re-fit and repair, and one undergoing training and leave in prepa-
acutely from the issue of limited interceptor stockpiles due to
ration of deployment. Unlike submarine based nuclear CASDs, a
the restrictions on their carrying capacity and their need to be
missile defense CASD would also remain vulnerable (despite the
flexible in the capabilities they can bring to bear against a variety
potency of the ship’s weapon systems), with surface vessels un-
of targets.
able to “get lost” like their submersible counterparts, this in turn
The current defenses are also woefully inadequate in terms
would require additional assets to be deployed in support to
of their inability to deal with other threats. In particular the re-
strengthen this potential weak link in the defense chain. In regards to all systems, the limited number of interceptor launchers, and current procedures calling for multiple
cent 2003 Iraq war, in which both sys-
In many ways, the primacy of such a program serves to re-impose a kind of siege mentality, largely absent since the end of the Cold War.
interceptors to be launched per target,
tems were deployed, saw both light aircraft and cruise missiles fail to even be picked up by the systems, let alone intercepted. Whilst it may be possible to dismiss these failings by arguing other tradi-
the system is vulnerable to “swarming” by opponents. In order to
tional NATO air assets should be able to adequately deal with
counter this blatant vulnerability the system will require signifi-
such threats, such crowding of air space, using craft from multi-
cant expansion in its scope. The “success” of the recent NATO
ple states, and with a defense system that requires very fast deci-
test of the system has been pointed to as a vindication of the
sions to be made is a recipe for friendly fire casualties, as oc-
program, yet the system remains vulnerable under “combat”
curred in the 2003 Iraq war for just this reason.
conditions. The particular characteristics of the PAC 2 and PAC 3 systems have been discussed already, but previous experiences
The consequences of a shield
of missile defense during the wars in the gulf have shown that,
However, beyond these weaknesses, which can be potentially
remarkably often, the poor quality of missiles manufactured
rectified with massive increases in the scope and cost of the pro-
makes them undertake unpredictable flight paths. This makes
gram, there are more concerning potential implications, espe-
them hugely difficult for PAC 3 hard kill missiles to hit, and still
cially where expansion of the program is concerned.
difficult for PAC 2 to neutralise. In addition to this, as midcourse
A major point of contention between NATO and the Russian
interceptors, both risk the contamination or collateral damage
Federation has been NATO’s plan for a missile shield. Russia
from their interceptions within NATO territory for example as
fears that such a shield is designed to challenge its continuing
wreckage or payloads from successfully intercepted missiles fall
nuclear parity with the North Atlantic Alliance, and the United
over NATO territories. Naval assets are likely to suffer more
States in particular. This is a point of serious contention for a
US missile cruisers launch test missiles (Photo: US Navy)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
6