Dialectic Volume 13 No 1 (Spring 2019) by Dialectic Journal

Volume XIII - Issue No.1 Spring 2019

Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy

Editor Sam Green

Deputy Editor s Alex Hall Finn Webb

Reviewer s Gareth Pearce Ale de Capitani

Copy editing Sol Hoffmann Katie Lee

Consulting Victoria Wynters

Contr ibutor s

Gaspard Petit

Cynthia Gonzalez

Brady Carr

Max Holme

Max Farey

Frank Davies

Will Dobbs

Martin Pallister Paul Fagan George Turner Sophie Norstrรถm

"A phil osopher who is not t aking par t in discussion is l ike a boxer who never goes int o t he r ing." -Wit t genst ein The theme of this edition is political philosophy, the area of philosophy concerned with who gets what in society, and according to whom. Therefore, on the one hand it addresses the questions of who should own property, how material goods should be distributed, and what rights people should have; while on the other it deals with the distribution of political power, and the laws reinforced by such power. Our first two papers both relate to property. Rousseau?s official position was that private property cannot possibly be abolished. M ax Holme argues that he would nevertheless have desired abolition, bringing to bear resources from within Rousseau?s work that demonstrate its possibility. Paul Fagan defends Locke against the charge that his work in some way promotes global inequality. Enactable or not, certain precepts pointed to in Locke?s work offer grounds for refuting the charge. Very broadly, the next three papers address cases of injustice within society. ?Latinx? has come to prominence as a gender-neutral term for addressing people of Latin American descent. Cynthia Gonzalez proposes to frame its increased usage as a case of hegemony. In an interesting contrast, the next paper, by Fr ank Davies, sketches how implicit biases (which can cause unjust discriminatory behaviours) could be conceived of as a public health problem. Finally, M ar tin Pallister explores some deficiencies in Rawls?s concept of the original position, namely its deprivation of a female perspective. Our book review is by Sophie Nor strom and Geor ge Tur ner, who review an edited collection about the philosophy of tax. The issue closes with an interview with Alan Thomas, who has written extensively on issues in political philosophy, most notably on the work of Rawls and liberal republicanism. Sam Green Editor Quotation: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections (1981: 132), edited by Rush Rhees

C o n t en t s 1

Rousseau and private property Max Holme

Locke and global justice Paul Fagan

'Latinx' as hegemony Cynthia Gonzalez Implicit bias as a public health crisis

Frank Davies

Feminism and the veil of ignorance Martin Pallister Review of 'Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives' (2018)

Sophie Norstrรถm and George Turner

Interview with Alan Thomas Sam Green

86 87

Philosophy Society's Page Call for Papers

III

Rousseau and private property Max Holme - University of York mh1407@york.ac.uk

I ntroduction There is an inconsistency in Rousseau's treatment of the idea of property, in that his political theory generally lends itself to support for abolition, but he opposed it. I will argue that this was on pragmatic, and not ideological, grounds. It is clear from the Constitutional Project for Corsica that he saw abolition as an unattainable ideal. I will not challenge the key ideas underlying Rousseau's political writings (such as the importance of amour propre in human psychology). Instead, I will critically assess the conclusions Rousseau reaches regarding property based on these ideas. I will conclude that Rousseau is wrong to argue for even a minimal role for property in a just state. Instead, he should have argued for the shaping of public opinion against property, and ultimately its abolition. My argument is in three parts. Firstly, I will argue that, whether or not he saw it as feasible, Rousseau saw the abolition of property as desirable. Secondly, I will argue that Rousseau's acceptance of property in the just state derives from his belief that because of its link to amour propre, it is impossible to abolish property de facto, even if it is possible de jure. I will respond to this by arguing that amour propre and property are

not necessarily linked; their separation is possible in the just state. This could be achieved by the shaping of public opinion against property, and there are precedents in Rousseau's work for removing undesirable expressions of amour propre this way. Finally, I will argue that despite his position to the contrary, Rousseau's commitment to stability does not require opposition to abolition but support for it; following the Social Contract, he ought to have seen property as a destabilising force in society. Hence, abolition of property is both desirable and possible following Rousseau's writings. It is important to note the difference between private property (such as buildings, land, and capital) and personal property (chattels, such as toothbrushes). As there is not space to discuss both, I will only discuss private property; in any case, the sovereign can only demand what is useful from citizens (Rousseau 1987: 157).

1 - The desir ability of abolition It is worth pointing out that Rousseau goes as far as claiming that humanity would have been spared conflicts and the miseries arisen from them, if the establishment of property had been resisted (Rousseau 1987: 60). Yet he simultaneously described property as the most sacred right held by citizens, revealing an apparent tension in his thought (ibid.:127). Putterman argues that Rousseau's concerns about property are focussed on the dangerous, destabilising effects of ostentatious wealth (1999: 423). On this interpretation, the just state that Rousseau envisaged, then, certainly would

have property rights, but not like those of mid-eighteenth century France, with pervasive and extreme inequality. Instead, Ryan suggests that perhaps Rousseau had in mind a republican agricultural ideal of property rights, involving ?politically virtuous and military courageous? independent farmers? (1984: 49). Putterman is right that Rousseau's 'policy proposal' for the just society is not to abolish property rights, but to minimise them, with moderate wealth and as little inequality as possible, and no right to claim property against the state (1999: 424). However, this passage from the Constitutional Project for Corsica illuminates Rousseau's views further: Far from wanting the state to be poor, I should like, on the contrary, for it to own everything, and for each individual to share in the common property only in proportion to his services ? [my idea] is not to destroy private property absolutely, since that is impossible, but to confine it within the narrowest possible limits ... I want the property of the state to be as large and strong, that of the citizens as small and weak, as possible.

(Rousseau 1953: 317, italics added) This greatly clarifies Rousseau?s view of property: ideally, the state would own everything, that is, private property would not exist. However, he sees the complete destruction of private property as ?impossible?. His acceptance of property rights is pragmatic, not ideological. What remains is to see whether his conviction that abolition is impossible is supported by his wider political theory.

2 - The impossibility of abolition

Rousseau's argument that abolition of property is impossible appears to take the following form: 1. Property is an expression of amour propre; 2. It is impossible to successfully legislate against amour propre; 3. Therefore, it is impossible to abolish property. I will discuss each point below, providing references for points 1 and 2. But, first, what is amour propre? In Rousseau, it carries more meaning than its literal translation as ?self-love?. It is best understood, in this context, as the need every human being has to be treated respectfully, and to be recognised to have intrinsic value (Bertram 2017). Through conspicuous consumption, property in modern society is a clear outlet for expression of amour propre (Putterman 1999: 427). Indeed, Rousseau states that ?[n]othing appears good or desirable to individuals which the public has not judged to be such? (Rousseau; 1985: 67) property's desirability derives from amour propre. But was this link always present? In the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau states that ?[f]rom the cultivation of land, there necessarily followed the division of land? (Rousseau 1987: 66). The 'necessity' of this link is not explained. Perhaps, with amour propre established, cultivation opened a new channel for competition, through property. But previously, presumably, amour propre operating in a collectivised hunter gatherer society would push people to compete over (among other things) who was the most community spirited who gathered the most for the group, for example. Why, then, should

cultivation lead to property? If people could equally well compete over being the best worker in a collectivised society, the first person to claim property for themselves would earn disdain, not respect. Of course, in Rousseau's account, with agriculture seems to come division of labour, and dependence on others (Lemos 1977: 38). But in a collectivised society, the fact that a blacksmith, for example, earned more respect than a field worker, an expression of amour propre, does not in the least imply that people would separate the fruits of their labour and invent property. Though property expresses amour propre in modern society, Rousseau does not evidence the necessity of the link. Perhaps, though property and amour propre could, at one time, be separated, now that they are bound, property is established ?forever? (Rousseau 1987: 70). But in this case, some other reason barring the possibility of abolition is required; simply being an expression of amour propre will not suffice, as discussed below. The difficulty Rousseau saw in legislating against expressions of amour propre is apparent in the Letter to d'Alembert: ?neither reason, nor virtue, nor laws will vanquish public opinion, so long as the art of changing it has not been found? (Rousseau 1985: 69). It is clear from Rousseau's discussion of duelling that he saw attempts to use force or law to quell expressions of amour propre as futile (Putterman 1999: 431). People will sooner resist the law than amour propre and will find ways to do so. As long as the properties are admired, therefore, legislation to abolish property is futile. The ?instruments proper to the direction of public

opinion ? are neither laws nor punishments nor any coercive means? (Rousseau 1985: 67). Only through inf luencing public opinion can an expression of amour propre be removed (Rousseau 1985: 67). So, abolitionist legislation will be futile, but this does not mean that abolition of property is impossible. As explained above, property is not inextricably linked to amour propre. If, as in the case of duelling, it is possible to remove expressions of amour propre through directing public opinion, then this should also be true in the case of property, and it can, eventually, be abolished by these means. The possibility of shaping public opinion is evident beyond the Letter to d'Alembert. In the Social Contract, Rousseau impels the legislator to use rhetorical means and to attribute their ideas to gods so that people ?might obey with liberty and bear with docility the yoke of public felicity? (Rousseau 1987: 162-165). Clearly, Rousseau saw shaping public opinion as possible beyond duelling and should therefore have seen the abolition of property as possible. One need not abolish amour propre to abolish property; the two are separable. While abolitionist legislative efforts will fail, the influencing of public opinion is familiar in Rousseau, and could be employed to, eventually, abolish property. Rousseau saw abolition as desirable, so given that he should have seen it as possible, he should have advocated it ? thus refuting the argument provided above. 3 - Stability and proper ty Rousseau's desire for stability generates some surprising conclusions; Ryan

points out that in order to pursue the greater goal of stability of society, he has to allow for little or no social mobility (1984: 67). Perhaps, despite his moral opposition to it, Rousseau saw property as a regrettable necessity in the interests of stability. One argument Rousseau offers is that property guarantees that citizens fulfil their commitments, because since goods are answerable for them, it prevents them from ?eluding? their duties and the law (Rousseau 1987: 127). By allowing property rights, the state ensures obedience by threatening their removal as a punishment. However, Rousseau also argues that in well-constructed states, public business takes precedence over private business: ?Once someone says what do I care? about the affairs of state, the state should be considered lost? (ibid.: 198). Clearly, if citizens are only obeying because they fear for their property, it is already too late. To have a just state, citizens' commitments must already be guaranteed by their sense of duty, not economic interests. Indeed, much of the Social Contract lends itself to the idea that the abolition of property would be a stabilising factor. If we take seriously his claims that society ought to be governed ?on the basis of common interest?, it could be suggested that holding property in common would fit well within his overall argument (1987: 153). Furthermore, since, for Rousseau, opinions close to unanimity are an expression of general will (ibid.: 205), and societal stability comes from general will (Daly 2013: 174), then it follows that the more united opinions are, the more stable society is. Rousseau also advises that private wills tend to be stronger than the general

will in individuals, ?a gradation directly opposite to the one required by the social order? (Rousseau 1987: 177). Clearly, the best way of ensuring stability is to align as closely as possible the individuals' interests with society as a whole's; in other words, to align the private will to the general will. The abolition of property would stabilise society, by ensuring that each individual's interest is materially aligned with the community; the individual can only prosper with, and not against, the general interest. As Rousseau points out, once ?public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizens [? ] the state is already near its ruin? (Rousseau 1987: 197). Given this, to abolish property seems the best way to ensure stability on Rousseau's terms, despite his position to the contrary.

