that has been primarily championed by the United States, it provides an opportunity for European Allies to demonstrate their
About the author
commitment to the Alliance and a means to placate American demands for greater demonstrations of political and financial
Oliver Jones
commitment. Publically it is also somewhat easier to sell to do-
Oliver Jones holds a Masters Degree in Intelligence Studies
mestic audiences than similar investment in more overtly aggres-
and International History from Aberystwyth University. He is
sive weapon systems may be (A new fighter squadron or tank
currently a research coordinator for the United Kingdom De-
regiment is harder to sell as purely defensive given many of the
fence Forum and a Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, a geo-
Allies’ recent operations have been expeditionary in nature).
strategic analysis firm. Previously, he worked as Program Assis-
However, even though this is a seductive aspect of the defense
tant for the ATA.
shield, it is not a justifiable reason for investment in it. Despite this, European leaders remain committed in an effort to prove their commitment to the US. At best, the program does little to alter the levels of security provided to NATO citizens, but more likely is it actually undermines that security. Whilst it can be argued that many of the scenarios hypothesized within this article are ones which may come to pass regardless of the existence of a shield, nevertheless, this still calls into question the point of the shield in the first place. This is not a peripheral program; it represents huge costs to NATO in development, deployment, and resources, which in this time of austerity could be far better spent. It also represents a program that does more to undermine the development of NATO, and NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War world. The political consequences of this program in alienating key international actors, in imposing a siege mentality upon NATO thinking, and in undermining already fragile international consensuses on arms control would be tragically corrosive to NATO and the security of the Alliance’s members. In a time of limited resources NATO should not waste its funds on unnecessary defenses, fundamentally NATO is currently less at risk from ballistic missiles than it has been during the majority of its existence. Traditional mechanisms of deterrence are more than adequate to deal with emerging ballistic missile states, who will not be foolhardy enough to attack NATO powers, and face the threat of destruction should they do so.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association, its members, affiliates or staff.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 2, Issue 3
10