U-17 Championship 2013 by Concacaf

TECHNICAL REPORT U-17 CHAMPIONSHIP

Panama City, Panama 20 April 2013

Introduction

Pag 7

Preliminary analysis

Pag 7

III

Technical/tactical comments

Pag 8

IV Statistics: ďżź A Match results

B Most Valuable Players by match

C List of goal scorers

D Team statistics

E When the goals were scored

F Who scored the goals

G Where the goals were scored

H How the goals were scored

I Goal and card averages by match

J Average playing time per match

K Match attendance

L Average age by team

M. Number of changes in lineups by team

V. Conclusion

Pag 22

VI. Recommendations

Pag 23

Technical Analisys

Pag 24

VII

Pag 74

Refereeing Report

FOREWORD OF PRESIDENT

Dear CONCACAF Friends The future of football is truly promising in our region. The recent U-17 CONCACAF Championship is a cause for tremendous optimism to the CONCACAF family as it demonstrates the competitive potential our football holds. As we continue to focus on development, we will surely become a powerful force. The Rommel Fernandez and Agustin “Muquita” Sanchez stadiums hosted 20 vibrant matches in the country of Panama just a few months ago. Throughout the tournament, 12 talented teams delivered a remarkable sporting spectacle which resulted in 67 skillful goals. Furthermore, during an exciting final that attracted 17,572 fans, Mexico, which hasn't lost a U-17 match in CONCACAF since 2003, captured its fifth regional title against Panama to complete an outstanding performance during the 14-day tournament. Runners-up Panama, Honduras and Canada will join Mexico in the upcoming FIFA U-17 World Cup in the United Arab Emirates in October of this year. CONCACAF is developing a solid platform for youth teams. Our progress can be exemplified by the Panamanian U-17 team, which will be making its second straight U-17 World Cup appearance, displaying an evident advancement in the structure and standards of football. In addition, Canada and Honduras made CONCACAF history as they reached the semi-finals. This marks the sixth time that Canada qualifies for a FIFA U-17 World Cup, with Honduras reaching the global competition for the third time. Similarly, the success of the CONCACAF Under-17 Championship goes well beyond the sport. It also sets an unprecedented standards in our region as CONCACAF agreed to promote the United Nations ‘Protect the Goal’ Programme on HIV/AIDS, led by its UNAIDS division. For the first time, the captains of the top two teams made a pledge calling on players, football fans and young people to support the cause during the final game. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that all these favorable outcomes are the result of tremendous effort not only of players but of the tournament’s host. For this reason, we would like to express our sincere appreciation and recognition to the Panamanian Football Federation for their strong commitment to hosting a successful U-17 CONCACAF Championship. This marks the first time Panama has organized the CONCACAF finals and the first time a 12-team CONCACAF Under-17 tournament was held in Central America since 1994 in El Salvador. Likewise, we also feel grateful to the local authorities and business partners for contributing to the success of this tournament. CONCACAF will continue investing in youth development programmes and inspiring excellence, fair play and team spirit to prepare our talent for a promising future in international competitions. This will in turn be nourished by these technical study groups as essential components of the progress of all development initiatives. Sincerely,

Jeffrey Webb President

I INTRODUCTION The Technical Study Group (TSG) comprised Luis Hernandez and Keith Look Loy (Trinidad and Tobago), supported by Luis Manuel Hernandez (Cuba, IT and logistics) and Javier Ainstein, Francisco Bech, Pablo Ledesma and Ausberto Valencia (Panama, statistics). The TSG attended all matches of the tournament, and performed the following functions: - Technical/tactical analysis and reporting of each match - Interview of team coaches by questionnaire - Collection of match statistics - Selection of Team Fair Play Award for each match - Selection of Most Valuable Player for each match - Selection of tournament Most Valuable Goalkeeper - Selection of tournament All-Star Team - Preparation of tournament preliminary report

II PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS The following are important tournament statistics and conclusions of the TSG: Tournament Most Valuable Player JoseAlmanza (6, Mexico) Tournament Top Scorer

Marco Granados(17, Mexico)

Best Goalkeeper of Tournament Raul Gudiño (1, Mexico) Fair Play Award Mexico Tournament All Star team Goalkeeper

Raul Gudiño (1, Mexico)

Right Back

Kevin Alvarez (2, Honduras)

Centre Back

Pedro Teran (4, México)

Centre Back

Jesus Araya (6, Panama)

Left Back

Kevin Galvan (3, Panama)

Right Midfield

Ervin Zorrilla (18, Panama)

Centre Midfield

José Almanza (6, Mexico)

Centre Midfield

Jordan Haynes (11, Canada)

Centre Midfield

Hanson Boakai (10, Canada)

Left Midfield

Rembrandt Flores (11, Honduras)

Forward

Marco Granados (17, Mexico)

This is based on a 4-5-1 formation, which was the formation most used by participating teams (10).

