Detente, Diplomacy and MBFR (1972-1976)

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(1919), one of a series of murals Cover: Detail from `Britannia Pacificatrix'

by Sigismund Goetze decorating the Grand Staircase of the Foreign and by kind permission Office. From a photograph Mrs Commonwealth of Maria Rainey

The publication last year of Detente in Europe, 1972-1976 in the series collection Documents on British Policy Overseas has inspired the present of Occasional Papers produced by the FCO Historians.

Detente in Europe charts Britain's role in the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in central Europe 1972-6; follows British reactions to Helsinki changes in East/West relations in the aftermath the of summit of 1975; and illuminates aspects of bilateral relations between Britain and the Soviet Union in the period.

The formal launch of this volume in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office last July was enlivened by the personal recollections Clive Sir of guest speaker, Rose, the first Head of the UK Delegation to the MBFR talks. Sir Clive has kindly expanded his remarks then into the first of the papers here published.

These give some unique insights into the significance of the MBFR talks for detente diplomacy multilateral across the board in the first half of the 1970s.

Sir Clive's paper is complemented by the historian's Keith by view given FCO Historian Hamilton, and Editor of the Detente volume. This considers MBFR for British policy towards the the significance more particularly of To round Soviet Union. have by kind included the collection off, we of the author, the epic verse `Parity Lost' penned by Francis permission Richards, when a member of the UK Delegation, as a parody to capture both the highs and lows of epic talks.

I should like to thank all the contributors least the to this edition not Eamonn Clifford, has manager, production who overseen changes in format design. and Heather Yasamee Records and Historical March 2002

cla

Department

Foreign

& Commonwealth

Office

HISTORIANS Occasional

Papers

No. 17

April 2002 CONTENTS Page

Mutual and Balanced Sir Clive Rose The Touchstone NIBFR Keith Hamilton

Force Reductions:

of Detente:

British

The first three years

diplomacy

and the talks on

Parity Lost Francis Richards

1-12

13-35

36-41

Note on Contributors

42

Copies of this pamphlet

will be deposited

with the National

FCO Historians, Library & Records Department, Old Admiralty Building London SW1A 2PA Crown

Copyright

ISBN 0 903359 84 7

Libraries

MUTUAL

FORCE REDUCTIONS AND BALANCED The first three years Sir Clive Rose

Introduction The enterprise known to the West as the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force (MBFR) was unique. It was the first and only direct negotiation Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to take place wholly during the Cold War. The fact that it lasted 16 years, from 1973 to 1989, without leading to an Its below. be from its importance, detract does as will shown not agreement in for different the an agreement negotiations scope and concept, successor, Forces in Europe (CFE), was launched in the dying Conventional limiting War November Cold in in the and resulted an agreement signed months of 1990 by all 22 members of the two Alliances, not long before the demise of Experience by both MBFR itself. in Pact Warsaw talks the gained sides the CFE to the the conduct of negotiations, which made a valuable contribution in international in totally changed climate and were concluded took place a little more than 18 months.

The MBFR talks took place contemporaneously on with the Conference in Europe (CSCE); the two negotiations Security and Co-operation are But despite different `siblings'. to, their paternity, as sometimes referred MBFR concerned the vital security, political and military interests of the two between them, Alliances in the geographical area of direct confrontation 35 for basis CSCE, find to a with participants, was an attempt a whereas the human diplomatic on a wide range of economic, modus vivendi relations, Europe issues in and environmental affecting all countries cultural, scientific, (plus the United States and Canada, as the two non-European members of Because the nature of the CSCE allowed room for diplomatic NATO). have developed been the were reached agreements which over compromise basis for institution (now 54 form the an to of members) able to play a years European MBFR in hand On the the other role affairs. major and continuing CFE both limited in the their objectives and their agreement, talks, and even in during dangerous served a crucial purpose period a participation, East/West relations which is now a part of history.

History and Origins From the start, the twin pillars of NATO policy were defence and deterrence. did In the early years of the Alliance's life, disarmament not and arms control feature as substantive subjects on its agenda, for the very obvious reason that its main purpose was to build up and maintain the pillars rather than to look Disarmament for means of reducing them. pursued, was a subject hardly but Nations, United through and the productively, conscientiously

for Western interest in 1960 Geneva.

NATO's in the proposals mainly centred Disarmament' by stages was confined `General and Complete to ensuring in initiatives, Alliance Soviet `peace' that they would not prejudice security. the context of the myth of `peaceful co-existence', were propaganda-inspired.

1960's in Such genuine the were took as negotiations place arms control Destruction', Mass `Weapons of concerned with nuclear weapons and other initially between the United States and Soviet Union and with participation by the United Kingdom. The first agreement reached was the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1962. The first half of the 1960's, the period of the Berlin and Cuba Crises, was not otherwise though on nonnegotiations productive, However began later decade. in biological the proliferation weapons and on in 1966, responding to a growing sense that the Alliance needed to take a fresh look at its role with regard to East/West relations, NATO governments Alliance factor for launched `to the strengthen a a study of means as a durable peace'. The resultant `Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance', Foreign Report' known as the `Harmel Minister after the Belgian who by the North Atlantic initiated Council in 1967. the study, was approved defence While reaffirming the importance the report of and deterrence, declared that `the ultimate is to achieve a political purpose of the Alliance in Europe just and lasting peaceful by appropriate order accompanied security guarantees' and that this purpose should be pursued by `realistic detente further designed in East- West relations'.

Henceforth to measures detente was adopted as the third pillar of NATO policy. This seminal report `Declaration the Force true the was genesis of on Mutual and Balanced by North Atlantic Reductions' Council in June 1968. The the adopted Declaration established principles on which preparations were to be made by for talks on MBFR and the Soviet Union the Alliance and its allies were invited to join in discussions on the subject. from Soviet This invitation Union, just the reply evoked no two months which With a good deal of ground to make up on the later invaded Czechoslovakia. `peace' front, the Soviet government published early in 1969 a vague and for `Conference European Security'.

This on proposal unspecific was Alliance by initially Soviet the typical with grave suspicions as a regarded It NATO's MBFR to was certainly not seen as a response ploy. propaganda developed, But it was eventually invitation. of substantial as a result NATO into 35-nation by the negotiations participants, potential elaborations its became CSCE, it in 1973 in Helsinki that clear as the when which opened for Soviet to talks on pro the agreement was essential quid quo acceptance The entry into force in March 1970 of the Nuclear Nonforce reductions.

Proliferation Treaty and the opening of the United States-Soviet negotiations for hope Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT) later inspired a on a month Soviet issued NATO MBFR. So in May 1970, a more positive reaction on

2

further specific invitation to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies which the Secretary-General was instructed to deliver. This invitation spelled out the considerations which would govern the Alliance's approach to MBFR talks, namely: (a)

Mutual

(b)

Reduction balanced

(c)

Reductions

force reductions be should compatible with the vital security interests of the Alliance and should not operate to the disadvantage having for the military of either side regard differences arising from geographical and other considerations.

their (d)

There

be basis should on a of reciprocity, as to their scope and timing.

and phased

include should stationed and indigenous in the area concerned. weapons systems

must observance reduction.

forces

and

and

be adequate verification to ensure the and controls force of agreements on mutual and balanced

As regards (c), the area was defined Central Region'.

`Europe, as

with

special

reference

to the

Thereafter

by the two sides on the events moved slowly towards agreement talks. NATO opening of preparatory agreed in May 1972 to embark on for CSCE talks that preparatory preparatory a provided talks on MBFR In the end, those on CSCE opened take place in parallel. in should November 1972 and, with some hesitation, the Soviet Union agreed in January 1973 to take part in exploratory force reductions talks on mutual starting on 31 January. The CSCE proper began in July and the MBFR talks in Vienna on 31 October.

Preparation The motivation behind NATO's MBFR proposal The was mainly political. designed general considerations spelled out in the 1970 invitation to were ensure that the negotiations would enhance, or at any rate not prejudice, the Alliance's military posture. But detailed preparatory studies revealed some of from a military the potential risks and difficulties: point of view there was little scope for any major reductions

by NATO, whereas those required of the Warsaw Pact would be very much larger, so that to any proposals acceptable NATO would have to be highly asymmetrical.

How could such proposals be negotiable?

3

in 1969 was made in the interests of While the Alliance's original Declaration detente, the degree of enthusiasm for MBFR varied according to furthering individual The United States interests the national of members. for in faced with Congressional Administration, a reduction pressures American in Europe, in favour in forces of engaging was strongly as a means of resisting pressures for unilateral cuts. The negotiations Germans supported in line with the Federal the proposal for negotiations, Ostpolitik. Some other European allies saw MBFR as offering Government's the possibility of reducing defence expenditure within an agreed multilateral We and the French were sceptical, reckoning framework. that the risks from The French the start. out any potential advantages. opted outweighed fully in all the preparatory We participated work, partly because we wished to support the Americans but also to enable us to use all available opportunities for damage limitation.

Following the election of the Labour Government early in 1974, the new British Ministers saw the existence of the MBFR talks as a useful argument against those in the Labour Party who were advocating defence cuts. unilateral The exploratory talks between representatives of the 19 countries which were 7 in Warsaw PactNATO the to participate were negotiations and -12 discussions. concluded on 28 June after 5 months of difficult and contentious `direct' Federal The seven NATO Canada, (Belgium, the participants States) United Luxembourg, Netherlands, Republic, United Kingdom and Turkey) Norway five `flank' (Denmark, Italy, Greece, countries and plus formed an Ad Hoc Group to co-ordinate their position. This in itself did not Warsaw The issues. due lack to of agreement on many substantive prove easy, Pact countries laboured under no such disadvantage under the firm control dissension (and Soviet The of the representative. of most serious point of disarray on the NATO side) was the status of Hungary, which NATO claimed Europe `direct' be a participant was part of central and should therefore Soviet be forces included (together in the the with would whose negotiations but which the Warsaw Union, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) An Bulgaria).

Pact insisted was a `flank' Romania (with and country left Alliance, by American-driven the the compromise, accepted reluctantly Little be Hungary determined in to the common negotiations. status of between matters and the the two sides on procedural ground was established in `balanced' Warsaw Pact, predictably, the title which objected to the word however NATO for interpreted `asymmetrical'. was they as a codeword intended Measures', in including `Associated to to a reference successful The agreed title and non-circumvention. cover such matters as verification in communiques issued at the end of the Preparatory talks for the negotiations Associated Armaments Reduction Armed Forces `Mutual and of and was: Measures in Central Europe'.

4

Objectives down in Alliance objectives were based on the four considerations the set NATO had Soviet Union its May 1970 invitation the to agreed on allies. and In Warsaw Pact in be framework to the to stages. presented of proposals a the end-result was to be a Common Ceiling for ground terms of reductions, force manpower in central Europe of 700,000 on each side. This came to be described as the `Iron Pole' of the NATO position. While strategic decisions Atlantic Council, handling North for the tactical the of the were reserved Vienna.

