Sindh Guardian VOLUME 2 – ISSUE 6
The Sindhi American Political Action Committee
October 2014
Sindhipac.org
U.S. Announces Makli Hill Cultural Preservation Project Interview with Dr. Grare at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace When Jews Called Karachi their Home U.S. Aid to Pakistan - Upgrading the Black hole SAPAC Condemns the Notion of Sindhi Taliban BOOK REVIEW: The Unraveling - Pakistan in the Age of Jihad
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Table of Contents
SAPAC: The Sindh Guardian in America ....................................................................... 3
U.S. Announces Makli Hill Cultural Preservation Project .............................................. 4
SAPAC writes to U.S. Ambassador Olson ..................................................................... 5
Interview with Dr. Frederic Grare ................................................................................ 6
When the Jews Called Karachi their Home ................................................................. 10
Sohni Canto VI Stanza 41 ........................................................................................... 13
US Aid to Pakistan: Upgrading the Black Hole ............................................................ 14
Press Release: SAPAC Condemns the Notion of Sindhi Taliban ................................... 21
Book Review: The Unraveling -‐ Pakistan in the Age of Jihad ...................................... 22
SAPAC Sindhi American Political Action Committee 1050 17th Street NW, Suite 600, Washington, DC 20036 sapac.sindh@gmail.com www.sindhipac.org
SAPAC: The Sindh Guardian in America Editorial by Nathan Schuerch
For thousands of years, Sindh has been the land of Sufis. Sindhi people have a long established history, language, and culture that set them apart as moderate, peace loving, progressive people. This however is not how politics work in Pakistan.
The deep state (military, security, intelligence services) has arrested, tortured, and even killed many peaceful Sindhi activists. It also supports Islamic terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, and uses them as proxies to fight and terrorize people demanding their legitimate human rights. Many peaceful Sindhi activists ended up in forced exile abroad. There, some of them continue their work, Advocating for Sindhi people’s rights. A few of them, such as Munawar “Sufi” Laghari, have come together to form the Sindhi American Political Action Committee (SAPAC) in 2009. SAPAC works hard to inform the political process in the United States of America about the political, socio-economic, and human rights challenges of Sindhis. SAPAC positively impacts the policies of the US Government towards Sindh and Sindhis. If the power, influence and resources of the United States can be used to help the Sindhi people in their quest for freedom, democracy and Justice, then there is still hope for Sindh. Sindhi and Americans are natural allies, and SAPAC is the Sindh guardians in America providing the link between our two nations; giving a voice to
Sindhis in Washington, and helping Americans reach out to Sindhis in the region. In its 4 years of existence, SAPAC has accomplished quite bit in raising awareness of Sindh and Sindhis in Washington. Before SAPAC there was no congressional caucus focused on Sindhi issues. Thanks to SAPAC’s efforts, today there is one. SAPAC works closely with the U.S. Congressmen members of this caucus to insure that US policies, and budgets are used to stop the oppression of the Sindhi people, and to help establish human rights in Sindh. SAPAC has also works closely and advocates with USAID, The Department of State, and The U.S. Consulate. Thanks to SAPAC Sindhis more support from the USA. The recent announcement of U.S. Ambassador Olson of the Makli Hill Cultural Preservation Project, the first of its kind in Sindh, is one of the achievements SAPAC can be proud of. If you care about Sindh, Sindhi people’s rights and culture, you too can help SAPAC and become a Sindhi Guardian from abroad. If you are American, or have a green card you can contribute to SAPAC. You can also write articles for the Sindh Guardian magazine. You can translate Sindh Guardian article is Sindhi and send it home to your friends and family. You can follow SAPAC on Twitter, like SAPAC on Facebook… go to SAPAC’s website and learn how you can become a Sindh Guardian.
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U.S. Announces Makli Hill Cultural Preservation Project The work of SAPAC pays off in Makli but more efforts are needed to save the Talpur Mirs tombs in Hyderabad.
The U.S. Ambassador Richard G. Olson visited the Makli Hill necropolis to announce the inaugural Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) project in Sindh province.
kings, queens, governors, saints, scholars, and philosophers from the 14th to 18th century. The U.S. is providing more than $260,000 to restore the ancient tombs of Sultan Ibrahim and Amir Sultan Muhammad. The U.S. Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation supports preservation of cultural sites, cultural objects, and forms of traditional cultural expression in more than 100 countries around the world. The Sindhi American Political Action Committee (SAPAC) is actively working for a similar initiative to take place in order to save the tombs of Talpur Mirs in Hyderabad.
U.S. Ambassador Richard G. Olson, at the Makli Hill necropolis, announces the first Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation project in Sindh province. The project will spend $260,000 to restore the 400 yearold tombs at Makli Hill.
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) named Makli Hill a World Heritage site in 1981. “The Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation is a centerpiece of America’s partnership with Pakistan in the area of art and culture,” said Ambassador Olson. “We are honored to work to restore the 400 year-old tombs of Sultan Ibrahim and Amir Sultan Muhammad at Makli Hill,” he added. According to Ambassador Olson, This is the first project in Sindh that will be funded by AFCP. Makli Hill is among the largest cemeteries in the world. The site includes the tombs of 4
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The end of the Talpur reign arrived when they lost the battle of Miani in the year 1843 against the British forces, led by General Charles James Napier. The tombs reflect the distinct architecture associated with Sindh in those days. However, once inside the tombs, one quickly realizes the extent of the decay. The walls appear to crumble and disintegrate at the slightest touch. The tombs tell a wondrous tale, one of historic resilience. They speak quietly of all that has evolved around them. They tell all that they have witnessed. SAPAC is therefore working to obtain the needed support from the U.S. Government to save these precious monuments to Sindhi culture and history, just as it did for the Makli Necropolis.