III TECHNICAL/TACTICAL COMMENTS Physical/psychological condition: Players were generally in good physical condition but the flow of goals indicates a general inability to sustain an even physical effort over the full course of ninety minutes. Teams were able to apply pressure on the ball – wherever they established their defensive zone in the field – and to maintain their attacking rhythm for the most of the match. However, the high intensity of most matches did result in the onset of fatigue in the last fifteen period of each half resulting in lapses in defensive concentration, the breakdown of defensive organization, and the opening of attacking space. This produced thirty-two goals (or 48% of the total number scored). Team unity, fighting spirit and the will to win were not in short supply, and it was evident that no team approached any match with a sense of inferiority. Players demonstrated a capacity to play to the end of the match, e.g. Panama vs. Jamaica (1:1), with the host team’s equalizing goal coming in the 90th minute after much frustration, and even in the face of defeat, e.g. Cuba vs. Mexico (0:5), Haiti vs. USA (1:3) Warm-up: The warm-up routine of some teams did not adequately prepare the players for immediate action. In particular, the main areas to be improved would include: *Physical organization, specifically better use of equipment, space and players. Too often non-starters were left to their own devices while the starting team engaged in warm-up exercises. The latter were often required to prepare for the match in a space that was too small for their numbers. *Structure of the activity, i.e. the exercises employed, and their functionality and specificity to positions were not considerations in most warm-up routines. Only a few teams employed exercises that first involved the players in a general warm-up, followed by exercises that were of a functional nature, and specific to the players’ position in the team. *Intensity of the activity, i.e. the majority of teams, whatever the exercises employed, failed to warm-up with adequate intensity. It must also be said that few teams, e.g. Cuba, Mexico

and the USA took the time to warm up for the second half of their matches. Inadequate warm-up is a theme to which the Technical Study Group devoted comment after the Confederation’s Under-20 championship in Puebla, Mexico, and one which the coaches of the Confederation should address. Systems of Play: The 4-5-1 was the formation most used by participating teams (10). Haiti employed a 4-4-2 formation, while Mexico and the USA adopted the 4-4-2 in the last match of the group phase. Jamaica used both systems and changed to 4-3-3 when chasing a winning goal in its group match against Barbados. Guatemala employed a 3-5-2 formation in their first match (against Haiti) but changed to 4-5-1 against the USA in their second. Most teams varied their basic formation when in attack or defence, e.g. from 4- 5-1 to 2-4-4 (Haiti) or 3-4-3 (Panama). Technical level: The artificial field at La Chorrera negatively affected the ability of many players to perform with skill and the general level of individual and collective technique varied among the teams. Mexico and Honduras demonstrated a world class technical level within their squad that other teams generally could not match across their squad as a whole, even if these teams may have included some players of sophisticated technique among their numbers, e.g. Guatemala, Honduras and USA. A few teams, e.g. Barbados and Cuba clearly experienced significant technical problems – passing and control. Long passes and shooting to goal presented problems for most teams – due to technical errors and poor decision-making - and accounted for much easy loss of possession and wasted goal scoring opportunities. Successful long passes usually placed a lone attacker under tremendous pressure as he awaited midfield support. At the same time, the defensive heading of all teams was very good, as was their tackling in 1:1 situations. It must also be noted that participating teams displayed a generally high level of goalkeeping. Despite the excellent goals scored from outside the penalty area, shooting to goal lacked quality and was a distinct technical weakness of the tournament.