Delegations in the the of responsibility was negotiations The principal objectives Head, the were: was

for United the set

Kingdom

Delegation,

I

of which

be To be seen by Parliament to and public opinion working seriously for a lowering of the level of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe while maintaining undiminished security for all.

MBFR negotiations through the Americans Europe.

American in level troops of adequate

To help

To limit

the military

To maintain

to maintain

an

damage as far as possible.

unity within

To avoid any MBFR freedom Europeans'

the Alliance. limit the agreement which might European to devise common

Western defence

arrangements.

From These objectives throughout. time to time constant remained Delegation between FCO differences the the and as to the relative arose I highest importance be to to them. the attached to given priority Alliance, in Group, is NATO Ad Hoc that to the the so say, unity maintaining long as this did not prejudice the other objectives. This was not disputed by led but FCO the there were occasions when extraneous considerations the latter to override my views on what best suited the tactical situation in Vienna. the place to make a detailed analysis of Soviet objectives.

Russians hoped the or wanted from MBFR varied of what But first three there was very little confidence that they the years. throughout degree NATO; by demanded the to asymmetrical of reductions would agree NATO find indeed to agreement which any might acceptable without the or inducement into injection major the negotiations, some of or, more This is not Assessments

5

or pressures outside the context of probably, as a result of circumstances MBFR. The Russians would see advantage in an agreement which gave them de Western European droit (especially German) forces and might a regard over be prepared to pay for this. In any case it suited their political purpose to be seen to be engaged in negotiations and they no doubt hoped that, if these be they were protracted, would able to count on cracks appearing in the unity by West European of the NATO side and unilateral reductions some participants.

The Negotiations Four months after the conclusion of the exploratory talks the 19 Delegations in Vienna for For the Alliance the opening of the negotiations. assembled brief the objectives referred to above and representatives, our comprised (presumably) had its national instructions.

But we had no each delegation rules of procedure, no secretariat either for the negotiations or for the NATO Ad Hoc Group and no precedents to guide us. This had certain in it had both that to advantages meant we work out our own arrangements, within the Alliance and in co-operation with the Warsaw Pact side. The lot fell on me to take the chair at the opening Plenary Sessions on 31 October. My American and German colleagues had no suggestions about how to conduct this; the most helpful advice came from the head of the Soviet Delegation, Khlestov (who also remained Head of the Treaty Department in the Foreign Agreement Ministry). was reached to set up a Working Group to work out Khlestov and myself as joint chairmen. At the first meeting procedures, with Khlestov summarily rejected the proposals I put forward on behalf of the Ad Hoc Group, only to table virtually identical proposals at the start of the The Alliance these without second meeting. representatives accepted thus allowing Khlestov to report to his authorities the success of amendment, his initiative, a gambit which cost NATO nothing and paid a small dividend in personal relations.

The essence of the procedural hold two plenary meetings to agreement was West behalf be the of a week at which statements would made, one each, on East; languages Russian (we English be the the official were and and would involved), fortunate in French this that the not which respect perhaps were Delegation be interpreted; Heads the only ones would sit of would only the Deputies) Russian in Plenaries (plus American table the the at at and behind; (English), Delegation sitting order members alphabetical other Chairmanship would alternate between East and West; and each side would The negotiations for its own secretarial arrangements. be responsible were `Rounds' in three months each, with a recess of approximately conducted few in After between each for consultation meetings a a and preparation.

6

in Redoutensaal into the magnificent cramped conference room we moved the Hofburg Palace (the scene of the 1815 Congress of Vienna) which the Austrian Government generously put at our disposal.

NATO

framework

involved the reduction of the overall 700,000 Ceiling Europe Common force to a manpower ground of The be first, in in the to two the ceiling was on each side. reached phases: 68,000 1,700 Soviet Union would withdraw tank a army comprising men and 29,000 soldiers, either as individuals in tanks and the US would withdraw or force units, these figures representing about 15% of each country's ground in further in be the the manpower area; second, reductions would made to Common The Ceiling. be to the complete movement reductions would Measures' by `Associated troop accompanied governing movements, The NATO verification and non-circumvention. gameplan was to make behind individual the presentations on reasoning elements of the proposals, leading to the tabling of the complete framework in 1974. In the event, the Warsaw Pact forced our hand and the framework was tabled on 22 November, figures the time to support the case for same manpower at as comparative asymmetrical reductions.

The

proposals in Central

As early as 8 November, the Russians achieved considerable tactical surprise by tabling a Draft agreement for reduction in 3 stages of all armed providing forces (including in Central Europe: in first `symbolic' the and nuclear) air forces its by 20,000 stage each side would reduce men; in the second and third each side would make further reductions of 5% and 10% respectively.

Reductions would be carried out by whole units of approximately similar type forces direct in to the and would apply of each individual participant its to to its side's total forces in the area. These proportion contribution immediately proposals were released to the Western media, where, despite deceptively the superficial their appeal of they received simple approach, little relatively publicity.

The fundamental

differences between the two sides were epitomised in these NATO to reduce opening proposals. the imbalance aimed the whereas Warsaw Pact planned to preserve it; NATO wished to avoid sub-ceilings on forces, for future Alliance national so as to retain flexibility and European defence arrangements, whereas the Warsaw Pact wished to enforce such for the Federal Republic; NATO national ceilings, especially to wished two clearly distinct and successive phases, whereas the Warsaw Pact negotiate be proposed a single negotiation that all forces should with agreement reduced from the outset; and so on. From the end of the first Round onwards the negotiations took two forms: each side extolled, to the extent of tedious

7

side its each the merits and reasonableness and proposals; of own of the object to chip away at the proposals attempted with the other of The West went toi great lengths to explain them in its own direction. moving detailed East's inadequate, why the proposals were and anyway needed unstable clarification, and would an existing merely serve to perpetuate demands East West's 'unequal' the situation; the argued strongly against their to while at the same time offering the occasional variations cosmetic blow-by-blow It would serve no useful purpose here own proposals. to give a repetition,

two only substantive first three the made (luring 1975 to withdraw Ueccinhe"r include to and armaments be ceiling, would which 1973 East to accept NATO's data in full; the second, by the East, 1976 June in proposals of was the tabling in Central Europe.

The West's nuclear on Warsaw Pact manpower offer was devised by the Americans it but by originally came time the as a trump card, Western in its to be played high confidence effectiveness among was not West failed it The East's data, for negotiators, and to take the trick. which the had been from pressing the start, to show, not surprisingly, purported approximate parity with the figures given by the West for NATO forces. When the West came to table up-dated figures for Alliance forces, France threw a in In the the works by refusing spanner to allow her forces to be included.

East's from confusion caused by this, the fact that Hungary the was omitted figures passed without comment, the Russians a gain for the East which quietly pocketed.

In course of the negotiations. major modifications to the initial proposals were years: the first, by the West, was the offer made in certain American short-range and tactical nuclear force in the Collective air Common manpower increased to 900,000, all as an inducement to the account

of

the

terms

By the end of 1973 it was apparent that the bi-weekly plenary process of for by meetings, with a formal statement each side, with no provision German questions or discussion, would achieve little. My American and colleagues and I agreed to try to get the Russians to accept the idea of a (on the weekly `informal' meeting, with three representatives on each side West, the American plus either the German or myself and one other direct participant) and to reduce the regular plenaries to one a week. The Russians hoped to engage in bilateral US/Soviet talks (which the West, including who the Americans, were determined to resist), and the rest of the Ad Hoc Group, below), be (see who feared that the Group's influence threatened would were initially reluctant to accept this idea, which was explored tentatively on It was eventually a number of social occasions. on the adopted, holding by be the that the informality understanding emphasised would East in Ambassadors' between (alternating meetings one of the residences The West) `negotiate'. `explore' that the and and purpose was to not to

8

began in March 1974: a specific topic for each was meetings between East West in lasted about and advance agreed and they normally (in effect the only) three hours. After a slow start they proved an invaluable debate on the substance of the forum in which a relatively free-ranging be conducted. could negotiations `informal'

The prospects of finding a compromise which would be acceptable to the Alliance were never high. Many people doubted whether they even existed.

Soviet aims and intentions Nevertheless were the subject of constant reFCO; Delegation by the the and at one point the latter described assessment Soviet willingness to pay NATO's price in MBFR (somewhat hyperbolically) detente.

We `the to their test' commitment military of as acid were always looking for indications that circumstances to the negotiations extraneous Soviet MBFR. But influence in Vienna the negotiations on policy might in presentation tended to acquire a life of their own. Modifications or words by Ad Hoc East Group to determine by the the were closely examined used desire for After initial three the they a progress. signalled years whether deadlock was little nearer being broken. The data tabled by the Warsaw Pact but imply the to of approximate acceptance parity as outcome only seemed by falsifying the existing balance to give the appearance that this result could be reached by adopting the Soviet proposal for equal percentage reductions.

The NATO Ad Hoc Group during disarray Mindful the exploratory talks, there was, from the the of Group determination the the to present a of all on part members of start, a Pact.

In Warsaw intervening four front NATO had the the to months united Delegations better for its the together the were much and prepared act got Meetings least took twice a week and often place at substantive negotiations. for Western the the weekly; rotated chairmanship subject more; presentation Plenary the was agreed and the speaker nominated; next and views were at latest Eastern In Group the the presentation. on addition, exchanged discussed future tactics and reports on bilateral contacts with the East.

It would be wrong to suggest that all the meetings were harmonious or that The Americans inevitably always easily. was reached played a a consensus leading role and the size of their Delegation enabled them to produce papers The forceful the could which others not match. personality of of a quantity Head, Jonathan (Jock) Dean, Deputy both irritant US the was an and a Group.

It in before his Ambassador, Resor, took the time a some stimulant intelligent lawyer had been Army, Secretary the and who of courteous his deputy, effective authority over ebullient somewhat to the established But Dean, Group. had flair ingenuity the who considerable of and and relief

9

influence hard immensely throughout a powerful worker, remained was an from Washington. loose to rein operate on a very and often appeared My American and German colleagues and I held regular tripartite meetings.

These were not declared to the Group but their existence was generally Provided the three of us resolved our tacitly and accepted. recognised had did differences, though a good not always easily, we which we usually However involved Group. this the the often rest of chance of persuading Direct by lengthy discussion other of national views strongly advocated latter Participants the an missing and the flank seldom countries, The be insisting interests that their overlooked. of should not opportunity launch `informal issue in first this the the of year was most sensitive by loss The Group feared in the that they a of control would result meetings'.

