Interstate issue winter 2017 2018 by Interstate

From the Editing Team Histories of International Politics often begin with the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia. The signatories established the principles of state sovereignty and legitimate use of power. These principles would go on to underpin European International Relations that have been exported globally and are now enshrined in International Institutions. The front cover includes Gerard ter Borchâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s painting capturing this pivotal moment. The following selection of essays approach questions relating to legitimacy. The approaches taken vary in scope and themes. Some will question how groups or organisations seek to gain legitimacy for their actions. Others will look at how actions can be justified by certain understandings of what constitutes a legitimate course of action. From the World Bank to the Muslim Community of Britain, questions of what can be justified in Total Warfare to legitimacy of illegal intelligence; legitimacy constitutes an omnipresent element of International Politics that requires careful attention and analyses. We hope you enjoy reading this issue. If you would like to contribute an article in the future, please get in contact with the Editorial team through the provided contact details.

Interstate Department of International Politics

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Aberystwyth University Aberystwyth Ceredigion SY23 3FE United Kingdom The Interstate Committee, the Department of International Politics and Aberystwyth University cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal. Any opinions expressed in Interstate are those of the individual contributors and do not necessarily represent those of the Committee, the Department or the University.

INDEX

The World Bank: conserving legitimacy beyond poverty and hunger .................................... Iasson Chryssikos 4 The Legitimacy of Leadership in British Muslim Communities: Infiltration of Islamists . Ross Paton 15 The Attack on Civilians in Total Warfare. ........................................................................................... Ben Brotherwood 24 The Legitimacy of Illegal Intelligence Practices by US Presidents ............................................. Natalie Speechley 30

Thank you to all contributors of this issue. Without contributions we would not be able to publish. The image of the Treaty of Westphalia is currently owned by the National Gallery. Full attribution is as follows: ‘The Ratification of the Treaty of Münster’ Gerard ter Borch (1648), ‘The Ratification of the Treaty of Münster,’ The National Gallery https://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/gerard-ter-borch-the-ratification-of-the-treatyof-munster

The Managing Editor would like to thank the following editors for their assistance: Iasson Chryssikos and Oliver Foley-Marshall. Thank you, Ben Brotherwood Editor in Chief for Interstate 2017-2018 Aberystwyth University 2018

The World Bank: conserving legitimacy beyond poverty and hunger By Iasson Chryssikos Introduction The World Bank, initially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), has undergone several changes in its capacities and goals since its inception in 1944. Initially, charged with coordinating post-World War II reconstruction of countries ravaged by war and famine, the World Bank soon acquired a wider scope of operations; shifting its focus to development in terms of infrastructure. Post 1956, it became an active lender to the private financial sphere and financial institutions of developing countries. With the founding of the International Development Association, from 1960 and onwards the World Bank Group has centered most of its efforts on the economic development of the poorest countries.1 Eradicating extreme poverty has become the primary goal of the World Bank Group, being explicitly expressed at their Washington headquarters with the following sentence carved in stone: “Our Dream is a World Free of Poverty.”2 Yet poverty has arguably always been combated in the wider context of economic growth and development, where poverty relief is perceived as unattainable, unless certain state structural adjustments aimed at improving economic performance occur. The process of promoting structural adjustments to render governance and poverty reduction more efficient and successful has not been a linear one. On the contrary, the World Bank has readjusted and rethought its strategic approach numerous times. The reason is its increase in efficiency of combating poverty, conserving the institution’s legitimacy in leading the fight against it and, the subsequent influence in policymaking and discourse formulation that being a leader in such an issue offers. This essay will be divided into three parts. Firstly, it will argue the World Bank has been conscious of the shortcomings in its initial economic programs in the 1980s. It has been open to readjusting its approach to reflect the realities acknowledged from 1989 to 2014, thus progressing significantly in its quest of combating extreme poverty and underdevelopment. Secondly, the extent to which these changes have been substantial will be stressed, thus discussing some critiques of the World Bank and whether this criticism is worth considering. Lastly, the wider picture will be briefly addressed, discussing the political significance of the World Bank’s policies that look past poverty itself, touching upon what Stephen Gill defines

1 2

World Bank, History. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history [Accessed 6 May 2017] World Bank, Overview. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview [Accessed 6 May 2017]

as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism.’ It will thence be concluded that the World Bank has undergone substantial change, not only in combating poverty, but in reinventing itself and reproducing its narrative and the method of global governance it promotes.

From the Washington Consensus to the Comprehensive Development Framework It is imperative to start by stating development as an issue is highly political and has been addressed by the World Bank as such.3 Any change in its agenda to accommodate developmental or poverty reduction goals have never shaken the institution’s raison d’être, which is to further the privatisation of state owned assets and the liberalisation of international trade in order to increase economic growth and the equivalent benefits. The Bank’s renovation of its scope each time sought to reconfigure the way the functionality of the economy should be perceived; more precisely to reimagine, “the relationship between society and nature, the state, civil society and the individual sphere with a neoliberal focus, in client states.”4 To understand the World Bank’s take on wider questions of development and the reasons why it felt it had to reconfigure its approach, the broader modus operandi should be taken into consideration. This mode of operation of the Bank, concerning its goals and rationale on dealing with development and hunger, can be described by discussing the external debt crisis of Latin America in 1982 and onwards. The Latin American external debt crisis gave the World Bank and the IMF an alibi for involvement, leading to a two-fold result: the indebtment of the client states and the publication and formulation of economic policies under the form of structural adjustment and economic discipline.5 This narrative of structural adjustments was further established as common wisdom with the arrival of the Washington Consensus in 1989, promoting expansion and intensification, not only in Latin America, but also in Africa and Asia. For the purpose of promoting free market policies, the World Bank elaborated distinct strategies within political, intellectual and financial action in the long term; hence, “ the diffusion of a social policy model centered on the relief of poverty coherent with macroeconomic adjustment; a change in the role of the state in the economy; the incorporation of the environment question into the dominant political agenda; and expansion of the scope and handling of the reforms, through the enthronement of the idea of governance.”6 Two major point are made here. First, the World Bank, as one of the institutions forming part of a wider range of International Financial Institutions seeking world-wide João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 819 4 Ibid, p. 819 5 Ibid, pp. 818-24 6 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), pp. 819-20 3

market liberalization, sought to intertwine poverty reduction with what it perceived as sound economics.

Secondly, dealing with these issues effectively had, as a precondition the

enshrinement of governance, which will be stressed later on. Yet in the Poverty World Development Report (WDR) of 1990, the short comings of stark structural adjustment policies and the equivalent social costs were acknowledged. Although, it stated, “it is all the more staggering – and all the more shameful – that more than one billion people in the developing world are living in poverty,” 7 it confirmed the World Bank’s faith in economic growth and rising wages as a means of tackling poverty, thus giving market oriented policies a central spot on stage. Nonetheless, this should be done in a poverty themed manner, “coherent with the economic adjustment and function of its expansion.”8 Therefore, a long-term effort to tackle the “shameful” occurrence of poverty cannot be dealt with properly unless the necessary groundwork is done to establish incentives for stable economic growth to occur. Something else the 1990 WDR emphasized on for efforts against poverty to be fruitful and of substantial magnitude, was the rationale behind the operation of public administration, the role of the state. More specifically, the WDR argues: “In some countries… growth has raised the incomes of the poor, but social services have received too little attention. As a result, mortality among children remains unusually high and primary enrollment unusually low, and the poor are not as well equipped as they might be to take advantage of economic opportunities. Some other countries, by contrast, have long stressed the provision of social services, but growth has been too slow.”9 Therefore, economic growth on its own might be insufficient, and possibly detrimental, if social services are not provided to the vulnerable. Resultantly, “a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction… calls for a program of well-targeted transfers and safety nets as an essential complement to the basic strategy.”10 Evidently, the World Bank thus sought to reinforce the state’s role in providing social services effectively but also in coordinating the implementation of reforms. The state acquired a major importance in the sustainability and successful implementation of market-oriented policies. The state was charged with institutionalizing reform, by “guaranteeing macroeconomic stability and an environment suitable for competitiveness, maintaining public order, investing in ‘human capital’ (primary education and basic health), providing productive infrastructure, protecting the environment,