Tactical organization and approach: Never mind the tender age the players, the best teams in the tournament displayed a maturity that belied their years. In their technical sophistication, their organization on the field, and their application of individual and collective tactics, the best teams and players demonstrated a capacity to perform at the highest level of expectation. World Cup qualifiers, Canada, Honduras, Mexico and Panama all provided good examples in this regard, the Mexican team being a virtual carbon copy of their Under-20 counterparts who won the CONCACAF tournament in Puebla, Mexico mere weeks earlier. With the exception of Haiti and Mexico, participating teams employed a 4-5-1 basic formation based on a spine of two central defenders, one or two holding midfielders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the best teams employed two - and one attacking midfielder who joined the lone forward in attack. The key role of holding midfield pairs and their excellent coordination with the central defenders behind them, their marking and mutual cover, were vital to good team organization, e.g. Mexico and Canada. None of the teams applied high pressing on a consistent basis, midfield pressure being the norm as teams attempted to disrupt opposing attacks by denying time and space to opponents in that sector of the field. The defensive anticipation of the Haitians, in particular, was excellent in this regard and in 1:1 situations.

In attack, all teams varied their formation, e.g. to 3-4-3 or 2-4-4 as one (e.g. Mexico and USA) or both wing backs (e.g. Haiti) advanced to support midfield play while flank midfielders pushed into advanced positions alongside the forwards. Most teams attempted to construct their attack with midfield combinations but bad passing was an unwelcome aspect of the tournament as players struggled to maintain effective possession. While unfamiliarity with the artificial field In the Agustin Sanchez Stadium in La Chorrera may be partially responsible for this, it is clear that many CONCACAF teams at this level need to focus on developing the ability of their players to control, pass and combine at high tempo, in tight spaces and under pressure. There were exceptions to this general criticism, however. Honduras, Mexico, Panama, USA and Guatemala all provided examples of excellent skill in their constant player movement, rapid ball rotation, and one- and two-touch combination play. Few teams adopted counter-attacking tactics, Cuba, Honduras (against Mexico and USA) and Jamaica being the teams with the most interest in defending from a deep position and to attempt long passes into space behind the opposing defence as a strategic choice. While counter-attack at high speed posed severe problems for defences and accounted for several important goals, as a strategic choice it also accounted for much easy and early loss of possession and undermined the quality of the game.

Eliminated teams: Three of the four teams eliminated at the end of the group phase belonged to the Caribbean Football Union (Barbados, Cuba and Haiti), with one coming from the Central American Football Union (Costa Rica). The five Caribbean teams - Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago being the other two - played 10 matches in the group phase, winning one, scoring ten goals (30% of total), and conceding twenty-six (79% of total). Both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were eliminated in the quarter-final round, scoring four goals combined but together conceding eight goals. This weak performance underlines Caribbean football’s relative lack of competitive quality at CONCACAF level. The performance of Caribbean teams highlights their need to concentrate on improving, 1) the stability of their defensive organization in the field, - improving their compactness, marking and cover, 2) their ability to consistently score goals, 3) their ability to maintain individual and collective

concentration for the duration of the match, and 4) the individual and collective technique of their players, specifically their ability to play under pressure of limited time, space and opposition. Finally, most Caribbean teams arrived at the tournament without the benefit of pre-tournament friendly international matches, as compared to their opponents from Central America and, more so, North America. At Under-17 level, the lack of international experience badly affects the performance of Caribbean teams. The fact that CFU teams generally qualify for CONCACAF tournaments by playing very few matches highlights the need for a revision of the CFU format for qualifying teams to CONCACAF tournaments, in order to allow Caribbean participants more competitive matches ahead of such a major tournament as this. Costa Rica’s elimination in the group phase, coming weeks after their Under-20 team was eliminated by Cuba in the quarter-final round of their competition in Puebla, Mexico, should set off alarm bells for the traditional UNCAF powerhouse. Costa Rica managed only one goal in their two matches and conceded three. At the same time, USA’s failure to qualify for the 2013 FIFA Under-17 World Cup was another blow to their youth programme. This is the first time in fifteen tournaments that the USA has not qualified for the FIFA Under-17 World Cup. It is also the third time in three years that a USA team has failed to qualify in an age group competition after the Uner-