Group as a whole. But, faced with the alternative of bilateral US/Soviet talks, that no the Group accepted the `informals', on the strict understanding formal agreements would be reached; agenda and speaking notes would be by Group; be in full the circulated to the advance and a agreed report would day. Outside the Group, the Italian Ambassador Group on the following EC in arranging lunches (bilateral) took the lead of occasional little but him which achieved gave a role. representatives Whatever internal disagreements the Group had to overcome, it maintained In East. impressive the record of solidarity an unguarded remark, vis-채-vis an Warsaw frustration Pact Delegations the their admitted a member of one of in had find despite been the their they to any chink that, all efforts, unable NATO armour through which they could drive wedges; he wished he could his Indeed, the own allies! success of the talks was same of an outstanding say in for first NATO in time the the together, the way which participants worked interests Warsaw Pact in the their were security with which negotiations involved, directly to achieve a degree of cohesion which was sometimes lacking at other levels in the Alliance.

The Warsaw Pact Delegations The Russians were firmly in charge. Khlestov was a lively character, sometimes limited fully but the to take exploited offence an able negotiator who quick Alliance his his brief in flexibility the to representatives within efforts entice dour Smirnovsky, By his Deputy, Soviet and the was a contrast ground. onto English his but of understanding with an engaging smile; natural stonewaller leave he (which Ambassador London in to was sad ways after seven years as for him him, having his the the scapegoat made government withdrew when The helpful 1971) in 105 occasions. on several proved spies expulsion of the in had bit Pact Delegations Warsaw they were allowed a which parts other

10

limited

freedom

to ad `your said: paragraph imposed on us' (which than they appeared in

lib but, as the representative quoted in the preceding is by is agreement whereas ours reached solidarity less in them solid private made some of paradoxically public).

At the start relations between East and West were correct and courteous. But being destined to live and work together for a long period, the Western basis for felt the need to find a reasonably Ambassadors social relaxed Eastern failure; dismal Formal the a proved entertaining relations. lead few Russians for to the take the and would engage representatives waited in small talk. Cocktail receptions were more successful, since the participants, delegations, 19 took the easy course of talking the virtually all members of idea Dean hit the the of upon negotiations. endlessly about the state of diversion during had the together, proved an acceptable which singing dinners and it Talks. We tried this out at one or two informal Preparatory Khlestov (allegedly) doubt because an opera-singer was caught on, partly no lawyer.

Soon he become insisted having his father these that a should manque, Vienna lives, in feature became the of our social a regular singing evenings Negotiators', A Book for houses. `Song in Weinstuben assembled our own or from by Dean, all the participating contained songs and constantly up-dated in for languages, in the those their original with phonetic versions countries Warsaw Pact) languages. (i. `difficult' e. more between This practice resulted in the development of close personal relations the Ambassadors, and the few senior members of their staffs who occasionally by a programme of joint took part. These relations were reinforced Woods, Vienna (East/West) through the a twosuch as an all-day walk events I do not claim that day expedition to Bavaria and a tour in Czechoslovakia. build helped but it to a the negotiations this social camaraderie made easier, hardhighly the and often controversial mutual respect which prevented discussions from affecting hitting personal outside the working relations hothouse in This the atmosphere unimportant rather was not sessions. intimate, in by took the the negotiations even circle which close, generated place.

Contribution for They hosts. the The Austrian Government venue provided were generous facilities, Plenaries they organised and periodically and various other for Delegations.

But the they otherwise entertainment other and receptions In lived in in the the effect negotiators proceedings. a world played no part local from divorced the scene. entirely Austria's

11

Conclusions Those in the West who may have hoped for agreed force reductions, whether for national purposes or as a means of correcting the East/West imbalance, limitation, But in damage disappointed. the talks were a as an exercise were Soviet Western the took and all unilateral reductions place, success: no Alliance denied.

Politico-military the was within cooperation objectives were by The Russians practical experience. and their allies were strengthened drawn into discussion of military matters to an extent which would previously (as they refused have seemed impossible and were forced to recognise initially to do) the legitimacy of NATO's security concerns, which would have to be taken into account. All these were positive gains, which could be built the subsequent negotiations. on throughout

12

OF DETENTE THE TOUCHSTONE MBFRI British diplomacy the talks on and Keith Hamilton British detractors. the without was rarely its but East/West tensions, the questioned easing of welcomed governments Atlantic impact the of the and popular perceptions alliance unity of on 1976, barely nine months On 9 December Western defence requirements.

James in Foreign Commonwealth Secretary his and as appointment after death, Labour Cabinet, and only two months before his untimely Callaghan's

During

1970s

its

detente

NATO Ministers in Brussels Crosland Anthony that the told a meeting of Act, the document Final Helsinki the conclusions of the embodying Europe `was Cooperation in (CSCE), Security Conference symbolic and on He argued in the face of but... not the core of detente'. that `security Alliance Russian strength important', increasing that the and was more East/West in balance the military and should should seek greater stability between Soviet peaceful `show up the disparity protestations and their he Soviet Union, `should be build The as added, regarded now up'. military 2 his Crosland's imperialist statement reflected own expressed an power'. his desire to `vulgarise' the language of detente, and the disappointment of Europe in in Soviet eastern and, more recently, conduct senior officials with by Planning Staff Foreign A Africa. the the and of paper prepared southern defined detente Office (FCO) and dated 23 November Commonwealth as based in interest the negotiation upon a common of a modest modus vivendi leading As, however, to the avoidance of military nuclear confrontation war. had so far been of the paper made clear, changes in East/West relations degree rather than kind. The CSCE had been a step in the direction of human both `extending and normalising' contacts on sides of the European divide. 3 But almost four years of negotiating in Vienna over what Western describe diplomats Mutual Balanced Force Reductions to as and continued Europe had so far contributed (MBFR) in central little towards military detente. Indeed, some FCO officials felt that Crosland might, with a view to

The opinions advanced in this paper are the author's own and should not be taken as an expression of the official Government policy.

I This paper is based very largely upon Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series III, Volume 111,Detente in Europe, 1972-76, eds. Gill Bennett and Keith Hamilton Cass, 2001).

(London: WHP/Frank 2 DBPO, Vol. III, No. 94.

3

Keith Hamilton, The Last Cold Warriors: Britain, Detente and the CSCE, 1972-1975 (Oxford: EIRU, St. Antony's College, 1999), pp. 23-24; and DBPO, Series III, Vol. II, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972-75 (London: TSO, 1997).

13

the raising `touchstone'

profile of or `proving

the

Vienna

ground'

talks, publicly 4 detente. of

designate

them

the

The elevation of MBFR as a measure of detente would seem surprising to familiar with what had been FCO thinking anyone on the subject when MBFR exploratory 1973. Officials in talks opened in Vienna in January Whitehall were then even less enthusiastic about negotiations on MBFR than they were about their diplomatic talks for sibling, the CSCE, preparatory fora were considered 1972. Both negotiating which had begun in November likely to work to the detriment NATO benefit Soviet Union to the of and of a But Europe.

British Western set upon the eventual `Finlandisation' while of CSCE for broadening that the officials recognised might offer opportunities in East, the agenda of detente and for challenging the they communist rule The force MBFR. in that could see no such compensating advantage notion in central Europe reductions could be compatible with undiminished for security all they dismissed as a `pipe dream'. Three years of intensive study NATO had MBFR agreement within revealed that any satisfactory must larger by the Warsaw Pact require considerably withdrawals and reductions Alliance, than by the Atlantic and there seemed little chance of Western diplomats being able to persuade Moscow to accept an understanding on this basis. Even were this attainable, it was doubtful it leave the would whether Alliance with a credible defence posture. As the British Defence Policy Staff in 21 April 1972, irrespective out a paper of pointed of the scale of any Warsaw Pact reductions, there might be a `critical minimum' forces, NATO of far below current levels, at which the Alliance's strategy of perhaps not very flexible response ceased to be viable. The alternative would entail greater deterrent, the nuclear on reliance and that could have considerable political `If Policy Defence to the the table', we ever get consequences. negotiating Staff reasoned, `NATO will therefore be bargaining risk a known military detente.

'5 the prospects of against only it might well be asked why the British, unlike the Given these considerations, French, should have agreed to participate in the pursuit of MBFR? The by Crispin Western Tickell, FCO's head the given the of answer was Department for both CSCE and Organisations (WOD), the lead department MBFR, in a minute drafted barely six weeks after the commencement of the Vienna. like He 1973: `We do March 13 talks the exploratory at not noted on MBFR We are in the negotiations because we think that it is the best way of ... helping the Americans keep their forces in Europe at acceptable levels, and

4 5

DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 93.

Ibid., No. 1.

14

because we think it enables us the more effectively to protect our own and Western defence interests. '6 The negotiations European the side, were, on British idea American-sponsored the to and other which an very much be hope in European thereby they the that able to would allies subscribed Washington in tendencies to contain neo-isolationist assist the administration by Senator Congressional those applied pressures, particularly and withstand forces United States in for his Mike Mansfield unilateral cuts associates, and in Europe. Whitehall of public was also aware of the need to take account Europe.

Detente in Western in Britain commanded and elsewhere opinion Staff Defence had, Policy NATO the as and support popular considerable despite And indications in its be to to pursuit. remain active seen admitted, in Europeans become Americans to more self-reliant that the wanted the `hanker Alliance defence to the seemed of some members matters, MBFR would enable them to reduce which, they anticipated, after perversely' for MBFR budgets.

West German defence their as an support the size of in Whitehall Belgians have but Ostpolitik the and waned, might of element by detente `doves', judged Canadians a and seeking preoccupied were Even Dutch, defence the though their to effort. reduce excuse respectable limit be looking hard-liners', `outwardly their military to to spending. seemed Some Western MBFR. in There was indeed of perceptions an ambiguity latch European to onto a conference were evidently preparing governments by But defence for device their efforts. assurances offered cutting as a in December 1970 that given a President Nixon to NATO defence Ministers be in by European `comparable there the would no reduction allies, effort' US troop levels in Europe, `except in the context of East/West negotiations', MBFR both for Washington that as a mechanism regarded suggested discouraging domestic for from and overseas critics placating allies 7 force reductions. embarking on unilateral At an official level there were those in Britain who, though doubtful about for MBFR, thought be used to the prospects that the negotiations might defence in Western Europe.

James and expand encourage cooperation Cable, the head of the FCO's Planning Staff, expressed his fears in a minute July 13 1972 if American force that to of reductions were `not exploited launch towards a new movement a more effective and self-sufficient defence European American the departure any substantial of number of ... beginning decline in European the troops [would] mark of an accelerated defence efforts, leading to a loss of political self confidence and to increasing reliance

on accommodation

6

Ibid., No. 4.

7

Ibid., No. 1.