SAPAC writes to U.S. Ambassador Olson
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Interview with Dr. Frederic Grare Dr. Grare is a senior associate and the Director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on security issues and democratization in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Previously, he led the Asia bureau at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs in the French Ministry of Defense. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a premier foreign policy think tank located in Washington DC where many Congressmen and U.S. Policy makers seek opinions and advice.
On September fourth 2014, a team of
SAPAC interns visited with Dr. Frederic Grare, Director of the Carnegie’s South Asia program, for an interview. The team of interviewers was composed of Kelly Sampier, Nissi Monsegue, Narwah Shurat, and Nathan Schuerch. The questions asked focused of U.S. foreign policy influence in the region, the tension between India and Pakistan, the Politics of Pakistan, and issues related to Sindh. Kelly: Western powers are leaving Afghanistan. By 2016 there will be American troops within the country. What does this mean for Pakistan?
is the dynamic that lead to the creation of Afghanistan as a terrorist sanctuary. This is much more important than Islamic ideological reasons. The ideology as such is really fairly weak across the region. The ideology essentially serves to define who belongs and who doesn’t belong. What we have seen in fact with the war in Afghanistan is that the differences between Islamic radicals have narrowed. Since most Islamic groups were under pressure, the kind of division that existed between them in the pas, has mostly disappeared, especially in Pakistan.
Dr. Grare: For Pakistan, it certainly doesn’t mean what most of the Pakistanis say it means. Nor does it mean what most of the direct neighbors of Afghanistan say it means. There is not going to be an explosion of Afghanistan with consequences in the neighboring regions and Pakistan.
What Pakistan fears today is a spillover from Afghanistan. About three years ago Pakistan started complaining about Afghanistan as a terrorist sanctuary. This is ironic because that was exactly the kind of policies that Pakistan itself had been pursuing vis-à-vis Afghanistan in the past. I doubt very much that Pakistan will collapse because of that.
What we are likely to see is movement of the TTP, seeking refuge in Afghanistan, getting trained, and eventually taking part in the fighting there and then moving on. That
Even with the bulk of NATO troops in Afghanistan no border was really ever closed. So movements still occurred in and
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By Kelly Sampier, Nissi Monsegue, Narwah Shurat, & Nathan Schuerch
out of the country. Have we seen the region exploding because of it? No. This doesn’t mean that there will not be trouble, but let’s be reasonable. Doomsday is not totally impossible in theory; but in practice it is very improbable. It is not a choice between a good and a bad situation, for the US, but a choice between a very bad situation and a bad situation. Kelly: What have been the broad effects of US foreign policy in Pakistan, particularly in regards to the various nationalities in Pakistan? Dr. Grare: The US did not have a policy towards the Pakistani nationalities despite the various conspiracy theories, which have emerged here and there. What was the policy of the US in Sindh? What was the policy of the US in Baluchistan? The US has carefully avoided having a policy in Baluchistan or Sindh. Whatever has happened in Baluchistan has happened for internal reasons. All of the grievances that suddenly turned into a conflict in 2005 had been there for decades and were amplified by Musharraf’s policies. Moreover the new devolution policy makes sure that traditional local elites are bypassed. So of course problems started arising. Where was US policy there? Where were they when the military intervened in Baluchistan? Nowhere. Blaming the US for separatist trouble is absurd. The Pakistani establishment only has itself to blame for that. Nissi: What is the core of the conflict between India and Pakistan? Dr. Grare: Partition is the core of the conflict between India and Pakistan.
We just attended a conference where Christine Fair introduced her book (Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War). I don’t know if you read it, but it is a very good book that makes a number of interesting points. Partition happened without any real forethought of what the Pakistani state should be. The partition process was very painful, with 13 million people displaced, and 1.5 million people killed on both sides. People can focus on the Kashmir issue, but I would argue that today it is much more a symptom of the evolution of the relations with India, rather than the cause of it. Now, you did have this second partition of the subcontinent, which is the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan never forgave India for that. These are the elements that created a desire for revenge. You have a whole generation of officers in Pakistan at the top today who started their career either just at the time of 1971, or in the years just following 1971. So the top Pakistani military today have been deeply influenced by this national trauma. Nissi: What do you make of press reports tying the source of the conflict to water? Dr. Grare: The water issue is definitely not the primary cause of the dispute. Kashmir has been first a territorial dispute. Then the Pakistanis turned it into an ideological dispute. Then it became something else, a Human Rights issue. It was at the same time a Human Rights and an ideological issue. The last iteration was the water issue. Frankly this is just rationalization of the same thing all the time. This rationalization is done in accordance with the kind of ideas SINDH GUARDIAN VOLUME 2 ISSUE 6
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Interview with Dr. Frederic Grare
that are trending in the West at the time. Pakistan’s objective is to internationalize the conflict. Nissi: India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. Do you think they will ever get involved in a nuclear war at some point? Dr. Grare: The risk is not zero. The risk is never zero. However, saying that this is a highly probable outcome is nonsense. The fact is that when you have a state like Pakistan, which promotes jihadists as a tool of foreign policy, and at the same time has a tactical nuclear program, you have a serious risk of escalation. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out. This is the only reasonable answer I can give you. It cannot be ruled out, but nobody should lose sleep over it. Narwah: What is your take on the protests going on in Pakistan? What are the protesters trying to accomplish? Dr. Grare: Everyone has his or her own agenda. Imran Khan believes he can force the government to step down, but he is not strong enough to achieve it. The military will not allow Khan to overthrow the government, but it does see it as an opportunity to weaken Nawaz Sharif. In this particular sense the protests have somewhat achieved their objective. There is dissatisfaction in the current economic, and security situation, and the government’s inability to change those things. The dissatisfaction is real. The protests are dealing with something different: fraud in the elections (Khan). The other protests are asking for the dismissal of Sharif on the grounds that he is corrupt (Qadri). There is however a disconnection between what the people want and what is being projected in the protests. Nathan: How do you see the future of 8