World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (Washington DC, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 1 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 820; World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (Washington DC, Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 1-6 9 World Bank, World Development Report 1990: Poverty (Washington DC, Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 3 10 Ibid, p. 3 7 8

controlling the birth rate, and administering the social security system.”11 As a result, reform of the state occurred through seven actions: rationalization of state bureaucracy; fiscal adjustments; improvement of the administrative and legal structure necessary for the privatization of public companies; transfer of provision of public services to NGOs; reform of the judiciary, with the purpose of cheapening judicial costs, facilitating access to the courts and optimizing market relations; legislation favorable to the free circulation of financial capital; and guarantee of property rights.12 But what really merged all aspects of the World Bank’s strategy in tackling development was its enshrinement of governance. Lack of governance was the reason structural adjustments failed in the past decade. Without an effective coordination between the governing and the governed, and a government reassuring the existence of suitable entrepreneurial environment; the aggrandizement of the private sector, economic growth, and the betterment of living standards would simply be impossible to attain.13 Moreover, an indispensable part of governance is social participation, hence the participation of civil societies, NGOs, in World Bank projects. The World Bank valued the knowledge productive ability of civil society, and thus the norm setting capability of such a process. This shift to interest in governance was the result of shortcomings of the limited incentives for structural adjustments (conditioned loans). Therefore, the World Bank valued and focused on processes of ownership of economic discipline by the subject state’s elites and civil society. For the reforms to be successful and economic liberalization certain, the adjustment had to be endogenous and perceived as a one-way solution.14 Therefore, efficient governance through the state and civil society setting the legal framework was essential in the success of structural adjustments and promoting growth and decreasing poverty on the long run. The World Bank’s rethinking of its approach did not end there, though. After the Mexican structural crisis (1994-5) and just before the Southeast Asia financial crisis, it was concluded that the state has an important and more proactive role to play in the success of World Bank programs. The Bank redirected criticism for the failures in Southeast Asia to the IMF and it's, ‘market fundamentalism’.15 Yet, the World Bank did not make a U-turn on its core agenda by completely discarding neoliberal norms. On the contrary, it sought to strengthen the state’s position and ability to defend the globalization of financial sectors and the prevailing

João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 820 11

Ibid, p. 821 Ibid, p. 821 14 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), pp. 822-3 15 Ibid, p. 825 12 13

narrative of economic growth through free market capitalism.16 So in reality, the new WDR on the state did not shake the foundation of the Bank’s rationale. Rather, it committed itself to the ways of the free market, privatization, and against state impediment. Yet, it did not rule out the case where the state could have to play a corrective role in the malfunctions of the market.17 Yet, the basic aims of the World Bank; deregulation, privatization and liberalization, remained unchanged.

The state was reduced to an administrative role, deprived of its

political dimension, thus normalizing neoliberal norms of governance, where there is a clear separation of civil society and its political idiosyncrasy on the one hand, and neoliberal economic orthodoxy promulgated by know-how technocrats through administrative institutions. The 1997 WDR goes as far as to make a distinction between insurance and assistance, the first being pensions for instance, and the second taking care of the poorest in society. It argues that this distinction is imperative and that the state should step out from the former, thus leaving the private sector to be more efficient in that domain.18 Any intervention from the state in providing insurance services could lead to increased deficits, sloppy growth and could ultimately jeopardize the poverty relief effort. After the 1997 WDR, criticism against the IMF’s, “market fundamentalism” spearheaded by Joseph Stiglitz within the WB started an internal debate which inaugurated the Post Washington Consensus (PWC) era. The WC was criticized for its narrow and dogmatic policies, which at times promulgated ineffective policies, whilst neglecting the wider developmental agenda. Stiglitz sought to address this, by widening the Bank’s definition of development and what it implied, making it more socially inclusive on questions of environmental protection, technological innovation, social cohesion, equity, and participation. The structural reforms sought to materialize this ‘developmental’ shift, and one of those reforms was the, “focus of the state on the construction of ‘human capital’ (basic education) and the creation of ‘protection networks’ for the poorest.”19 Admittedly, tackling poverty and past mistakes of the World Bank into account, it sought to involve the state as a catalyst, readjusting for market failures, yet handing any role back to the private sector once the issue at hand were resolved.20 The World Bank confirmed the PWC concerns by urging governments to “implement mechanisms to alleviate the socially regressive effect of neoliberalism, in order to guarantee the necessary strength for its political sustainability.” 21 There was a need for the João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 825 17 Ibid, p. 825 18 World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Washington DC, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 57-58 19 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 827 20 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p.828 21 Ibid, p. 828 16

establishment of an international development paradigm, which would be shared and promulgated by public-private international coalitions, seeking to reach attainable results. 22 With that in mind, James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank (1995-2005), launched the Comprehensive Development Framework, which was an attempt to “establish a framework of macroeconomic, financial, structural, social and environmental policies shared by the international community.”23 Beginning in the 2000s, the World Bank sought to expand its agenda by incorporating in its scope various issues deemed to be ‘international security’ concerns. Its agenda began to address environmental protection issues. Moreover, in the light of the 9/11 attacks, “security and humanitarianism came to occupy a central place on the Bank’s agenda, with ‘poverty’ being tied to ‘global insecurity.’”24 The World Baml also took increased interest in ‘failed states.' This was the result of the intertwinement of the WC and the neo-conservative, ‘war on terror' occupying a prominent role in the coordination with international civil society (NGOs) of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ operations.25 Lastly, in relation to poverty reduction, the World Bank and the IMF developed Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which sought to guide highly indebted poor countries out of their hardships. This aimed at the increase of transparent social participation, and was sought by “the delimitation of a macroeconomic framework and a script of structural reforms considered appropriate for private investment… when necessary, programs focused on poverty reduction are included.”26 The World Bank admittedly has reformulated its strategy on tackling questions of underdevelopment, poverty, and efficient governance. For that the state’s role has been called into question numerous times, ultimately asking for it to become a transparent functions facilitator of economic growth through the private sector, rather than an arbitrary actor in economics.

Change: success or a cover-up? The World Bank reconsidered its approach throughout the 1980s, 90s and 2000s. The acknowledged shortcomings of ‘market fundamentalism’ sparked the need for better governance with the help of the state for development, and a steady decrease in poverty to occur. But regardless of the attempts of the Bank to be more efficient in its approach, sceptics

Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Global Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: the Globalization Argument and the ‘Political’ Science of Economics’, in Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 320 23 João Márcio Mendes Pereira, ‘Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989–2014)’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 829 24 Ibid, p.830 25 Ibid, p. 830 26 Ibid, p. 830; International Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.aspx [Accessed 6 May 2017] 22

argue that changes in its approach are but a popular myth, a positive narrative that has no link to reality and the actual magnitude of poverty. The World Bank, along with the OECD, IMF and the UN, declared victory and steady progress against extreme poverty with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Report of 2015.27 The report reassured the successful fulfillment of the MGDs set in 2000. The first goal was to halve, between 1990 and 2015, extreme poverty; defined as people who live under $1.25 per day, while halving the number of people suffering from hunger as well.28 From 47 percent of people in the developing world living in extreme poverty in 1990, this percentage has been reduced to 14 percent. More specifically, the amount of people living in extreme poverty fell from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015. On the front of hunger, the amount of malnourished people fell from 23.5 percent in 1990-2 to 12.9 in 2014-16.29 Figure 1 shows exactly how things developed according to the World Bank’s data on poverty reduction.30

Sceptics argue that the MDGs Report of 2015 maintains a falsified positive narrative. Global economic multinational organizations such as the World Bank take credit for the Figure 1: The World Bank data from 1980 to its projection of 2015 shows a significant decline in extreme poverty, defined in this specific graph as the amount of people who live with less than $1.90 per day.