Union Soviet the with

15

as a substitute

for effective

defence'. 8 Much the same point was made by Tickell in discussions he had Britain's Ten October. in German West signature months after officials with (EC) Community European to the and one month treaty of the accession leadership Soviet had Kissinger to accept the opening of the persuaded after for Western MBFR in to talks agreement exchange on exploratory `time it Germans CSCE, Tickell to that the talks told was on preparatory European inject into the debate on the future relationships countries of 9 defence issues'.

Similar concerns also conditioned of consideration some be MBFR in Tickell's thinking should negotiations about the way which favour in he In 30 November of reductions argued a minute of conducted. limited to American reached through and Soviet forces in an agreement disadvantages There he to this negotiations. were, recognised, multilateral best forces American the equipped were, after all, most efficient and course. be MBFR in Europe; without the pretext of might still certain countries US/Soviet to engage in unilateral tempted agreement reductions; and a `bilateralism' in the sort of strategic matters which put the would smack of interest `constantly having Europeans to their vital at risk of matters of if Yet, heads'.

Tickell their as a result of contended, security settled over MBFR reductions were to be made in West European forces, `the basis of any future European defence system could be eroded' and Britain would find it EC `defence its difficult the to a enlarged promote aim of giving more States United in Such be interpreted the as might also reductions aspect'. full Europeans that the to responsibility assume remained reluctant evidence Tickell reasoned, up to Britain to for their own defence. It was therefore, force look MBFR its in terms to reductions, of at not simply allies persuade `real dialogue' Pact Warsaw but as an `instrument the the on countries of with issues of European security'. Likewise, the emphasis in negotiations should be moved away from consideration of troop reductions alone and towards the Britain, for and verification. of various proposals constraints examination Tickell urged, must advance the argument that these `should be seen as an be MBFR, lead in later a product the to should reductions and that essential MBFR here 10 hint it'.

There detente then of and not a means to was no of detente in 1972 detente'.

On being the `touchstone was the contrary, of MBFR. of agreement on considered a precondition by NATO. Alliance An paper stated guidance stance was endorsed be [force] `implementation the product of reductions should plainly that the detente'. delegates And British talks to the exploratory the of cause and not

This

8 Ibid., No. 2.

9 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

10 Ibid., No. 2.

16

be `initially on the concentrated that negotiations should were reminded between both designed sides... to create greater confidence such measures degree any actual precede should of such confidence that a greater and by defined British delegates broad The a as troops'. of objective of reduction `seek 1973, 30 January briefing to some way remained nevertheless, paper of Central Europe in forces level lowering while the and armaments of armed of `the FCO It for the conceded, was, security all'. undiminished maintaining Equally important [would] least that Parliament expect'. and public opinion Americans `that British the maintain substantial should were objectives lower Europe, in forces than their present not much preferably military " be Atlantic levels', and that the unity of the should preserved. alliance for MBFR talks had already created severe strains within NATO. Preparations These could worsen, and the British wished to combat tendencies to favour Western delegates, inadequately the compensated reductions. or unilateral Alliance in `using briefing the machinery should cooperate paper concluded, instrument in Americans diplomatic that the a such way as the chosen deal it [were] bilaterally happy be [would] tempted to to use and not also 12 delay be disappointed.

Reluctant They Russians'. to to were soon with the insisted Americans had the talks, the the opening not on a prior of The first multilateral meeting of and procedures. on participation agreement in states was consequence participating of all nineteen representatives bilateral haggling in by fourteen followed meetings and what the weeks of `plenary described Delegation cocktails', a more-or-less as of by Eastern Western hosted alternately and series of receptions regular NATO delegates, Meanwhile, delegations. the to the alarm of other much domestic before Americans their too to preoccupations ready put seemed all In William the the maintenance of agreed allied positions. words of Ministry UK Defence deputy Head of Mumford, official of and a senior European Delegation, there developed a 'strong undercurrent of resentment by hustling, bull-dozing US tactics the the employed often at with their allies, by the personality' made manifest and accentuated of Jock Dean, the leader 13 American team. of the

Soviet

Head

The main source of contention both between East and West and, ultimately, NATO delegates, deciding the was amongst problem of what for the purposes central Europe. Put simply, the Warsaw Pact countries of MBFR constituted initial Western demands Hungary, but Italy, be that opposed not should included

in the force

reductions

area. This

11 Ibid., No. 3.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., No. 4.

17

the Western

allies

had

already

East had NATO the that the studies compensation suggested anticipated. for deal Hungary covering a would outweigh any advantages would require to the West. Indeed, only late in the day and then at thereby accruing Belgium's behest had Hungary been added to NATO's `guidelines' area for States had given strong support MBFR. The United to this initiative.

Nevertheless, hardly six weeks into the exploratory talks, the Americans, who determined in to the the ensure were opening of substantive negotiations autumn, proposed to their allies a formula which would have left in abeyance Hungary's direct Britain, Benelux the question the of participation.

But countries and West Germany, were reluctant to accept this compromise. the countries of NATO's southern flank, Greece, Italy and Turkey, seemed deflect too to anxious only pressure from the Warsaw Pact to draw the Mediterranean lands into the reductions for Hungary's in area return In these circumstances inclusion. the British emerged as hardest liners at Brussels and at Vienna. Their case was clear. It was well known that East and West were divided over Hungary, and they felt that any agreement which did for Hungary's full participation in the substantive negotiations not provide be interpreted would publicly as a major defeat for NATO at the outset of the it especially process, as would mean leaving out of the reckoning a country indisputably four Soviet divisions Europe was which part of central and where and 200 aircraft were stationed. However, in the absence of allied unity it inevitable On Warsaw have Pact that the their seemed way. countries would his return to London, disconsolate in his Mumford the a mood registered opening sentences of a report dated 22 March and subsequently circulated in `NATO', he complained, Whitehall. `has embarked on a perilous voyage. It has divided objectives. Its preparations have been found wanting. The locusts for into few left for NATO's the the months preparations are eating Pact The Soviet Warsaw its Union is in talks allies of substantive charge who ... is displaying no good will. '14 from The improve. news standpoint not matters that Mansfield had persuaded the Senate Democratic caucus to in US forces for overseas adopt a resolution calling a substantial reduction Within NATO further Dean's Soviet the to tactics. to sap seemed will resist floated British talks with an the idea of winding up the exploratory leaving on a simple agenda, agreement vexed questions of practice and and But in be diplomatic the to through channels. settled procedure other Hungary American found acceptable, ally who a retreat on presence of an European it to they were compelled tolerable, allies who considered and From the Washington

British

did

14 1&&

18

first formal the plenary of the talks on at approved acquiesce 14 May, which, while it allowed for the enlargement area of the strategic This, in flank Hungary designated in participant. a effect under negotiation, `represented Delegation, UK Head Thomson, John a the the opinion of of 15 True, in Western impatience'. for Soviet the over persistence victory final Russians talks, the the a accepted exploratory stages of concluding in a package,

felt `perhaps a shade of advantage to accorded which communique force `balanced' NATO's Although West'. they the of concept rejected Mutual describe the talks to the they agreed on as negotiations reductions, in Armaments Associated Measures Forces Reduction Armed and and of be Central Europe compromise which could semantic cumbersome -a Western desiderata interpreted and as constraints such as covering 16 in Soviet to the opening of substantive assent negotiations verification. during Brezhnev's October 1973 was, however, only secured visit to the United States in June. Indeed, in this and in other respects the exploratories Soviet/American bilateralism. towards to the tendency seemed enhance Allied conduct was, as a joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report suggested, had Russians to they the that no reason to make concessions such as convince to the West as a whole and that there were advantages to be had from 17 protracted negotiations.

Thomson

Thomson Vienna that so much of the energy of the subsequently at recalled had been devoted themselves to negotiating that it had allies among Russians [were] `sometimes if the the a with seemed as negotiations 18 in A different the meantime secondary was matter'. picture rather The from CSCE had been CSCE Helsinki. the talks emerging at preparatory Soviet initiative had had it been Russians a the sought to accelerate and who hoped they progress towards the summoning evidently which of a conference had They Europe. in the territorial would confirm even tried to status quo the opening make talks on MBFR of substantive conditional on the had for their part taken a backseat completion of the CSCE. The Americans Neither President his Henry Kissinger, Nixon at Helsinki. national nor left to the conference, they security adviser, attached much significance and it to the West Europeans, both NATO in as allies and as participants European Political Cooperation, had to take the lead. Detailed preparations been made for the talks, and Western delegates, along with neutral delegates, had worked in pressing for together well and effectively successfully

15 Ibid., No. 7.

16 Ibid., No. 6.

17 Ibid., No. 8.

18 Ibid., No. 6.

19

agreement on an agenda and conference procedures which would permit, in the context of Basket III, the fullest examination of such hitherto taboo issues human freer dissemination information.

When July in the contacts and of as 1973 the Foreign Ministers of the thirty-five participating states gathered in for Stage I of the Conference, Helsinki they could look forward to for redefining the scope of detente. negotiations which offered opportunities They might extend its meaning beyond the narrow notion of an easing of divisions in tensions between alliance blocs in order to transcend ideological Europe. The West might also be able to use the CSCE to loosen Moscow's grip on its East European allies. 19 By contrast, the prospects for MBFR still seemed positively dangerous from a British point of view. The Russians could be expected to exploit differences within NATO and thereby undermine the US commitment to the defence of Western Europe. They might also secure locus a standi which would permit them to interfere in West European affairs defence Far being from particularly where arrangements were concerned. the touchstone of detente, MBFR appeared more likely to serve as testimony to its bilateralisation.

Fortunately

from the British point of view, the Americans, who once more assumed the lead in the allied negotiating team, were not set upon achieving an early resolution of the substantive talks. The Western powers were also better somewhat prepared than they had been at the commencement of the A key element in their thinking that any exploratories. was the assumption basis. In central agreement on force reductions must be on an asymmetrical Europe the Russians not only enjoyed short lines of communication over which they could reinforce rapidly, but were also judged quantitatively NATO in There to superior conventional offensive equipment. would then, if these disparities were to be removed or neutralised, have to be `significantly larger reductions in Soviet forces in the agreed area compared with those of With this in mind, it was settled that NATO should seek the Alliance'. reductions in two phases: in the first, the parties would agree on a 15% cut in US and Soviet forces in the agreed reductions area, with Russian cuts of 68,000 men, including American divisions, five tank one and cuts of army of 29,000 men of which the proportion of combat troops was as yet undecided; bring forces to their and in the second, each side would make further cuts down to a common ceiling of 700,000 in the reductions a area, representing 10% reduction in NATO forces and a 20% reduction in those of the Warsaw Soviet Pact. 20 Such a programme hardly to to the appeal was calculated Union and on 8 November, barely a week after the opening of substantive

19 See Hamilton,

Last Cold Warriors, pp. 12-15.