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Pakistan Peoples Party as the only Sindhi Party after Benazir Bhutto? Dr. Grare: First of all the PPP does not represent only the Sindhi interests. The PPP was and is still stronger in Sindh, but it always had national aspirations. All the mainstream parties by and large have national aspirations; even the MQM in a way has national aspirations now. I don’t see that the future of the PPP is in representing one given province in the country. The future of the PPP is to do its work. It needs to regain the confidence of the population. There will be opportunities for that. Lets wait and see if they are capable of doing this. For the time being, the future of the PPP seems very bleak. But remember 1999 when Nawaz Sharif was ousted, where was the future of the PML-N, where was Nawaz own future? Now he is back in power. Nathan: What impact do you think the rise of Islamic extremism in parts of Iraq and Syria will be on Sindh? Dr. Grare: There are Pakistanis going over to fight for extremist groups. Some of the money that has been paid by the Saudi state is apparently related to that. Many of the Pakistani fighters and terrorists will be killed in Syria and Iraq. But then again, many of them might survive and will go back to Pakistan. So it is going to be an additional problem, especially if the Pakistani state does not solve its internal issues. Nathan: What do you suggest to the moderate and secular forces like the Sindhis as a way to solve this Situation? Is separatism a possibility? Dr. Grare: Nobody will break away from Pakistan. First the separatist forces are not capable of that. Secondly it is also quite
By Kelly Sampier, Nissi Monsegue, Narwah Shurat, & Nathan Schuerch
clear that while the Pakistani establishment has no real project for Sindhi or Baloch people, the separatist leaders have no real political project either. Separatists are only grounded in resistance to Pakistan. It does not mean that they are able to substitute anything to this Pakistani state. So it is going to be difficult in those conditions to achieve anything meaningful. Nathan: So until there is real political leadership separatism is not an option? Dr. Grare: That is one aspect of it, but they will definitely not breakout. Now, you do still have a political leadership, which understands that the prospects for independence are zero. So they are looking for political solutions within the framework of the Pakistani constitution. People like Mengal for example tried. He was defeated largely because the elections were rigged. Whatever we may say about free and fair elections, it did not happen that way. These elections could have been a way out of the existing problem. It is better to keep arguing in parliament than to kill each other in the streets. So what is the next opportunity to solve these problems?
I don’t know. Meanwhile the kill and dump policy continues. This has to stop! Nathan: Could you give some suggestions for Sindhi Americans to play their part in improving the situation in Sindh? Dr. Grare: Theoretically they can do a lot. One thing they can do is raise awareness and mobilize people around the issues going on in Sindh. Another thing they can do which may be more effective, is import in Pakistan the factors that make a democracy work. They can learn about the system here, or elsewhere in Europe, and so forth. Learn how to articulate a political project that could be implemented once in power. Learn all the details of what makes a democratic system functional. Learn about the institutions that are needed for democracy to work. Articulating a political project beyond simply capturing power would be some thing useful. Oh, and please, stop projecting the South Asian conflict in the political debate here (the United States). It does not serve anybody. It does not serve the country back home, and it does not serve the debate here. This can only makes the problems worse.
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When the Jews Called Karachi their Home By Gul Hassan Kalmatti
There were about 2,500 Jews living in
Karachi before 1947. Most of their ancestors had migrated to Karachi from Persia (Iran) in the 19th century, and lived there as tradesmen, artisans, poets, philosophers, and civil servants. The native language of this group of people, known as Bene Israel, was Judeo-Marathi. The Jews in Karachi mostly settled in the area of Lawrence Road, the Ram Swami neighborhood and Gazdarabad then called Ranchore Line (Karachi). The locals called them Yahudis (Yahudi Tribe). While the Kalhoro and Jatoi tribes still survive today, the Yahudis have disappeared from Karachi. The Magain Shalome Synagogue, A “Jewish Temple” in Karachi In 1893, Jewish settler, Solomon David Umerdekar, built a Synagogue as a place of worship for the Jewish community in Karachi. They called it the Magain Shalome Synagogue. This building was located in the center of Karachi, at the intersection of Nishar Road and Jamila Street (Barnes Street). The leader of the Jewish Community Mr. Solomon David was a surveyor in Karachi City.
my late father who was then a commission agent in the fruit & vegetable wholesale market on University Road (now the Super Highway). My father was a regular visitor of Ram Swami and I sometimes I accompanied him. He told me about the Synagogue. Later, when I was a student at the S.M. Arts College, I would often travel from Gadap to Lee Market by bus. The building was a landmark along the route, which is very much ingrained in my memory. In 1912, Gershon Solomon Umerdekar and Rahamim Solomon Umerdekar, the sons of Solomon David expanded the building. In 1916-18 the Karachi Jewish community opened a Hebrew school on the synagogue’s premises and in 1918 constructed the Nathan Abraham Hall. After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the name of “Pakistan Bane e-Israel Association” was affixed on the face of the Synagogue. Relations between the Jewish community and others in Karachi continued to be harmonious immediately after the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. However, incidents involving violence against Jews began to occur some time after the creation of Israel, leading to feelings of insecurity within the Jewish community. The synagogue in Karachi was set on fire, and several Jews were attacked. The frequency of attacks increased after each of the ArabIsraeli wars, i.e. 1948, 1956 and 1967.
