Atlantic Voices Vol 4, no. 10 (october 2014)

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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Volume 4 - Issue 10 October 2014

NATO Summit Review September was a key month for NATO: the Summit in Wales gathered all the leaders of the member and partner countries in order to discuss the future of the Alliance. What was meant to be an event to assess the relevance of the organization in today’s world turned out to be a reaffirmation of its goals. Considering the recent crises that have emerged right at the door of NATO, namely the crisis in Ukraine, Syria, and caused by the emergence of ISIS, the Alliance is faced once again with threats to the security of its member states. NATO therefore needs to adapt to this new situation The coinciding Future Leaders Summit

NATO Wales Summit and Atlantic Council Future Leaders Summit official logos (Photo: NATO)

Contents: Communicating The NATO Summit: A View From The Inside

enabled the young generation to also debate on

Daniel Hatton offers an interesting insight on the Wales Summit, both from a

issues the Alliance is currently facing.

British and from an organizational perspective, presenting the challenges and

This issue of Atlantic Voices focuses on

expectations from the Wales Summit.

the Wales Summit as well as the parallel Future

NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A Changed Security

Leaders Summit, and their outcomes. The

Environment

articles aim at providing several viewpoints on

Marte Ziolkowski, from the Norwegian delegation,examines the various topics

common threats, and how to respond to them

that have been touched upon during the Future Leaders Summit, from the dif-

through NATO. A month after the NATO

ferent security threats to the future of the Alliance.

Summit, this issue of Atlantic Voices presents

A View From Canada

some of the outcomes of the Summit.

Julie Lindhout and Christian Paas-Lang present the perspective of Canada: how

- Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

they prepared, and what they took home from the Summit. 1


Communicating The NATO Summit: A View From The Inside By Daniel Hatton t all happened very quickly. NATO had not held a Summit since Barack Obama had invited his fellow heads of state and government to his home patch of Chicago, Illinois in 2012. NATO, unlike the European Council, with its regular meetings of President and Prime Ministers, only meets around every two years or so. At the height of the Cold War, Alliance leaders only met once between 1957 and 1974 – they became a bit more regular after that.

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But what was the Summit going to be about? What would the big issues be? What would our narrative be? All good questions. And we thought we had decent answers.

 Afghanistan: 2014 would see the end of NATO’s ISAF mission, which for over 10 years had fought to stop Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. We’ve built up the ANSF. We were looking So when the forward to launching Prime Minister decided Resolute Support. back in September 2013 Capabilities: we wanted that the UK would host to strengthen NATO’s the next NATO Summit, ability to deliver security it was a big deal. The UK, for its members by makMember States Leaders during aircraft demonstration (Photo: NATOWales) while no stranger to playing an ing sure it was fast, flexible important role within the transatlantic alliance, was sudand fit for the future. denly thrust to the forefront. Every word from “our Summit hosts” would be scrutinised, every action ana Partnerships: NATO’s 2010 strategic concept outlysed, and, in the digital world we live in, every tweet lined ‘cooperative security’ as one of the Alliance’s core re-tweeted. For the UK Delegation to NATO, where I tasks. An important part of Future NATO would be to work, it was going to be a big challenge. This, in the strengthen and deepen NATO’s already large network of words of a former Ambassador, “small but perfectly partners, both politically and operationally. The Summit formed” part of the UK Government was going to have would look to deliver on all these. to step up to the plate; but it was a challenge we relished. From a communications perspective, things got  And then Russia annexed Crimea, and continues off to an interesting start. High international diplomacy to destabilise the east of Ukraine. Russia’s actions threatwas conducted before the public announcement of the ened the Alliance’s vision of a Europe whole free and at UK’s intention to host the Summit over what hashtag to peace – the very thing NATO leaders had committed to use. The nature of working in a multilateral setting the last time they met in the United Kingdom in 1990. meant that there were many different stakeholders to The Wales Summit had just got a whole lot bigger. coordinate with. In the end we managed to settle on one, and people used it, quite a lot.

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Comms Approach Now I would like to talk a bit about what it was like to work on the Summit, what I did, and what happened at it. As I mentioned earlier, I work at the UK Delegation to NATO, which was at the heart of the UK’s effort to deliver the Summit. The Summit presented many challenges. Security; logistics; policy; communications; accommodation; catering – the list goes on. My small part in this was communications. Working with two other colleagues in UKDEL’s communications team, we helped to deliver the UK’s communications output around the Summit. What it means is that we used all the tools we had at our disposal, from the traditional, such as press conferences, briefings, articles, speeches, events and interviews; to the more modern and innovative, including digital and social media.

press briefings for the Brussels based press corps, and one pre-Summit brief to correspondents based in London. One of the challenges of working with media on a high profile international event is that for most of the journalists covering the Summit, NATO wasn’t really their patch. So we needed to do a lot of work to bring them up to speed on some of the basics. What is the NAC? What is Article 5? What is ISAF? The press briefings, as well as conversations with journalists on the margins, provided opportunities for us to inform their reporting, as well do a bit of NATO jargon busting (the Alliance uses a staggering amount of acronyms).