20 DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 9.

20

the Soviet talks in Vienna and before the tabling of the Western proposals, in draft delegation the agreement a which envisaged reduction submitted forces, forces, in including three stages of all armed central air and nuclear be in Europe. Reductions to carried out whole units of approximately were in fall forces direct the to types and were on participants of similar forces total to the their to contribution on each side, thereby proportion of and equipment separate ceilings on the manpower creating permanent 21 individual allies.

Western their with objectives since were NATO imbalance the existing what perceived as confirm would acceptance Whilst Western Europe.

Allies in forces the were seeking unequal central of Warsaw Pact the to ceiling, countries were offering a common reductions be followed by `symbolic' to of equal quantity, reductions of equal reductions instead to ground of two phased negotiations confined and proportions; forces, the East proposed a single negotiation with all the forces (including direct being from the of participants reduced nuclear weapons and aircraft) individual British Sub-ceilings feared the which on would participants, outset.

European future defence the of evolution arrangements prejudice defence European (including the creation of a community), would also be British German in impede turn, they, and and would efforts to unavoidable US forces in Europe. for by in Moreover, caused make up any shortfall cuts the Warsaw Pact proposals about the verification said nothing and nonNATO the to circumvention arrangements participants which wished Rose, Clive UK Head `associated They the of consider as measures'. were, as Delegation, in intended to to the recognised, evidently public opinion appeal West: they were superficially fair to superficially easy and understand, superficially simple to execute. The Russians may also have hoped that by they would be able to disrupt Western tactics and draw seizing the initiative Western delegations into negotiations on the basis of Soviet proposals and The US delegation, by Stanley Resor, first led concepts. at now appeared impatient in detailed bargaining Soviet opposite to engage their with But Allied unity was maintained NATO's Ad Hoc Group numbers. within Allied (the committee in Vienna), of negotiators and war in the Middle East domestic pressure on the and the ensuing energy crisis seemed to moderate Nixon for early force reductions. 22 When in the following administration Tickell October for tripartite talks with the Americans visited Washington

These

terms

incompatible

21 Ibid., No. 10.

22 Ibid.

21

Germans longer West the term aspects of allied on and found MBFR to be very much `on the back burner'. 23

defence

policy,

he

By then it was clear that the positions assumed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations left little scope for compromise, Eastern that the and participants 24 in Rose's 'digging for Regular in themselves were words a war of attrition'. between informal NATO Pact Warsaw meetings and representatives, disguised in the first instance as 'social gatherings', began in February 1974, and these allowed both sides to explore each other's attitudes, strategy and The tactics. 25 Yet such negotiations there as were proceeded at a snail's pace.

Russians insisted that Western proposals were inadequate and that any agreement must cover all forces and armaments: they wanted assurances that both the Bundeswehr and the British Army of the Rhine would be brought the scope of the reductions, to accept general within and refused forces would be reduced in a second phase. that European undertakings Meanwhile, British diplomats remained wedded to the view that the Warsaw Pact was simply 'seeking to codify the [East/West military] imbalance and to West in the agreements the to give it a certificate of respectability persuade 26 from There was, in any case, as a Vienna'. which would eventually emerge JIC paper of 6 May contended, always the danger that the Russians were simply using the policy of detente 'to soften up the West while maintaining 27 Sir Indeed, their long term aims and improving their military strength'.

Terence Garvey, who in the autumn British 1973 of was appointed Ambassador in Moscow, was already speculating on whether some in the Soviet leadership might think the moment ripe for a fresh ideological and advance. From a Leninist perspective the West's economic problems, especially the industrial unrest associated with the onset of the energy crisis, [was], he by foretold 'what thought, the at must, confirm that was prophets last, verily coming to pass'. There may have been 'no let-up in pro-detente in the Soviet press', but predictions

by Communist party propaganda ideologues of impending did nothing `radical revolutionary transformations' in the judgement of Julian Bullard, head of the FCO's Eastern European and Soviet Department (EESD), to remove underlying Western fears that 'one day doctrine and policy [would] coincide, and that the present separation between them [was] merely a question of tactics'. 28 It was also likely that

23 Ibid., No. 18.

24 Ibid,

No. 16.

25 Ibid., No. 12.

26 Ibid., No. 14.

27 Ibid,

No. 58.

28 Ibid., No. 53.

22

Western Europe, fuel the slow economic growth of costs would check rising the process of integration, and leave the Warsaw Pact countries more Soviet Union.

In it dependent the these circumstances seemed upon form limit inauspicious to envisage any of agreement which might singularly British or West German forces in central Europe.

The MBFR talks were, however, about more than relations with the Soviet The draft brief for British its Union the allies. steering prepared and in the autumn of 1973 was laced with phraseology delegation which seemed fashionable to lend credence to the Primat der Innenpolitik-the notion once so 1960s 1970s.

Britain's historians in the the talks and of participation amongst `primarily brief in damage limitation', the as acknowledged, an exercise was, intended to be seen by Parliament to allow the Government and the public level the to be `working seriously for a lowering of of armed forces and Europe', in Central that there remained while ensuring armaments an `adequate level of American troops in Europe'. 29 As Tickell later explained, in dialogue Western governments were engaged a with their own parliaments domestic in themselves opinion, trying to arrive at, and public amongst and so The Conservative allied agreed negotiating positions. elaborate, and loss of its parliamentary in the general Government's majority election of 1974 was a poignant February British to reminder negotiators of the domestic Summoned in importance opinion. of response to the challenge by

the Government's in the formation

to impose striking efforts posed wage Harold Wilson the election resulted under restraint, of a Labour to undertaking administration minority committed a widespread defence in, Britain's In therefore of, and probably review cuts expenditure.

Labour had also been highly critical of the expulsion politicians opposition in September from Britain 1971 of 105 Soviet diplomats on charges of from had move espionage-a which Anglo-Soviet relations only just begun to 31 And Callaghan, Foreign Commonwealth Secretary, the recover. new and Britain's `chosen to enthuse over what Bullard described seemed unlikely as Cassandra to the Western alliance on the theme of the Soviet threat role as a 19 March Callaghan to Western Europe'. 32 Indeed, told the Commons on that the Government would `look for opportunities to build a safer and more productive requested

miners

relationship Roy Hattersley,

to

the Soviet Union', with and he subsequently State in the FCO, to prepare then Minister of

a

Ibid., No. 9. so Ibid., No. 25.

31 DBPO, Series III, Vol. I, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972 (London: 75-77.

32 DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 40.

23

TSO, 1997), Nos.

position paper on the current Union and Eastern Europe. 33

Britain's state of

relations

with

the Soviet

The drafting of the Hattersley paper was in Bullard's words to prove a `rather foggy exercise' in which senior officials were obliged to `ransack their minds and cupboards for types of action which [had] never previously been thought In the to be in the British interest, but which would now be so represented'. final version, completed that the on 30 July 1974, Hattersley contended British must make it clear that they no longer regarded themselves as the `sheet anchor of defence against the hurricane of detente', and that their interests would best be served by `activity' rather than the adoption of a `defensive posture'. He observed that, in view of the fact that the Labour Government defence in were committed to `substantial reductions NATO', be that there expenditure and these some within of must made ... was clearly much to be gained from successful MBFR which included early by all NATO nations. Britain, he argued, could do more within reductions Alliance he the Western to help the MBFR negotiations along, and in blurring that they should be ready to go further the recommended distinction between the two phases of MBFR and be more forthcoming on Yet, where bilateral the inclusion of nuclear weapons in any agreement.

Soviet Union and its East European allies were concerned, the relations with the paper had little more to propose than increased Ministerial visits and more active trade promotion. 34 British policy was in any case bound to be by changes taking place elsewhere in East/West, conditioned and more US/Soviet, particularly relations. Slow progress in the CSCE, virtual deadlock in in the MBFR negotiations, be uncertainties achieved about what would in SALT II, differences between Moscow and Washington developments over Watergate the Middle East and Cyprus, the debilitating the affair on affect of in Congress to Kissinger's dealings the American presidency, and opposition Union Soviet There detente. future the all seemed to threaten the with of however, like Bullard, those still, were about the who were concerned for US/Soviet its of a possible emergence and potential condominium damaging European the interests of America's allies. Such fears were not in by issued Moscow Nixon's the to communique the allayed at visit end of July 1974 which appeared to endorse the Soviet desire to see an early 35 CSCE. to the conclusion

33 Ibid., No. 66.

34 Ibid.

35 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Richard 1975), pp. 571-2; DBPO, Series III, Vol. II, No. 89.

24

Nixon,

1974 (Washington:

GPO,

in Rose far `less the evident admitted, was, as Vienna negotiations' than the fear of it amongst other Western delegations. for Russians It was, nonetheless, the the sake of that might, apparent be detente Brezhnev's to go some way towards meeting prepared policy, MBFR. Rose American suspected that they would pursue any such wishes on be by `wedge-driving', their to that object would and primary understanding Bundeswehr the which would reduce and thereby achieve an agreement West European defence development in the of any union which obstruct determined Germany might have a dominant to role. They were, he thought, 36 The prospects for defence cooperation. have a droit de regard over European their achieving this were slim. British, West German and US delegations were Vienna: Western in the at close collaboration on side they working Tickell `motor for Tickell termed the the negotiations'. was, what constituted by the `curiously isolated atmosphere' in which the talks however, perturbed by degree independence by being the and of conducted, enjoyed some were The very informality delegations.

Western of the contacts established between the development the two sides had encouraged of a series of Eastern identities: Western and group participants understood overlapping Soviet/American

`bilateralism'

good personal relations, well, enjoyed went on coach trips each other hikes, had MBFR for together, organised even conference and an song-book 37 `A twenty mile walk through their evening the Vienna entertainments. in its latter from Napoleon's sequence stages, a woods, which resembled, from Moscow', Rose discover `enabled to some eleven of us recalled, retreat differences humanity ideological in forget shared and our our common '38 discomfort. danger

local tactical that of all this from London's was point of view be might considerations given priority matters of policy, and over broader interests to the that Western European might too easily be subordinated There were no easy delegation.

American wishes of an overly-independent NATO delegations in Vienna were responsible to these solutions problems. for deciding on day-to-day negotiating tactics, and Rose had only limited for The imposed by alliance diplomacy manoeuvre. room constraints could be ignored, especially when Eastern participants tabled a proposal not on 26 November 1974 for a freeze on the manpower the of both sides until The proposal, negotiations were completed. whose very simplicity seemed in the West, once more put Allied to appeal to public opinion calculated defensive.

