How Communication Saved the World: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Wynne- Penkovsky Espionage | Kat Jivkova

By Kat Jivkova

The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the US and the Soviet Union into a dangerous standoff lasting thirteen days in October of 1962. Known as the ‘biggest Cold War confrontation’, the origins of the crisis lay in the alignment of Cuba with the Soviet Union under leftist leader Fidel Castro. US officials anticipated that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would use Cuba to establish a military presence in the Western hemisphere, thus directly threatening American national security. On 14 October, these suspicions were confirmed. After weeks of hunting, the American U-2 spy plane finally captured images of missile sites near San Cristobal in Cuba. In the days to come, communication between Khrushchev and US president John F. Kennedy would be the most critical factor in deterring a large-scale nuclear war. On a smaller scale, the communication between spies Oleg Penkovsky and Greville Wynne was undoubtedly the most productive espionage of the crisis, enabling the British and Americans to obtain crucial Soviet intelligence.

The correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev during the crisis reveals the importance of communication in times of nuclear confrontation. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to start a nuclear war. Khrushchev provided Castro with ‘defence capabilities’ in order to protect Cuba from future invasions, and Kennedy interpreted this decision as a direct threat to the US – Soviet ballistic missiles had a range of over one thousand miles, hence could reach most major American cities within mere minutes of launch. At the beginning of the crisis, the two leaders exchanged a series of letters blaming one another for the crisis. A “flurry” of messages on both sides of the confrontation were sent over both formal and informal channels, resulting in dangerous misunderstandings, mistakes and misinformation. This is most evident following Kennedy’s decision to place a naval blockade upon Cuba at the beginning of the crisis.

Kennedy had consulted a newly created National Security Council known as ExComm – to assist him in the best course of action – following the discovery of missiles in Cuba. Over the next five days, Kennedy and his council made the decision to place a naval “quarantine” on Cuba in order to prevent any more missile shipments from entering the country. US Navy ships positioned themselves eight hundred miles from the Cuban shore in order ‘to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere,’ according to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Tensions rose further following Kennedy’s televised speech to the US public regarding Soviet plans in Cuba. Kennedy ended the speech by directly addressing Khrushchev: ‘I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.’

In response to Kennedy’s speech, Khrushchev responded that he did not intend to respect the blockade: ‘The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind towards the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war.’

The crisis escalated even further on 25 October during an emergency session held by the UN Security Council. This session was the wake-up call that Khrushchev needed. US and Soviet ambassadors, Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin respectively, engaged in a tense discussion over the existence of offensive nuclear weapons within Cuba. Zorin repeatedly tried to evade the question but was finally bested by Stevenson, who unveiled a presentation showing the U-2 spy plane photographs US forces has taken. Stevenson said: ‘We know the facts, and so do you, sir, and we are ready to talk about them. Our job here is not to score debating points … it is to save peace.’

Khrushchev was surprised by American response to Soviet missiles in Cuba. He was convinced that he would successfully be able to install missiles in

Cuba secretly, leaving the US with no choice but to concede to Soviet presence in the country. He stated:

‘we just wanted to intimidate them, to deter the anti-

Cuban forces.’ Khrushchev understood the severity of the crisis and decided that a better course of action would be to negotiate with the US. He sent Kennedy his first conciliatory letter on 26 October. The letter was long and filled with emotion. Khrushchev mentioned that he had no wish to relive the trauma of war, and reassured Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking the US from Cuba. He proposed that if the US removed the naval blockade and promised to not attack Cuba, then he would remove Soviet missiles from the island nation: ‘We and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the 38

rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied …let us take measures to untie that knot.’

Khrushchev sent a more aggressive letter the day after, before Kennedy had the chance to reply to the first. This was probably due to mounting pressures from hard-line communists within Khrushchev’s government. The new letter not only held a much more formal tone, but also added a new condition to ending the crisis: that the US were to withdraw their own missiles from Turkey. Kennedy faced a dilemma of how to respond to both these letters, which had been sent within a matter of hours. With the help of his brother, Robert, he decided to respond to the first letter on 27 October, agreeing to Khrushchev’s initial terms and promising to remove US missiles from Turkey in secret. Thus, the crisis ended on 28 October and the world was swept away from the brink of nuclear war.

While this much larger communication between two world leaders was happening, a high-grade exchange of information between foreign trade negotiator and engineer Greville Wynne and GRU officer (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff) Oleg Penkovsky played an important part in diffusing the crisis. Recruited by the CIA-MI6 team, Penkovsky desired to “save” the world from both communism and the Soviet military threat. Meanwhile, Wynne was chosen as the vital link between Penkovsky and the MI6, acting as a courier for important Soviet information. This included nuclear plans, identities of KGB officers, information about military headquarters and any missile developments. In the space of 14 months beginning in 1961, Penkovsky and Greville exchanged approximately 5,000 secret documents to the CIA-MI6 team.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Penkovsky provided Greville with information on every operational missile in the arsenal of the USSR, manuals for the mediumrange ballistic missiles that had been placed in Cuba, and for intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). These manuals enabled CIA analysts to discern the technical capabilities of the missiles deployed to Cuba by comparing them to aerial photographs taken at the beginning of the crisis. Penkovsky’s information also allowed the US National Photographic Interpretation Centre to identify the deployment patterns of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Subsequently, the National Intelligence Estimates, using Penkovsky’s documents, were able to advise Kennedy to avoid a direct military intervention in Cuba which undoubtedly would have escalated the situation. Alongside this, Penkovsky’s political information regarding mounting opposition to Khrushchev in the Communist Party pushed Kennedy to react in an even more decisive manner before the Soviet leader was cornered by his own subordinates. Thus, Penkovsky is regarded as the most active spy during the crisis, and his communication with Wynne enabled the CIA-MI6 handler team to understand Soviet intentions more clearly.

Beyond exchanges of information, Greville and Penkovsky developed a friendship in contrast to Kennedy and Khrushchev’s strictly professional correspondence. From ‘approved for release’ papers documenting the meetings between the two men, it has recently been revealed that Penkovsky met Wynne’s family and they shared many a drink. This remarkable relationship between two spies reflects the determination of both sides of the “Iron Curtain” to de-escalate a crisis that could lead to nuclear war. Unfortunately, both Penkovsky and Wynne were tried in Moscow in May 1963, with Penkovsky executed and Wynne sentenced to eight years in prison. The bravery of these men, and their espionage during the Cuban Missile Crisis will always be remembered as monumental in helping the world avoid an even larger nuclear crisis.

Ultimately, the communication between both Kennedy and Khrushchev and Wynne and Penkovsky demonstrate the ability for people in power to overcome their differences in order to ensure peace. While the correspondence between the two world leaders was initially unsuccessful, the turning point of the UN meeting allowed for communication to improve, with Khrushchev setting terms for the end of the crisis and Kennedy accepting. Contrastingly, Wynne and Penkovsky’s correspondence was conducted much more covertly and while it was successful for over a year, sadly ended with both men being arrested. Nonetheless, both forms of communication during the Cuban Missile Crisis were responsible for saving the world.