As a child I visited this “Jewish temple” with 10
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By Gul Hassan Kalmatti
The decade-long period under President Ayub Khan saw the gradual disappearance of Jews from Sindh and Pakistan. They migrated to India, Israel, or the United Kingdom. Reportedly, several Jewish families remained in Karachi beyond this period, but out of concern for their own safety, and as a reaction to increasing religious intolerance, many of them concealed their Jewish identity, sometimes passing themselves off as Parsis or Christians. The synagogue in Karachi became dormant in the 1960s and was razed to ground by property developers in July 1988 to pave the way for a shopping plaza – Madiha Square. Reportedly, the last custodian of the synagogue, Rachel Joseph, lived in Karachi in a state of destitution. She also acted as the caretaker of the Jewish graveyard in Mewa Shah, an old locality of Karachi. Today many of the Jews who left Karachi now live in Ramale in Israel. They have built a synagogue there called Magain Shalome in remembrance of Karachi, their former home.
but this is not the case the School is named after Councilman Abraham Reuben, a Jew from Karachi. On March 18, 1911 a delegation from Ali Garh University came to Karachi under the leadership of Sir Raja Ali Muhammad Khan, popularly known as Raja Sahib Mehmoodabad. Allama Abdul Karim Dars, Sir Abdullah Haroon, and Khan Bahadur Shaikh Sadiq Ali, the Prime Minister of the Khairpur State, welcomed him in Karachi station. Hundreds of people carried the Victoria Buggy on their shoulders. When the procession reached Lawrence Road, near the Jewish Synagogue, Abraham Reuben threw so many flowers that the whole carriage was hidden under the flower petals. Historic buildings like the Mules Mansion in Keamari, BVS Parsi High School, the Karachi Goan Association Hall in Saddar, Khaliqdina Hall on Bunder Road, Jaffer Faddoo Dispensary in Kharadar, Edward House on Victoria road and the famous Flagstaff House were all designed by the Iraqi Jewish architect Moses Somake.
By contrast, in Iran where Jews have at times been persecuted, there are still eleven Jewish temples (synagogues) standing. The Islamic revolution did not damaged them. Prominent Jews in Karachi History Abraham Reuben, a Jew, was elected to the Karachi Municipal Corporation (city council) thrice – in 1919, 1936 and 1939. He established a school in 1927, which still exists today in Liaquatabad’s Haji Mureed Goth. It is still running in the name of "Abraham Reuben School". People think the name comes from Ibrahim (Abraham, the father of the faithful in the Old Testament)
Mo ses So make, an Iraqi Jewi sh archit ect livin g in Karachi , des ign ed th e famou s Fl agst aff Hou se
He was a prominent Jew on Victoria Road where his office Mosak & Company was located. All of these landmark buildings in Karachi are his work. The name of this Jewish architect shall long survive in the Sindhi capital. Jews were our stones, our buildings. They are no longer there. SINDH GUARDIAN VOLUME 2 ISSUE 6
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When the Jews Called Karachi their Home
Abraham Benjamin Tilkar was a science teacher in the Sindh Madrasah from 1922 to 1955. He was a very honest, hardworking and a gentle teacher. He died in Mumbai in 1990. His niece, Elizabeth Tilkar served as headmistress at the “Corner Indians Girls School.” Another Jew, M.G. Solomon served as office superintendent at D.G. Sindh College from 1919 to 1941 for 29 years and he left for Mumbai in 1945. Before 1947, different communities lived in Karachi without religious discrimination and were united in bonds of love and brotherhood. After the creation of Pakistan, people began discriminating against each other on the basis of religion. Hence life has become miserable for the people of Pakistan. Karachi’s Jewish Streets From Ram Swami to Hoti Market and further around Lawrence Road there are ten streets named after prominent Jews in Karachi history. The names of these streets are as follows: • • • • • • • • • •
Yousuf Ali Bhai Road Jam Meer Ayub Aaliani Vishan Das Road Sundus Street Solomon David Road Masjid Street Road Jeevan Street Pritam Das Street Raghoo Street A.B. Advani Road
In Ram Swami, many homes still bear the Star of David. Karachi’s Jewish Population A Jewish personality, Emanuel Matat said in an interview that his father married in Karachi in 1957. And that, at that time there were nine hundred Jewish families living 12
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there. He further added that his father had very deep roots in Karachi. His grand father Simon Wyes was the owner of Great Western Hotel as well as the Killarney Hotel. This Killarney Hotel was destroyed in 1970 and in its place stands the Sheraton Hotel. According to population census of 1881, the population of Karachi including the cantonment was 73,590 people among which were over 38,949 Muslims, 24,917 Hindus, 4,191 Christians, 937 Parsis and 4,899 were classified as “other religions.” The Jews were included in the other religions. In 1893 there were 153 Jews were in Karachi. In 1907, according to the Sindh Gazetteer Census of 1901, there were 428 Jews were living in Karachi. According to the census of 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, Jews were (0.3%) of the population. In 1941, there were 513 Jewish men and 538 Jewish women in Karachi. In 1947, when Pakistan was created, there were 2500 Jews in Karachi. In 1948, after the creation of Israel, many Jews emigrated to Israel. In 1959, there were hardly 400 Jews living in the city. In 1948, 1956 and 1967 during the Arab Israeli conflicts, rising waves of extremism, cause many Jews to leave in fear. In 1988, there were hardly 250 Jews in Karachi when their Synagogue (Magain Shalome) was set on fire. The remaining Jews began to disguise themselves as Parsis and Christian. Jews built the first bakery in Karachi. It was near the Garden Road at the Bunder Road signal near the Pehlvi Restaurant. From there breads were supplied to Saddar and Soldier Bazar cantonment. The Jews of Karachi were highly educated. They worked in public service. They were soldiers in the army. They served on the city council and administered the Karachi port. They helped in developing Karachi.