Conclusion Given Rousseau's political theory, he should have advocated the abolition of property. He clearly sees merit in the idea; in the Constitutional Project for Corsica he writes directly about wanting the state to own everything, and he criticises wealth and inequality throughout his work. However, Putterman is correct that he stops short of advocating the abolition of property, instead advocating moderation of wealth and the minimisation of inequality. But this is due to pragmatic, not ideological, beliefs. Because of property's link to amour propre, Rousseau saw its abolition as impossible. Abolition of property, however, does not imply an attempt to remove amour propre. Property and amour propre could be separated through the inf luence of public opinion. Neither does stability necessitate the

preservation of property. In fact, by aligning private interests with the general will, the Social Contract is more fully realised. Hence, Rousseau had the motivation to advocate abolition, and though he saw it as impossible, his wider theory implies this possibility. His failure to advocate abolition represents an inconsistency in his treatment of the idea of property.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Bertram, C. (2017). Jean Jacques Rousseau. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [Online]. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/ [Accessed 23 Dec 2018]. Daly, E. (2013). Austerity and Stability in Rousseau's Constitutionalism. In Jurisprudence, 4 (2): 173-203. [Online]. Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.5235/20403313.4.2.173 [Accessed 17 Apr 2018]. Einaudi, M. (1967). The Early Rousseau. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Lemos, R. M. (1977). Rousseau's Political Philosophy. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Putterman, E. (1999). The role of public opinion in Rousseau's conception of property. In History of Political Thought, 20 (3): 417-437. [Online]. Available at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com.libproxy.york.ac.uk/ contento ne/ imp/hpt/1999/00000020/00000003/51# [Accessed 7 Apr 2018]. Rousseau, J. J. (1772), Political Writings, trans. Watkins, F. Edinburgh: Nelson & Sons, 1953. Rousseau, J. J. (1985). Letter to M. d'Alembert on the theatre. In Politics and the Arts, trans. Le Rond d' Alembert, J. & Bloom, A., 5th edn, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Rousseau, J. J. (1712-1778). Basic Political Writings, trans. Cress, D.A. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987. Ryan, A. (1984). Property and Political Theory. Southampton: Camelot Press Ltd.

Locke and global justice Paul Fagan - University of Sheffield pf.tracts@gmail.com

I ntroduction We live in a world with an uneven spread of wealth. The question then arises: what is to blame for such gross inequality? The blame is usually attributed to the world?s dominant economic system: capitalism. However, prior to the advent of capitalism, some blame may be attributed to capitalism?s political bedfellow, namely liberalism. Consequently, blame may be attributed to ?the father of liberalism?, namely John Locke. However, the problem for those who recoil at the inequality is that the current economic system has proved to be both enduring and tenacious, and unless an alternative emerges, the world is probably entwined with this arrangement for some time. The task will therefore be to instigate improvement. Here, it will be explained that although the dominant economic system may be blamed for gross inequalities of wealth, it is wrong to blame John Locke for this situation. Moreover, it will be explained that Locke did not promote such a state of affairs. An interpretation of his work will be provided which brings to light his promotion of greater global equality, by

referring to passages from his Two Treatises of Government (1689).

The problems descr ibed An Oxfam report of January 2017, concerning the spread of wealth, revealed that ?the world's richest one per cent [? ] own more than the other 99 per cent combined? (Oxfam 2017). Moreover, the report noted that ?while one in nine people on the planet will go to bed hungry tonight a small handful of billionaires have so much wealth they would need several lifetimes to spend it?(Oxfam 2017). For many, this situation is intuitively wrong. However, from the point of view of political philosophy, the concentration of wealth allows the societies that create such wealth to be unwittingly directed by such wealth. Specifically, the wealthy may own banks and manipulate the banking system, they may own the media and control the news people receive, and they may own the means of production and control the goods people enjoy. Hence, the concentration of wealth may confound democracy: a major principle that the most productive societies are based upon. A further problem for those who would like to dismantle the present system is that for over 200 years, there have been unfulfilled predictions that the economic system of capitalism will end. The most famous came from Karl Marx, who envisioned two bodies of interests pitted against each other, namely the workers and the capitalists, where the latter would be overthrown (Marx 1976: 929). The problem for capitalism?s

naysayers is that capitalism has been resilient and dissipated a need for major political change. In part, this has been achieved as capitalism has provided affordable goods, comfortable homes, entertainment and plentiful food for the masses (Ryan 1984: 181). It is therefore possible that capitalism will last for the foreseeable future. The quest, then, must not be to replace capitalism, but instead to improve it.

What is the solution? Here it will be claimed that the work of Locke may be used to forge an ethos which, if accepted by consensus, may contribute to achieving global justice. By an ?ethos?, I mean ?the characteristic spirit of a culture, era, or community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations? (Oxford Living Dictionaries 2018). The seeds of a benign ethos may be found in Locke?s Two Treatises and three sections of Locke?s work are highlighted; before finishing with a fourth section that would enable the first three to be actioned. Firstly, Locke placed emphasis upon individuals only providing for their needs. One could own property after labouring to acquire it ?at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others? (2 s.27) (Locke 1689: 128). When encouraged and enacted, this should provide a device to prevent excessive accumulation by individuals: one may take enough for one?s own needs whilst ensuring others may do the same. In the present age, the value of the ?enough, and as good? clause is

that it can be used as a yardstick to assess whether people receive an adequate amount of material possessions from the society in which they find themselves. The society in question would agree what comprises ?enough? as it would change from society to society. Hence, an absolute measure defining whether people have ?enough?is not offered here. Secondly, Locke had an aversion to ?waste? and this may be interpreted as a device that discourages the concept of ownership over any surplus goods. He unambiguously wrote: ?As much as anyone may make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share and belongs to others? (2 s.31) (Locke 1689: 31). Put simply: if you are not going to use something, then it does not belong to you in the first place. When instituted in a society, this sort of thinking lends itself to immediately distributing to others any food, which would be destined to perish. That said, the practical actioning of this theorising could result in the supply of (not necessarily perishable) material possessions to the needy. For instance, a system could be devised that supplies unwanted goods to others such as laptops, clothes, furniture, medical equipment, and educational equipment. In short, anything that could end its life in a landfill site and more besides. Thirdly, it should be noted that Locke had an unequivocal desire to see charitableness exercised. Locke wrote that it is a ?sin in any man of estate, to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty?(1 s.42) (Locke 1689: 31).

Locke?s notion of ?estate? could also possibly encourage the lending of our material possessions to others. For instance, if a field is to be left unploughed by its owner, then it could be borrowed by another and used to produce crops that season; or an automobile could be lent out to one?s neighbours who have no transport. Furthermore, this reasoning may be extrapolated so that any property that is no longer used, due to its having been replaced, should be gifted to those who may be in need. A point to note here also, is that societies, particularly wealthy ones, do not need the amount of material possessions they currently hold if an institute of borrowing and lending is enacted on a widespread basis. Hence, we can reasonably conceive of a Lockean-inspired aspiration for a more egalitarian society which eschews greed and distributes goods that would otherwise be wasted, meaning that a lesser amount of goods needs to be produced. Furthermore, if people share or gift property, then there would be less need to hold the larger goods that the accountant may label as ?fixed assets?. Now, if all three of the above principles were accepted by a society, and the society collectively acted to support them, then we may say that an ethos operated. Certainly this sort of ethos would work in a localised society, the sort in which Locke envisaged that his own philosophising would exist. However, we now live in a very interconnected world with globalisation overseeing international trade and the internet keeping us informed of events in foreign climes. Hence, this thinking should be extended to consider developing societies, and as such, it should expect to

honour notions of international justice. Honouring notions of international justice may occur in many ways. For instance, developing societies could be given the information to benefit themselves quite easily. Although the transport of surplus goods that may be donated to developing societies, following the third principle noted above, would undoubtedly require funding. The question of where the necessary funding for honouring international justice would come from then arises. A fourth notion arising from Locke?s work answers this question: the funding would arise from consensually agreed taxation. When referring to governments, Locke famously noted that ?they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people? (2: s142) (Locke 1689: 188). Now it will be explained how all four of Locke?s ideas may feasibly work within a benevolent ethos. Firstly, people would realise that they have ?enough? material resources and would be prepared to give away their excess goods that would otherwise go to ?waste?. The recipients, realising they are receiving a favour, would be more prepared to pay a nominal tax on this transaction as opposed to the full price of the good. Secondly, where people borrow larger assets they could again pay nominal taxation for this service, realising they benefitted from someone?s charity. The taxation could be gathered, and could be used to fund processes that aim to achieve the global equalisation of wealth.

The actual acceptance of the Lockean ethos in any particular society would require a study in itself, but hopefully it would be introduced via an enlightening education system, and after this, be willingly accepted as part of society?s culture. Locke himself favoured a type of education which repeatedly emphasised the benefits of both virtue and reasoning (Locke 1693); hence, one may expect there to be ample space to elucidate the first three principles of the ethos within a Lockean-based education. However, by encouraging the acceptance of all of the above principles as norms by which to live one?s life, they may provide four pillars that an ethos may rest upon.

Some potential cr iticisms of the offer ed solution Lockeans may venture that Locke?s work was meant only to guide our actions within a discrete society; they may ask, is it not unfair on the memory of Locke to extend his remit into topics such as globalisation? Possibly it is extending his remit and therefore the resulting ethos may only ever claim influence from Locke. Based upon passages from the Two Treatises, some may question Locke?s sincerity with regard to people only owning ?enough?. Locke felt that the notion of money allowed people to ?fairly? attain ?unequal possession of the earth? without this being an injurious situation for anyone (2: s50) (Locke 1689: 139). Following this, is it not possible for people to become enormously wealthy? Is this not a state of affairs that Locke would

endorse? It is possible that Locke would have condoned this situation: provided that others? needs were satisfied within your own society and individuals? suffering had been removed. However, added to this are the global concerns of poverty that inform our thinking here; and these should be tackled before one accumulates enormous holdings. Hence, according to the operation of the ethos as described here, an individual would only be able to hoard unlimited amounts of wealth provided that global suffering has been eradicated. Apart from criticising the first, ?enough, and as good? clause, some may have problems with the second, concerning ?waste?. They may object that the phrase: ?As much as anyone may make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils? is very vague. The answer to this is that if a Lockean-inspired ethos were operating, then the education an individual receives should guide them here, and it should only concern excess goods that can be donated without the donor suffering in any way. With the emphasis Locke placed upon individuals benefitting themselves through their own efforts, some may question whether any levelling of holdings should be considered anti-Lockean. And the answer to this is that it should not where any levelling has been voluntarily agreed and is supported by consensus within a society. Where a population values the ?enough, and as good? clause above all others, the levelling of holdings could satisfy the constraints of Lockean thinking. There may also be those Lockeans who are aghast at a presentation

of a selective reading of Locke and initially find such a presentation of his work untrue to Locke?s aims. However, if this work is considered to be ?applied philosophy?, and intends to solve a problem, then why not mix differing parts of his two treatises? The Lockean may be comforted by the notion that Locke?s work, on its own, has provided a potential solution to a global problem.