Promoting Wales on the international stage was another important aspect of the comms for the Summit. At NATO HQ, UKDEL played its part. While most of Brussels was on its holidays in late July, we hosted On the press side, we used the increased media to NATO and national delegation staff for a ‘pre-Summit set up media opportunities for our Ambassador, the Foreign party’, which allowed staff at HQ to get a ‘taste of Secretary and the Defence Secretary. Every two months or Wales’, in the midst of the final preparations for the so, NATO foreign and defence ministers come to Brussels Summit. But the biggest event was by far the UK-hosted to assess, steer and drive forward the work of the Alliance. foreign ministerial dinner in June. Here, we used the These high-level meetings have always garnered media atopportunity of the last meeting of NATO ministers betention, but the added focus fore the Summit to give NATO foreign ministers themof the Russia/Ukraine criselves a ‘taste of Wales’. Mesis, and the steady progress dia, including the BBC and towards the Wales Summit, ITV, and various print journalmeant there was even more ists from Wales, were invited media attention on these to cover the arrivals and welmeetings. The UKDEL come reception, where miniscomms team managed to ters were able to enjoy fresh find some time in busy minWelsh produce. The First Ministerial schedules to organise ister for Wales also attended various media engagements, and gave a speech. Dinner was i n c l u d i n g literally ‘food for thought’, as ‘doorsteps’ (where ministhat evening, ministers had imters make comments on arriOsprey landing (Photo: NATOWales) portant discussions on NATO’s val and departure from NATO HQ), and interviews with Open Door policy; agreeing a substantive package to help various broadcasters, including the BBC and the British Georgia come closer to NATO; and an opening of intenForces Broadcast Network. sified and focused talks with Montenegro. Outside of ministerials, we organised media engagements for our Ambassador, Sir Adam Thomson. Press briefings formed the most important aspect of these engagements. Our Ambassador conducted several well attended Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

But before we knew it, the Summit was upon us. As part of a 60 strong UK media liaison team, I headed to a Summit which we at UKDEL had been working on for nearly a year. It was great to see the announcements, 3


speeches, meetings, plans and drawings, come together into the ‘real thing’. Plans for displaying military capabilities on site had turned into reality: an F35 here, a Eurofighter Typhoon there. Celtic Manor, the Summit location, had a real buzz about it, helped by the presence of more than 1000 representatives of the world’s media. And the weather was fantastic.

So after almost a year of planning, press, meetings and media, the Summit was finally behind us. The key thing now, as new NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed in his first public remarks earlier this month, is to implement the Summit decisions. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, and the threat posed by ISIL, show that we live in As the media a dangerous and unliaison officer responpredictable world. sible for NATO’s cenNATO’s core task of tral Asian partners, I collective defence, as helped facilitate the well as the tools it media activities of the Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and British Prime can bring to crisis heads of delegations Minister David Cameron (Photo: NATOWales) management and cofrom these countries. These were mainly focussed operative security, show that the Alliance matters now around the ISAF session (the final such meeting beas much as ever. fore the end of the mission in December 2014), Next stop, Warsaw 2016. where central Asian countries had made important contributions. Day two of the Summit saw some spectacular set piece events, as well as some meaty policy decisions. Leaders (and media liaison officers) got up early to watch a flypast by fighter jets from nations that had contributed to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, which has been strengthened as part of ongoing reassurance measures. At lunchtime there was a landing of an Osprey aircraft (which can take off and land both vertically and horizontally), to mark the opening of NATO’s Special Forces operations HQ. But the main headlines on day two were on the policy side of things, mainly the announcement of a ‘spearhead force’, which will be able to be deployed across Alliance territory in 48 hours. The spearhead force, known in NATO jargon as the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task force), provided one of the main components of the Readiness Action Plan, which was also agreed at the Summit. Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

About the author Daniel Hatton studied International Relations (BA Hons) at the University of Leeds, Daniel moved to Brussels for an internship in the European Parliament. Working for a British Labour MEP, Daniel followed policy matters on the EP’s civil liberties, justice and home affairs committee. After completing his internship, Daniel worked for The Parliament Magazine, organising EU policy events and discussions. Since May 2013 he has worked on press and communications at the UK Delegation to NATO, where he was involved in the UK’s cross-Government communications campaign for the NATO Summit in Wales.