United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (New York, United Nations, 2015) United Nations, Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger Available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml [Accessed 4 May 2017] 29 United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (New York, United Nations, 2015) p. 4 30 Max Roser, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, ‘Global Extreme Poverty’, Our World in Data, 27 March 2017. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty/ [Accessed 6 May 2017] 27 28

reduction of extreme poverty when it is China’s efforts since the 1990s that alleviated hundreds of millions from poverty. Moreover, the World Bank being the main source of data on poverty, the way in which extreme poverty is calculated and generalized world-wide risks being inaccurate. The calculation of extreme poverty in Chile takes into consideration factors completely different than those that would have been employed in the calculation of extreme poverty in Somalia, for instance.31 Not only can it be inaccurate, but the way in which it can be calculated is sometimes arbitrary and aims at promoting this positive narrative. To understand the above argument concerning arbitrary calculations of poverty, the way extreme poverty is calculated must be stressed. The World Bank acts upon extreme poverty by calculating what it calls the International Extreme Poverty Line (IEPL or IPL). The IPL “reflects the conditions of absolute poverty in the world’s poorest economies and corresponds to the same real level of well-being in all countries.”32 The way the IPL is calculated is the following: the World Bank takes national poverty lines of a set of very poor countries, uses PPP exchange rates to convert the lines into US dollars, calculates the average, and ultimately converts it back into their national currencies.33 The dollar-a-day IPL was conceived by World Bank economist Marin Ravallion in 1985, but has since changed numerous times.34 Poverty was getting worse by the year 2000. Wolfensohn refuted the claims though. He reaffirmed the unshakeable success of structural adjustments and supported it with statistics that showed that 400 million people were ‘freed’ from poverty between 1981 and 2001.35 The empirical evidence for this progress was provided by an alteration in the calculation of the IPL. It was increased from $1.02 per day to $1.08. Enacted in 2000 along the MDGs, it had a significant effect in the number of people that were perceived as living below the poverty line. The IPL figure changed in 2005 again, being increased to $1.25 per day. Effectively, although the $1.08 IPL showed a decrease of 316 million poor people between 1990 and 2005, the $1.25 IPL increased that number to 437 million, thus giving great leverage to institutions such as the World Bank and the Millennium campaign.36 The latest change of the IPL to $1.90 per day in 2011 shows that although numerous people have been alleviated from poverty, the Jason Hickel, ‘The true extent of global poverty and hunger: questioning the good news narrative of the Millennium Development Goals’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 752; Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Global Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: the Globalization Argument and the ‘Political’ Science of Economics’, in Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 342 32 Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Global Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: the Globalization Argument and the ‘Political’ Science of Economics’, in Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 342 33 Ibid, p. 342 34 Jason Hickel, ‘The true extent of global poverty and hunger: questioning the good news narrative of the Millennium Development Goals’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 752; Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Global Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: the Globalization Argument and the ‘Political’ Science of Economics’, in Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 342-3 35 Jason Hickel, ‘The true extent of global poverty and hunger: questioning the good news narrative of the Millennium Development Goals’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 752 36 Ibid, p. 753 31

amount of people living in extreme poverty was much higher.37 Yet, progress has been undeniably substantial. Critics take issue at the choosing of the one dollar-a-day IPL, deemed too little an amount to be considered as the IPL, arguing that it overshadows the true extent of poverty, thus calling for a more ‘ethically’ acceptable IPL that corresponds to the stark reality of poverty. Yet, even if the IPL were raised to $5 or $10 dollars a day, thus counting between 50 to 80 percent of the world’s population as poor, it would be calculated as arbitrarily as the $1.90 IPL. There is a significant difference between the usage of the $1.90 and the $5 or $10 figures. The former decries a situation which must be dealt with while conserving in place a system of governance that can act upon it. The two latter figures aggrandise the problem whilst questioning the effectiveness of, say, the World Bank, and hurting its legitimacy as a global norm-setter.

The political aspect of development The criticism of the success of the World Bank’s efforts on tackling poverty effectively show once again that development is a political issue. The Bank is doing its best to preserve this ‘good news narrative’, whether that is by taking credit for China’s successes or changing the IPL in the most arbitrary and suitable way.38 Most importantly, the redefinition of the state’s role in civil society and the economy through the enshrinement of global economic governance is the cardinal point of what Stephen Gill calls ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. That is because, “it relies upon the market, especially the capital market, to discipline economic agents.”39 As Gill argues, this market-oriented discipline of liberal economic orthodoxy is being promoted and reproduced by “the G7 state apparatuses and the international financial institutions.”40 Therefore, from a Neo-Gramscian perspective, the World Bank’s narrative and its reproduction through the manipulation of the IPL, the monopoly of data on poverty and its WDRs, promote an ideational hegemony of a positive narrative whilst creating the impression that there is an inevitability as to the free market-oriented solutions that the World Bank prescribes.41

Robert Hunter Wade, ‘Global Growth, Inequality, and Poverty: the Globalization Argument and the ‘Political’ Science of Economics’, in Global Political Economy, edited by John Ravenhill (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 342-3 38 Jason Hickel, ‘The true extent of global poverty and hunger: questioning the good news narrative of the Millennium Development Goals’, Third World Quarterly, 37:5 (2016), p. 752 39 Stephen Gill, ‘New constitutionalism, democratization and global political economy’, Pacifica Review, Peace, Security & Global Change, 10:1 (1998), p. 25 40 Ibid, p. 25 41 Rupert, M. ‘Antonio Gramsci’, in Critical Theorists and International Relations, edited by Jenny Edkins et al (London, Routledge, 2009), p. 183; Rupert, M. ‘Marxism’, in International Relations Theories: discipline and diversity, edited by Tim Dunne et al (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 135; Smith, G. Antonio Gramsci: selections from the notebooks (London, Lawrence &amp; Wishart Limited, 1998), p. 245-6 37

Gill denounces the mannerisms of the World Bank and its long-term strategy. Most importantly, he argues that by giving superiority to Private International Law, the World Bank “removes questions of the legal regulation of commerce from national, social and democratic controls,”42 thus restricting popular democracy. Yet, there is another way to perceive what the World Bank promotes, that of a market society alongside a market economy.43 In Milton Friedman’s words, the free market “gives people what they want instead of what a particular group thinks they ought to want… underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack of belief in freedom itself.”44 Moreover, the World Bank has achieved and promoted the conceptualization of the state as a set of formal rules that “are intended to be merely instrumental in the pursuit of people’s various individual ends,”45 giving space to the private sphere to flourish, whilst restraining the arbitrary aspect of popular democracy.