Conclusion Where the globally dominant political system is an unfair but tenacious form of liberalism-capitalism, ways to improve it may be necessary. It is possible, by revisiting Locke?s work, that principles may be identified that underwrite the introduction of a benign ethos; an ethos that facilitates the movement of goods from the developed world to the developing world, which may directly contribute to realising global justice.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Locke, J. (1693). Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Available at: http://www.sophia-project.org/uploads/1/3/9/5/13955288/locke_education. pdf [Accessed 28 Oct 2017]. Locke, J. (1689). Two Treatises of Government. London: Orion Publishing Group, 1993. Marx, K. (1867). Capital Volume 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976. Oxfam. (2017). Press Releases. Available at: https://www.oxfam.org.uk/ media-centre/press-releases/2017/01/eight-people-own-same-wealth-ashalf-the-world [Accessed 23 Dec 2017]. Oxford Living Dictionaries. (2018). Available at: https://en.oxford dictionaries.com/definition/ethos [Accessed 2 Mar 2018]. Ryan, A. (1984). Property and Political Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

'Latinx' as hegemony

Cynthia Gonzalez - University of California, Santa Cruz cylgonza@ucsc.edu I ntroduction According to Google Trends, use of the term ?Latinx? burgeoned around mid-to-late 2014 and has steadily gained traction in the United States (Google Trends 2018). The term has been introduced to address certain problems of exclusion associated with the alternative gendered words ?latina? and ?latino?. In November 2015, second-year undergraduates Gilbert Guerra and Gilbert Orbea published an article in their college newspaper, the Phoenix, called ?The argument against the use of the term ?Latinx??. They argued that the term is a blatant form of ?linguistic imperialism?(ibid.). Although it is highly improbable that their critique is the first, it certainly sparked a widespread debate, in which participants have tended to take two positions. On the one hand, various social policy researchers have argued against the use of ?Latinx?, considering it a form of ?linguistic imperialism? (ibid.)1. On the other hand, gender rights advocates have, in 1

In December 2017, an opinion piece appeared in the Los Angeles Times in which Daniel Hernandez argued that ?the binary rule [of gender] isn?t even applied strictly in Spanish?? citing, for example, ?la radio?? though accepting that ?the gendering of words is

the face of the ?imperialism? charge, maintained that ?Latinx? is the necessary solution to the ?problem of exclusion? inherent in Spanish (Sharrón-del Río 2015)2. However, I will argue that the proponents of ?Latinx? as ?imperialism? fail to appreciate that consent, rather than force, has been involved. As a result, the increased usage of ?Latinx? is better understood as hegemonic rather than imperialistic. In making this case I will draw on the political theory of the Italian philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci to elucidate the way in which a hegemonic class can maintain power, thereby providing some insight into how the debate may be moved forward. Using Gramsci?s notion of hegemony allows for a more nuanced understanding of the proliferation of the term ?Latinx?. I will demonstrate how it allows us to account for the inf luence of education on the way people of Latin American descent identity themselves. It also offers an explanation for why people of Latin American descent may accept or reject the term.

1 - The ar guments for ?L atinx?

problematic? and ultimately opting for the term ?Latin?, dropping suffixes altogether. In March 2018, Associate Professors at Michigan State University, Pilar Horner and Daniel Vélez Ortiz argued on Latino Rebels that ?Latinx?is a ?tool? of ?imperialism?. 2

Only a month after the Guerra and Orbea piece in 2015, María R. Sharrón-del Río and Alan A. Aja (Associate Professors at Brooklyn College, New York) published a rebuttal on the website Latino Rebels, stating that ?intersectionality is not a choice?(brought to widespread attention in April 2016, when popular feminist website Everyday Feminism republished it).

?Latino? is one of two established terms used to reference people of Latin American origin (both non-U.S. born and U.S. born), ?Hispanic? being the second most popular. Proponents of ?Latinx? can be understood as arguing for its adoption through two main arguments: which I will refer to as the minor argument and the major argument, named so because of their popularity. The minor argument calls for the adoption of ?Latinx? simply because it offers a spoken version of the written forms: ?Latino/a? and ?Latin@?. These terms were introduced around the late 1990s but have no obvious spoken form. For instance, the written ?Latin@? may cumbersomely be read aloud as ?Latina-Latino?. The motivation for using these terms is a problem with the term ?Latino?: although a room full of Latin American women can be described with the feminine plural ?Latinas?, a room full of one hundred Latin American women and one Latin American man defaults to the masculine plural ?Latinos?. Use of ?Latino/a?or ?Latin@?in writing solves this problem by conveying both the masculine and feminine forms of ?Latino? simultaneously. This guards against what is perceived to be a male normative standard in the Spanish language.3 But while these terms have no spoken equivalent, ?Latinx? does, being pronounced ?La-teen-eks?. The now popular major argument promotes ?Latinx? over ?Latino? for its capacity to include gender non-binary individuals, rather than its 3 Note how the inclusion of persons of non-binary gender is not a necessary part of the minor argument.

mere ability to overcome a male normative standard. This paper will focus on the major argument for ?Latinx?. ?Latinx? offers a term for addressing all non-U.S. born and U.S. born people of Latin American origin because one may substitute the ?x? for an ?o? for the masculine, an ?a? for the feminine, or retain the ?x? as a neutral alternative for gender non-binary individuals. Hence, to understand the major argument, we must first understand what gender non-binary means. Under a current popular view of gender identity, there is a distinction between sex and gender. Sex refers to biological or physical distinctions ?and will not vary significantly in different human societies? (Little 2016). Gender, however, is social and as such ?may vary greatly between different societies? (ibid.:). Furthermore, a dichotomous view of gender is unique to certain cultures rather than being universal (ibid.). Gender, according to this view, is a construct. Those who are gender non-binary, then, are people who do not act in accordance with their particular society?s expectations of what a person of that sex should act like ? or who reject their society?s ?dichotomous view of gender? (ibid.). Proponents of the major argument, like the proponents of the minor argument, note that ?Latino? is in the masculine singular. The terms ?Latino/a? and ?Latin@?, however, hold no appeal not merely because they have no spoken equivalent, but because they retain the masculine and feminine designations that non-binary people? who do not align with either? would reject. ?Latinx? in this case is preferable because the final ?x? does not denote a masculine or feminine. Now that I have set

out the major argument in favour of using ?Latinx?, I will set out the arguments made by Guerra and Orbea (2015) attacking its use. 2 - The ar guments against ?L atinx? In their article, Guerra and Orbea (2015) conclude that ?Latinx? should be rejected because the word represents a ?degenderization? of the Spanish language. First, they argue that the attempt is misguided, since gender in Spanish and gender in English are two different things. According to the grammatical rules of Spanish, the term ?Latinos? is already all-inclusive in terms of gender (ibid.). Guerra and Orbea cite the fact that inanimate objects are given gendered ?o(s) and ?a(s) endings, yet ?it is inherently understood that these objects are not tied to the genders assigned to them? (ibid.). Second, they point to the absurd consequences of using the term ?Latinx?. The principle behind it would demand the construction of sentences such as: ?Lxs niĂąxs fueron a lx escuelx a ver sus amigxs.? This is incomprehensible, to the point of actually being exclusionary to Spanish speakers (ibid.) They conclude that since Spanish is an inherently gendered language, any attempt to make it genderless or gender neutral is indistinguishable from an attempt to promote the ?erasure of Spanish? (ibid.). Guerra and Orbea say that this is a prime example of English speakers being unrelenting in imposing their social norms on other cultures, especially since ?Latinx? is virtually non-existent in any actual

Spanish-speaking country. So ?Latinx? represents a form of ?linguistic imperialism? because it imposes Anglo-American English language norms and values onto the Latin American Spanish-speaking communities (ibid.). 3 ? Gr amsci?s notion of hegemony Guerra and Orbea?s observation of the term ?Latinx? as an imposition of values and norms is indeed apt. But Gramsci?s political thought concerning hegemony can shed light on how this imposition of ?Latinx? is hegemonic rather than imperialistic. Hegemony, for Gramsci, is how the ruling class maintain control over the subordinate class and it is rooted in the normalisation of the dominant group?s values and norms over the values and norms of the subordinate group (Gramsci 1971). According to Gramsci, hegemony has an ethical-political foundation because it depends on the ruling class imposing their values and norms? which are necessarily rooted in their ethical and political systems? on the subordinate group. Similarly, putting values and norms into action involves an economic aspect. For example, a society that valued paved surfaces would have an economy ref lecting this, in which workers are paid to create paved roads and society caters for a class of engineers to design them. Since hegemony is social, political and economic, it is also ?organisational and connective? (Gramsci 1971: 103). This means that the ruling class maintain their values and norms as the default by maintaining a ?network of alliances? based on their own views (ibid.: 271). Only leaders who value paved roads are selected; education systems emerge which extol

the virtues of paved roads. A subordinate group that valued train tracks would find it difficult to secure funding and power in this society. Hegemony, then, has deep rooted social, political and economic foundations. I will now examine how the ruling class maintains the power to retain its own values and norms. Gramsci argues that consent, in some form, is necessary for the ruling class to retain its hegemonic control over subordinate groups. The consent of the people is necessary because the state (the organisational structure which allows the imposition of values) is where the ethical, political, and economic domains dwell. Hegemonic control, for Gramsci, is exerted in civil society, which is ?the sphere in which a dominant social group organizes consent and hegemony? (Simon 1982: 27). The ruling class, then, in order to maintain its values and norms, needs to secure the ethical, political and economic domain and so must strive to secure control over the people, with their consent. This consent is largely obtained through ?intellectuals [who] are the dominant group?s ?deputies?? (Gramsci 1971: 103) as well as through the school system which is the ?instrument through which intellectuals of various levels are elaborated? (Gramsci 1971: 101). Hegemony can be understood as having a top-down characteristic, as opposed to a bottom-up structure. This means it involves the dominant group instilling its values down, and onto, the subordinate groups. The intellectuals of societies, because they are a part of the state, which is controlled by the ruling class, are able to maintain the values and

norms of the ruling class by educating others in accordance with their particular values and norms (Simon 1982). This, in turn, creates an environment in which the values and norms of one group dominate. This is not to say that a conscious plot is involved to ensure certain values are kept dominant, simply that certain values are promoted by a society at the expense of the values of a subordinate group. Hegemonic rule devolves into imperialistic rule when the ruling class fails to obtain the consent of the subordinate group (Gramsci 1971). The subordinate class must consent either passively, through the unconscious adoption of the norms of the ruling class, or actively, through the conscious acceptance of the values and norms of the ruling class. If consent cannot be obtained either passively or actively, force must be used in order to impose the values and norms of the ruling class. Thus, hegemonic rule deteriorates into imperialist rule through the adoption of force. For Gramsci, then, the distinction between hegemony and imperialism is rooted in whether the ruling class uses consent or force to impose their views.