By Gul Hassan Kalmatti
Today, due to religious extremism, the memory of these Jews is being destroyed. Karachi’s Jewish Graveyards In Karachi there were two major Jewish graveyards, one was near Haji Camp (Lyari), which was named as “Bane-e-Israel Graveyard.” It was located towards the southwest of Haji Camp, within the boundaries of the Cheel Chowk cemetery. Before Pakistan was created, Cheel Chowk was named “Abraham Chowk” in honor of Abraham Reuben. It was later on renamed as “Molvi Usman Chowk” where there are still one hundred Jewish graves. They are all buried in a separated enclosure where there is also grave of “Shello wife of Solomon David.” The date of burial on the grave is inscribed as 27th April 1903.
The oldest grave in the cemetery is from 1901. Before that the Jews were buried at the Haji Camp Graveyard, where a prominent Rabbi, Solomon Omer Daker (1841-1930) According to Behram D. Avari, a senior member of the Parsi community there is also a Jewish cemetery in Manora. Conclusion Before the creation of Pakistan, Karachi was a diverse, tolerant, peaceful city. Today There are fewer Hindus, only a few Goans, and Parsis, and no more Jews. Karachi is 99% Muslim but people cut each other’s throats and seek after each other’s blood. Once upon a time Muslims, Parsis, Hindus, Christians, Jews and Goans lived in Karachi together, and there was peace.
Sohni Canto VI Stanza 41 On what count am I here? Oh why Bereft of loved ones face? “You preach: “Deflect from sin”, but I your virtue do deny“Moral control I do not need nor do for music sigh. “Keep closed your lips, and from within yourself you’ll beautify “These that on ‘Top’ of waters flow are bubbles that belie. “Feed on selflessness, for your love Mincemeat to be, then try “If headlong into dirt you rush yourself you’ll purify “Naught does possess more wealth than dust
nothing with dust can vie, “who runs by stirrup of the guide the other side will spy. “Falcon, pick up your greedy self and fly with it on high. “Don’t lose sight of the friends, walking in veils that mystify. “More than Oneness in love, is like splitting two-lettered tie “Those who do long for wine of love with purest them supply.” “These ravings are the vain reply of tortured, sickly one. On what count, am, I here oh! Why? Bereft of loved ones face.” (Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai)
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US Aid to Pakistan: Upgrading the Black Hole By Michael Volk The relationship between the United States other groups and ethnicities, have been of America and the Islamic Republic of persecuted more and more in the postPakistan has long been marked by distrust 9/11 era. and strain, and this is certainly true of U.S. foreign aid to Pakistan. U.S. Congressman Factors contributing to human rights abuses Gary Ackerman famously stated in a House by the Pakistani security establishment Foreign Affairs Committee hearing in 2012, include the fact that the majority of money “Pakistan is like a black hole for American given to Pakistan by the U.S. is security or aid. Our tax dollars go in, our diplomats go military, not development related. Also the in sometimes, our AID professionals go in procedures for oversight on the funds given sometimes, our hopes go in, our prayers go are not sufficient. Thus, the status quo is in, nothing good ever maintained or exacerbated 1 Pakistan is like a black in a country where comes out.” hole for American aid. oppression and violence has Foreign aid has recently historically been a major Our tax dollars go in, our come much more into issue. question in American diplomats go in foreign policy circles, not to sometimes, our AID In order to improve this mention the American professionals go in situation the United States public, because of the sometimes, our hopes go must drastically cut military Pakistani security in, our prayers go in, financing to Pakistan while establishment’s ties to, and nothing good ever comes simultaneously maintaining likely sponsorship of certain out civilian aid, and increasing extremist organizations. oversight as to where the These concerns are money is going and how it is implemented. especially heightened because of the harboring of terrorists by the Pakistani security establishment, perhaps even Osama A Dramatic Increase since 9/11 bin Laden, who was found and killed by U.S. After the September 11, 2001 attacks by al forces near a Pakistani military base in Qaeda in New York City and Washington, Abbotabad in May 2011. D.C., U.S. aid to Pakistan saw a dramatic increase compared to the previous fifty Tied directly to illicit support for extremism years. From Fiscal Years 2002-2014, with is the issue of human rights in Pakistan. Both the remainder of 2014 being estimated via the Pakistani military and Inter-Services budget approvals, the U.S. has granted Intelligence (ISI), and increasingly Islamist Pakistan over $27 billion.2 This includes $10 fundamentalist groups, routinely violate the billion in economic aid (development human rights of Pakistanis. Most notably, assistance, economic support, food aid, Sindhis in southern Pakistan, and the Baloch in southwest Pakistan, along with various 2 K. Alan Kronstadt and Susan Epstein, Direct Overt U.S. U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 1
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Aid for Military Reimbursements to Pakistan-FY2002FY2015, CRS Chart (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, March 26, 2014).
By Michael Volk
disaster relief), $7 billion in security aid (military training, counter-narcotics, counterinsurgency, foreign military financing), and an additional $11 billion in “Coalition Support Fund Reimbursements.” The latter are essentially security related, as they compensate Pakistan for assisting U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan. These funds come out of the Pentagon budget just as security aid does. To put the amount of aid in perspective, for the entire period of 1948-2001, Pakistan received $10 billion in aid from the U.S.3 Markedly, aid rose from $36.76 million in 2000 to $187.7 million in 200, and then jumped to $2 billion in 2002.4 For the period directly after 9/11, indeed throughout the Bush administration and into the Obama administration, much of the aid was given without much thought for conditionality or oversight. Essentially, Pakistan was given money without strings attached, told to fight terrorism, democratize and allow U.S. and NATO supply lines to run through its southern territories, primarily Sindh and also Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This was in part due to fears of souring relations with Pakistan and also of putting too much pressure on what is already a weak government.5 Nonetheless, in recent years there are some important trends regarding greater attempts at oversight and civilian aid distribution that must be noted. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) Act (named for it’s congressional sponsors), drastically increased U.S. assistance to DeAndre K. Whitley and Keith E. Noel editors, Pakistan: U.S. Relations and Foreign Assistance (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2012), 58. 4 Ibid 65. 5 Ibid 88.