Conclusion This essay had a three-fold purpose. Firstly, the changes the World Bank has undergone in its approaches to poverty and development were discussed. Evidently, it has altered its policies numerous times, identifying short-comings in previously enacted policies and elaborating new ones, more encompassing of institutional and instrumental resources such as the state. In any case, failure was not admitted, but met with new goals and policies pertaining a positive narrative. Secondly, the critiques of the World Bank promoted narrative on progress concerning poverty were addressed. The critiques are right to argue that the way the IPL is calculated and used by the International Financial Institutions apparatuses can be arbitrary and misrepresenting the true depth of the problem. Yet, the alternatives, such as setting a significantly higher IPL demonstrating that potentially more than fifty percent of the world’s population can fill in the financial category of extreme poverty, serves little in dealing with the issue and would rather create a crisis of legitimacy for the World Bank, which is among other IFIs one of the few institutions that can monitor and direct policies for the betterment of living conditions in the world. Lastly, it briefly explored the political dimension of development and the conflict of narratives that can exist concerning the World Bank’s work. The World Bank, in the wider context of combatting poverty, not only has managed to decrease the number of poor people, but it has also preserved its legitimacy and promoted the dominant narrative of global free market society and its conception of freedom as it is meant by Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.

Stephen Gill, ‘New constitutionalism, democratization and global political economy’, Pacifica Review, Peace, Security & Global Change, 10:1 (1998), p. 30 43 Recycling and expansion: an analysis of the World Bank agenda (1989-2014), p.827 44 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 15 45 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (New York, Routledge Classics, 2001), pp. 76-7 42

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The Legitimacy of Leadership in British Muslim Communities: Infiltration of Islamists How do Islamist figures within the British Muslim population attain legitimacy of leadership?

By Ross Paton

Arguably, the most predominant meaning of the word legitimacy, is the following one; ‘the quality of being based on a fair or acceptable reason.’1 Within the space allowed to me by this article, I will be solely focused this wider definition of legitimacy, as opposed to one denoting lawfulness. Legitimacy as it is essential to notice, is always perceived (regardless of the extent to which it is perceived). More specifically still, what I will be considering is the legitimacy of leadership in the British Muslim population; how do leadership figures within the population build a perceived notion that they are legitimate? This is the question I will be asking; except, the particular figures who try to attain legitimacy of leadership that I want to understand, are Islamists. What is an Islamist? As Maajid Nawaz, founder of the counter-extremism NGO Quilliam points out, ‘Islam is a religion; Islamism is the desire to impose any version of that religion on society.’2 This is a good starting point but is not without its problems; many have argued that labelling any politics deriving from religion as Islamist is not specific enough. This argument is astute, Quilliam, the organisation Nawaz leads (although not a religious organisation) has a religious component. As it says on its website; ‘Quilliam’s team of theologians research and analyse the textual tradition of Islamic theology…in order to present pluralistic interpretations of Islam that are suitable for our age.’3 Laudable and encouraged this should be, it contradicts with Nawaz’s own definition of Islamism. Liberal interpretations of Islam are political interpretations nonetheless, and therefore Islamist interpretations. Needless to say, counter-extremists don’t need to de-radicalise Liberal Muslims; the answer therefore is to be more specific about what it is counter-extremists are objecting to. It is Islamism, but it is ultra-conservative Islamism. One of the clearest ways in which legitimacy can quickly rise is to take the legitimacy of a larger platform by infiltrating it. Essentially there are three prominent platforms which Islamists have demonstrably infiltrated, to the benefit of an increase in their legitimacy; nonOxford Learner’s Dictionary, English, ‘Legitimacy Noun’, found at: (https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/legitimacy) 1

Nawaz, Maajid, London Central Synagogue, 19/02/2016 Titled ‘Central Synagogue Meeting 19th Feb 2015’ found at: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=465Wt-eX2RY), found on 20/01/2018, found at 27.50 3 Quilliam International, Divisions, UK, Islamic Studies, found on: 20/01/2018, found at: (https://www.quilliaminternational.com/divisions/uk/islamic-studies/) 2

governmental pressure groups, Muslim representative bodies and mainstream media platforms. Non-governmental pressure groups, will naturally seek to conceal their Islamist views under a more visible, socially acceptable, non-contradictory political cause. One immediate example is MEND, or Muslim engagement and development. Simply put, MEND masquerade as civil liberations to eliminate governmentally threats to Islamism. As Tom Wilson puts it in the conclusion of his report on MEND; ‘At first glance, much of its activity appears to be legitimate, if not socially beneficial. A more detailed examination of the organisation’s…statements made by its officials show that the criticism from journalists and public figures have been warranted.’4 In times where one doubts the sincerity of an individual or group, to distil true motivations, it can often be of assistance to do as Baelish advises; ‘…I assume the worst; what’s the worst reason they could possibly have for saying what they say and doing what they do. Then I ask myself, how well does that reason explains what they say, and what they do.’5 They oppose counter-extremism legislation and counter-terrorism operations. They campaign against anti-Muslim bigotry. Moreover as Wilson notes, their events, ‘have become a platform for extremist speakers.’6 MEND aims to increase Muslim participation on the political process. It has presented Islamophobia as institutionally viral within the government. ‘Mend’s presentations, appear to have had a strong sense of voting along sectarian lines according to religion...’7The deceptiveness of the organisation’s public image should now be plain to see. Many of these policies, as Wilson notes earlier are in themselves socially beneficial, and therefore provide a veil to hide the more nefarious activities. But the genius of MEND’s public relations strategy, is that even the outwardly beneficial push to campaign against anti-Muslim bigotry, still corresponds with their wider Islamist strategy. According to Wilson, Tom, Mend: Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians, Henry Jackson Society: Centre for the Response to Radicalism and Terrorism, p.81, Found at: (http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-MendReport-2.pdf) 4

Baelish, Petyr, Game of Thrones Season Seven, Episode Seven, Titled: ‘Game of Thrones 7x07 - Sansa Stark and Petyr "Littlefinger" Baelish’, 2.00, found at: (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdpcyovK0ZU) 5

Wilson, Tom, Mend: Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians, Henry Jackson Society: Centre for the Response to Radicalism and Terrorism, p.55, Found at: (http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-MendReport-2.pdf) 6

Wilson, Tom, Mend: Islamists Masquerading as Civil Libertarians, Henry Jackson Society: Centre for the Response to Radicalism and Terrorism, p.66, Found at: (http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HJS-MendReport-2.pdf) 7

a paper from the European Radicalisation Awareness Network both socio-psychologically and politically, a victimhood complex is a contributing factor in the radicalisation process. 8 In this sense it is beneficial to campaign against anti-Muslim bigotry, inflate its prevalence beyond its truthful quantity, as Wilson notes; ‘Mend’s emphasis on portraying hatred of Muslims as widespread, systematic and institutionalised is at times accompanied by a downplaying of the bigotry that other minority groups can also suffer.’ This difference between publically stated and private agendas, is also reflected by how their events appear from the outside (one was named ‘Islam Is Under Attack, What You Can Do About It’), and the reality of what happens within the confines of a room; ‘Mend events…have become a platform for extremist speakers…such as the rebuking of British mosques for not holding prayers for the Mujahedeen.’9 It is clear then, that sadly one should observe Muslim rights organisations with more of a critical eye, than one would initially think necessary. Muslim Representative Bodies have an inherent problem with Islamist infiltration. Any representative body, is built up of individuals who represent their community as a political pressure group. While an Islamist, as outlined earlier, is someone with the desire to impose a version of Islam over society. The problem then is that Islamists will be, by their sheer nature pulled towards political power, while secular Muslims would be otherwise hypocritical to do the same. It is important to notice that legitimacy is not readily given to new Islamist groups, but one with an established group. Here we see a historical component to this; groups like the Muslim brotherhood with Islamist underpinnings have had almost a century to build their international power base, to network, to gaining smaller affiliates and thus, legitimacy in leadership from the sheer extent that they have led Muslim representation internationally. 10 Indeed the FIOE (Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe), as Silvestri points to has ‘…links with the Islamist network of the Muslim Brotherhood.’11 Islamists holding positions of leadership within Muslim representative groups also has the added consequence of surreptitiously shifting the goalposts of what it means to Muslim; after all, these groups are supposed to represent them. This creates a dangerous perception change in the British Muslim public whereby through a process of osmosis, they assume that the more Islamist positions they see and hear from those in authority, are in fact Muslim Ranstorp, Magnus, Radicalisation Awareness Network, p.3, found at: (https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ranpapers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf) 8