4? ?L atinx?as hegemony I believe that if Gramsci?s distinction between hegemony and imperialism is accepted, ?Latinx?would not be a form of imperialism. If ?Latinx?were a form of imperialism, state intervention would impose use of ?Latinx? by force, but this is plainly not the case. More positively, I believe the case can

be made that ?Latinx? is perpetuated by intellectuals of the ruling class, which would designate it a case of hegemony. This is achieved through the school system which normalises Western values and norms. ?Latinx? is linguistically dependent on the root term ?Latino?, which has more widespread recognition than ?Latinx?. I believe that by pointing to two features of the way ?Latino? functions as an identity term can help to establish my claim that the education system plays a crucial role for ?Latinx?. First, we can observe that the tendency to identify oneself with a country of origin decreases as one?s level of education increases. 57% of those with less than high school education identify themselves with their country of origin (Flores 2017). This goes down to 54% for those who graduate from high school and then to 46% for those with some college education (ibid.). If one retains that identity terms (such as ?Latino?) relate some kind of value system and norms of a people, then there is an apparent shift in values and norms from those who first arrive to the United States in comparison to those who receive an increased degree of education. Granted, one may argue that this shift in values and norms simply ref lects the shift in values from one generation to the next; later generations are assumed to have an increased access to higher education. Yet, even if such is the case, the origin of the new values and norms is still left unanswered. Of course, the question of the origin of these values is

important to answer since values and norms must have some origin. So this seems to support the thesis that ?Latino? itself already ref lects a top-down hegemonic structure. That is, ?Latino? is already an imposition of the ruling class?s values onto the subordinate: Latin American peoples. Specifically, the normalisation of

the ruling

Anglo-American peoples? values by the subordinate Latin American peoples. The notion that the ruling class of the U.S. is Anglo-American is relatively uncontroversial.4 If this is the case, then? alongside Gramsci?s assertion that the school system ref lects the values and norms of the ruling class? we can consider that the shift from identifying with a country of origin to identifying with ?Latino? seems to demonstrate a normalisation of values and norms. Second, ?Latino? is built on an Anglo-American manner of identifying Latin American peoples. Indeed, Hernandez (2017), writing in the Los Angeles Times, noted how ?odd? objections to ?Latino? were when they rested on bemoaning the application of Spanish grammar to a word that is in fact an English invention. Indeed, ?Latino? is still ?virtually unknown? outside of the U.S. as a means of identification (Suรกrez-Orozco and Pรกez 2009: 4). 62% of the people born in Latin American countries, who later migrate to the U.S., choose to identify themselves with their specific country of origin (Mexican, Cuban, Brazilian etc.) rather than as 4

The ruling class dictates values and norms of a society through the ethical-political sphere. The ethical-political sphere in the U.S. is largely built on and governed by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution respectively. The undeniably Western and particularly Anglo-American nature and origin of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution is, of course, readily apparent.

?Latino?(Taylor 2012). Of course, when one considers that, on average, 69% of the people of Latin American descent consider themselves to have not one shared and common culture but multiple differing cultures, the inclination not to identify as the general group ?Latino? becomes easier to understand (Taylor 2012). Therefore, ?Latino? is an Anglo-American term generally unused as a means of identification outside the U.S. and people of Latin American descent largely value their country of origin as a means of identification. It seems, then, that the term ?Latino? for Latin American peoples, is already largely inadequate for describing how Latin American peoples think of themselves.

5 - Cultur al plur alism and 'L atinx' Now that the top-down hegemonic nature of ?Latino? has been considered, let us bring our attention back to the major argument in favour of ?Latinx?. Under the previously presented gender-identity theory which motivates the major argument for ?Latinx?, gender is a social construct, unlike sex. On this view, every culture has their own nuanced understanding of gender, with values that may very likely differ from other cultures.5 Some cultures may construct what other cultures do not construct.

It is important to note that it is not necessary to validate or invalidate non-binary gender identity since the imposition of a value system from one culture to another is hegemonic, regardless of its truth status.

?Latinx?, like ?Latino?, references people of Latin American descent, so to advocate for ?Latinx?, there must be some underlying assumption that Latin American peoples all have a shared culture and that this culture has the same gender values that Anglo-Americans possess. But those assumptions conf lict with Latin American peoples? identity values, since Latin American peoples themselves largely argue that even ?Latino? references multiple and varying cultures. Granted, it is possible that the multiplicity of Latin American cultures has a notion of gender, and that they align with the current Anglo-American notions of gender; it is more likely that the Anglo-American gender values have become normalised in some people of Latin American descent. And I believe this point can be seen in the shift, in US schools, from ?Latino? to ?Latinx?. In 2017, the University of Colorado shifted from ?Latino Student Services? to ?Latinx Student Services? (University of Colorado). In 2018, the University of California, San Diego, decided to change from using ?Latino? to ?Latinx? to refer to its Latin American peoples? student body (Robbins 2018). New York University introduced a new project in 2018 titled ?The Latinx Project? (Anon, What we do). Therefore, we can see a hegemonic process facilitated through the U.S. school system.

Conclusion

To reduce my framing of the issue (as hegemony) to simply condemning the term?s use would be a mischaracterisation of my position. Rather, identifying 'Latinx' as a form of imperialism falls short because it fails to give a feasible explanation of how some peoples of Latin American descent do find the term 'Latinx' favorable and how the term 'Latinx' is perpetuated. Approaching 'Latinx' as hegemonic allows for an account of how the active consent of some Peoples of Latin American is achieved and an explanation for how the term 'Latinx' is being bolstered. Arguing that 'Latinx' is imperialistic would mean that peoples of Latin American descent are being coerced by the state, through military intervention, to use 'Latinx'. This is an issue because there is no such coercion occurring. If 'Latinx' is taken as a case of hegemony it can explain how some peoples of Latin American descent argue in favour of the term 'Latinx'. Since an important aspect of hegemony is the fact that the educational system is used to preserve and impose the ruling class' values, hegemony can sensibly explain how some peoples of Latin American may argue in favour of 'Latinx'; educational institutions, like the University of California, San Diego, normalize the values underlying the term 'Latinx' in peoples of Latin American descent.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Anon. ?What We Do?. Department of Social and Cultural Analysis, NYU. Available at: https://wp.nyu.edu/latinxproject/123-2/what-we-do/ [Accessed 11 Oct 2018]. Flores, A. (2017). How the U.S. Hispanic population is changing. Pew Research Center. Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/18/how-the-u-s-hispanic-po pulation-is-changing/ [Accessed 11 Oct 2018]. Frey, W.H., 2018. The US will become 'minority white' in 2045, Census projects. The Brookings Institution. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-becomeminority-white-in-2045-census-projects/ [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. Google Trends (2018). ?Latinx?. Available at: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=Latinx& geo=US [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Eds. G. Nowell-Smith and Q. Hoare. Available at: http://courses.justice.eku.edu/PLS330_Louis/docs/gramsci-prison-noteboo ks-vol1.pdf [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Guerra, G. & Orbea, G. (2015). The argument against the use of the term "Latinx". In The Phoenix. Available at: https://swarthmorephoenix.com/2015/11/19/the-argument-against-the-useof-the-term-latinx/ [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. Hernandez, D. (2017). The case against 'Latinx'. In The Los Angeles Times. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hernandezthe-case-against- latinx-20171217-story.html [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. Horner, P. & VĂŠlez Ortiz, D. (2018). 'X-ing' Out Dissent With LATINX: The Danger of Unexamined Political Maneuvering. In Latino Rebels. Available at: http://www.latinorebels.com/2018/03/18/xingoutdissent/ [Accessed 10 Nov 2018].

Little, W. (2013). Introduction to Sociology. 2nd edn. Available at: https://opentextbc.ca/introductiontosociology2ndedition/chapter/chapter-12 -gender-sex-and-sexuality/ [Accessed 10 Nov 2018]. María R. Scharrón-del Río & Alan A. Aja (2015). The Case FOR 'Latinx': Why Intersectionality Is Not a Choice. Latino Rebels. Available at: http://www.latinorebels.com/2015/12/05/the-case-for-latinx-why-intersect ionality-is-not-a-choice/ [Accessed: 10 Nov 2018] Robbins, G. (2018). 'Latinos' is out, 'Latinx' is in at UC San Diego in nod to evolving gender and sexuality terms. In The Los Angeles Times. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-latino-latinxucsd-20181202- story.html [Accessed: 10 Nov 2018]. Simon, R. (1982). Gramsci's Political Thought. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Sua?rez-Orozco M. M. & Pa?ez M. (Eds.)(2009). Latinos: Remaking America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Taylor, P. et al., (2012). II. Identity, Pan-Ethnicity and Race. Pew Research Center's Hispanic Trends Project. Available at: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/ii-identity-pan-ethnicity-and-race/ [Accessed: 10 Nov 2018] University of Colorado Denver. Module 3: Learning Objectives. Available at: http://www.ucdenver.edu/about/departments/odi/CII/LSS/Pages/default. aspx. [Accessed: 10 Nov 2018].

Implicit bias as a public health crisis Frank Davies - University of York frank.s.davies@gmail.com

I ntroduction Hosking and Russell?s paper, ?Discrimination Law, Equality Law, and Implicit Bias? (2016), submits that our present view of the harm done by bias in the workplace cannot be adequately addressed with the UK?s available legal and institutional tools. They suggest that more progress could be made by considering the harmful exercise of bias, not as a crime for which we must punish individuals, but as a public health problem (ibid.). This essay will fill a lacuna in such a suggestion by specifying how it may be implemented, arguing that the implicit bias problem must be addressed through collective action and public pressure to reduce discrimination in our society. I will review the evidence that implicit bias presents a serious social problem and justify the conceptual frame of a ?public health crisis? as an appropriate way to propel the implicit bias problem to a position of prominence in the public consciousness. I will argue that a shift is needed from an individualistic, market-justice approach to the implicit bias problem to a collective-action driven, social justice approach. Finally, I will draw on public health education literature to lay

the groundwork for a strategy to realise this new conceptual framing of implicit bias as a public health concern. 1 - The implicit bias problem Every individual is possessed of implicit biases. The world is too large and too complex for us to carefully evaluate all the information we perceive, so we simplify the world using implicit associations and generalisations that we internalise from an early age. This produces problems when those associations are discriminatory. Examination of more than 60 studies of implicit associations has produced three key findings: (1) Implicit associations that indicate a preference for people of a particular race, religion, financial standing, nationality, and body type are harboured by an overwhelming majority of people. (2) The values and opinions one consciously holds and expresses are not predictive of one?s implicit associations, especially in relation to socially sensitive issues. (3) Implicit associations (as measured in implicit association tests [IATs]) reliably predict observable discriminatory behaviour. (Greenwald & Krieger 2006; Greenwald et al. 2009)

(1) tells us that if there are problematic consequences of implicit biases against social groups, this will be a widespread problem. (3) tells us that such a problem does exist as discriminatory associations manifest as discriminatory behaviour. This comes in a variety of forms. For example,

subjects who exhibit negative implicit associations with black people are likely to behave in a less friendly, more hostile way to a black interviewer than a white interviewer and interpret the neutral actions of a black person as negative or hostile (Greenwald & Krieger 2006). The problem of implicit bias is a problem of discrimination. (2) indicates that this problem is difficult to solve. It is hard to mitigate the effects of attitudes we do not know we have and actions we do not know we take, so perhaps a more radical approach is needed to solve this problem. 2 - The pr esent fr aming of bias We can consider discrimination and implicit bias as part of the same causal chain. We make generalisations about the world to save time and energy. These generalisations inform our implicit biases which can, as Greenwald et al. (2009) have shown, result in discriminatory behaviour. generalisations

implicit biases

discrimination

At present, when we think about bias and discrimination, our main focus is on the last link in the chain: the discriminatory acts themselves. When our legal system addresses the problem of discrimination it is similarly focussed on the discriminatory acts of individuals of which they might be found guilty. It is illegal to discriminate against a person on the basis of race or gender, though it is difficult to prove someone guilty of this. One must prove that one has received less favourable treatment than a person of different race or gender, whereupon the alleged discriminator has an opportunity to present an acceptable explanation for the difference of

