(Continued from previous page) well-founded fear of not receiving a fair trial. See Adkins v. Winkler, 592 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “A verified motion for disqualification must contain an actual factual foundation for the alleged fear of prejudice.” Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986). A mere “subjective fear[ ]” of bias will not be legally sufficient; rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Id. In this case, our review of the record—including the trial judge's passing reference to knowledge of events in a neighboring county caused by the April 30, 2014,
(Continued from previous page) the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused[.] §775.15(16) (a)4., Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). [Footnote omitted.] Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 775.15(16)(a) could not be applied to his case because the child's DNA [from the sixteen year old victim's impregnation] was not obtained during the “original investigation” within the meaning of the statute. The trial court denied the motion, noting that, between 2008 and 2010, law enforcement was “always exercising due diligence to try and find [Appellant]; therefore, the investigation, the original investigation never ceased and it was ongoing.” * * * We reject the trial court's conclusion that there was an “original, ongoing investigation” (emphasis
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storm—fails to show a basis for disqualification. Trial judges are permitted to be aware of events in their own communities, such as storms, flooding, construction projects, and so on. General observations acknowledging such awareness are insufficient to establish a basis for disqualification, absent a more particularized demonstration than was shown in this case. As to the claim that the trial judge ruled against petitioners on certain evidentiary matters, it is well-established that a judge's adverse rulings may not serve as a basis for disqualification. See Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 204 (Fla. 2010); Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Broward Cty., 810
added) sufficient to trigger the extension period of section 775.15(16) (a)4. We acknowledge that this statute was intended to apply where a DNA sample was obtained shortly after the commission of a crime where the identity of the source of the DNA is unknown. Here, Appellant was hardly unknown, as he was named as the child's father on the birth certificate. Nonetheless, our decision is dictated by the plain language of the statute and the fact that no DNA evidence of the crime was collected during the “original investigation” to preserve for comparison against an accused and thus trigger the application of the extension period under section 775.15(16)(a)4. During the period when police first learned of the potential lewd and lascivious behavior until the time the case was initially declared “inactive,” the onus was on the police to collect evidence to preserve for a later match—in this case, the DNA of the child. DNA evidence was collected only after Appellant was located by the investigating police department upon being arrested for a different charge, well after the original investigation had first been declared “inactive.” * * * We reverse and vacate Appellant's conviction and sentence, includ-
So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). ● In Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP et al. v. Ramone E. M.D. et al., 40 Fla. L. Weekly, D1801b (Fla. App. 2nd Dist., July 31, 2015), a medical group moved for a temporary injunction to prevent a physician from practicing medicine with another medical group in violation of a partner professional services agreement. Relying on Fla. Stat. § 542.335, the 2nd DCA held that it was improper for the trial court to consider whether the potential injury to the physician outweighed the threatened injury to the medical group. (Section 542.335(1)(g) specifically states that a court “[s]hall not consider any individualized economic or other hardship that might be caused to the person against whom enforcement is sought.”)
ing his designation as a sexual offender, as the extension of the statute of limitations period under section 775.15(16)(a) is inapplicable in the instant case. Appellant's prosecution was commenced over three years after the alleged crime was first reported and thus the statute of limitations has run. Accordingly, we direct Appellant's immediate discharge with respect to the charge at issue in this case. ● In deciding Axelis v. State, 40 Fla. L. Weekly, S423a (Fla. S. Ct., July 9, 2015), the Florida Supreme Court gave clarity to several previous appellate court decisions dealing with actual (versus possible, potential, or theoretical) conflicts of interest: [W]e consider whether a trial court is required to obtain a conflict-of-interest waiver when criminal codefendants are represented by the same lawyer but there is no actual conflict of interest between the codefendants. * * * To the extent that [various appellate decisions] hold that a waiver is required in the absence of a determination that an actual conflict of interest exists, they are inconsistent with our holding and are disapproved to the extent of the inconsistency. [Emphasis added.]