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NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A Changed Security Environment and the Ukraine crisis. The rhetoric used by nearly all

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By Marte Ziolkowski eeks have passed since the world leaders gathered at Celtic Manor in Wales to discuss the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the time leading up to the summit, the media attention was high and the expectations were even higher. The Summit in Wales started a new chapter for NATO in a highly unstable security environment. In this article I seek to address some of the impressions I am left with after attending the coinciding Future Leaders Summit, and the key challenges I believe the Alliance will be facing in the future. The Crisis In Ukraine At The Top Of The Agenda At the opening of the Wales Summit in September, the then Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, started off by stating that the Summit was “one of the most important summits in the history of the Alliance” and “a crucial summit at a crucial time”. 65 years after the Alliance was created to “keep the Russians out”, using Lord Ismay’s own words, it seems that the recent changes in the security environment in Europe have made this quote relevant again. The illegal Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the crisis in Ukraine altered the entire NATO summit agenda. Before the crisis in Ukraine burst, it was expected that the 2014 Summit would be the meeting where the members states needed to find a new raison d’être for the Alliance, as international forces were being withdrawn from Afghanistan and the international engagement was coming to an end. It was therefore expected that the withdrawal from Afghanistan would be the main discussion point at the summit. However, the recent Russian aggression and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine made Afghanistan a much smaller issue on the summit agenda. In other words, the overshadowing topic at the Summit was, without comparison, how to handle Russia Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

government officials speaking at the Future Leaders Summit was condemning, critical and clear: Russian aggression is not acceptable and poses a direct threat to the entire European neighbourhood. However, handling the threat and ensuring the security of all member states is not as straight forward. The crisis in Ukraine has put focus on some of the key challenges for the member states in the time ahead. Failing To Meet The 2% Defence Spending Guideline European member states still do not take enough financial responsibility for their own security. The situation in Ukraine puts the NATO allies under pressure when it comes to realizing the weakness of their current capabilities given the steadily declining defence budgets. Collective defence was a key word at the Summit, but at the moment, the military capabilities are too weak for the “collective defence” to have serious meaning. The US remains the main contributor to the NATO defence budget covering almost 75% of the expenditures. There were high hopes that the threat of military invasion from the East would mean that the European member states would own up to the responsibility. However, although there was an agreement at the Summit, the language in the Wales Declaration reveals that there is still a serious lack of political will. The agreement states that: “Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will: (…) aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets filling NATO’s Capability shortfalls”. Not only is the phrasing unambitious, but the language is vague and puts little pressure on the allied nations. This is not surprising, but disappointing. The Threat in the South: ISIL The threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was another key topic at the Alliance. Although 5


many speakers at the Future Leaders Summit spent most of their time focusing on the current crisis in Ukraine, some also focused on that from the extremist Islamist group. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Børge Brende, was one of them. He underlined that there is a need to tackle the threat from ISIL, who, with their brutal violence and crass rhetoric towards the West and Western values, pose a direct threat to the Alliance. If ISIL continues on the road that they have started on, it could be that NATO’s next Article 5 intervention will not happen in Eastern Europe, but in the South, at Turkey’s border. Although there was no agreement during the Summit, it was stressed in the Wales Declaration that ISIL poses a grave threat to the Alliance and that the member states condemned their actions in Syria and Iraq. However, there was no agreement at NATO-level to commit to any particular actions.

sia, other member states are more concerned with the situation in the Middle East. The member states need to return to the common basis that NATO was founded on, and the member states need to combine their resources, and also figure out where to use them. Keeping Important Partners Close At the Summit, there seemed to be little will or wish to expand the Alliance in either direction. Both Montenegro and Ukraine seemed to have their hopes up before the Summit, but were quickly reminded that NATO is in no position to expand or negotiate new agreements at this point, especially not in the East. However, two countries that could join the Alliance without much debate are Finland and Sweden. In both of these countries, the discussion about joining NATO has reappeared in the media and amongst politicians.