treatment. If an employment tribunal is not persuaded by the explanation, only then is a person considered guilty of discrimination (Hosking & Russell 2016). The narrowness of the legal approach to the harmful exercise of bias creates a narrow, individualistic framing of the issue. This restricts our ability to think of ways to solve the implicit bias problem in our society. We conceive of bias as the legal system does: as a crime of which one can be guilty, not as a harmful by-product of deeply held generalisations of which we may not even be aware (Hosking & Russell 2016). The very fact that our implicit biases are often so different from the values and beliefs we extol undermines our ability to legislate against their effects as it may be hard to argue that we should prosecute someone for deeply rooted, unconscious behaviour (Greenwald & Krieger 2006). A further problem of our current legal tools for countering implicit bias is that they are purely reactive; they only demand action after the fact. They do nothing to directly incentivise anti-bias training or otherwise addressing latent biases that may later come to have a harmful impact (Hosking & Russell 2016). It may be tempting to suggest that we make a legal provision specifically for prosecuting people whose implicit biases cause harm to others. Perhaps if an accusation is brought to court, the accused must take an IAT and if the results bear out the accusation this may tip the balance of the tribunal. There are many problems with this idea. Firstly, there is little

point advocating for legislation that will never pass, and this will never pass. No party is likely to come out in support of legislation that could be used to prosecute citizens for acts they have no knowledge of or control over. Furthermore, we cannot simply use the IAT to determine legal culpability for the discriminatory exercise of biases, as often we cannot know for sure that such bias has necessarily affected our decisions. If an employer does harbour implicit racial bias, that does not mean that that bias has definitely influenced a particular decision. Instead of attempting to criminalise the harmful exercise of implicit bias, we should construct a social consensus of collective responsibility to mitigate it. I submit that this can best be achieved by framing the implicit bias problem as a public health problem, which in turn must be considered a matter of social justice. 3 - M arket j ustice ver sus social j ustice Our current legal approach to the problems of bias and discrimination is deeply individualistic; it is rooted in market justice. Individuals are expected not to discriminate and if they are proven to have done so they are punished. We should build an approach to the implicit bias problem based in social justice that embraces collective responsibility to address earlier links in the causal chain before they manifest as discrimination. Market justice treats discrimination as an individual fault; social justice treats it as a matter of public health. I will draw on the work of Beauchamp (1976) to lay out a

distinction between market justice and social justice. Both are models of justice; they are systems with the aim of ensuring that the ?burdens and benefits of society [are] fairly and equitably distributed? (Beauchamp 1976: 3). Under market justice, responsibility for wellbeing is primarily individual; the individual is considered primarily self-determined and should expect to benefit only from personal effort or merit. Beauchamp?s presentation of social justice is a ?counter-ethic to market justice?, which conceives of individuals as part of a larger social structure (1976: 6). The goal of social justice is to ?[Control] the hazards of this world [in order] to prevent death and disability? through organised collective action? (ibid.: 7). It is an ethic of collective responsibility with a strong commitment to the common good (Dorfman et al. 2005). It is this ethic that is needed to inform our approach to the implicit bias problem. One might reasonably question whether the implicit bias problem is really a hazard that may cause ?death or disability?. But there is extensive evidence in the UK and beyond that people of colour are more likely to live in poverty, experience worse health and poorer levels of education. For example, certain racial groups including African American families are more likely to have their children declared ?at risk? and removed by social services - and can access fewer services to prevent these removals (Rivaux, et al. 2008). Black children are at higher risk of hospitalisation for asthma for poverty related reasons (Wissow et al. 1988). Non-white people in the UK are substantially more likely to suffer from income poverty, with Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and black Africans experiencing levels of income poverty between 45% and 65% (Kenway & Palmer 2007). These findings

do not prove that implicit bias causes death and disability on their own, but we know that the majority of the population harbours negative implicit racial associations and we know that these are predictive of less favourable treatment (Greenwald, et al. 2009). It is therefore reasonable to extrapolate that implicit biases contribute to entrenching and maintaining the disadvantages demonstrably experienced by ethnic minorities, that contribute to the likelihood that members of such minorities will suffer death and disability. Implicit bias therefore deserves to be framed as a matter of social justice, specifically as a public health crisis. The conceptual frame of a public health crisis will bring many advantages to efforts to solve the implicit bias problem that are unavailable under our current individualised view of the problem. A conceptual frame is a cue that invites an audience to consider an issue in a particular light to inspire particular interpretations. Effective framing is essential to gathering political support. In the early days of efforts to protect the public from the harmful effects of tobacco, tobacco corporations were able to frame the debate around market justice, emphasising the economic damage that could be done if the tobacco industry were more aggressively controlled and arguing that their products only posed risk to responsible individuals who chose to use them (Dorfman et al. 2005). Over time, campaigners were able to change the frame of the debate to one of social justice, with the focus on protecting the public from death and disability resulting from the prevalence of tobacco products. The onus was lifted from the individual to protect themselves from tobacco and a collective responsibility was

assumed between the government and charity workers to reduce the effects of tobacco on the public (ibid.). We are in a similar position with regard to solving the implicit bias problem. There exist public sector guidelines that require an effort to eliminate bias and discrimination from decision making (see Hosking & Russell 2016), however requiring private employers to adopt such policies would be seen as an intolerable restriction of their ability to operate freely with potentially harmful economic consequences. Furthermore, it would contradict the market-justice ethic that individuals are each responsible for controlling their own biases. This argument will persist until the public come to recognise a failure to employ demonstrably effective anti-bias measures as the social harm it truly is. The current norm is a market justice approach to the implicit bias problem and the discrimination it produces. To address the implicit bias problem, we must make social justice the new norm when considering how to tackle discrimination by recognising the need for collective action against discriminatory implicit associations.

4 - How to use the public health fr ame How might this transformation be achieved? Dorfman et al. (2005) lays out a strategy for public health educators to frame their issues persuasively. Advocates?messages should be structured to express, in order: (1)

What is wrong?

(2)

Why does it matter?

(3)

What should be done about it?? (Dorfman, et al., 2005)

In the case of the implicit bias problem, this might take the form of: (1)

Implicit racial bias is inhibiting racial minorities socially and economically.

(2)

It is wrong for people to suffer because of their race.

(3)

private corporations should form self-imposed guidelines requiring them to take all reasonable action to eliminate the harmful effects of implicit bias.

Dorfman, et al. (2005) place great emphasis on the importance of part 2 of this message, arguing that a persuasive framing is always one that appeals to deeply held principles, pointing out that public health educators frequently fail to convey this vital component in media appearances; this, they submit, is a major shortcoming as it is this component that motivates people to act in defence of their principles (Dorfman, et al. 2005).

Conclusion This essay has established that implicit bias is a critical problem in our society. Our present legal tools for addressing its effects are inadequate and tools for addressing the existence of harmful implicit biases at an

institutional level are yet to appear in the private sector. I have advocated the use of a public health frame to shift the common conception of implicit bias from a narrow, individualistic view to one that embraces collective responsibility. This has the aim of creating a new norm under which policies designed to tackle the effects of implicit bias are expected of the private and public sectors alike. Further work is needed to fully develop a detailed strategy for the framing of the implicit bias problem as a public health crisis through government action and effective use of media to educate the public. There is also a need for a more detailed picture of how existing methods for changing implicit associations might become more widely used.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Beauchamp, D. E. (1976). Public Health as Social Justice. In Inquiry, 13 (1): 3-14. Dorfman, L., Wallack, L. & Woodruff, K. (2005). More than a message: framing public health advocacy to change corporate practices. In Health education & Behaviour, 32 (3): 355-362. Greenwald, A. G. & Krieger, L. H. (2006). Implicit bias: scientific foundations. In California Law Review, 94 (4): 945-967. Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, A. T., Uhlmann, E. L. & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity. In the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97 (1): 17-41. Hosking, K. & Russell, R. (2016). Discrimination Law, Equality Law, and Implicit Bias. In M. Brownstein & J. Saul (eds.). Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 254-278. Kenway, P. & Palmer, G., (2007). Poverty rates among ethnic groups in Great Britain. s.l.: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Rivaux, S. et al. (2008). The Intersection of Race, Poverty and Risk: Understanding the Decision to Provide Services to Clients and to Remove Children. In Child Welfare, 87 (2): 151-68. Wissow, L. S. et al., (1988). Poverty, race, and hospitalization for childhood

asthma. In American Journal of Public Health, 7 (78): 777-782.

Feminism and the veil of ignorance

Martin Pallister - Open University (MA) martinpallister@hotmail.com

Despite feminism?s commitment to achieving substantive gender equality we are living at a time in which globally ?women?s hard-fought achievements now risk being reversed? as there is ?an unprecedented pushback? that threatens ?the hard-fought progress in achieving women?s equality? (UN Report 2018: 7). For example, women?s reproduction rights in the USA are being slashed as 'in the first three months of 2018, 347 measures to restrict abortion or birth control had been introduced in 37 states' (Edwards, Gonzalez-Ramirez and Goff 2018). Another example if how the #MeToo movement that has brought to us the knowledge of the tragic extent of sexual violence against women has been cleverly manipulated by men so that the survivors are accused of creating ?a vindictive plot against men? (Burke 2018). It is because of this backlash that it is with a renewed ?sense of urgency? and duty for feminist political theorists and philosophers to explore new and old avenues of thought that can be exploited and result in positive action and change towards gender equality (UN Report 2018: 5).

In this work I am going to refer to Rawls and his works A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism as benchmarks in criticizing Western liberal societies? slow progress towards gender equality today. I would like to concentrate on the assumptions that Rawls makes for persons behind the veil of ignorance in the original position, showing that these concepts are fatally flawed and would lead to gender inequality in an ideal theory and help maintain the patriarchal structure in Western liberal societies. I will also question why Rawls did not at first consider the problem of the family for his theory of justice. A lot of very important work has been written on how Rawls does not solve the problem of the public-private dichotomy that leads to the family being a major source of gender inequality and can put the woman in a situation of vulnerability.1 However, my question is why Rawls did not see this problem in the first place. I will answer by exploring Gilligan?s (1982) theory of moral development and Irigaray?s (1984) theory of sexual difference. Rawls (1971) sets out an ideal theory of ethics based on justice as fairness. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls states that: For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the advantages from social cooperation.

(Rawls 1971: 6) The effects of the basic structure upon the individual are ?profound from 1

See Kitaay and Okin in Abbey (2011).

the start? affecting their choices and search for their good (Rawls 1971: 7). The major social institutions include the ?legal protection of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the monogamous family? (Rawls 1971: 6). How the basic structure is formed will lead to how rights and duties are distributed and ?determine the advantages of social cooperation?(Rawls 1971: 6). The question is how are we to decide on principles of justice that everyone in a pluralist society can reasonably accept and that do not privilege some persons and their idea of the good over others? Rawls proposes a type of thought experiment where individuals are placed in a hypothetical original position behind a ?veil of ignorance? (Rawls 1971: 11). This is a ?thick? veil of ignorance as the parties do not know their abilities or their place in society and are unaware of their conceptions of the good. The individuals are stripped of any knowledge specifically about themselves. They do not know their social status, their strengths, their rational life-plan or ?even the special features of [their] psychology? or race and ethnic group, sex and gender. They are essentially stripped of their individuality. They do know the ?general facts about human society? however, including ?the laws of human psychology? (ibid.: 119). By not being influenced by their own conceptions of the good and because they are ?rational and mutually disinterested?, the parties in the original position will be fair in reaching the principles of justice (ibid.: 12).3 In some ways

Emphasis added to quotation.

this method? far from portraying the individual as self-interested? pushes the individual to be entirely empathetic to everyone else?s position. As you do not know what position you will be in, you must imagine that you could be in any possible position. From behind the veil of ignorance Rawls believes that the parties will arrive at the two principles of justice that everyone will accept. Later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls (1993) explains that looking for consensus only applies in the public realm, not in the private. On this division between the public and the private Rawls tells us that: The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in ways the political is not. (The associational, the personal, and the familial are simply three examples of the non-political? )

