 1986, Libya launched ballistic missile
facture than ballistic missiles and easier to deploy.
attacks on the US Coastguard station on the Italian island of
The potential for missile defense shields to become a vehicle
Lampedusa. The missiles overshot their intended target, but
for the militarisation of space must also not be overlooked. The
were fired in retaliation for the US bombing of Tripoli. So far
importance of communications and satellites in NATO’s missile
this has been the only incident of NATO territory being targeted
defense system cannot be stressed enough in the numerous
by hostile ballistic missile forces.
NATO web-pages, booklets, and graphics. Targeting this weak
It must be noted that any effective missile shield may carry
link may become the primary focus of those who feel threatened
with it a certain opportunity cost. Successfully creating an effec-
by such a shield. This is a trend NATO should not be encourag-
tive shield will actively incentivize states to adopt new strategies
ing, in the same vein as it should not be attempting to encourage
which will allow them to achieve some form of strategic parity
the abandonment of other internationally agreed arms limita-
with adversaries. For the primary target of NATO’s missile
tions.
shield, Iran, this could almost certainly involve greater support
Additionally, NATO needs to consider some of the ways in
for terror groups. In the early years of the Cuban revolution, in
which a civilian missile defense shield may actually prove counter
response to fears over believed US hostility, and in the knowl-
-productive in creating a safer environment for the citizens of
edge that Cuban conventional forces would have great difficulty
NATO states.
in imposing costs on the US and its civilian populations, the Cu-
As has now been examined in some detail, a costly and com-
ban government embarked upon a number of measures designed
plex missile defense shield is vulnerable to technological shifts by
to redress this situation. Best known are the agreements made
adversaries, however it is also important to examine how such a
between Cuba and the USSR, which led to the Crisis in 1962,
shield may also impact adversaries and potential adversaries tar-
but less well known is the Cuban support for terrorist groups in
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
8