There is no doubt that both of these countries are Nevertheless, during the Summit, the US infeeling Russia’s closer presence. Russia has violated vited a small number of countries Swedish airspace and one of Putin’s envoys threatened to join them in a coalition against Finland by saying “they should not join ISIL; namely Britain, France, NATO unless they want to start World Germany, Canada, Australia, War III”. Although the Finnish Minister Turkey, Italy, Poland and Denof Defence said at the Future Leaders mark. Although understandable, Summit that membership was currently this is also a worrisome move in not an option for Finland, both Sweden the position that the Alliance is and Finland were given a so called “Gold currently in. Characterized by Card” during the Summit, which in economic crisis and thereto low practice means that they are in a selectdefence budgets, there is little ed group of close partners to the Allithat needs to be added in order to ance. This could prove to be a wise drive the member states further move. Both countries have vast ecoapart with coalitions like these, as nomic resources and are better off fithis further adds to the Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Future Leaders Summit nancially than the majority of the weakening of a com(Photo: NATOWales) rest of the member states. By mon strategic culture in giving these countries this Gold NATO. This strategic culture could be the little Card, NATO facilitates a closer relationship while ennudge the member states need in order to overcome suring that the Swedish and Finnish governments will national differences and commit to joint efforts. The not have to face the domestic debate about whether or number of current crises has contributed to accentunot they should join the Alliance. This adds to the Alliating the diverse strategic environment surrounding ance’s resources, capabilities and training options. At the Alliance. While the Eastern European countries, the same time, NATO needs to be careful and they need with Poland at the forefront, are raising their awareto make sure they do not lose the incentive of memberness and focusing on the perceived threat from RusAtlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

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ship by offering agreements like these. Maintaining The Experiences And Interoperability From Afghanistan Afghanistan was downplayed in this Summit. Somewhat because the Ukraine crisis demanded the main attention of the politicians present, but also because there was, at the time, still no agreement between the two Afghani presidential candidates in regards to the outcome of the Afghani presidential election. Nevertheless, it was still on the summit agenda, and one of the main issues discussed was how to maintain the experiences NATO countries and their partners have achieved after over a decade in international military operations. The lengthy deployment to Afghanistan has taught the diverse national armies vital lessons. The interoperability and international training they have brought with them from this period needs to be maintained. This can be done through frequent training missions in all military branches, knowledge sharing and frequent exercises.

About the author Marte Ziolkowski works at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee and holds an MSc in Politics and Government in the EU from the London School of Economics where she specialized in European Security and Defence. She represented Norway at the NATO Future Leaders Summit in Wales. Her main fields of interest are NATO and NATO-EU relations.

Bibliography Barents Observer. Putin envoy warns Finland against joining NATO. [Online] Available from: <http:// barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/06/putinenvoy-warns-finland-against-joining-nato-09-06>; North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, NATO Funding [Online] Available from: <www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/topics_49208.htm>; North Atlantic Treaty Association Website, Wales Summit Declaration. [Online] Available from: <http://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm> The Guardian Online Edition, Nato summit in Newport 'one of the most important in alliance's history. [Online] Available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/ world/video/2014/sep/04/nato-summit-newportmost-important-in-alliance-history-video>

Joint Efforts And Commitment Needed To Ensure Strong Euro-Atlantic Defence The Wales Summit showed that the member states still see this alliance as an important one. There is no doubt that the member states still believe in a strong defence, they just do not have the means to build it. Combining resources, equipment and expertise will continue to be vital in maintaining a strong EuroAtlantic defence. However, the language in the Wales Declaration shows that there may not be enough political will to fulfil the standards that need to be met. The 28 member states need to find common ground in evaluating which threats are important – and which are not. The defence budgets will have to be increased accordingly. The crisis in Ukraine has put focus on some Without doing this, the Alliance of the key challenges for the member states in will be fumbling in an unstable the time ahead. security environment without the means and resources to handle an external threat if met with one.

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A View From Canada

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By Julie Lindhout & Christian Paas-Lang n January of this year, the upcoming NATO Summit in Wales looked to be a dull affair. Though the world continued to be wracked by crises, few of them directly impacted NATO states. Even the rapidly developing invasion of Iraq by ISIS forces concerned primarily just the United States, not NATO as a whole.

officials. NATO has other issues apart from the Ukrainian crisis. NATO faces many challenges in securing Afghanistan after the departure of the majority of International Security Assistance Forde (ISAF) troops. “Insider attacks” by Afghan security personnel against ISAF members occur often enough to be a real concern. The Taliban forces are still active in much of Afghanistan, as well as across the porous border in the tribal regions of Pakistan.