Its acceptance have confirmed the negotiators on the would

The

36 DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 16.

37 Ibid., No. 19.

38 Ibid., No. 16.

25

its Europe; in the forces which imbalance rejection, central of existing East have favoured, the Americans with a considerable presented would Allied The tested cohesion. severely proposal advantage. propaganda Government British just were it came Moreover, at the point when the in Paper White defence in their that cuts any their to announce preparing on forces in Europe must depend on the prior achievement of an agreement for Western delegates, the Russians chose not to exploit MBFR. 39 Fortunately forthcoming by Influenced full. initiative the official visit perhaps to the their down Moscow, the Callaghan to Wilson notion of tended they to play and of 1975, January in began fifth freeze talks and the of round when the a 40 West. by formal its the rejection accepted without undue protest 1975, British officials had hoped that Wilson's visit to Moscow in February inaugurate 1968, Minister Prime British first by a new era would since the a in bilateral relations between Britain and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the term inserted in the joint statement issued at the end `new phase' was deliberately Callaghan in telegram observed that a subsequent guidance of the visit, and it seemed clear that the Soviet side `wished to open a new phase, in which FRG Brezhnev's in France [moved] Britain the pattern of and up alongside The value of the visit was detente diplomacy'. 41 This was not just hyperbole.

Anglo-Soviet `unproductive' largely symbolic. But in the preceding phase of Western in Britain had been the the odd-man-out very much relations Moscow his in Garvey the talks, the warm on report suggested alliance and, as have been directed Wilson Brezhnev by towards to might welcome extended 42 detente'.

The Russians in Britain's `discordant the choir of voice silencing had, after all, only recently witnessed the disappearance of three of the West, Brandt, Pompidou Nixon, detente in the and of principal protagonists being by British ignore hardly the role prominent played and they could diplomats in Stage II of the CSCE at Geneva. Indeed, it was a British initiative III issues Basket Brezhnev his and allowed on a compromise which permitted 43 FCO however The Helsinki. desired was cautious about the summit at much The US in detente.

East/West further for collapse of policy southprospects in Middle East, diplomacy for Kissinger's Asia, the communist setbacks east NATO Turkey's divisions Portugal, in within over military and advances for in Cyprus, all appeared to offer Moscow fresh opportunities intervention Garvey And influence Soviet that while was of the opinion abroad. expanding

39 Ibid., No. 20.

40 Ibid., Nos. 21 and 23.

41 Ibid., No. 76.

42 Ibid.

43 DBPO, Series III, Vol. II, Nos. 119 and 120-124.

26

Russians for Westpolitik `no to adopt', the to there was alternative credible he insisted, tension on conditional was, their pursuit of a relaxation of world imperial fullest `maintaining the to the aims of old their extent practicable 44Callaghan Marxist Russia and the revolutionary the made aims of myth'.

Commons he November, 10 himself the that the told the point when, on East/West CSCE had brought tension: there remained, to end no overnight in `armistice differences' he said, `great ideological the war there was no and 45 ideas'. of Rose had long MBFR. towards since an accord on was also no progress Russians if that the the were ever going to make the conclusion reached do West, by they to the so solely were unlikely essential concessions thought in Vienna.

An he for anything them the Allies might offer agreement, Russians be because had the taken a political achieved only would predicted, decision that one was desirable for `reasons partly or wholly extraneous to the Others themselves'. assumed that the outcome of the talks negotiations CSCE depend the the some successful conclusion of and/or on would Strategic Arms Limitation the completion of a new accord advance towards (i. e. SALT II). But the signing of the CSCE Final Act seemed to have little or 46 Both Vienna.

East Soviet in West impact the stance and continued upon no familiar hallowed basic `on in their to reiterate ground and positions force field definitions in the of was any useful practical phrases', and only This in during 1975. done to a the part attributable was autumn of work The Western interest in the talks. the end of the of of outcome waning hard-headed Vietnam the war and emergence of a new and more Union had between United Soviet States the the seemed to relationship and The Mansfield Congressional defence towards expenditure. attitudes change lobby was in retreat, and it was no longer so necessary for the administration American forces in in Washington to find excuses for the retention of Likewise, Schmidt in West Germany Europe.

Helmut Chancellor was line on defence than his immediate evidently ready to take a much tougher Willy Brandt. `It August, is', 20 Tickell `fair to say predecessor, minuted on is there at present unmanageable that in no NATO country pressure for

There

44 DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 85.

45 Ibid., No. 83.

46 In a paper of 17 November 1975, drafted for a forthcoming Heads of Mission conference in London, Rose maintained that 'Soviet and Warsaw Pact strategic and military objectives CSCE after remained exactly as before it'. The `fundamental purposes of Soviet military he policy', contended, `have not changed - to provide military support for the Soviet Union's foreign policy objective of changing the balance of power in the world in general and in Europe in particular in favour of socialism, and to provide an invincible war-fighting capability for defence against attack by the West'. Ibid. No. 26.

27

Alliance Atlantic ' Within MBFR. in instant the progress cuts or unilateral focus had the for to tended upon attention efficiency greater pressure for forces, the and the standardisation need of redeployment defence labour in division interdependability of and the of weapons, less like MBFR look had in turn made a and tasks, all of which planning Tickell Nevertheless, for admitted, as reducing military expenditure. panacea likely, if, Vienna, for as appeared especially there was still scope at agreement Eastern delegates Western their a package to counterparts the were offer American Europe from including nuclear the withdrawal of certain in inclusion the proposed collective the of air manpower and armaments 47 ceiling. had Americans Such a proposition, the originally suggested to their which usually referred option and which was therefore allies as a third negotiating to simply as Option III, had been under consideration since the autumn of from 1974. It amounted the reductions to to an American withdraw offer 36 F-4 dual 54 1000 surface to aircraft, and capable area nuclear warheads, in Pact's for Warsaw launchers in the the acceptance surface missile return NATO objectives for Phase 1 of the talks i. e. the withdrawal of a principal Soviet tank army and the East's agreement to the concept of a common far from Rose about what this offer might achieve. ceiling. was optimistic Vienna Nevertheless, he thought that the consensus of Allied negotiators at was that Option III was the one card in Western hands that might tempt the Russians to contemplate Resor favoured his reductions. asymmetric staff and it, 48 and in March 1975 it was examined in detail during Anglotrilateral Both the British German-American West the talks in Washington. and Germans were anxious that the offer should not be made until they and the Americans to buy. If, for were agreed on exactly what it was intended instance, it were used simply to secure Soviet agreement to asymmetrical Soviet forces American in Phase I, the West Europeans in and reductions left East's be the to might still without any assurances regarding commitment Phase 11.49 In Western in Allies were able to the the event a common ceiling insist both that the common that they agree would ceiling, now covering be defined in Phase I. Moreover, the force and air manpower, should ground British were, after a good deal of hard-bargaining, able to secure the addition in to the Western presentation of a proviso making it explicit that reductions were not part of the offer, and that limitations non-US Western equipment But whether ground, air or nuclear, were unacceptable. on such equipment,

47 Ibid., No. 25.

48 Ibid., No. 20.

49 Ibid., No. 22.

28

if the offer, which was formally tabled on 16 December 1975, represented a West's in it Tickell to the the approach shift negotiations, was, as substantive inadequate by the Russians. 50 Two months had foreseen, still considered US later, on 19 February 1976, they proposed instead Phase I reductions of forces including Soviet `freeze' in specific weapons the size reductions, a and direct forces participants, of all other and equal national percentage of the defined While a precisely this went within subsequent phase. reductions Western it left the towards accepting the two notion of phasing, some way basic far issues on such as ever apart as asymmetric reductions as and sides collective,

as opposed

to national,

ceilings.

III appeared to condemn the Vienna talks to The East's rejection of option further deadlock. It is doubtful whether this was considered a serious setback in Whitehall. From the British point of view, one of the principal gains so far diplomacy from detente had been the multilateral the provisions of secured Final Act Helsinki Western the which the offered governments of human issues in Soviet Union its East take to the up rights and opportunity had Geneva Russia's European satellites-51 During the negotiations at allies degree independence West had displayed in the that of the once some not Basket Agreement III issues had the on nonetheless expanded expected.

A detente. by EESD in November 1975 paper prepared of argued that agenda longer in telling the Russians that the ideological any point there was no inconsistent detente, West with was that the and should take struggle Final Act `to by the the of make contest more equal widening and advantage Western improving the channels ideas and objective through which West [could] information the about reach the citizens of the Soviet Union 52 And in a despatch of 11 March 1976 Callaghan Europe'.

Eastern and by Garvey it approval an earlier with assertion that was not only the recalled heartily `we to wanted who promote revolutionary also change: communists it'. 53 The desire change in Soviet society and the others that emulate detente Vienna force in military of as encapsulated the mechanisms likely for to talks were never provide such opportunities promoting reduction CSCE Moreover, had the while encouraged closer cooperation change.

Western allies, especially in the those the who were partners amongst MBFR still had the potential to weaken NATO. When European Community, Tickell, 1975, August the last head of WOD, left the FCO to begin a in

50 Ibid, No. 27.

51 On the implementation III.

of the Helsinki

Final

52 DBPO, Series III, Vol. III, No. 84.

53 Ibid., No. 87.

29

Act see DBPO, Series III, Vol. II, Appendix

in

United

States,

his

he

the that colleagues reminded sabbatical Vienna in Russians Americans the on terms yet settle with might he II. In Phase in European interests disadvantageous such circumstances, to believed that Britain should lean more towards the West Germans than the `not expect the Americans `We must', he minuted, Americans. to stay in Europe in their present numbers for ever, and the Germans, and with them be increasingly Europeans, associated, will the other with whom we shall constitute

the

our essential

'54 shield.

in US forces There was, however, no immediate of prospect of a reduction Public pressure for cuts in American Europe. abroad spending military by less decline, threat an be in the talk posed there of was to and seemed William As interests.

European Moscow/Washington incipient axis to (the department now head of the FCO's Defence Department Wilberforce, 1976, March 12 in MBFR for of a submission explained matters), responsible `one Atlantic both had to the of some sides of the public mood changed on "detente" disenchantment greater awareness of and a correspondingly with Callaghan 55 March And 15 defences'.

NATO told for an on the need sound had Government to Office the expected the that gain political meeting Western had MBFR been had `largely MBFR from enabled achieved: extract 56 for force domestic Governments unilateral reductions'. to resist pressures become increasingly in had detente American the meantime vocal critics of in expressing their concern about the Soviet Union's growing military might, SALT II in Russians a exploiting agreement order to the prospect of the internal `war their and rigid suppression capability', of winning secure a in the former Portuguese dissent. Soviet involvement colony of Angola, the MPLA, Russians backing to the the their afforded and of massive assistance had, in the words of Sir Peter Ramsbotham, Britain's Cuban intervention, `confirmed in Washington, Ambassador the pessimists' fears and deepened in face impotence US In a the of Soviet "adventurism"'. their anger at President 1 March Ford interview that he was television on even announced dropping the word `detente' as a description of US policy towards the Soviet he would describe henceforth Union: the process as a `policy of peace This did in Ramsbotham's US the through not that strength'. opinion mean intending Kissinger's to the abandon was central administration core of Union.