20s in 2011 and the Under-23s (Olympic qualifying) in 2012. The USA scored 5 goals in three matches and conceded three. Team/match management: The higher the level of competition, the greater the role of team and match management in the ultimate success of the team. This includes, 1) defining team strategy and tactics, 2) team selection, and 3) match management, including changes of player personnel, i.e. substitutions, and changes of tactics during the match. Changes of strategy, tactics and team personnel require much from young players. It would appear that at least some of the coaches in the tournament did not know their best starting eleven. Generally, the teams that altered their starting line-up and/ or formation from one match to the other were affected by the lack of stability. Jamaica made six line-up changes for their second match (two due to expulsion against Panama) and suffered throughout a tense match against unheralded Barbados for a 2:2 draw. Equally, after an excellent losing performance in their opening match against the USA, Haiti made two changes to their line-up and also changed their formation - from a four-man midfield playing in line to a narrow midfield diamond. This undermined their defensive rhythm and fluid passing, they failed to match the quality of their opening performance, and they exited the tournament. The only team to maintain a stable starting line-up in the group phase was Trinidad and Tobago. This paid dividends for the Caribbean team, which improved from its opening match loss to Canada and repaid the confidence of their coach by winning against Costa Rica and giving a cohesive performance in their losing quarter-final effort against Panama. At the same time, however, Mexico demonstrated their strength in depth by making six changes to their starting lineup for their semi-final match against Honduras and going on to win 3:1. Six substitutes repaid their coach’s decision to use them by scoring goals - Molina of Panama (1vs Jamaica), and Granados of Mexico (2 vs Cuba) in the group phase. Zuniga of Panama (1 vs Trinidad and Tobago), Adams of Trinidad and Tobago (1 vs Panama), and Elis of Honduras (1 vs USA), scored in the quarterfinal round, while Haynes of Canada (1 vs Honduras) scored in the third place match.

Interestingly, the leading scorer of the tournament was used mainly as a substitute – Marco Granados (17) of Mexico. Finally, some teams failed to properly warm-up their substitutes, both during the match and ahead of substitution into the match. Barbados was particularly negligent in this regard. Match attendance To say the tournament did not capture the imagination of the Panamanian public would be an understatement. Match attendance averaged just over five hundred (511). Only the matches of hosts Panama enjoyed higher attendance, with an average of 2’050 in the group phase, 6’853 at the semifinal against Canada, and 17’572 at the final against Mexico. Under-17 football may not be as popular as the higher level game and the exact reasons for the poor attendance are not to be discussed here but this contrasted sharply with the CONCACAF Under-20

tournament held in Puebla, Mexico a few weeks earlier. The Goals: The tournament enjoyed an average of 3.35 goals per match. This compares very well with the 3.0 goasl per match scored at the 2011 FIFA Under-17 World Cup in Mexico. A marginal majority of goals were scored in the second half of play (32 or 48%). The least number of goals (5 or 7%) were scored in the opening 15 minutes of the match, with the number of goals scored increasing in the second 15 minute period to 13 (or 19%) and increasing yet again to 15 (or 22%) in the final 15 minutes of the first half. The second half saw 8 goals (or 12%) being scored in the first 15-minute period of the second half, with 7 (or 11%) coming in the second period and 17 (or 27%) in the final period. These figures suggest, 1) teams were not physically and/ or mentally prepared for the opening of the match;

2) they were better able to score goals after playing for fifteen minutes resulting in a remarkable increase in productivity in front of goal; 3) they were able to further their goal scoring rate towards the end of the half; 4) they emerged from the half-time interval with renewed focus, which limited the goal-scoring rate; but 5) the onset of tiredness and the consequent loss of concentration at the end of the match (final 15 minutes) allowed yet another goal rush. All of this also suggests, therefore, that teams generally engaged in an inadequate warm-up, often lacking proper organization, structure and/or intensity. Further, it would appear that the general physical preparation of the players could be improved. Only Mexico had a warm-up of reasonably high intensity, which allowed them to begin the match with high intensity and to consistently score early goals.

Forwards scored minimally more goals (31 or 46%) than midfielders (30 or 45%), which demonstrates the importance of attacking initiative and scoring by the latter in the modern game. Defenders did not contribute many goals to the tournament (merely 5 or 8%) but two of these (by Alvarez against USA, and Wbias against Panama) were critical to securing a World Cup spot for Honduras and the tournament title for Mexico, respectively. Alvarez’s goal underlined the key role of the modern wing back in getting forward to support the attack and in taking chances to score, while Wbias’ goal highlighted the important role of centre backs in attacking corners. - The majority of goals were scored from within the penalty area (50 or 75%). Of these, 18 (or 27%) were scored from within the goal area. Nine goals (or 13%) were scored from shots taken outside the penalty area. These statistics point to 1) poor marking within the penalty and goal areas, and 2) lack of pressure on players in possession around the penalty