(Rawls 1993: 137) The first criticism I will explore, with reference to the original position, is that the ?kind of liberalism it represents is intrinsically faulty because it relies on an abstract conception of the person and uses an individualist, non-social, idea of human nature? (Rawls 1993: 29). The persons behind the veil of ignorance are stripped of knowledge about themselves and are mutually disinterested. But then this leads us to the question: ?what is left of one?s self when all that knowledge is excluded?? (Kymlicka 2002: 63). Persons are interrelational, interdependent, emotional and embodied. What type of justice system will be created when it denies essential aspects of human nature? It is a political system well suited to

egoistic men who do not see how dependent we are on others and how important relationships are for persons, for example in the family. These persons (men), who are ?abstract, rational, liberal individual(s)?, are used as ?the units of political thought? (Held 2002: 155). This concept of man, subsequently applied to reality, creates a non-caring egoistic society, which has negative consequences for women. When we talk about sexual harassment or domestic violence we often talk about how it is produced by power and dominance of the man over the woman. But it is not just this. Power does not always have to be wielded in a negative way. It is more likely to happen negatively however, when society promotes self-interested individualism over benevolence, empathy and care. Rawls tells us that it is a misconception to see the parties in the original position as egoistic. Nussbaum explains that the ?rationality of the parties in the original position is not meant to be, all by itself, a model of how persons are, or a theory of human nature? (2003: 492). The theory of justice that Rawls proposes asks us to find the best system of rights so that everyone can pursue their own particular idea of the good. In this way it is not egoistic. Rawls tells us that just because ?in the original position the parties are categorized as mutually disinterested does not entail that persons in ordinary life, [...] are similarly disinterested in one another? (Rawls 1971: 128). Because the parties in the original position do not know anything about themselves and the fact that they could be anyone outside of the veil ignorance means that they would not choose doctrines of ?racial and sexual discrimination? (ibid.: 129).

However, I do not think this response holds up. Presumably, Rawls defenders would say the care and benevolence that is found in the original position is enough. They would say that if a society is unjust then laws and rules must be brought in to change it so that the principles of justice such as fair equality of opportunity can be upheld. The problem is not that in the theory of justice the persons do not relate to each other or care, it is that there is no real emphasis on the interrelational, caring person as an important aspect of our lives that can contribute towards equality. Therefore, we must rely on rights to solve deeply rooted psychological problems. Rights can go some way to giving solutions to the manifestations of gender inequality. Stronger punishments for gender violence, for example. But they do little to treat the cause of this violence, because the cause is rooted in the person and emphasized by society. Carol Gilligan helps us understand this: If aggression is tied, as women perceive, to the fracture of human connection, then the activities of care, [ ...] are the activities that make the social world safe, by avoiding isolation and preventing aggression rather than seeking rules to limit its extent.

(Gilligan 1982: 43) Let us now consider the issue of gender inequality in the family and the failure of Rawls? theory in this regard. The separation of the public from the private as subject of justice, fails to take into the account the family, which remains at the centre of gender inequality today. The UN Working group ?has shown that discrimination against women and girls

and the backlash against their rights all too often start in the family ...? (UN Report 2018: 7). Rawls does try to respond to criticism that his theory of justice ?employs an unworkable distinction between the public and the private that renders it unable to deal with the problems of gender and the family?, saying that he is convinced that these problems can be dealt with adequately (Rawls 1993: 29). It is not clear that he does adequately deal with these problems in his later works, and the arguments remain damaging. Nevertheless, the burning question that I would like to ask is: what conditions lead a person like Rawls, whilst writing A Theory of Justice, not to be able to see the family as so problematic for gender equality? He does not ignore the problem, it is invisible to him. Why? I believe Carol Gilligan and Luce Irigaray help us answer this question. Gilligan (1982) responded to research on stages of moral development done by psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg?s research led him to conclude that mature ethical development gave importance to laws and rules that were to be applied equally regardless of the circumstances. The problem was that when his model of development was applied to women, women rarely reached full moral development. This is not surprising when you consider that to develop his model, Kohlberg only used male subjects. In response, in her book, In a Different Voice, Gilligan?s (1982) studies of moral development showed two important discoveries: 1. That systems of measuring moral development were based on a standard created by men for men. Therefore women were always

found to be morally underdeveloped. 2. That in fact women reason in a ?different voice?. Man?s voice is one of autonomous individualism where separation is favoured over connection. Woman?s voice however, is connected, and placed within a network of caring relationships. In contrast to Gilligan who says that women speak in a different voice Irigaray (1984) argues that women do not have their own voice. She argues that her language has been created through masculinity and its expectations of what woman should be. Irigaray looks to ?create a representation for women that [...] would allow her to exist on her own terms and speak for herself? (Zakin 2011). For Irigaray (1984), women have not been able to achieve subjectivity. Men are subjects and women are reduced to ?the other?. Women, models of society, models of psychoanalytic theory, philosophy, language?

everything has been

modeled by man?s norms. Irigaray tells us In actual fact, the self-proclaimed universal is the equivalent of an idiolect of men, a masculine imaginary, a sexed world.

(Irigaray 1984:121) If we are ever to achieve gender equality ?women must attain subjectivity, and men must become more embodied?(Donovan). Much like Gilligan criticized Kohlberg?s research, Irigaray criticized Freud?s ideas in his essay Femininity for only taking into account the male sex and considering women to only exist through male experience

and therefore be no more than ?defective men? (Irigaray 1984). Freud then tried to ?expand his male experience of the world into a general theory applicable to all humans? (Donovan). Irigaray?s claim, therefore, was that Freud?s theories were sexually indifferent. If we accept Gilligan?s and Irigaray?s arguments, then Rawls could face some serious problems. First, it is not a surprise that Rawls favours a person behind the veil of ignorance that is unrelated and ultimately egoistic. If Rawls has not comprehended the possibility that his voice is a biased voice then he will not see that his ideal theory already favours one particular way of seeing the world. Similarly, Rawls failed to see the problem that the family, as a locus for gender inequality, could cause for his theory of justice, because he failed to realize his own embodied self in the world. He was writing at that particular time in that particular place. Although he wanted to achieve equal rights for everyone he could not see where inequality came from in the first place. He was blind to the problem until someone else pointed it out because it was a different voice to his. The persons in the original position are stripped of knowledge and asked to imagine they could be anyone. But how are we to imagine we are a woman if we do not know what it means to be a woman? The construct of the feminine in Rawls is based on a man?s idea of woman. We can accuse Rawls of the same accusation that Irigaray puts towards Freud, that his theory illustrates sexual indifference. Of course, using this f lawed idea of woman, Rawls can say that everyone would accept his theory of justice, and that equality would be reached through rights. But as Mackinnon points out ?illusions and mistakes sex discrimination law can deal with.

Realities are another thing entirely?(1984: 224). Irigaray tells us that ?sexual difference is probably the issue in our time which could be our ?salvation? if we thought it through.? (Irigaray 1984: 5). She asks, Why, on what grounds, does society, does the community, have an interest in maintaining women?s silence? In order to perpetuate all the existing norms of the society and the culture which also depend on separating women from each other.

(Irigaray 1984: 105) How do these insights help towards achieving gender equality? We must accept our interdependence and that we have different voices; and learn to listen to them. We must understand that our societies have been created using man?s voice. Once we understand this we can start educating and changing society. We must search for what the feminine means and give it priority for it to be embraced, not just for the sake of women but for humanity as a whole.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Abbey, R. (2011). The Return of Feminist Liberalism. Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited. Burke, T. (2018). Me Too is a movement not a moment. TED Talks. [Online].

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me_too_is_a_movement_not_a_moment [Accessed 21 Jan. 2019]. Diprose, R. (1994). The Bodies of Women. London: Routledge. Donovan S. K. (no publication year). Luce Irigaray. In Internet Encyclopedia

Philosophy,

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https://www.iep.utm.edu/irigaray/ [Accessed 21 Jan 2019]. Edwards, A. A., Gonzalez-Ramirez, A., and Goff, A. (2018). How Difficult Is It To Get An Abortion? Here Are The Laws For Every State. Refinery29

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https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/05/198385/abortion-laws-inevery-state [Accessed 21 Jan 2019]. Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Goodin, R. E. and Pettit, P. (Eds.) (2006). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. Held, V. (2002). Feminism and Political Theory. In R.L. Simon, (Ed). The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Irigaray, L. (1984). An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Translated from the

French by C. Burke and G.C. Gill. New York: Cornell University Press. Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackinnon, C. (1989). Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M. C. (2003). Rawls and feminism. In S. Freeman, (Ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 488-520. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. edn. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press (1999). ??? (1993). Political Liberalism. Expanded ed. edn. New York: Columbia University Press (2005). Rawls, J. and Kelly, E. (2001). Justice as Fairness: a Restatement. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press. Sandel, M. (1982). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998). United Nations Human Rights Council (2018). Report of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice [Online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/report-workinggroup-issue-discrimination-against-women-law-and-practice-ahrc3846 [Accessed 21 Jan 2019]. Valian, V. (1999). Why so slow? The advancement of women. Cambridge,

Mass: The MIT Press. Zakin, E. (2011). Psychoanalytic feminism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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sum2011/entries/ feminism- psychoanalysis [Accessed 21 Jan 2019].

Review of Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives (2018)

Cover image of the book: 'The Tax Collector's Office' by Pieter Brueghel the Younger (1564-1638)

Sophie Norstrรถm introduces the book and reviews Chapters 1 and 3 and George Turner reviews Chapters 4, 6 and 9. 61

Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives (2018), edited by Martin O?Neill and Shepley Orr, offers a comprehensive view of the ways in which we use political philosophy to engage with issues relating to tax systems of states. The text embarks on a convergence of the disciplines to identify the core philosophical issues of taxation. Representing its interdisciplinary approach, the book?s 12 chapters offer the expertise of a range of authors, with focus on areas from political science and economics to law, aiming at a more thorough understanding of the place of tax in a political system. Split into two parts, Part I (chapters 1 to 7) aims at more general issues of forming a tax system, and Part II (chapters 8 to 12) focuses on specific tax policy and its effects. The basis of the work is the juxtaposition between the libertarianism of Robert Nozick and the liberalism of John Rawls, which in turn spawned the contemporary work of Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (2002). The latter is the focus of much of Part I, particularly in Chapters 1-4 by Alan Hamlin, Marc Fleurbay, Geoffrey Brennan, and Laura Biron, with each attempting to discover a ?middle ground? between Nozick?s absolute libertarianism; and Rawls, Nagel and Murphy?s damning critique of the very notion of pre-tax income (O?Neill and Orr 2018: 5). In Chapter One, What Political Philosophy Should Learn from Economics, which will be of particular focus here, Alan Hamlin emphasises the lessons political philosophy may learn from the in-depth analysis of mainstream economic models of taxation. The upstanding mode of taxation discussed at length is the Optimal Taxation Model (OT) which

emphasizes, under a set of economic constraints, a system maximizing some value function. Usually social welfare, the function operates in a non-ideal system aimed at optimization. The theory is ameliorated by two supplementary political theories: the Political Economy Approach (PE) and the Tax Constitution Approach (TC). The chapter requires a second reading for those not acquainted with economic theory, but to the philosophy student, the chapter invokes ethical theory models such as utilitarianism deontology and virtue ethics; and Mill and Locke, who students of political theory will be familiar with. Hamlin begins the chapter by accounting for the discrepancies in political philosophy in discussions of tax, noting that when it comes to redistribution, welfarism and progressivity there is a conception that philosophy fails in real world application. Such a failure will ring true to students of political theory, who will have seen this in Hobbes? ?Leviathan? (1651), which makes broad judgements about the sovereign?s supremacy in monetary pursuits, ?all property relations being determined by the sovereign? (Lopata 1973: 204). Similarly, Marx and Engels (1848), in their ?Communist Manifesto?, are guilty of the same charge, with their ?abolition of private property? failing to mention economic theory (Wright 2009). ?Tax theory and tax policy are complex, multidimensional issues? Hamlin (2018: 17) admits, but he nonetheless hopes to demonstrate the value of a more complex analysis to political theory. To do so, he initially introduces the concept of ideal and non-ideal worlds. Theorists often talk of tax policy in an ideal world, in which it is possible for the taxing authority