Pakistan. In FY 2008, total U.S. aid to Pakistan was about $2 billion. In FY 2009, that number increased to approximately $3 billion and aid peaked at an all time high of around $4.5 billion appropriated in FY 2010.6 In each of those years security related aid dwarfed economic related aid, and that remained true until FY 2013, when economic aid finally overtook security aid. In the peak aid appropriation year of 2010, security related aid reached just over $2.7 billion while economic aid was just under $1.8 billion.7 This ratio is typical in each post-9/11 aid year until 2013. Aid Decreases after 2010 Also important to note is that after the peak in 2010, aid has decreased in each subsequent year. This has to do with domestic budgetary restraints in the U.S. and bureaucratic politics. It also a great deal to do with skepticism in the U.S. about the worth of sending foreign aid to Pakistan. The perceived lack of results in fighting extremism and in aiding U.S. efforts in Afghanistan by the Pakistani government certainly lends Pakistani aid to this skepticism. Just as heavily weighed, if not more heavily weighed, was the finding and killing of Osama bin Laden near a Pakistani military base in Abottabad, Pakistan in 2011. Beginning in 2010 with the KLB Act, greater oversight and conditions were placed on the granting of aid to Pakistan, and again in 2011 more restrictions were applied. In 2008, before KLB was in place, The Guardian reported that up to 70% of U.S. military aid to Pakistan, approximately $6
3
6 7
Ibid 81-82. Kronstadt and Epstein, Direct Overt U.S. Aid.
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U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Upgrading the Black Hole
billion, was unaccounted for or “misspent.”8 Though lax oversight procedures were in place from 2002 onward, they did not receive heavier consideration and bolstering until the KLB Act of 2009 was passed. As noted above, the Act drastically increased aid starting in 2010, but it also added a number of oversights, approvals, and reports necessary to release aid to Pakistan. For example, KLB section 102 states that no aid for “Democratic, Economic and Development Assistance” can be released until the “Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees” and that no more than $750 million in aid can be released until “the President’s Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan submits… a certification that assistance… to date has made or is making reasonable progress toward achieving the principle objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan contained in the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report.”9 However this is followed by a waiver notice, which states that the Secretary of State can waive these limitations if “the Secretary determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do so.”10 Similar waivers are granted for security funding.11 Additionally, these waivers have been used on multiple occasions to release billions in
Declan Walsh, “Up to 70% of US Aid to Pakistan ‘Misspent’,” The Guardian, February 27, 2008, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/27/pakistan.us a. 9 U.S.. 111th Congress, 1st Session. S. 1707, Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. Washington, Government Printing Office, 2009. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 8
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aid, once in September of 201212 and then again in February of 2013.13 Other general forms of oversight are required as well in the language of KLB. The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Comptroller General must submit a slew of reports including the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report, a Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report, a Security-Related Assistance Plan, a SemiAnnual Monitoring Report and several Government Accountability Office Reports.14 Also significant is that the KLB Act appropriates $10 million for U.S. government administration,15 and $30 million for auditing expenditure of economic aid in Pakistan.16 The problem with KLB, besides the aforementioned fact that its rules are very easily bypassed with waivers, is that, though it is an improvement from the Bush administration’s near lack of conditionality, it still does not provide stringent enough oversight on how aid money is being spent, thus, some of the money can in fact end up supporting extremism, terrorism, and human rights abuses. This became even more abundantly clear in the aftermath of the killing of Osama bin Laden. In fact, in a Senate Armed Services Intelligence Committee hearing in September of 2011, both Admiral Mike 12 Dan Murphy, “A Quiet Waiver for Pakistan from the Obama Administration,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 15, 2012, accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/SecurityWatch/Backchannels/2012/1015/A-quiet-waiver-forPakistan-from-the-Obama-administration. 13 “United States Issues Fresh Waiver to Pakistan,” Economic Times, April 5, 2013, accessed April 22, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-0405/news/38306686_1_defence-equipment-foreign-militaryfinancing-pakistan. 14 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
By Michael Volk
Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, accused the Inter-Services Intelligence of supporting the Haqqani Network, a group that stages attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.17 Congress has subsequently approved much less aid for Pakistan, particularly security-related aid. On the other hand, the Obama administration has shown severe restraints about cutting military aid to Pakistan. In October of 2011 the President stated in a press conference, “We could not have been as successful as we have been without the cooperation of the Pakistan government,” while at the same time acknowledging “troubling” ties between the ISI and the Haqqanis.18
Development (USAID), the Department of State and the Department of Defense. USAID has admitted so much in a 2013 audit of its Sindh Education program.19 Also, the phenomenon of ghost schools in Sindh is a problem, (over 2,000 of them) because of societal norms, pressure from religious extremists for children not to attend secular schools, and most importantly, lack of oversight by both the Sindh government and USAID.20 These are schools that are built, but no students or teachers ever show up for class. Part of the problem is that the extremists who intimidate Sindhis receive tacit support from a military establishment that sympathizes with Islamic fundamentalists.