Events quickly robbed the summit of its potentially relaxed atmosphere. Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych’s decision not to embrace an EU partnership deal sparked massive street protests that eventually led to his removal and flight from Kiev on February 22, 2014. The ouster, deemed a coup by neighbouring Russia, incited a secessionist movement in much of eastern Ukraine, a region dominated by Russian speakers. In Crimea, the movement quickly developed into a rebellion encouraged and materially supported by Russia. Following a referendum in the Anders Fogh Rasmussen and David Cameron peninsula, Russia annexed Crimea on March 18. welcome Stephen Harper , Prime Minister of

The war in Afghanistan has had effects that reach beyond the country’s borders. Domestically, NATO states have struggled to address the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among war veterans. With fatigue and frustration running high from the experience in Afghanistan, interventions like those possible in Syria and Iraq appear even less attractive. Even a previously successful intervention in Libya in 2011 fades as that country has collapsed back into conflict.

In addition, given the economic downturn of 2008, most NATO countries Canada (Photo: NATO) have cut back substantially on their defence NATO’s response was swift. budgets, which will affect their ability to Scheduled joint military manoeurespond to any call by NATO to guarantee security, espevres with Russia were cancelled and NATO states imposed cially in the less capable states in Eastern Europe. sanctions on Crimean and Russian officials. Additional troops and warplanes were deployed in Romania, Poland NATO states, especially multicultural states such as and the Baltic states. Assurance of collective defence beCanada, have experienced strong debates regarding culturgan emanating from NATO headquarters in Brussels and al values, in part as a result of NATO’s actions overseas. from foreign offices on both sides of the Atlantic. Compounding this, the phenomenon of radicalization has led to nationals of NATO states travelling abroad to fight Despite this, the extent of NATO’s response sufin foreign conflicts, and returning home with dangerous fered immediately from some of the realities on the skills. ground. Direct intervention against the growing rebel movement in Eastern Ukraine, centred around Donetsk Roundtable, August 21, 2014 and Luhansk, was nearly impossible due to Russia’s masIt was against this background that the Atlantic sive deployment of troops to the border region. Political Council of Canada organized a Roundtable to discuss issues will in Atlantic states extended only so far as bolstering the for the then upcoming NATO Summit. Professor Stephen defences of NATO’s newest members in Eastern Europe. Saideman of Carleton University in Ottawa, and Professor David Wright, Kenneth and Patricia Taylor Distinguished Other political considerations factored into Visiting Professor in Foreign Affairs, Victoria College, NATO’s actions. Many European states continue to be University of Toronto, and former Canadian Permanent heavily reliant on Russian oil and natural gas for their enerRepresentative to NATO led a stimulating and informative gy consumption, weakening their leverage in potential discussion with interested attendees, several of whom negotiations. Canada and the United States, relatively were experts in international politics and security issues in independent from foreign energy imports, have been their own right. markedly more assertive than their neighbours across the Atlantic. As the insurgency in eastern Ukraine fully developed, further sanctions were laid against Russian and rebel Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

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The discussion first turned to what is perhaps the most pressing and most significant issue facing NATO today: its changing relationship with Russia. Though Putin is clearly the driving force behind Russian aggression, there was also a discussion of some dangers that Putin may be facing in the near future. First, the economic impacts of confrontation with the West may eventually undermine Putin’s support, as Russian integration into the global economy has made the country more vulnerable to international sanctions. Second, Russian nationalism, so long stoked by Putin, may be a force he is unable to control in the long run. Trying to tame Russian irredentism for practical purposes —compromise or accommodation with the West— may prove difficult and unpopular for the Russian president, who has gained enormous domestic support for his belligerent actions. Despite this, Putin risks solidifying a Russian isolation that neither he nor the country can survive. Participants felt that the situation had become even more dangerous as a result of the strong evidence that surfaced over the summer of Russian troops being active in Ukraine in support of rebel units. Some felt that marked a clear escalation of the crisis, an incontrovertible breach of international law and a strong challenge to the West and NATO. This new development would almost surely strengthen the need for NATO personnel to be deployed in countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to provide both security and assurance. The result from the emergency Security Council and NATO meetings would, no doubt, prompt additional measures, if need be. While the recent ceasefire in Ukraine was a heartening sign that peace could be restored to the region, there was some doubt as to how well the ceasefire would hold, or whether it would simply be a pause to allow the conflicting factions to regroup. Some suggested that NATO, in some ways, is reaping what it sowed in its waves of enlargement after the Cold War. While the perception in Russia that NATO expansion is aimed against it is misguided, Russia’s interests and strength should be taken into account. Russia has far too much influence in crisis zones like the Middle East and Central Asia to be ignored without consequence. Knowing this, it is interesting to see debate being sparked in countries like Finland, Sweden and Georgia concerning possible membership in NATO. Though talks are unlikely to start in the near future, renewed Russian aggression has led to renewed interest in NATO from countries that have traditionally been sensitive to Russian interests. It was suggested, however, that such developments can pose dangers to NATO and the countries involved. If NATO shows itself to be too willing to support these states, it risks escalating any possible conflict, as occurred in Georgia in 2008, by emboldening a faction. The situation in Afghanistan also featured heavily in the discussion. While official Canadian government policy makes it clear that Canada would have little, or nothing, to do with Afghanistan after the last of its troops has left, security concerns would remain. The Taliban continues to have a presence in the region, the Afghan-Pakistan border remains porous and the government unstable. NATO’s involvement has been expensive, both in human life and in money, and the ambiguity of Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