Wilson, ibid, p.55 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Muslim Brotherhood, found on 25/01/2018, found at :(https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood) 9

Silvestri, Sara, ‘Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe: the Muslim Brothers’, found in: Khaled, Political Islam: Context verses Ideology, SAQI/London Middle East Institute SOAS, p.265 11

positions. Naturally, creating a more Islamist population base translates to a higher potentiality for future gained legitimacy. Another example of an organisation with infiltration issues is the Muslim Council of Britain. As an umbrella body, to establish its own legitimacy within the community it must be inclusive; though normally an necessary decision it within the Islamist context leaves it open to infiltration. Indeed as the Economist notes; ‘The council presented itself as a diverse Muslim body. But Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab Islamists held a big share of the top positions…A senior member of the council signed (in a personal capacity) a declaration in support of Hamas…Critics began to pay more attention to the conservative Islamist groups in the council, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami.’12 In the climate of intimidation that Islamists often drive, it is no surprise that divergent, more moderate opinions are frozen out, as the Economist goes on to note; ‘…more moderate Pakistani Sufi groups…felt frozen out.’1314 Without a serious change of the democratic process of the ways these bodies are run, Islamists will continue to manipulate them to attain legitimacy. The final platform which Islamists exploit to gain legitimacy is the media. The media differs slightly from the prior two platforms in that (in the mainstream cases of broadcasters), it is far harder to infiltrate, or even to do so uncontested. Nonetheless, media is a platform which Islamists are not reluctant to take advantage of. Mohammed Ansar was a particularly instructive case in this respect; a fraudster, at various points claiming to have been a member of fifteen professions, Including a lawyer, lecturer and theologian, with barely hidden Islamist views, was uncritically given a media platform.15 According to journalist Jeremy Duns, after being fired from a position as a financial manager, Ansar ‘…then started to reinvent himself as a social and political commentator, with remarkable success, working up from local radio to appearances on the BBC’s Today show, Newsnight and a host of international media.’16 As Nick Cohen notes of Mo Ansar; ‘Ansar understands better than most that if you want to exploit the media you must always be available to harassed researchers on rolling news

Economist (Print Edition), ‘Muslim Council of Britain: No one to talk to’, October 18 th 2014, found here: (https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21625867-muslim-group-falls-favour-no-one-talk) 13 Murray, Douglas, Verwey, Johan Pieter, ‘Victims of Intimidation: Freedom of Speech within Europe’s Muslim Communities’, The Centre for Social Cohesion (2008) 12

Economist (Print Edition), ‘Muslim Council of Britain: No one to talk to’, October 18 th 2014, found here: (https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21625867-muslim-group-falls-favour-no-one-talk) 15 Duns, Jeremy, ‘Some Due Diligence on Mo Ansar’, found on 25/01/2018, found at: (http://www.jeremyduns.com/moansar/) 14

Duns, Jeremy, ‘Some Due Diligence on Mo Ansar’, found on 25/01/2018, found at: (http://www.jeremyduns.com/moansar/) 16

programmes’.17 This astonishing case of fraud, reveals perhaps more about the media than it does about Ansar; the fact that he was allowed a significant platform repeatedly, without adequate background checks, is suggestive. While it implies a certain laziness on behalf of the broadcaster, it also shows that the BBC felt reluctant to scrutinise Mo Ansar’s claims to be a community leader; it is possible that the bigotry of low expectations towards a Muslim minority left the BBC reluctant to verify his claims (why hold a minority to journalistic standards when the community has its own). Such condescension, to an extent arguably allowed Ansar to attain legitimacy. It is clear then that institutions cannot afford to adopt a cultural form of affirmative action; not just to avoid creating the conditions that will assist in building the legitimacy of charlatan Islamists like Ansar, but that everyone should be held to the same journalistic standards. To do otherwise is deeply condescending and indeed, is racist. The societal context in which Islamist figures try to attain public legitimacy and leadership positions, is of doubtless importance to their rise. Therefore to understand the rise, we must understand the serendipitous social context which has allowed them to do so. One of the interesting things about the context in which this legitimacy of leadership takes place is that there is a fascinating contrast between the way in which British society is overwhelmingly socially liberal, while but Islamic attitudes (according to polling) are distinctly not. The following polling figures underline the differences in social attitudes towards homosexuality, both between the wider British people and the Muslim minority, as well as the wider British public’s attitudes towards Muslims: A 2015 YouGov poll asking Britons to consider if they personally ‘…consider homosexuality to be morally acceptable or morally wrong’ found the following: •

17% of Britons considered homosexuality to be morally wrong18

When participants were asked ‘…are same-sex relationships are wrong?’ in polling from the 2017 34th edition of the National Centre of Social Research the following was found: •

64% of Britons think that same-sex relationships are “not wrong at all.”19

Cohen, Nick, The Curious Case of Mo Ansar, The Spectator, 17 th May 2014, Found here: (https://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/05/a-guy-named-mo/) 17

YouGov Survey Results, ‘Is homosexuality morally wrong?’, February 2015 found at: (https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/t42u7601yg/InternalResults_150224_homosexualit y_Website.pdf) 19 Harding, Roger, NatCen Social Research, ‘British Social Attitudes’, ‘Key findings: A kind-hearted but not soft-hearted country’, Context, Found at :(http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-34/keyfindings/context.aspx) 18

Moreover, in an international 2013 Pew poll asking ‘should society accept homosexuality?’ across thirty-nine countries, the following results were found: •

76% of Britons said that society should accept homosexuality, while only six of

the 39 countries had a higher percentage of the same question, putting Britain in the top 18% of the world populations sampled. •

This put Britons firmly in the top 18% of world populations to the extent that

they societally accept homosexuality.20 On an international basis, Britons are comparatively more socially liberal on the aforementioned social-conservatism litmus test, of attitudes towards homosexuality. 2015 YouGov polling asking participants if they had ‘…a negative or positive view of Christianity/Islam?’ found the following: •

31% of Britons ‘had a negative view of Christianity’

•

61% ‘had a negative view of Islam.’