Soviet But it the towards reflected policy a change in atmosphere

54 Ibid, No. 25.

55 Ibid., No. 28.

56 Ibid.

30

which affected the year. 57

the conduct

of US/Soviet

relations

during

the remainder

of

Callaghan He did, the language of detente. was less ready to abandon in Moscow to impress on the however, instruct the British Ambassador Russians that `while we have no objection to the contest of ideas, we object by force to the to promote efforts solution strongly of political problems from far Soviet Union's 58 in When Soviet the territory'. the countries arising Gromyko Andrei Minister Foreign in March Callaghan visited London detente `indivisible' British that that was and public opinion was emphasised in Europe from `not likely to accept that detente should be immune 59 in the African Callaghan's developments continent'. officials remained danger, British being lulled false into that the to of another public alive a by detente, by the apparent the achievements security of of and sense increasing tendency of commentators and politicians to refer to the Cold War Indeed, FCO Planners had it Soviet if that past event. a were earlier argued as in Eastern intervention Europe (presumably in a delinquent military Romania) `might strike a useful blow against wishful thinking' in the West. 째 had meanwhile Soviet propaganda to make much of the need to continued detente.

Yet, from had five to the military political witnessed past years shift build-up Soviet of military power since the Second World War, the greatest MBFR Russians had in talks the the seemed to resist all measures which and Warsaw impair Pact forces in Europe. the superiority of might The scale of the problem was analysed in a JIC report of 22 December 1975.

It pointed out that Soviet theatre forces in central Europe (i. e. East Germany, Czechoslovakia) 27 had Poland 1968 and at since constant remained divisions and three tactical air armies, but that increases within them had in to six an enhancement of their combat strength equivalent resulted divisions.

And increased forces in pre-1968 the air effectiveness complete (including those in Hungary) was assessed as equating to the addition of four `By introduce air to these pre-1970 regiments. electing complete basis within improvements on a piecemeal units', the report explained, form in formations, `rather the than of additional the Russians have been have the to much of avoid public apprehension which would contrived West by more obvious methods. ' There had also been some in the aroused

57 58 59 60

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid, Ibid.,

No. No. No. No.

89.

86.

88.

54.

31

significant infantry

improvements

in ground

forces

equipment,

particularly towed and

in tanks,

artillery, guns self-propelled vehicles, combat delivery logistics defence, and nuclear air equipment, obstacle-crossing had by NATO A of advantages of quality once enjoyed number systems.

Russians fields in fast disappearing disappeared the might and some or were force be in the lead. Earlier deployment to the equipment of new ground intensive forces, modernisation of these groups seemed and more groups of both desire Soviet indicate to them relatively and to strengthen an enhanced 6' absolutely.

Ambassadors Britain's Meanwhile, to of out at a conference as was pointed London Union in in Soviet Europe Eastern the which assembled and November 1975, Western societies were `faced to a greater extent than at any task of maintaining their economic time since 1939 with the complex and defend in if integrity themselves, their to a relatively will necessary, and social Monetary far have inflation situation'. might so relaxed non-confrontational done more than detente to increase pressure on Western governments to but East/West it defence the tension relaxation expenditure, of made reduce Soviet difficult in West to to the the efforts counter nurture all more a public 62 disarmament.

And, favourable to these unilateral given mood MBFR British diplomats the talks a new assumed significance. circumstances, fact it fully Soviet Union to the that the would probably cost alive more were forces from Eastern Europe than to maintain to withdraw them there, and from likely disbandment. few But to their that they also accrue savings were felt that Brezhnev remained wedded to the pursuit of detente and that he in Vienna be in to progress sanction might ready order to ensure a more favourable international climate for the CSCE review conference which was Belgrade in 1977.

He in further to to would meet not wish scheduled risk detente in disillusionment West, the with public and there might, the FCO disposition in Moscow to look at the political `be a greater speculated, Soviet Union from to the that accrue would advantage an reaching West, 63 If the the even at cost with agreement of some military concession'. detente policy were to be kept on track then the Russians must Brezhnev's MBFR. `In short', noted Sir John towards attitude assume a more constructive Killick, now Britain's permanent to NATO, `we must somehow representative just Belgrade, but detente that the not make credibly clear whole process of

61 Ibid., Appendix II. 62

63

I

No. 84.

bid, Ibid., No.

84.

32

development) its future (its achievements as as well '64 halted. build-up is Soviet military present

is at stake

unless

the

far MBFR issues An agreement off as remained of nonetheless on the central from Soviet Quite been. had it to accept the the reluctance apart ever as differences fundamental there were reductions, of asymmetric notion into which between the two sides over the nature of the Phase I obligations Eastern States United Western direct participants the than might enter. other delegates maintained that cuts in Soviet forces must depend on their receipt Canadians West Europeans from the the and guarantees of concrete be by date they would the scope of their reductions which and the regarding Soviet delegates insisted Western that must reductions completed, whilst Warsaw Pact True, June 1976 in the precede any such commitments. force delegates for the first time tabled data on their ground and air in central Europe -a move which was particularly embarrassing manpower immediately to their Western colleagues since they were unable to respond inclusion France's figures because NATO to the opposition of with updated by in them of French forces in the reductions area. The numbers supplied Western lower East in than the and estimates, any case considerably were in East's `interest Rose initiative that the the evidence although considered [was] keeping other progress genuine', of substantive alive the possibility being Soviet Union it designed British the to prevent thought officials 65 in Indeed, blamed for the continuing the talks spent participants stalemate.

Edwin Rose's Bolland, in 1976 what engaged much of the autumn of `restating UK Head described Delegation the as and as successor of [of] become had in The their effect process respective positions'. elaborating Yet Moberly, Assistant Underdiplomatic Patrick in the ritual. a view of Secretary Defence Department, talks were the Vienna superintending `as being feature in detente a the prominent emerging panorama', and were West in `one the to seen as of the means of testing the Soviet commitment If the talks could be so elevated, they might be used to demonstrate detente'.

Western to an otherwise that it was the Russians who complacent public lacked There FCO Planners to detente. commitment was therefore, a strong case for making MBFR `the proving ground for detente' contended, for bringing Vienna the talks more to the attention and of the public in order Western defence to facilitate the maintenance of an adequate effort.

Crosland, had Callaghan Foreign Commonwealth who succeeded as and in April 1976, was receptive Secretary to the tactic. Disenchanted with the bilateral relations, which, despite Gromyko's `new phase' in Anglo-Soviet visit

64 Ibid., No. 94.

65 mod., No. 32.

33

had been more characterised by petty bickering to London, than active Crosland his Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir cooperation, agreed with Michael Palliser, that they should `vulgarise' the language of detente and, in mind, he readily endorsed with the Angolan the notion conflict of denouncing the Soviet Union as `an imperialist power'. In the meantime, MBFR would be made the public touchstone of detente. 66 The Russians, for their part, seemed reluctant to envisage the talks' demise, Callaghan had already appeared to indicate that he was not averse to the and MBFR negotiations like the Genevaevolving into a `continuing process' based UN Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. 67 In consequence, the talks continued, twelve years later on 2 only finally to be wound-up February 1989, a month before the opening in Vienna of the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe. There was, as Robin O'Neill, Britain's Ambassador in Vienna and last Head of Delegation, `no then recalled, moment when both sides really wanted agreement, except on such onefor terms as to be unnegotiable; sidedly favourable and a number of years had neither side was ready for an agreement at all'. Warsaw Pact participants nonetheless come to accept the Western case for `measures designed to The talks the general goal of increasing promote security and stability'. became the only multilateral forum for regular East/West contact on security for a whole generation questions, and provided the arms control background of politico-military experts in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And, as O'Neill recognised, they in one sense achieved Whitehall's original objectives. They forestalled in US troops in Europe, burden any reduction the of and had contributed `to the crippling unreduced military expenditure of the Soviet economy' which by 1989 was Gorbachev's `greatest single problem'. 68 This last remark was doubtless made with tongue in cheek, implying as it did that MBFR had become one of the West's Cold War-winning weapons.

Nevertheless, what is striking about what Tickell had once described as this Janus-headed is how even during the first four years of the negotiation'69 talks Whitehall's perception of their political value had changed. As with the CSCE, the British had been reluctant participants in this multilaterisation of detente in Europe. The CSCE had, however, provided new mechanisms for the meaning of detente and for carrying the war of ideas into the expanding Tom McNally, Callaghan's Political Adviser, was by enemy encampment.

66 Ibid., No. 94.

67 Ibid., No. 28.

68 Ibid., Appendix 69 Ibid., No. 16.

III.

34

[ideological] `positive advocating a war of movement70 ideas, Yet, in applying theirs'. our challenging advancing progress Helsinki agreed at was slow, and within principles a year it suited British diplomats define detente in narrower to terms and to utilise statesmen and MBFR to focus public Soviet opinion on the more menacing aspects of foreign policy. It was, after all, as FCO Planners argued, difficult to see any Western from by which acceptance the way, apart of Soviet hegemony, in East/West be avoided.

The element confrontational relations could Vienna talks remained in Tickell's words `a classic device by which Western 71 for [force] By 1976 they were also govts resist[ed] unilateral pressure cuts'.

November

1975

by a means which ministers and officials sought to remind an all too unwary populace of the limits of detente. Almost as much an exercise in public, as in diplomacy, like military, the MBFR talks were ultimately, the CSCE less about finding negotiations, to confrontation than about alternatives Cold War. adjusting battle fronts in a continuing

70 Ibid. No. 83.

71 Ibid., No. 14.

35

PARITY Francis

LOST' Richards

Arms and Manpower I sing, and lest the Theme Too Lofty for my Modest Talents seem, Come, lovely NATO, lead the Everian troop Of martial spirits to my Drafting Group; With timely guidance, Nymph, my thoughts inspire lyre!

And teach the hand that tunes the untutored Thy broad wings, steel-girt Goddess, swiftly bear Thee over towns and forests through the air, O'er snow-clad Taunus, and the rushing Rhine Beyond the Elbe and Oder-Neisse line, From where the Stolid Dutchman his Dyke guards To Lodz, and where the morning Sunbeams strike The crests of Tatra; and from Pripet's fen To Friesland's meadows, and then back again, Tell all, fair Harbinger; do not conceal

What thy all-seeing National Means reveal How stands the Balance between East and West?

Are the scales level? Or is one depressed?

Could our defences stand the brutal shock Flock?

Of Eastern wolves descending on our But stay! Why do thy tattered garments gape, Inadequate to hide thy Beauteous Shape?

Rubescent cheek and downcast eye proclaim Thee as the victim of some deed of shame.

Speak, fair Everia; for my spirit longs To dress thy wounds, and vindicate thy wrongs!