the mission’s success has contributed to growing warweariness in Western states. Nevertheless, no one could foresee 9/11, and no one can guarantee that there would not be some event of sufficient impact on NATO countries in the future, that might draw NATO in again. The situation in Iraq was also briefly discussed. The quasi-revival of the “coalition of the willing” by President Obama, this time to fight ISIL, was seen as an interesting development both in American foreign policy and in NATO’s role in Iraq. Many NATO states have already signed on to the mission, and Obama is working closely with Gulf and Arab League members to secure their support for a coordinated assault against the ISIL. The participants at the roundtable stressed the need for a representative government in Iraq, while underlining the difficulties of multilateral military operations. It was also suggested that thanks to the challenges it faces in Ukraine and elsewhere, NATO may be experiencing a rejuvenation it has been searching for since the end of the Cold War. Reorienting the Alliance from an organization explicitly meant to counter the Soviet Union to one relevant in the post-Soviet world has proven difficult. With Russia as a clear and present threat to peace in Europe, NATO has in some sense regained its initial purpose. Renewed Russian aggression may help to strengthen emphasis on transatlanticism, a policy focus previously losing ground to North America’s growing interest in the Pacific region. The Summit So how did the Summit in Wales actually deal with these issues? In the first place, the Summit addressed all the issues raised and a few more. According to the official text of the Wales Summit Declaration, its first order of business was to approve the NATO Readiness Action Plan (NRAP), an overarching plan “capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.” The plan includes a significant enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint task Force (VJTF). The VJTF will consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces support, which can be deployed quickly especially when challenges arise on the periphery of NATO’s territory. The NRAP also includes a greatly enhanced exercise program for all elements of the plan, including complex civil-military scenarios. There is special mention of a focus on the southern and eastern peripheries of the Alliance. Reading between the lines, that allows NATO to enhance its presence in those states without permanently stationing forces there, which Russia would see as a provocation, and which some of NATO’s member states would not agree to. The second major issue addressed in the Declaration is the need to increase defence budgets and the need for a more “balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”. While the Declaration acknowledges that “how we spend it” is also important, the major focus of Section 14, is on the amount of spending. There is much emphasis on the guideline for 9


member countries to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a guideline emphasized by successive Secretaries-General, but met by very few countries over the more than 60 years of NATO’s existence. The Declaration also makes very strong statements condemning Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine, including its “illegitimate ‘annexation’” of Crimea. It also identifies “Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law” referencing the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, citing Russian behaviour in Georgia and Moldova as further examples.

aim “to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational Ballistic Missile Defence” to protect all Europe, but emphasizes that this capability is purely defensive and can only complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. A large part of the Declaration is taken up with details of enhancements that have been made or will be made to the various elements of NATO’s capabilities including the Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative and the AWACs. It also describes various initiatives undertaken by groups of Allies for joint operations. Almost buried in the middle of the Declaration is a very important endorsement of an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy which acknowledges that a cyber attack could have sufficient harmful impact to make it an Article 5 attack, but that a decision to invoke Article 5 would be taken on a case-bycase basis.