area, combined with the good shooting technique on the part of those players. The implications for team preparation (defensive organization, team compactness, marking and cover) are clear. - Nineteen players from nine countries scored the majority of goals (44 or 66 %). - Flank attacks (22 or 33%) and Individual plays (19 or 28%) accounted for the majority of goals. The former statistic highlights the fact that teams generally attacked with a balanced width (11 goals from both right and left). The latter statistic also underscores the fact that, in modern football, individual ability and creativity remain key to resolving the problems posed by collective organization and tactics of the opposing defence. - Set plays (free kicks and corners) were a solid source of goals (10 or 15%), providing Panama’s equalizer against Trinidad and Tobago in the quarter-final round, as well as both Mexican goals in the final. Only three penalties were awarded with all being scored (10%). Playing time: The average playing time in this tournament was 52.35 minutes per match, which exceeds the average playing time of 49:16 minutes at the recent CONCACAF Under-20 tournament in Puebla, Mexico. This average time is not too distant from the average playing time per match at the 2011 FIFA Under-17 World Cup in Mexico (56:59) and the 2011 FIFA Under-20 World Cup in Colombia (55:36). Notably, three matches – Cuba vs Mexico, USA vs Guatemala, and Mexico vs Guatemala exceeded one hour of play. One of the reasons for the favourable comparison with the Puebla tournament was the slower match rhythm of the Under-17 players, which allowed more ball possession by the teams.

A. MATCH RESULTS GROUP PHASE 6 April

0-2 Canada 1-1 Jamaica

Trinidad/Tobago Panama

7 April Haiti Cuba

0-3 USA 1-5 Mexico

8 April

2-2 Jamaica 0-2 Trinidad/Tobago

Barbados Costa Rica

9 April Guatemala 3-1 Haiti Honduras 4-1 Cuba 10 April

Canada Panama

1-1 Costa Rica 2-0 Barbados

11 April

USA Mexico

1-0 Guatemala 2-0 Honduras QUARTER-FINALS

13 April

Canada Panama

4-2 Jamaica 4â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2 Trinidad/Tobago

14 April USA 1-3 Honduras Mexico 2-0 Guatemala SEMI-FINALS 17 April Honduras 1-3 Mexico Panama 2-1 Canada 3RD PLACE AND FINAL 19 April

Canada Panama

2-2 Honduras *1:1(0:1) 4:2 Penalties 1-2 Mexico

B. MOST VALUABLE PLAYERS BY MATCH Trinidad/Tobago v Canadà:

Jordán Hamilton (Canadà, 9, forward)

Panamá v Jamaica:

Rushane McClymont (Jamaica, 6, centre back)

Haití v USA:

Christopher Lema (USA, 8, midfielder)

Cuba v México:

Luis Hernández (México, 7, midfielder)

Barbados v Jamaica:

Shaquille Boyce (Barbados, 10, midfielder)

Costa Rica v Trinidad/Tobago:

Akeem García (Trinidad/Tobago, midfielder)

Guatemala v Haití:

Christopher Ortiz (Guatemala, 7, midfielder)

Honduras v Cuba:

Devron García (Honduras, 6, midfielder)

Canadà v Costa Rica:

Jordán Hamilton (Canadà, 10, forward)

Panamá v Barbados:

Ervin Zorrilla (Panamá, 18, forward)

USA v Guatemala:

Christopher Lema (USA, 8, midfielder)

México v Honduras:

Ulises Jaime (México, 11, midfielder)

Canadà v Jamaica:

Andrew Gordon (Canadà, 14, midfielder)

Panamá v Trinidad/Tobago:

Ismael Díaz (Panamá, 10, forward)

USA v Honduras:

Alberth Elis (Honduras, 9, forward)

México v Guatemala:

Raùl Gudiño (México, 1, goalkeeper)

Honduras v México:

José Almanza (México, 6, midfielder)

Panamá v Canadà:

Ervin Zorrilla (Panamá, 18, forward)

Canadà v Honduras:

Jordan Hamilton (Canada, 9, forward)

Panamá v México:

Jose Almanza (Mexico, 6, midfielder) C. LIST OF GOALSCORERS

Four Marco Granados, Mexico (2 vs Cuba, 1 vs Guatemala, 1 v Honduras)