The participants were then asked, ‘Would you feel comfortable expressing criticism of Christianity/Islam to people you know?’ •

10% said they would not feel comfortable criticising Christianity

•

25% said they would not feel comfortable criticising Islam.21

These polls tell us much that is pertinent to the wider context, of the original question when we combine them with a final poll. ICM Research was commissioned to do a survey for the Channel 4 program ‘What Muslims Really Think’ detailing the views of Muslims on a range of issues. When asked: ‘…to what extent you agree or disagree with each one: homosexuality should be legal in Britain?’ The following was found: •

18% were in net agreement

Pew Research Centre, ‘The Global Divide on Homosexuality’, updated May 27 th, 2014, found at: (http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Homosexuality-Report-REVISED-MAY-27-2014.pdf) 20

Dahlgreen, Will, Politics and Current Affairs, ‘Cautious Attitudes to Criticising Islam in Britain’, YouGov Polling: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/01/09/britains-cautious-attitude-criticising-islam/ 21

•

52% were in net disagreement.22

The polling clearly illustrates the worrying cultural context in which Islamists are attempting to infiltrate leadership positions and conjure a perception of legitimacy. The first three polls, though outlining liberal attitudes towards homosexuality, infer that Britain on a wider basis is generally socially liberal; while the ICM survey, doesn’t merely ask about the accepting or rejecting the moral case for, the relationships, or societal acceptance of homosexuality. It asks if the current, very legality of the sexual-orientation should remain, with 52% saying that it should not.23 Not only is this opinion potentially, substantially more consequential (if it were implemented) to the lives of homosexuals in its self; it also stands 16% above any of the parallel negative attitudes documented in the first three polls. 24 This undeniably large difference, both in severity of opinion and the quantity of those holding it, implies a serious socio-political gulf between the wider British public and the Muslim minority within it. In 2015, YouGov polling of the British public presented another worrying dimension to the situation; 25% said they would not feel comfortable criticizing Islam. 25 This essentially underlines an insidious dynamic; though the British population is overwhelming liberal, and Muslims are overwhelmingly more socially conservative, 25% of the British population feels reluctant to criticize the faith from which much of these Conservative attitudes derive.26 This assists in building an incubator for Islamism, whereby criticism of Islamist politics risks being conflated with criticizing private religious sensibilities. Once a belief becomes outwardly political in nature, it presents a unique danger to conflate it as a private religious belief, rather than an outwardly public, or political belief. Essentially this creates ghettoized social attitudes of a culture, within a wider culture; consequently meaning a change in social attitudes is more reliant on change from within the Muslim population. Islamists therefore have a serendipitous context in which to rise to positions of legitimacy; Britons are loath to criticize them externally, while other Muslims internally, are largely conservative anyway, only differing on the way in which they do, or do not derive politics from their faith. In summary, the conservatism of the Muslim demographic provides Islamists with a semi-camouflage in which to operate, while wider society remains wrongly paralyzed by the fear from conflating

Channel 4, News features and Video, ‘C4 survey and documentary reveals What British Muslims Really Think’, 11 th April 2016, Found at: (http://www.channel4.com/info/press/news/c4-survey-and-documentary-reveals-what-britishmuslims-really-think) 22

Channel 4, ibid Channel 4, ibid 25 Dahlgreen, Will, Politics and Current Affairs, ‘Cautious Attitudes to Criticising Islam in Britain’, YouGov Polling: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/01/09/britains-cautious-attitude-criticising-islam/ 23 24

Dahlgreen, ibid

Islamists and Muslims. To make it more difficult for Islamists to attain leadership and legitimacy then, it is clear that the societal context in which they do so, must change. Another contextual ne should not overlook the wisdom in Baroness Warsi’s criticism of the use of the word Islamism; ‘…it doesn’t sufficiently draw a distinction between conservative religious practices…and intolerant views that religious types seek to impose upon others.’27 This underlines the political fault lines within the Muslim community and consequently, the difficulties in criticising Islamists, without alienating potential conservative allies. If we look at the split in terms of groups, we see that it includes liberal, secular Muslims, Conservative secular Muslims, and Islamists, who are neither liberal nor secular. It is therefore not tactically sound for liberals to criticise Islamists on the grounds of their social conservatism, as this fails to adequately distinguish mere conservatives from Islamists. The critique, to distinguish and win (rather than alienating), potential conservative Muslim allies must therefore be a secularist one. One can therefore see that Islamists have seamlessly increased their legitimacy through a pretence of posing as mere conservatives, without letting on to the desire for the theocracy they crave. The savvy traversing of these contextual political fault-lines has clearly been a source of legitimacy for them from the conservative Muslim base. In conclusion, it is clearly the case that various platforms are used by Islamists to elevate their legitimacy. If we are to mitigate this process of legitimacy, these factors must be mitigated and the wider cultural context in which they arise, changed.

Baroness Warsi, Sayeeda, The Enemy Within: A Tale of Muslim Britain, Penguin UK, found at: https://goo.gl/8EFGvY, (trial version, page numbers not given) 27

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The Attack on Civilians in Total Warfare. Does a total war necessarily involve attacks on civilian targets?

By Ben Brotherwood Introduction The concept of Total War is first introduced by the scholar, Daudet to describe conflicts that feature the mass mobilization of one’s population1. This definition is further built on by Ludendorff, a German general who creates an argument that in a ‘Total War,' every resource needs to be mobilised to achieve victory; the rights of citizens become a secondary concern.2 The claim that anyone is a target needs to be analysed, to see if civilians do become a necessary target when fighting in a war which features the attributes of a Total War. Firstly, the way civilians are viewed in Total War frameworks needs to be analysed to see how states view their own citizens in periods of conflicts. Following this, two main ethical frameworks, Just War and utilitarian arguments will be contrasted to see if either argument supports the direct attack on civilians. Using the work of O’Brien3, the essay will discuss if it might be more effective if civilians are looked at as a resource, one which can be manipulated. The underlying approach to the essay will be to show that Total War means civilians should be viewed as a resource by both sides of a conflict, however, this does not necessarily mean they need to be directly attacked.

The attack on Liberty The way in which civilians are viewed in Total War frameworks has a large impact on the way in which they can be viewed. Clausewitz is widely considered as one of the first authors to focus on how mobilisation changed with the arrival of the Nation State. The underlying trait he identifies is that war becomes an affair of the people.4 It is logical then to argue that this supports the principles of Ludendorff; if war is an affair of the people then the people are directly engaged in the conflict itself. This means that in the process of mobilizing one’s resources, you already have a pool of humans to be used as the state feels necessary. The

Daudet, L. The gauerre totale (Paris, Nouvelle Librairie, 1918), cited in Heuser, B. ‘The history of the practice of strategy from antiquity to Napoleon’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World 5th Edition, edited by John Baylis, James J. Writz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 30. 2

Ludendorff, E. Der Totale Krieg (Munich, Ludendorff Publishing, 1935), cited in, Sheenam, M. ‘The Evolution of Modern Warfare’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World 5th Edition, edited by John Baylis, James J. Writz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), p.44 Ludendorff, E. The Nation at War (London, Hutchinson and Co, 1938). Translation by Dr A. S. Rappoport 3

O’Brien, P. ‘Chapter 2: The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction’, in How the War was won (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 67-94. 4 Clausewitz, C. On War (Hertfordshire, Wordsworth, 1997), pp. 347-349

issue is there is an underlying assumption that every member of the state is willing to actively engage in the conflict. This simply is not the case. There are generally groups or individuals in a state who will not feel the war is to their personal benefit or an affair they can support; an example would be pacifists. We need to look at the way in which a state actually forces the citizens to participate when it is not in their interest, to determine if Total War necessarily requires attacks on individual liberties by the state, towards its own people. A suitable approach for deciding if a state needs to attack citizens’ liberties is to assess the necessity of the action. Ludendorff does argue in his work that a state needs to be ruthless towards its citizens in order to be able to effectively partake in the war5. This means attacking their civil liberties in order to force them to do what the state requires. The work of Goscha disagrees with this idea in his analyses of the rise of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the Vietnam War. He argues that there are limits to mobilisation, demonstrating that the DRV were brought to the negotiating table after a long period of relatively successful period of mobilization due to the populace becoming fatigued of the conflict.6 However, while there is a limit, one can argue his work highlights that necessity still requires a state to infringe on a citizen’s rights and use them as a resource in a war effort. In the instance of the DRV, the use of civilians as porters in mass numbers proved essential to the war effort in order to keep the DRV’s armies supplied7. The state was purposefully violating a citizen’s rights to protection by placing them in danger. The necessity of the situation meant that the state had to attack its own citizen’s rights in order to sustain the mobilization of its military forces. This basic attack on the right to protection is exemplified in other areas such as forced conscription into a states army in order to bolster its military strength. They two were civilians but, the necessity of a Total War meant the state had to place its citizen’s rights second in order to be able to use them as a resource.