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, accused the Inter-Services Intelligence of supporting the Haqqani Network, a group that stages attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Also, as was noted above, the Obama administration did use the waivers built into KLB several times after the killing of bin Laden to release aid to Pakistan. While aid has greatly been decreased over the past 3 years, especially military aid, it remains highly questionable whether the United States should continue any funding to such a duplicitous partner. The Problems with Aid to Pakistan The problems with aid to Pakistan deal with corruption, extremist ties, human rights violations and inefficiency. Economic aid can be caught up in corruption and waste when it is not monitored properly by United States Agency for International Whitley and Noel, Foreign Assistance, 113. Press Conference, White House, October 6, 2011, “News Conference by the President,” accessed April 22, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/10/06/news-conference-president. 17 18
However, norms must be addressed. Working with local people directly, and showing them the importance of vocational and secular education can accomplish this. Most significantly, oversight issues, such as lack of competent teachers and infrastructure, must be addressed through aid. Though these administration issues are likely to occur in any large-scale program in an underdeveloped country, they can have dire repercussions when dealing with forces as corrupt, violent, and oppressive as the ISI and Pakistani military.
19 “Audit of USAID/Pakistan’s Sindh Basic Education Program,” U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report No. G-391-14003-P, March 31, 2014, http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/g-39114-003-p.pdf. 20 Jamal Kurshid, “4,540 Non-Functional, 2,181 Ghost Schools in Sindh,” The News International, September 13, 2013, accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-2017834540-non-functional-2181-ghost-schools-in-Sindh.
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U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Upgrading the Black Hole
Lack of sufficient oversight of security aid in murders were likely influenced or ordered Pakistan is much more dangerous than lack by the ISI, as that organization is infamous of oversight with economic aid, as the for its control of political assassinations examples of Osama bin Laden and the throughout the country. Haqqanis illustrate. For these reasons it is in Economic aid dollars stolen Though it is very difficult to the best interests of the by corrupt NGOs, track aid money to U.S. to severely limit the development firms, or organizations like the ISI and government officials might Pakistani military as a whole, amount of security or result in those firms or state especially Coalition Support military related aid workers buying expensive Fund Reimbursements provided to Pakistan, and cars, clothing, houses, etc. which are simply meant to ideally to cut it off with that money, which is a compensate the Pakistani completely. significant problem in military for U.S. and NATO Pakistan, but stolen or unaccounted for use of roads, airbases and other military military aid can be used by extremist activities, it is highly probable that large sympathizers in the military to support or amounts of that money are used in harbor terrorist networks. nefarious ways and also to contribute to the oppressive nature of the Pakistani Security aid from the U.S. can also be used government. by the ISI and Pakistani military to perpetrate human rights abuses, such as the By funding these apparatuses in any way the torture and murder of political activists, U.S. is contributing to the status quo of which happens regularly in Sindh and Pakistan, and likely even exacerbating it. Baluchistan. For instance, in it’s 2013 human Contributing to a societal status quo of rights report on Pakistan, the State military dominance, civilian subservience and Department detailed, “There were rampant human rights abuses is certainly extrajudicial killings of nationalist political not in the short or long term interests of activists in Sindh Province. On April 28, the the United States. bodies of two Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz (JSMM) workers, Aamir Khuhawar and Additionally, the Pakistani military often Sajjad Markhand, were found near Khairpur buys conventional war materials with U.S. Nathan Shah. According to JSMM’s military aid, like jets, because of its perpetual spokesperson, both Khuhawar and war stance towards India, when the money Markhand were Sindh University Jamshoro was intended for counter insurgency and students abducted from Larkana on April counterterrorism purposes. This is not only wasteful of U.S. aid money but it 24.”21 contributes to the heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan and could Additionally, on August 15, 2013, police contribute to greater conflict and violence killed three more Sindhi student activists in in the future. Karachi, and “Local television coverage and a deputy inspector general investigation revealed police killed the three students Solving the Pakistani Aid Conundrum following detention while in custody.”22 The For these reasons it is in the best interests of the U.S. to severely limit the amount of 21 “Country Report on Human Rights 2013: Pakistan,” U.S. security or military related aid provided to Department of State. Pakistan, and ideally to cut it off completely. 22 Ibid.
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By Michael Volk
Economic aid should continue because it is the only way that the U.S. can contribute to the growth of Pakistani civil society and the strengthening of the Pakistani government relative to the dominant security forces in the country. There are serious reservations that should come with that continued aid, however, including drastic increases in oversight, even if it costs more money to do so. The rationale behind this is that the U.S. has spent tens of billions of dollars in aid to Pakistan over the past 12 years and seen little if any progress in its interests. Despite the immense sums of aid money given to Pakistan, the Institute for Economics and Peace, in its 2012 Global Terrorism Index, listed Pakistan as the second highest terrorism impacted country
of weapons through security aid in an already violence plagued country should not be a focus), and spend the money to make sure that those programs, such as education, infrastructure, healthcare, etc., are implemented correctly, despite higher costs that will likely be incurred for greater oversight. Programs that should definitely be maintained are education programs sponsored by USAID. This is especially salient in Sindh where increasingly the only options poor children have for education are madrasahs, which at best only teach doctrinal religious material that has no practical use for employment in a developing society, and at worst have radicalizing effects. USAID’s Sindh Basic Education Program is
Programs that should definitely be maintained are education programs sponsored by USAID. This is especially salient in Sindh trailing only Iraq. 23 In it’s 2014 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders listed Pakistan near the bottom of the list, at 158 out 180 countries. 24 Likewise, Reliefweb in it’s Human Rights Risk Index of 2014 ranked Pakistan as the fourth highest risk country behind only Syria, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 25
hugely important. It plans to rebuild schools in the flood ravaged areas of the 2010 disaster, increase girls enrollment, and also improve education standards that are currently abysmal in Sindh public schools.26
Given these facts, the U.S. needs to focus in on certain aspects (increasing the number
It has had major setbacks though, as an audit of the program in March of 2014 illustrated. Its local partner proved highly ineffective, timeframes were not kept, and money was appropriated unproductively.27
“2012 Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of Terrorism for the Last Decade,” Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, Australia, 2012, accessed April 23, 2014. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2012_Gl obal_Terrorism_Index_Report.pdf. 24 “World Press Freedom Index: 2014,” Reporters Without Borders, accessed April 23, 2014, https://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php. 25 “World: Human Rights Risk Index 2014,” Reliefweb, accessed April 23, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/map/world/world-human-rights-riskindex-2014.