to obtain full access to information of all economic agents, who are fully motivated, informed and compliant; and the taxing authority is deemed to be focused on enforcing public good. Hamlin (2018: 18-20) hopes to do away with this, as tax is essentially non-ideal for the following reasons: (1) the taxing authority does not have full knowledge of all agents, (2) motives of political elites often diverge from the public good, and (3) agents are not equally motivated and compliant. Philosophy has a tendency of operating within the ideal, and this method is incompatible with tax policy. To encourage a more comprehensive analysis, Hamlin introduces the predominant model of taxation: Optimal Tax Theory. Admittedly, this is difficult to grasp due to its focus on economic terminology, but again, utilitarianism offers a reference point to students of ethical theory. Issues arise with OT, Hamlin notes, for two reasons: its ambiguity, and lack of political focus. The system is ambiguous as the emphasis on social welfare changes from system to system and is largely dependent on political actors who are often motivated beyond the public good. All that is essential in OT is the description of a value function, and therefore there is no necessary commitment to social welfare (Hamlin 2018: 25). Further, it has a lack of political focus, as criticised by its rival, the Political Economy Approach (PE), which emphasises the political failures in tax and offers a supplement to OT. A greater integration of political philosophy with economics would be beneficial for both disciplines here, in my view, even

though this may require adopting principles from opposing approaches. Perhaps, specifically, greater clarity may be offered in the strengthening of the value function of OT, namely the social welfare function. This may lead to greater clarity in taxation and a more deontological focus, as opposed to utilitarian, which often leads to the tyranny of the majority. The PE approach states that political parties, in seeking election wins, will enforce tax reform which aims at the median voter, grouping individuals into tax bands which balance the ?administrative costs against political costs?, offering the grouping which ?minimises total costs as perceived by? the political party (Hamlin 2018: 28). Reform of tax here is entirely politically driven and open to manipulation by political elites. Those studying politics will be familiar with the example of Thatcher?s poll tax in 1990; the result of a complicated set of legislative manoeuvres as opposed to economic (cf. Crewe and King 2013: 654). This is a prime example of the interconnectedness between politics and tax policy. Causing widespread disarray, this highlights the self-evident pertinence of Hamlin?s insight. Thatcher?s austerity tradition arguably changed British politics, namely in the predominance of a conservative ?government knows best? tradition, and thus emphasising the role of ideas in tax policy (Marsh 2008: 263). I think, therefore, that though Hamlin gets to the nub of the issue in tracing the origin of tax policy to ideas about tax, he seems to downplay the role of politics in inf luencing tax policy? dismissing it as ?hardly surprising?? when, perhaps, some deeper exploration of how this occurs would be helpful (Hamlin 2018: 28).

Similarly, the Tax Constitution Approach is another political critique and intended amendment of OT. It points to the deficiencies in politics and, through this appreciation, improves the tax system via reform. While PE outlines the emphasis placed on winning elections by the political actor, TC argues for greater constitutional control of governmental elites who aim to pursue their own objectives. It notes that OT defines tax bases broadly as they are most optimal and least distortionary, but most open to exploitation (Hamlin 2018: 29). An optimal tax system results in regressive structures which tend towards unrestrained revenue. This is beneficial to the government, but not to social welfare. Hence, we need constitutional reform to government: more federal government with greater checks on powers in formulating tax policy. However, as Hamlin points out, with reduced governmental power comes reduced power to target tax exploitation. In Chapter Three, Taxation, Justice, and the Status of Private Rights, Geoffrey Brennan attempts to establish a middle ground between Nozick?s extreme libertarian stance and Murphy and Nagel?s Rawlsian account of the ?myth of ownership?. Murphy and Nagel?s contention is that pre-tax property rights do not exist, and they therefore focus on in-period distribution and the more specific details of the tax system. Brennan holds that, while we should consider rights and justice with regard to the rules of in-period distribution, constitutional rules which regard political and economic factors should also be taken into account ? hence establishing a ?middle ground? (Brennan, 2018: 78). Here, Brennan reiterates the Tax Constitution Approach which aims at restraining the constitutional power

of political elites in taxation. The role of political institutions is reinforced, and the approach to economic theory is broadened by a range of other factors which must come into play? as in Hamlin?s approach. There are, I think, some notable similarities in the arguments of Hamlin and Brennan regarding the role of political philosophy in economic theory. In Chapter One, Hamlin concludes that there is a lot to be learnt by political philosophy in regards to incorporation of more thorough-going economic theory, and this is certainly the case. Most notably, political philosophy must recognise the non-ideal nature of tax and must not appeal to broad generalisations. Opposing this view, I believe economic theory can learn from political philosophy and politics more broadly: with emphasis on the role of ideas and established political traditions. I also believe there is emphasis throughout in the lacking moral character of both OT and governmental bodies; which offers a space for a more extensive study of ethical theory. In Chapter Three, Brennan reiterates the importance of the role of other institutions in thinking about tax, such as the nature of democratic procedures and property rights. This is useful to the philosophy or politics student as the interdisciplinary nature of the discussion offers a refreshing glimpse at the real world application of their subject. The book, though challenging, offers a welcoming introduction of economic theory to political thought, maintaining the importance of the latter in a broader scheme of taxation? offering ways in which to fill the absence of taxation and thorough going economic theory in philosophical literature. I recommend the book to any philosophy student hoping to

overcome the broad or idealised nature of philosophy in this, bringing philosophy into modern approaches of economics and revitalising its appeal. Geor ge Tur ner on Chapter s 4, 6 and 9 In Chapter Four Biron presents a scepticism of the argument presented by Nagel and Murphy that property rights are a mere myth, as given in The Myth of Ownership (2002), in defence of Rawls. Biron argues that we need to re-centre attention on the importance of property. The political philosophy of property needs to incorporate taxation policy to understand itself; likewise, the political philosophy of taxation needs to incorporate property rights in order to understand itself. The paradigm libertarian view presented by Nozick is that taxes amount to expropriation. Expropriation, however, is usually for a specific item of property which is taken back for public use. Whereas the compensation of expropriation is a direct stipend of money, the compensation in taxation is an implicit promise by the state to invest in ways which benefit the contributor. Murphy and Nagel argue that pre-taxation property rights are an imaginary legal convention and are dependant on the legal conventions in which they exist, including those of taxation policy. Therefore, the state has no right to expropriate the pre-tax income of the population. According to Biron, the attempts made by Murphy and Nagel to broaden the debate around social justice by relying on the ?myth of pre-tax income? or the conventionality of property are not

sufficient in this endeavour. The position of ?total ownership?consists in the belief that one has complete, unmitigated rights to one?s own property and therefore the right to use it in any way one chooses. This motivates some to state that taxation, as limiting the freedom of use, undermines our rights. Biron, on the other hand, contends that one can have one?s income taxed and nevertheless have ownership of it; the hyperbolic ?total ownership? does not intuitively apply in the case of land or tangible property (as merely owning something does not give somebody unlimited freedom to use it; owning a knife does not supersede the law prohibiting its use in murder), therefore it is relatively easy to rebut the notion that ?total ownership? applies in the case of fiscal assets and the following rights of taxation on these possessions. However, the more restrictive notion, confusingly termed ?full-blooded? ownership of tangible goods, in which ownership implies limited rights can, in theory, be more intuitively supported. But the further step from the rights of tangible property to the rights of fiscal ownership is a logical step which has to be argued for and not merely stated outright. The libertarians believe that we have total ownership of our pre-tax income; Nagel and Murphy argue that the justification for this is the intuition that we have total ownership of our post-tax income. But ownership of pre-tax income, according to them, is a ?myth?. For Nagel and Murphy, the reason some have the intuition that we have ownership of our pre-tax income is that they believe we have total ownership of our post-tax income. Biron argues against this position by stating that: (a)

Post-tax income is not in fact owned in totality; it is subject to various forms of secondary taxation (sales etc.), (b) Even if we did have total ownership over our post-tax income, this does not necessarily mean that we think we have ?full-blooded? ownership of our pre-tax income. We could merely think we have less than full-blooded ownership, (c) Biron points out an absurdity in their motivation in that Nagel and Murphy posit restrictions on the post-tax income in order to establish that it is not a true case of total ownership, however if there are restrictions on the post-tax income, this renders pointless the notion of a pre-tax income which is entirely restricted from being owned. The conceptual issues and the relations between them and the ideological commitments of the competing parties was somewhat difficult to comprehend on a first reading, yet they do become clearer on a closer analysis. The post-Mirrlees welfarist approach to taxation holds that any just taxation system should bring about equality of outcome on utilitarian grounds. In Chapter Six, Cappelen and Tungodden point out that this welfarist approach is beset with problems: the hard-working subsidise the laziness of the poor, and the talented become enslaved in a cycle of production in order to maximise utility. Cappelen and Tungodden attempt to provide a formulation into which responsibility and non-responsibility factors can be inputted and from which a fair and proportional tax policy will be produced. ?Responsibility factors? (RF) can be defined as anything over which an individual has primary control; for example, I can choose to

work more or less hours etc. This enables us to come up with the just amount to which a person ought to be taxed after being aware of the RF?s. One potential issue with the liberal egalitarian approach is that it has to be in contact with all of the relevant information with regard to responsibility such as hours worked, motivations, institutional power relations etc. On the other hand, welfarism does not need to be sensitive to these data as its intention is to introduce a lump-sum tax which redistributes to produce an equality of outcome. In order to address this lack of awareness of information, the liberal egalitarian solution proposed by Cappelen and Tungodden posits a retroactive approach in which an overall taxation policy is judged to be fair or unfair on the extent to which it has reflected the responsibility and non-responsibility factors within an economic system. From this, the formula can adjust to tweak inequities in the policy?s future development. The formulae in this chapter may be difficult to grasp, if not impenetrable, for undergraduates less familiar with mathematics, which counts against its accessibility. Nevertheless, appreciating the technicalities is not necessary for an overall understanding of the arguments. Although in A Theory of Justice Rawls does not present a systematic account of a tax system, he does hint that an inheritance tax would be necessary to prevent advantages being unfairly transferred across generations. In Chapter Nine, White defends the Rawlsian inheritance tax against four main objections. One might think that an inheritance tax constitutes a ?double tax? as it taxes the post-tax assets, which have, by

definition, already been taxed. In response, White cleverly points out that even if this is an accurate characterisation of an inheritance tax, the phenomenon would not be unique; sales taxes on chocolate bars also constitute a double tax. A second objection to inheritance tax is that individuals receive different rates of taxation on the same levels of wealth merely depending on how they choose to use such wealth. Yet, White argues, being bequeathed a sum of money without being taxed is unequal to an individual who earns the same sum of money and who pays hhincome tax and this would therefore constitute an inequity in itself. Furthermore, many people would intuitively argue that an inheritance tax merely penalises the virtuous; people who save money in order to gift it to their loved-ones are taxed for this act whilst self-interested consumption is exempt, thus encouraging indulgence and discouraging self-sacrifice. White?s insightful retort to this argument is to offer a novel counterexample in which the familial politics in play with regard to inheritance create a situation in which the asset-holder blackmails the potential recipient into sacrificing their own desires - hardly virtuous. A final, somewhat implausible, objection is that whilst the incentive of inheritance tax is to limit the power of the wealthy, the power of the wealthy in fact lies in consumption capacity rather than assets. To counter this, White points to the capacity of a boss to threaten his worker by saying ?Do what I say or I?ll sack you?, demonstrating the inf luence the wealthy can have simply as a means of expressing the potential force they wield without consumption. The explication of these arguments was clear, concise, and entirely accessible to informed undergraduates; a prime political and philosophical

approach. The book?s success is its ability to introduce students to contemporary philosophical ideas, and both students and scholars to a much overlooked area of political analysis. Yet I believe that the contributors to the book all make one crucial assumption which overshadows many of the arguments being made and remains, at least in my mind, to be seen. The assumption is as follows: Every member of the population of a country is naturally opposed to paying taxes. Therefore, either people have to be compelled to pay their taxes, or the state has no right to interfere with their aversion to doing so. I would argue that the assumption requires evaluation. Whilst it is an empirically valid observation given polling etc. that the members of a population do not desire to pay more in taxation, this may simply be a side-effect of the erosion of democracy. Since we know our taxes are spent on illegal wars and bank bailouts, our reaction to their increase is to mourn, but what if they were spent on projects which improved our lives and the lives of those around us? We would gladly celebrate our collective funding of the future.