Ethical Concern The ethical dimension of warfare can come from many angles and offer varying viewpoints towards what can and cannot be justified in the act of war. Two particular moral justifications

Goscha, C. ‘A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization? Social Mobilization and State-Building in Communist Vietnam (1949-54)’, in War & Society, 41 (2012), pp. 161-162. 7 Goscha, C. ‘A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization? Social Mobilization and State-Building in Communist Vietnam (1949-54)’, in War & Society, 41 (2012), p. 155

will be focused on; Walzer’s interpretation of the Just War tradition and the justification of President Truman for dropping two nuclear bombs on Japan at the climax of WW2. The ethical arguments proposed by Walzer acknowledge a certain level of necessity that is inherent in Total War. However, Walzer chooses to argue that only imminent defeat and political destruction is the point at which the ethical calculations of war can be completely disregarded8. In effect, he is offering a ladder of escalation to the ways in which resources can be targeted and a ceiling that needs to be hit before a state can view its enemies as a resource to be deprived. At first it would seem to run counter to the ideas of Ludendorff and his argument that war needs to be followed to its natural conclusion of totality and the mobilization of all9. Ludendorff is arguing that a strategist in a Total War should accept that nature from the start and mobilise from the beginning. The only real difference between the two viewpoints however, is Walzer’s view that a conflict should escalate into being considered a Total War, he still accepts that the shift of attitudes towards civilians is a necessity while conducting a Total War. Walzer’s ethical viewpoint is one of a range of varying ethical standpoints. By analysing Truman’s justifications, a different moral viewpoint can be viewed which embraces Ludendorff’s views on war. Truman’s speech never makes an explicit reference regarding attacking civilians, instead he states the that the US is, ‘ now prepared to obliterate…every productive enterprise the Japanese have above ground in any city…we shall completely destroy Japan’s power to make war’10. The threat to Japan is not that the US will assault its civilians, it will instead seek to prevent civilians and their work for the war effort from being of any use to the Japanese state. Placed into the context of the USA facing a possible invasion of mainland Japan, we see Truman embracing Ludendorff’s ideas as a point of necessity. Truman is trying to avoid mass casualties for both allied troops and Japan, which is the main point of justification for the bombing in his statement11. By proving he has the capacity and willpower destroy Japan’s ability to mobilize its forces, his decision to embrace what

Walzer, M. Just and Unjust War 5th edition (New York, Basic Books, 2015), p. 267

The White House, Truman informs the nation that an atomic weapon has been detonated in Japan, Statement by the President of the United States, August 1945. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primaryresources/truman-hiroshima/ [Accessed 30 November 2016]. 11 The White House, Truman informs the nation that an atomic weapon has been detonated in Japan, Statement by the President of the United States, August 1945. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primaryresources/truman-hiroshima/ [Accessed 30 November 2016].

Ludendorff refers to as the inevitably of war12 and strike the enemies civilians is ethically justified. In order to see if they necessarily need to be attack, we need to look at the empirical evidence to see if this justification applies to other situations. So far in the essay, we have looked at how different views towards Total War focus on resources as a primary asset, with a need to view civilians as just another resource being an essential feature for a state engaged in a Total War. Using the empirical evidence gathered together by O’Brien, we will challenge the assumption that civilians necessarily need to be directly attacked by enemy forces in order to deprive an enemy state of human resources. O’Brien shows that the destruction of equipment in ww2 needed for combat had little effect on the outcomes of the war. Destroying the transportation networks however, especially the rail lines or shipping routes brining in raw materials did cause massive mobilisation issues as production dropped13. The example that is most relevant is the destruction of much of Germany’s rail network. The repair work meant Germany had to re-apply its human resource, from the factories to the railroads, leading to a large loss in productivity and equipment output in 1944. In this instance, the attacks are not being carried out to physically harm civilians to deprive Germany of a resource. Instead, the attacks are forcing workers to be used in a manner which does not constitute the most effective mobilization of all of Germany’s resources combined. This still constitutes an act of Total War, for it recognizes the role of civilians as a resource to be mobilized and the necessity of depriving the enemy state of that resource. A similar example of civilians not being physically attack but still being targeted in order to deprive a state partially of human resources can be seen in the First World War. Germany and Britain both attempted to cut their opponents supply lines. The British efforts were far more effective. Janicki argues that that by targeting these supply lines, the British were able to exert a great deal of pressure on the Germany government14. This he describes as an embodiment of Total War, for it forced the governments to not just focus on the mobilization of the military machine. The entire system was recognized to be interlinked and by effecting the efficiency and willpower of one element of the system, other systems where then

War Office, ‘Report from Captured Personal Field Marshall Milch’, July 1945, p.7. Cited in O’Brien, P. ‘Chapter 2: The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction’, in How the War was won (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 76. 14 Janicki, D. ‘The British Blockade during World War 1: The Weapon of Deprivation’, Inquiries Journal, 6 (2014), available at: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/899/5/the-british-blockade-during-world-war-i-the-weapon-of-deprivation [Accessed 30 November 2016].

effected15. The civilian population is once again having its efficiency as a vital resource lowered, without the need for direct attack. Both the examples of O’Brien and Janicki are taking place in wars that are very different in scope however. Both wars also feature attacks on civilians, but the magnitude of civilian attacks is far higher in WW2. Despite the texts show that civilians do not need to be directly attacked by the enemy, we have yet to have an example of the conflicts being discussed betraying the characteristics of a ‘Total War,’ as laid out by Ludendorff, when civilians are not physically attacked. This raises the question of whether the sheer levels of escalation required by Total Wars invariably lead to attacks on civilians by an enemy force. The essay has purposefully not included instances were civilians are killed despite not being a direct target, the bombing of a factory for instance or the sinking of merchant shipping. In such situations, civilian deaths are inevitable, even if it may be possible to fight a Total War without directly targeting civilians, civilians will die all the while a nation’s infrastructure and non-human resources are attacked due to their proximity. In conclusion, the way in which a civilian is viewed is essential in determining if their targeting is an essential feature of Total Wars. For the state the civilian belongs to, a civilian must be considered a resource which is to be mobilized out of necessity. This inherently leads to an assault on their civil liberties, as Clausewitz’s claim that a war truly is an affair of the people16 is not true for all citizens. When considering the enemy’s civilian population, Total War does not necessitate their assault. It does require that they be considered as a resource though, and the most effective way of limiting their usefulness for the enemy’s efforts to mobilize and sustain a conflict to be considered.

Janicki, D. ‘The British Blockade during World War 1: The Weapon of Deprivation’, Inquiries Journal, 6 (2014), available at: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/899/5/the-british-blockade-during-world-war-i-the-weapon-of-deprivation [Accessed 30 November 2016]. 16 Clausewitz, C. On War (Hertfordshire, Wordsworth, 1997), pp. 347-349

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Clausewitz, C. On War (Hertfordshire, Wordsworth, 1997).

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Goscha, C. ‘A ‘Total War’ of Decolonization? Social Mobilization and State-Building in Communist Vietnam (1949-54)’, in War & Society, 41 (2012), pp. 136-162.

III.

Heuser, B. ‘The history of the practice of strategy from antiquity to Napoleon’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World 5th Edition, edited by John Baylis, James J. Writz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 17-33.