26 “Sindh Basic Education Project,” U.S. Agency for International Development, October 21, 2013, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/Sindh%20Basic%20E ducation%20Project.pdf. 27 “Audit of USAID.”
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U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Upgrading the Black Hole
In order to improve this situation, oversight As Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign over constantly arising issues needs to be Relations notes in October 2009, “For more efficiently handled. If that means several drama-filled days, Pakistan’s greater numbers of experts working on the opposition politicians took to the floor of projects and monitoring the National Assembly in them, then that should be Islamabad to decry KLB’s A new aid agenda in done. If this means working ‘insulting’ language that Pakistan can be set, one to find more adept local violated Pakistan’s that is primarily partners, or even bringing in sovereignty and imposed economically oriented. By outside help from unreasonable ‘conditions’ doing this the U.S. can international NGOs, then on the aid.”28 feasibly work to improve that should also be pursued. the human rights situation A similar situation might Despite the fact that the KLB Act places emphasis on utilizing local partners, success of the program should be of the highest priority, and local groups or individuals can be trained along the way.
This can be made possible by re-allocating security related funding and using it to enhance the effectiveness of economic related programs. Increasing manpower, experience, and involvement of groups with proven track records should all be considered even at greater financial cost. This makes sense because it is better to spend more time, money, and resources on a project like the Sindh Basic Education Program, to ensure that it is done right, than to spend less money on a project only to have it not succeed and have all of the money wasted. There however may be issues with this type of plan, in addition to those already discussed. The largest foreseeable barrier is opposition from the Pakistani government to a larger role by the U.S. in domestic Pakistani policy. This is predictable because of the initial backlash that the Kerry-LugarBerman Act received in Pakistan. Many Pakistani officials saw the initiative as too domineering and an encroachment on Pakistani sovereignty.
ensue with perceived invasive actions by the U.S. government, but skilled diplomacy can reasonably smooth these things over, just as was eventually done with the KLB Act, to allow operations to proceed.
Conclusion With the impending end of the KLB Act after 2014, a new aid agenda in Pakistan can be set, one that is primarily economically oriented. By doing this the U.S. can feasibly work to improve the human rights situation in all of Pakistan by supporting economic and civil society growth, and limiting the reach of the ISI and Pakistani military. By re-allocating what was military aid; the U.S. can boost the oversight and efficacy on important economic projects. This will in turn increase their success rates. These things will inevitably work towards the U.S. foreign policy goal of a more stable and prosperous country and region, one that upholds human rights and does not support terrorism.
28 Daniel Markey, No Exit From Pakistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 141.
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Press Release: SAPAC Condemns the Notion of Sindhi Taliban
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Book Review: The Unraveling -‐ Pakistan in the Age of Jihad By Kelly Sampier
In The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of
Jihad, author John R. Schmidt states: “It is impossible to fully understand why the Pakistanis behave as they do, in their dealings with radical Islam and much else besides, without understanding the motivations and habits of behavior that drive these two groups.” In his effort to do this, Schmidt guides the reader through Pakistan’s turbulent history from partition to present day in an attempt to uncover how a nation founded as a homeland for South Asian Muslims became a sanctuary for terrorist organizations and radical Islamic extremists. As political counselor to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad from 1998-2001, Schmidt uses first hand accounts to deconstruct the problematic relationship between the Pakistani ruling elite and various extremist groups. One of Pakistan’s main problems, according to Schmidt, is that Pakistan was an “improbable state” from its very creation. Pakistan was partitioned from the British Raj in 1947 and from its very onset was starved for democracy. Over the next two decades, the feudal civilian politicians and military rose to power, both of which dominate Pakistani politics today. The Pakistani’s support of jihadist groups first took rise during the Cold War in an attempt to drive Soviet forces from neighboring Afghanistan. Not only was this financed by the United States, but it also attracted radical Islamists from across the globe. While Soviet forces ultimately were defeated and withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to support jihadist groups as a deliberate foreign policy 22
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strategy in Kashmir, a predominately Muslim territory disputed with India. While the use of jihadist groups first emerged during the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, it was fully developed during the Kashmiri resistance. Not only was Pakistan supporting jihadist groups, but it also encouraged new groups to join the jihadist movement. However, the turning point would be September 11, 2001. No longer could Pakistan continue to support these terrorist groups, and ultimately Pakistan chose to support the United States in their war on terror, eventually driving these terrorist groups from Afghanistan onto Pakistani soil. Groups that had once been supported by the
Book Review by Kelly Sampier – The Unraveling
Pakistani government were now turning their vengeance domestically, particularly against the military and innocent civilians. Ultimately, Schmidt aims to answer the question, how did Pakistan become a sanctuary for violent terrorists and domestic jihadists? The answer is that the blame can be squarely placed on the decisions of the rulers of Pakistan. While the chronic mistrust between the U.S. and Pakistan, as well as Pakistani-India hatred has played a factor, the rulers of Pakistan chose to make decisions that could lead to the ultimate
destruction of the country. Schmidt leaves the reader wondering whether the forces of radical Islam will ever claim control over Pakistan. While it seems unlikely, it is nonetheless a daunting vision. While not everyone can be as proficient on Pakistan’s history as Schmidt, he enables the reader to gain a straightforward and comprehensive synopsis of the country’s history, as well as the relationships between key players and the dynamics that led to the use of jihadist groups as a strategic foreign policy.
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