Three Ismael Díaz, Panama (2 vs Trinidad/Tobago, 1 vs Canada) Jordán Hamilton, Canada (1 vs Trinidad/Tobago, 1 vs Jamaica, 1 vs Honduras) Ervin Zorrilla, Panama (2 vs Barbados, 1 vs Canada) Salomón Wbias, Mexico (1 vs Honduras, 1 vs Panama)

Two Christopher Alegria, Honduras (1 vs USA, 1 vs Mexico) Jesús Araya, Panama (1 vs Trinidad/Tobago, 1 vs Mexico) Hanson Boakai, Canada (1 vs Costa Rica, 1 vs Jamaica) Shaquille Boyce, Barbados (2 vs Jamaica) Junior Flemmings, Jamaica (1 vs Panama, I vs Barbados) André Fortune, Trinidad/Tobago (1 vs Costa Rica, 1 vs Panama) Devron García, Honduras (2 vs Cuba) Andrew Gordon, Canada (2 vs Jamaica) Luis Hernández, Mexico (2 vs Cuba)

Ulises Jaimes, Mexico (1 v Honduras, 1 vs Guatemala) Christopher Lema, USA (2 vs. Haiti) Christopher Ortiz, Guatemala (2 vs. Haiti) Yorjdany Somonte, Cuba (1 vs Mexico, 1 vs Honduras) Khallil Stewart, Jamaica (2 vs. Canada) One Weah Adams, Trinidad/Tobago (1 vs Panama) Kevin Alvarez, Honduras (1 vs USA) Corey Baird, USA (1 vs Guatemala) Jorge Bodden, Honduras (1 vs Canada) Raffiqu e Bryan, Jamaica (1 vs Barbados) Marco Bustos, Canada (1 vs Panama) Jean Wisner Derival, Haiti (1 vs. Guatemala) Alejandro Díaz, Mexico, (1 vs Cuba) Marco Domínguez Ramírez, Canada (1 vs Trinidad/Tobago)

Alberth Elis, Honduras (1 vs USA) Rembrandt Flores, Honduras (1 vs Cuba) Jordan Haynes, Canada (1 vs Honduras) Mario Hernández, Guatemala (1 vs Haití) Milciades Molina, Panama (1 vs Jamaica) Steven Ramos, Honduras (1 vs Canada) Ahinga Selemani, USA (1 vs Haití) Brent Sam, Trinidad/Tobago (1 vs Costa Rica) Joel Sonora, USA (1 vs Honduras) Pedro Teran, Mexico (1 v Honduras) Arington Torres, Costa Rica (1 vs Canadá) Brayan Velásquez, Honduras (1 vs Cuba, 1 vs USA) Luis Zúñiga, Panama (1 vs Trinidad/Tobago) Víctor Zúñiga, Mexico (1 vs Honduras)

D. TEAM STATISTICS TEAM GP W L D GF GA YC RC Barbados 2 0 1 1 2 4 3 Canada 5 2 1 1 10 7 9 CostaRica 2 0 1 1 1 3 5 Cuba 2 0 2 0 2 9 4 Guatemala 3 1 2 0 3 4 3 Haiti 2 0 2 0 1 6 4 - Honduras 5 2 2 0 10 9 13 Jamaica 3 0 1 2 5 7 5 2 Mexico 5 4 0 0 14 3 3 Panama 5 3 1 0 10 6 3 1 Trinidad/Tobago 3 1 2 0 4 6 8 1 UnitedStates 3 2 1 0 5 3 2 E. WHEN THE GOALS WERE SCORED

H. HOW THE GOALS WERE SCORED

1-15 5

Wing plays

16-30 13

- Right side

31-45 15

- Left side

46-60 8

Combination plays 3

61-75 7

Central penetration

76-90

Individual plays 19

90-105

After corner kick

106-120

- Right side

- Left side

Free kicks

F. WHO SCORED THE GOALS

- Direct

- After

Forwards

Midfielders

Penalties 3

Defenders

Own goals 1

Goalkeepers

G. WHERE THE GOALS WERE SCORED

Inside the goal area

Inside the penalty area

Outside the penalty area

Penalties

I. MATCH AVERAGES Goals 3.35 Yellow cards 3.05 Red cards J. PLAYING TIME BY MATCH Match: Trinidad/Tobago v Canada