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Janicki, D. ‘The British Blockade during World War 1: The Weapon of Deprivation’, Inquiries Journal, 6 (2014), available at: http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/899/5/the-british-blockade-duringworld-war-i-the-weapon-of-deprivation [Accessed 30 November 2016].

Ludendorff, E. The Nation at War (London, Hutchinson and Co, 1938). Translation by Dr A. S. Rappoport

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O’Brien, P. ‘Chapter 2: The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction’, in How the War was won (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 67-94.

VII.

Sheenam, M. ‘The Evolution of Modern Warfare’, in Strategy in the Contemporary World 5th Edition, edited by John Baylis, James J. Writz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 33-48.

VIII.

The Legitimacy of Illegal Intelligence Practices by US Presidents Is the illegal use of intelligence legitimate in the hands of the US president?

By Natalie Speechley Finding an answer to questions asking if the illegal use of intelligence can be legitimate is complex. At first glance many will answer no, due to the implications of law breaking. However, when looking more deeply into how the illegal use of intelligence may secure a state’s security the answer to this question becomes blurred. We trust in the executive (President), to have the states interest at the heart of all foreign policy and state actions. Does this legitimize the use of illegal intelligence if it is the order of the President, someone who is democratically elected to govern? To answer this question, we will be looking at ethical implications, realism (a theory of international politics), democracy, and a partnering example in relation to American international politics. When questioning legitimacy within intelligence, ideas and concepts of ethics must be considered. Unconsciously, we all adhere to the ‘social contract’. This is the fundamental construct of society whereby all civilians will adhere to law set by the government and in turn the government will provide safety for the nation.1 But what happens when the law is broken by those who set it? And what if the action of breaking the law is carried out to ensure the safety of the state’s citizens? Questions such as this need to be addressed to be able to effectively answer whether it is legitimate to use illegal intelligence. It can be argued that any breaking of the law, by any actor is wrongful and should be a criminal offence. This is a plausible argument. When we start to allow legislation to be broken we can start to knock down the pillars in which society stands on. Is breaking down these pillars of society worth the potential consequences for the state and the international system? There are arguments that the use of any intelligence is unethical. If the use of intelligence is unethical, then the illegal use of it definitely will be. This argument stems from idea of individual privacy of the people. Is it right that all actions we take can be seen on surveillance? New media within today’s society has enabled a form of Signals intelligence which enable agencies to read into this abundance of available data and extract information. However, secret documents of other actors are not published on twitter. It is more likely to be the commentary of such documents when put into action that are posted, which thus limits the use of media as an open source of intelligence. Here we see that using new media, a form of consensual intelligence, is not enough in securing a state. Therefore, more secret use of intelligence may be required. This brings us back to the question, if we cannot easily and consensually acquire the information needed to secure a nation, is it legitimate to do it in the opposite way?

Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians. Cambridge: Polity, 2006, p. 13.

Structural Realism argues yes to the above question. It indicates that it is uncertainty within the international state system which can create violence and aggression and anarchy. 2 Gathering certainty of other actors within the international system should therefore allow states to behave peacefully.3 Gathering such certainty can be done through intelligence. Therefore, it stands to reason that intelligence may offer certainty in an anarchic international system. Thus, can intelligence offer peace? This view point implies that any action which may enable a nation-state to peruse security of its nation is legitimate as the means legitimize the end. Like this point we must question democratic involvement in the illegal use of intelligence by the executive. If the executive is democratically chosen to govern the United States, then it implies that the citizens of America have trusted in the executive to govern the state in an appropriate way. Laws restrict freedom, but those whose freedom has been restricted are involved in the state by democratic processes4. In doing so they also put trust in the executive to make the decision of when the use of illegal intelligence is appropriate and when it is not. An appropriate case study to that discussed above is the coup d’état imposed on Iran 1953 as, ‘indirect and behind the scenes’ efforts to remove Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq’s government.5 US foreign policy during this period was based on the premises of fear of Soviet and communist expansion. This was a major reason in the justifications of the covert action within Iran. In 1950, shortly after the election, Mosaddeq acclaimed in a speech that Iran’s oil would be the possession of the Iranians.6 This nationalisation of the oil meant that the oil produced in Iran was no longer under the control of the British. This caused tension with the United Kingdom, who owned 50% of the stock7. The UK claimed the oil due to them finding and processing it despite the oil being within Iran’s territory.8 Due to the unstable nature of the Iranian government and the events in Czechoslovakia and Korea, the United States feared that Iran would too, fall behind the Iron Curtain9. This led to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to suggest that the US form a covert operation to expel Mosaddeq from power.10 Mass demonstrations overtook the nation in the name of the Shah – the King. Coordinated uprisings engineered with the help of tribal leaders within Iran enabled mass support for the Shah, whilst support for the Prime Minister, Mosaddeq plummeted. 11 Eisenhower’s administration escalated

K. Waltz, ‘Explaining War: The Levels of Analysis’, in K. Waltz Man, The State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, pp. 24-35. 3 P. J Jackson, ‘Historical reflections’, in Intelligence and statecraft: the use and limits of intelligence in international security, Westport, Conn; London: Praeger, 2005, p. 11. 4 Adam Swift, Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians. Cambridge: Polity, 2006, p. 15. 5 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3, 1987, p. 246. 6 “Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue on JSTOR,” accessed November 9, 2017, p. 465. 7 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3, 1987, p262. 8 “Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue on JSTOR,” accessed November 9, 2017, p. 467. 9 Ibid., p. 475. 10 Ibid., p. 475. 11 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3, 1987, p. 270.

their work in Iran, turning all soviet propaganda towards Mosaddeq; persuading opposition figures to create disturbances which dramatized the current situation and gaining support of military leaders. This was carried out by a pre-existing network within Iran under BEDAMN, an espionage operation to limit soviet influence. Demonstrations grew and Mosaddeq was forced to call a referendum in early August of 1953 that was rigged12. Further demonstrations continued funded by the CIA13. Crowds were joined by the army and police units and all entities who supported Mossaddeq, newspapers or government office buildings, were attacked14. The protesting concentrated around Mossaddeq’s home, until he surrendered to General Zahedi the following day15. In the case study, the US wanted to keep Iran within the western sphere of influence and not allow it to become a soviet ally. At the time of the Cold War, such state matters were of utmost importance in shaping US foreign policy. It is therefore apparent that the US could have been justified in its actions. This is due to the need to defend its national security while preventing the spread of communism. Following Truman’s administration and Eisenhower’s inauguration into the President’s office, the coup was amplified. This matched the amplification of the Cold War that also occurred. The US’s perception that the Soviet Union was a growing threat, provides legitimacy to US action in Iran. While, I respect the premise of illegitimacy when breaking any law, the threat of Communism was considered existential and it’s defeat imperative to the survival of the United States. In conclusion, it is apparent that discussions on legitimacy in relation to the use of intelligence can be ambiguous in nature. Using America as a case study, I have argued that it can be legitimate to use intelligence illegally if the threat it is used against is existential. Ethical implications can be surpassed in such situations.

Ibid., p.272. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’Etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3, 1987, p. 274. 14 Ibid., p. 247. 15 Ibid., p. 275. 13

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Fariborz, M. "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue," The Middle East Journal, 62(2008), pp. 457-488

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Swift, A. Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.

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Waltz, K. ‘Explaining War: The Levels of Analysis’, in K. Waltz Man, The State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

Jackson, P.J. ‘Historical reflections’, in Intelligence and statecraft: the use and limits of intelligence in international security, Westport, Conn; London: Praeger, 2005