Chapter Two
2.1.7 Relativism
of some part of your world view. Willed ignorance actually takes some effort, and perhaps isn’t precisely the same as laziness. But it has the same basic effect: it prevents people from learning things that they may need to know, and so makes it more likely that they will make bad decisions, or turn their world views into value programs. Some people might even argue that there is no such thing as ‘Truth’, with a big capital T, referring to statements about the ultimate things like God, or justice, or knowledge, or reality. They might believe that it is pointless to claim that any given idea or belief or explanation of such things is true, no matter how well supported it might be by the facts or by logic. There might be an appeal to some kind of relativism as the reason for why there’s no such thing as an ultimate truth. And in that sense, this line of thinking is not truly lazy: it goes to some effort to seriously defend the claim that no one can make a serious claim about such things. But the real function of such assertions is to justify a refusal to think deeply and carefully about the things that matter. It may be the case that there are, or that there are not, ultimate truths about such things. But the intellectually lazy or willfully ignorant person does none of the work needed to find out. They actually do not know, and they have made their ignorance into a kind of rule for their thinking. It might not be polite or kind to name this habit ‘laziness’, but that’s what it really is. Just as one can be lazy at practical tasks like cleaning your house, you can be lazy in your thinking about pressing problems or important questions. And just as laziness in your practical affairs can hurt you eventually, there are times when lazy thinking can cause you great trouble later on, too. Lazy thinking can make it easier for others to manipulate and deceive you, for instance. And it can also paralyze you into doing nothing in situations where decisions must be made.
arguments that support their position while showing the problems with the opposing position. Consider, as an example, a debate about the moral permissibility of the death penalty. The speakers might take these two positions: A: The death penalty is morally permissible (for reasons x, y, z). B: The death penalty is not morally permissible (for reasons a, b, c).
When assessing the evidence for these claims, philosophers are trying to establish whether it is true or false that the death penalty is morally permissible. In this case the moral permissibility of the death penalty is being treated like a fact. Often beginning philosophers are not comfortable with treating moral, epistemic, or aesthetic claims as being either right or wrong. Philosophical claims are not scientific claims for which we can provide empirical evidence, and often both sides provide very compelling arguments. This can make it seem as if both sides are right. Sometimes it makes sense to search for a middle ground, however, it is not always possible or desirable. It is, furthermore, a contradiction to say that the death penalty both is and is not morally permissible. When is it morally permissible? What makes the death penalty morally permissible in some cases but not others? More needs to be said. Relativism is the view that a claim is only true or false relative to some other condition. There are many varieties of relativism: but the two most common kinds are: • Subjective relativism, also known as Personal Belief relativism, is the claim that the truth about anything depends on what someone believes. It is the view that all truth is in the ‘eye of the beholder’; or that something is true if (and only if ) someone believes it to be true, and then
2.1.7 Relativism
it is true for that person, and perhaps only for that person. In ethics, subjective relativism is the idea that an action
Philosophical arguments are often presented in the form of debates. Sometimes there are two positions that are opposed to each other, and each side presents
is morally right if the person doing that action believes it to be morally right. Nothing makes an action right or wrong except the judgment of the person doing it.
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