The Declaration specifically acknowledges The Declaration gives measures taken by Canada, special recognition to the value of Norway, and the United partnerships with other organizaStates, as well as NATO’s tions like the UN, EU, the Afriimmediate decision to suscan Union (AU), and OSCE, in pend all practical civilian and enhancing international security military cooperation with especially in the face of terrorRussia, to put pressure on ism. It also celebrates internal Russia to deescalate and lead partnerships mentioning the 20 to a political solution in years existence of the Partnership Armed Forces Declaration by the NATO Heads of State and Ukraine. It emphasizes that for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Government (Photo: NATO) political channels of commuPartnership Council; 20 years of the nication will remain open, but that any sustainable, Mediterranean Dialogue; ten years of the Istanbul Cooperpolitical solution must respect “Ukraine’s sovereignty, ation Initiative, and the development of a Defence and independence, and territorial integrity within its interRelated Security Capacity Building Initiative to help partnationally recognised borders.” In other words, Russia ner nations. The first countries involved in this initiative is not entitled to keep Crimea. The declaration uses will be Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova, at their requests. the same terms of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity with reference to Armenia, AzerbaiThe establishment of a permanent position of jan, Georgia, and Moldova. NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security confirms NATO’s commitment to UN Security With regard to the situation in the Middle East, Council Resolution 1325, and also to UNSCR 1612 on the the declaration re-affirms NATO’s continued commitprotection of children affected by armed conflict. There is ment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, and states that also a strong statement on the Open Door Policy under NATO will consider other assistance measures within Article 10 of the Washington Treaty as one of the Allithe framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Secuance’s great successes. NATO’s door will remain open to rity Capacity Building Initiative if the Iraqi Governall European democracies who meet the requirements and ment should request it. The Declaration also expresses it is emphasized that “decisions on enlargement are for concern about developments in Syria and references NATO itself.” NATO’s role in deploying Patriot missiles to defend Turkey, and the role of NATO Allies in the still ongoSpecial mention is made of Georgia, including a call ing process of securing the destruction of chemical to Russia to reverse its recognition of South Ossetia and weapon material in Syria. NATO also continues to Abkhazia. Mention is made of the good progress made by stand ready to support Libya with advice and the willMontenegro, and that the aspirations of Bosnia and Herzeingness to develop a partnership which might lead to govina are fully supported, but that the country needs to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue. meet conditions set by the NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in 2010, before it can be admitted to the MemberNot surprisingly, the Declaration repeats the ship Action Plan. As at all Summits since the 2008 Buchastatement in the 2010 Strategic Concept that “as long rest Summit, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear continues to be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a alliance,” and affirms the “deterrence and security” mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been value of the nuclear forces of the United States, reached within the framework of the UN. The Declaration France, and the United Kingdom. It also restates the also expresses appreciation for the country’s long-standing Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

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commitment to NATO operations and to the NATO accession process. There is a separate Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan which outlines NATO’s commitment for short-term training, advising, and assisting of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014; contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF in the medium term; and strengthening NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan in the long term, with the commitment and cooperation of Afghanistan. Canadian Reaction Canadian media and government opposition parties have largely concentrated on the first two topics: the Response Force and the defence spending guidelines, but not with great enthusiasm. There has been little focus even on such previously hot button items as Ballistic Missile Defense and very few picked up on the issue of a cyber attack being a potential Article 5 attack. Most media commentators are skeptical at best about the extent to which the plans for the NRF will be implemented. Even in real crisis situations like Libya and Ukraine, they contend, there is no concerted effort to provide real resources. There is always much talk, but only certain countries provide the heavy lifting and it is not always the same countries. Even the most capable countries have pulled back in recent years in active operations, so how can one expect real commitments to the NRF? They also point to the fact that not all NATO members see the various crises in the same way, with the same degree of urgency, and the same willingness to act in the larger interest of the Alliance rather than in their narrower national interests. When pressed on the issue of defence spending, Prime Minister Harper has stated that 2% of GDP is an arbitrary amount. It is more important to look at specific expenditures that need to be made, rather than talk about spending a certain amount for the sake of spending it. He has also pointed out that when it was necessary, Canada spent a lot of money to equip its forces in Afghanistan and that the country continues to deliver military supplies to forces fighting ISIL in Iraq, contributes planes and ships when asked, and is spending a lot of effort and money in Ukraine. One media opinion writer also asked if countries were to meet their 2% of GDP targets in good times, would it be acceptable for them to lower their spending appreciably in bad economic times to match a reduced GDP? The fact remains, that on the whole the Canadian public is war weary and does not support significant defence spending. The general reaction after Canada’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been in effect to say, “We have done our bit, and now it is time to focus on domestic needs.” The official opposition New Democratic Party has always been pacifist, and the Liberal Party does not have a strong record from which to attack the government. The official statements from all opposition parties have usually promoted diplomatic efforts, and condemned specific expenditures, so there has been limited discussion of the broader defence spending issue in Parliament. Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10

Some more hawkish commentators have attacked specific examples of lack of spending, such as the delays in replacing aircraft and ships, and the need to provide better support to veterans, but they have not, by and large, supported the concept of spending a certain percentage of GDP, and have generally left the impression that when necessary, Canada will rise to the occasion and spend what it takes for its troops to do their usual excellent job.