Then speaks the Goddess, fighting back her tears, `In deference to your somewhat Tender Years And lack of Clearance, I shall exercise Some Self-Restraint, and subtly Bowdlerize find My Tale; some circumstances you would Repugnant to the Chaste and Modest Mind.

Now hearken: first I bent my hapless course To make inspection Western force. the of

In the opinion footnotes, of Sir Clive Rose, who kindly provided the explanatory this parody 'was one of the best things to come out of the first three years of the MBFR talks'.

36

All through the day the Luneberg Heath beat With clash of armour and with marching feet; The proud parade those fearsome Teutons led, Rank on brave rank, with Leber' at their head; Then Rumsfeld2 marched his Grizzled Legions on, With Lance and Pershing, and with Honest John; The Rhenish Army, with its Ancient Gear, British Cohorts next appear; And dwindling Thousands more, to sounds of fife and drum, From Benelux and Canada there come A bold array! What danger could impend When such as these our Liberties defend?

Alas! Too soon I laid my fears to rest, For as I turned my back upon the West, And Eastward sped across a low'ring sky A darker scene presented to my eye; Black clouds rose up to bar my passage, chased By chill winds from Siberia's icy waste.

The birds fell silent, and fast took their flight, Yielding their place to creatures of the night, Foul shapes of Evil, reeking of Fresh Blood; Foxbat and Flogger, Fitter, Frog and Scud, Fishbed and Faggot, Ganef, Grail and Bear Gibbered and shrieked in the putrescent air.

Beneath - beyond the bristling hedge of steel, from head to heel, Cleaving the Continent That rings the Workers' Paradise about To keep the Workers in, and others out I saw Pavlovsky's Slavic Vanguard dread, The Muscovitish myriads, outspread.

A Horde unnumbered as the grains of sand In Gobi, or on Blackpool's Tropic Strand A motley million, drawn from near and far; Buryat and Bulgar, Prole and Commissar, brown Uzbek, The smooth Armenian the and The rancid Kirghiz and the humbled Czech, Kazakhs and Tadzhiks, Latvians and Huns, Tundra and taiga yield their choicest sons,

I

Herr

Leber, Federal

German

Defence

US Permanent Donald Rumsfeld, 2001. from Defense US Secretary of

2

Minister.

Representative

37

to the North

Atlantic

Council

1973-76.

Tartary's jetsam, gathered by the tide far side; And cast up on the continent's Forces which to our own as well compare As hawk to plover, or as hound to hare.

Most prominent among their serried ranks Mine eyes descry the dread Main Battle Tanks Hide Metallic Pachyderms, whose Toughened Weaponry Can turn oncoming aside, Track Whose Mighty Gun and Caterpillar Make them a fearsome weapon of Attack, Monsters descended lineally from those Which braved with Hannibal the Alpine snows And fought the Macedonian, when of yore He strove with Porus by the Indus shore..

Now part the ranks, as once the Red Sea's wave Passage to Israel's fleeing children gave; What champion it be field? that takes the can The trumpets sound, and Brezhnev stands revealed: That fabled chieftain and commander staunch, Hardened Sinew Immense Paunch, of of and He comes, with Foul Intent and Visage Fell, Like Cerberus before the gates of Hell.

Too late I knew the peril of my plight, Too late I turned to save myself by flight; Through Collective Farm and mire wood and plough, Splashed by mud and rent by thorn and briar, By plain and puszta, over stile and hedge, Edge.

At first I kept a Qualitative Some time the unequal steeplechase I led, Though close behind I heard the heavy tread Of lusty Brezhnev and his Ribald Crew As foot by foot they ever nearer drew.

I slipped: they seized me: and what then befell No power on earth can move my lips to tell; Mine not to draw aside the Kindly Veil

That night cast o'er the ending of my tale.

Long did thy Nymph endure their Bestial Rule; But when at length the fires of Lust grew cool They rose, like Glutted Vultures from a Bone And left me, bruised, dishonoured and alone.

Full long I wept, and cursed the fatal slip

38

That gave me to that Forced Relationship Whore, Nameless With Brezhnev's myrmidons; a Thy Maiden Goddess maiden is no more.

What tears, what prayers can e'er restore to me My virgin treasure, spotless PARITY? Oh Parity! Sole pledge of Lasting Peace, Whose name is potent to make Discord cease!

By SALT experts acclaimed the brightest gem That gleams in Detente's dazzling diadem!

Which nips th' incipient Conflict in the bud, That Mars may howl in vain for human blood And Zeus's nuclear Bolt rest in his hand While rosy Pax prevails throughout the land And SACEUR lays aside his idle blade To sport with Amaryllis in the shade.

My Parity once lost, how can there be A real enhancement of stability?

She paused, and cries of grief distressed the air As NATO gave full rein to her despair; Sobbing, she laid her lovely head to rest On Dr. Luns's3 sympathetic breast. from his wrathful eye Then blazed the lightning As to the Goddess Luns returned reply: `Hush, Wronged Enchantress! Wipe away thy tears!

Vain is thy grief; unfounded are thy fears.

Still in thy service beat some Valiant Hearts, Arts; Practised in War and Diplomatic To their assistance let us have recourse, To win by guile what has been lost to force.

For thou shalt have thy Parity again When Terence Wood4 shall come to Dunsinane! ' At Luns's word, the call goes far and wide To summon NATO's champions to her side.

First honest Resor5, learned in the law, in those days of yore As Cincinnatus Sped at the Senate's call to succour Rome,

3

Dr Joseph

Luns, Netherlands

Foreign

Minister

1952-71, Secretary-General

of NATO,

1971-

84.

Assistant Head Austria 1992-1996.

4

5

Stanley

of Western

Organisations

Resor, Head of US Delegation

Department,

1973-77. Formally

39

FCO,

1973-77

US Secretary

Ambassador

of the Army.

to

Forsakes the plough, With his Achitophel,

home;

his leaves prairie and 6 Dean, the wily

He treads the road to once-imperial

Wien.

Next Behrends7 leaves the margin of the Rhine, With Hofmann, 8 and his store of Nahe wine; And Cagiati, 9 Nimrod of the Alps, Turns from the chase to hunt for Russian scalps.

And Adriaenssen10 his resolve attests To spice the Group's discourse with Gallic Jests; Winter11 and Vos12 this Band of Heroes swell With Spyridakis, 13 Grande, 14 and T端rel, 15 But stay! What gallant troop from Albion's shore Sets sail, in dazzling panoply of war, And braves the buffets of the Northern sea?

Chivalry, 'Tis ROSE, 16 the flower of Whitehall's Destined to shine in Vienna's far-famed fight, And, having had his Day, to be a Knight.

Others there are in Rose's train, whose names Are ever on the lips of Russian dames, Who use them to intimidate each child That shows an inclination to be wild: In case it be, as we have been assured, True that the Pen be mightier than the Sword, With devious Gillmore, 17 skilled in Soviet Lore,

6

Jonathan Dean, Deputy Head of US Delegation to the exploratory talks.

7

Wolfgang

Ambassador 8

Behrends,

Head

to Canada.

Deputy Hoffman,

of the Federal

1973-77. Formerly

German

Delegation.

head of US Delegation Later,

Federal

German

of the Federal German Delegation.

9 Head of Italian Delegation.

Italian Ambassador interests in (Italian to Austria, nominally by Counsellor in the the talks were represented at the Embassy. ) Later Italian practice Ambassador in London.

Wilfred

10 Head 11 Head

Head

Delegation, Belgian also at the exploratory of Delegation.

Luxembourg of

talks.

12 William Vos, Head of Netherlands Delegation.

13 Head of Greek Delegation. Subsequently Greek Ambassador in Cyprus.

14 George Grande, Head of Canadian Delegation. Later Canadian Ambassador Africa.

15 Head of Turkish Delegation.

16 Sir Clive Rose, Head of UK Delegation, North Atlantic Council, 1979-82.

17 David 1975-78.

(later

Sir David)

Permanent

Gillmore,

Under-Secretary

1973-76. UK Permanent

Head

of Chancery and Deputy of State, FCO, 1991-93.

40

Representative Head

to South

on the

of UK Delegation

And sapient Mehew, 18 our success is sure: While if the Sword be mightier than the Pen, Why, Pratt19 is with us, and we win again!

Oh Concourse of Great Minds! Excess of Brain!

When shall Europa see thy like again!

Let Brezhnev tremble! Let Podgorny quail!

The cause of Right must surely now prevail!

My task is done: mine not to sing the scene Of what transpires behind locked doors in Wien.

Seek not with hands profane to draw aside The Veil of Secrecy ordained to hide Mysteries. Its weekly Rites The Hofburg's Are only for the eyes of Acolytes; Remember Pentheus, and the fate of him Whom raving Maenads once tore limb from limb Because with impious gaze he dared to spy On what was not intended for his eye.

(But he who yearns for Knowledge nonetheless Has but to scan the columns of the Press. ) And now my patient Muse I may release To sing of Love, and other toys of peace, Of Nymphs and Shepherds, Daffodils and Larks, The Joys of Spring in green suburban parks, And wait the day when she shall be retained To sing the Lay of PARITY REGAINED

18 Peter Mehew, 19 Brigadier

Counsellor

Oliver

UK Delegation, 1975-77. of Defence), Adviser, UK Delegation, 1973-76.

(Ministry

Pratt, Defence

41

NOTE

ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sir Clive Rose GCMG

Head of the United Kingdom Delegation Mutual (UKDEL) to the talks on Reduction Forces Armaments and of and Measures in Central Europe, Associated 1973-76. Ambassador UK Permanent and Representative Atlantic at the North Council, 1979-82. He is the author of Campaigns Against Western Defence: NATO's Critics (London, 1985) adversaries and

Francis Richards CMG, CVO

First Secretary, UKDEL Vienna, 1973-76.

Government Director, Communication Headquarters 1998. since

Dr. Keith

Senior Editor, Documents on British Policy include (with Overseas. His publications Langhorne) The Practice Richard of Its Evolution, Theory Diplomacy: and (London, 1995) Administration

Hamilton

42

DOCUMENTS

ON BRITISH

POLICY

OVERSEAS

documents from Foreign the the of archives collection of and Office is published by authorisation Her Majesty's Commonwealth of The Editors have been accorded the customary freedom in the Government. documents. of selection and arrangement This

SERIES I (1945-1950) Published Volume

I

The Conference

Potsdam, at

Volume

II

Conferences and Moscow.

Volume

III

Britain and America: Negotiation August-December 1945.

Volume

IV

Britain America: Atomic and December 1945 July 1946.

Volume

V

Germany

Volume

VI

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Volume

VII

The United Nations: Iran, Cold War and World January 1946-January 1947.

July-August

and Conversations

and Western

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of the United

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