About the authors Julie Lindhout is the President of the Atlantic Council of Canada. Julie previously worked as a secondary school teacherm , then for the Ontario Ministry of Education. In 1998, Ms. Lindhout established Lindhout Associates Education Consulting, and increased her involvement with the Atlantic Council of Canada (ACC) and became President in 2002. She has also been active in the Brussels-based Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA). She is also a director of the Canadian Turkish Business Council, the CanadaAlbania Business Council, and a member of the Ontario Special Education Tribunal. She is the recipient of a Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal. Christian Paas-Lang was the program editor for Canada’s NATO during his internship with the ACC in the summer of 2014. His interests are wide-ranging, including topics such as economics, security and international relations. He is particularly interested in European and Middle -Eastern history, international relations and culture. As a second year student, Christian has just started a specialist degree in International Relations at Trinity College, University of Toronto. He looks forward to eventually pursuing graduate studies in international relations upon the completion of his degree.

Bibliography Opencanada.org, The NATO summit: commitmentphobia [Online] Available from: http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/ roundtable/the-nato-summit-commitmentphobia/; Prime Minister of Canada, PM delivers closing remarks [Online] Available from: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm-deliversclosing-remarks-nato-summit; Prime Minister of Canada, The government of Canada’s response to the crisis in Ukraine [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/11/governmentcanadas-response-situation-ukraine-0; Prime Minister of Canada, PM concludes successful NATO Summit in Wales [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm -concludessuccessful-nato-summit-wales; Pugliese, David, Stephen Harper promises boost in defence spending but provides non details [Online] Available from: http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/ stephen-harper-promises-boost-in-defence-spending-but-providesno-details; Pugliese, David, Canada and Germany derail NATO request to increase military spending targets [Online] Available : http:// news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derailnato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, Wales Summit Declaration [Online] Available from: http:// news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derailnato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, NATO Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan [Online] Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm? selectedLocale=en

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ATA Programs In cooperation with NATO SPS, the Atlantic Treaty Association and the Atlantic Council of Georgia are organizing a workshop in Tbilissi,

Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to inform the debate on key issues that affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its goals and its future. The work published in Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals and researchers.

Georgia on November 25th to 28th. The aim is to provide high-level

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-

discussions and information sharing, in order to find solutions for today's

governmental organization based in Brussels working to facilitate global

emerging energy security challenges. The workshop will feature panels

networks and the sharing of knowledge on transatlantic cooperation and

on the role of international organizations, public and private stakeholders

security. By convening political, diplomatic and military leaders with

in energy security; terrorism and its implica-

academics, media representatives and young professionals, the ATA promotes

tions for energy infrastructure security and

the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty: Democracy, Freedom,

cyber threats to critical energy infrastructures.

Liberty, Peace, Security and Rule of Law. The ATA membership extends to 37 countries from North America to the Caucasus throughout Europe. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was created to specifially

Two months after the Wales Summit, The German Atlantic Asso-

include to the successor generation in our work.

ciation and the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) are organiz-

Since 1954, the ATA has advanced the public’s knowledge and

ing an international conference in Berlin to revisit key outcomes of the

understanding of the importance of joint efforts to transatlantic security

summit and to discuss the process of policy implementation. On 4-5th

through its international programs, such as the Central and South Eastern

November 2014, the conference will gather high level NATO representa-

European Security Forum, the Ukraine Dialogue and its Educational Platform.

tives and experts from acedemia, national

In 2011, the ATA adopted a new set of strategic goals that reflects the

policies, and civil society. The aim is to

constantly evolving dynamics of international cooperation. These goals include:

provide a public platform and a forum for

young voices in the Alliance.

the establishment of new and competitive programs on international security issues.

the development of research initiatives and security-related events for its members.

Atlantic Voices is always seeking new material. If you are a young researcher, subject expert or professional and feel you have a valuable contribution to make to the debate, then please get in touch. We are looking for papers, essays, and book reviews on issues of importance to the NATO Alliance. For details of how to submit your work please see our website. Further enquiries can also be directed to the ATA Secretariat at the address listed below. Editors: Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt

Images should not be reproduced without permission from sources listed, and remain the sole property of those sources. Unless otherwise stated, all images are the property of NATO.

the expansion of ATA’s international network of experts to countries in Northern Africa and Asia. The ATA is realizing these goals through new programs, more policy

activism and greater emphasis on joint research initiatives. These programs will also aid in the establishment of a network of international policy experts and professionals engaged in a dialogue with NATO.

The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.

This publication is co co--sponsored by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization


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