BI BL I OGRAPHY Bulpitt, J. (1986). The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher?s Domestic Statecraft. In Political Studies, 34 (1): 19-39 [Online]. Available at https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9248.1986.tb01870.x [Accessed 2nd Feb 2019]. Crewe, I. and A. King. (2013). The Blunders of Our Governments. London: Oneworld Publications. Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. Great Britain: Wordsworth Editions, 2014. Lopata, B. B. (1973). Property Theory in Hobbes. In Political Theory, 1 (2):

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https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2007.00297.x?j ournalCode=bpia [Accessed 2nd February 2019]. Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1848). The Communist Manifesto. Sweden: Chiron Academic Press, 2016. Nagel, T. and Murphy, L. (2002). The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. O?Neill, M. and Orr, S. (Eds.) (2018). Taxation: Philosophical Perspectives. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007). Understanding Governance: Ten Years On. In Organization Studies, 28 (8): 1243 ? 1264, [Online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840607076586 [Accessed 2nd Feb 2018]. SAGE Publications, LA. Wright, P. J. (2009). ?Hobbes vs. Locke?: The battle continues. The Mackinac

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Both second year students at the University of York, Sophie Norstrรถm studies Politics and Philosophy; George Turner studies Philosophy.

An I nter view with Alan Thomas Alan Thomas is Professor of Philosophy at the University of York. His research interests are moral and political philosophy, epistemology and the problem of consciousness. In his latest book, Republic of Equals (2017), he defends a ?property-owning democracy? as the best way of organising society to satisfy Rawls?s account of justice as fairness.

1. M uch work in contempor ar y political philosophy is based on John Rawls?s A Theory of Justice. What is this book about? Rawls?s book is a systematic treatise about justice in the social contract tradition. However, it is also very wide ranging and expresses a complete social philosophy: a conception of society as a ?social union of social unions? indebted to Humboldt. It also has a detailed moral psychology and the first sketches appear of a utopian form of private property society that Rawls calls a ?property-owning democracy?. I think it is worth recalling the historical context in which Rawls?s book appeared. The 1960s were a tumultuous time in the USA, yet philosophy seemed to have abdicated its intellectual responsibilities in this decade. It seemed to have nothing to about the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, civil disobedience and Lyndon B. Johnson?s ?War on Poverty?. Yet, during all this seismic social and political change, it turned out that a relatively obscure philosopher at Harvard was working on a systematic treatise about justice comparable to the classic works of the nineteenth century tradition of philosophical

utilitarianism ? comparable in scale and ambition to the work of Mill and Sidgwick. Rawls took himself to be renovating the social contract tradition in philosophy, a claim that I contest in my own book A Republic of Equals. I was persuaded by my thesis supervisor Bernard Williams that the contract device is not a central part of Rawls?s view that is better regarded as a genealogical account of justice. In that sense Rawls is not an ?analytic philosopher?: he is better viewed as synthesising a concept of justice than analysing it. But if we view Rawls?s core argument as a genealogy, then we can apply another of Williams?s thoughts to it: that ? like impredicative definitions in mathematics ? when we have selected that model for justice that gives us the most insight into it, we have to draw out the consequences of that model. Those consequences can be a surprise to us; but if we do not withdraw our commitment to the model, then we must accept them. In my book I try to establish the prima facie surprising conclusion that only a property owning democracy expresses a conception of justice as reciprocal fairness.

2. What is a proper ty-owning democr acy and why is this concept r elevant to Rawls? Over the course of his long career, Rawls became the subject of a ?Rawls industry? ? a legion of commentators and interpreters. An unfailingly polite man, he found time to acknowledge all these interlocutors and they have helped to shape his somewhat muffled prose style. When you read Rawls you feel you are reading something drafted by a committee. But underneath

the politeness, Rawls was very much his own person and resolutely followed his own path. In particular, he became more and more troubled by one of the main critiques of liberalism in the history of political philosophy. Karl Marx argued that liberalism both gave people formal equality before the law, but also permitted material inequality because of its strategic alliance with capitalism. This inequality, Marx believed, made a person?s formal equality practically meaningless. He believed that a distinct social class, the monopoly owners of the means of production, enjoy a structurally grounded power to dictate the terms on which others must labour for a wage. Rawls became increasingly troubled by this critique. While the concept of a property-owning democracy ? an idea Rawls took from the Keynesian economist James Meade ? is present throughout Rawls?s work it comes to prominence in his last substantive monograph on economic justice: Justice as Fairness: a Re-Statement. A Theory of Justice had become a set core text in the Harvard curriculum and Rawls taught it every year with an ever shifting cohort of graduate teaching assistants. It became his practice to circulate a mimeo of notes about the interpretation of his own views that became, over time, the text of Justice as Fairness. The concept of a property-owning democracy is central to that book and its response to Marx. A capitalism compatible with liberalism must, indeed, eliminate a distinct capitalist class with monopoly control over the means of production. The simplest way to do this, Rawls argued, was to make everyone a capitalist. If we then define capitalism as a system that permits

monopoly control of the means of production by a distinct class, then we can, alternatively, say that Rawls is an anti-capitalist. It is not a merely verbal maneouver: Rawls thinks that a property-owning democracy is a realistically utopian form of private property system that is not capitalist. It pre-emptively disperses the accumulation of capital to prevent the emergence of a capitalist class that tries, via inf luence on the political process, to re-route a democracy towards the path of oligarchy. By shifting our focus away from income inequality to inequality in wealth or capital holding Rawls makes a fruitful connection with a parallel tradition in economics. Leading figures in that tradition, besides Meade, were Meade?s Cambridge colleague Joan Robinson and, in our time, Sir Anthony Atkinson and Thomas Piketty. 3. What is the differ ence between welfar e-state capitalism and proper ty-owning democr acy? Historical context is important here: Rawls was familiar with Lyndon Johnson?s ?War on Poverty? and that may have inf luenced his less than f lattering depiction of welfare state capitalism. One of the reasons that I personally think that it is helpful to bring out the convergence between Rawls?s views and the republican tradition is that he seems to think that welfare state capitalism leaves structures of domination in place. Two groups can be in a relationship where one dominates the other, even if the outcome makes both groups better off compared to a situation where they are not in that relationship at all. Rawls thinks that the worst off under welfare state capitalism certainly lead materially better lives than they might otherwise have done under different institutional arrangements. But

while they have formally equal liberties, nothing is done to protect the fair value of those liberties except trying to keep money out of politics ? with varying success in different countries. Distinct social classes remain in place; welfare state capitalism pays lip service to equality of opportunity, but does not do very much to advance it in practice; it also tolerates very high levels of inequality provided the worst off live at some minimal decent standard. Rawls thinks, on grounds taken from Rousseau, that there is no reason to accept a social order in which one?s contribution to society is valued so much less than other people?s. He thinks that there is a standing risk, which welfare state capitalism does not take seriously, that the worst off will form an underclass of citizens with second class status whose political fate is in the hands of a coalition of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie. Looking at our own welfare state societies ? even ?successful? ones ? I am not sure that concern is misplaced. Certainly, as the wealth dispersal required in a property-owning democracy has been systematically ignored over the last forty years, our societies in the affluent West have become more unequal, less democratic, and their welfare state settlements distorted.

4. What is the differ ence between predistr ibution and redistr ibution? (Which one is better and why?) The redistributive social democrat thinks that prosperity overall is optimised if the better off are allowed to continue to improve their distributive share, provided that the worst off are living at a decent minimal

standard. So the redistributivist wants to ?grow the cake? so that a larger distributive share can be taken from the better off, via progressive taxation, and redistributed to the worst off. The predistributivist, by contrast, focuses on the initial endowments agents bring to the market for their labour ? where ?initial? does not mean ?earliest in time?. This is not simply about state funded child trust funds, or baby bonds, or demogrants for young people ? not that those are not valuable policies. The basic predistributivist thought is that the market can only yield fair outcomes if the agents who interact

on it

have equal

bargaining power

because they

are

?pre-capitalised?. Income from the labour market is supplemented by non-market holding of

capital. The pre-distributivist thinks that

guaranteeing fair access to capital allows markets to do their job while being economically efficient and also not being a threat to democratic values. As I have heard one radical economist say recently: if you are re-distributing a lot, then that is as sign of failure, rather than success, and I think that is right. The danger in the re-distributivist program is that it will neglect psychological and social tensions ? such as those produced by a very wide inequality gap between market returns to the very rich and to the worst off ? that are destabilising. Bismarck, after all, invented the welfare state as a social safety valve to stop German workers becoming Communists, and our own welfare states seem to be regressing to that role. If you are interested in developing a progressive politics, then the predistributive tradition has, I think, more current appeal than the ?tax and spend? appeal of redistributionism or, for that matter, the appeal of Marx. I think it is good to have a realistically utopian private property system, that

is not capitalist, as one of our options. 5. How do you see your work r elating to that of Ber nard Williams? The librarian in my home town, Llanelli in South Wales, held the very old fashioned view that a local library had an important educational function and should contain what people ought to want to read, not what they actually wanted to read. The philosophy section of my local library was comparable to the kind of library you find in an Oxbridge college! It was while browsing that library in a year off before going to University (originally to read English, and indeed I had an offer to read English at York) that I met a person who had left school the year before me. He was going to evening classes in philosophy at Swansea University and offered to drive me the 16 miles down the road to be taught by a philosopher called Ieuan Williams. In those classes we studied the work of Bernard Williams, who was at the time something of a public intellectual. When I eventually did go to university I had changed my subject to philosophy and went to the college where Williams was Provost, King?s College, Cambridge. I must admit that when I first met him I was too awestruck actually to speak to him. Over the next three years I was fortunate enough to be taught by Ross Harrison, Adrian Moore, Naomi Eilan and Mark Sacks and only met Williams occasionally. However, he did come and speak to the philosophy undergraduates following the publication of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy in 1985. When I went on to graduate study he had left the UK to take up a post at the University of Berkeley in California; however, he

came back to the UK a year after I did and it was a natural step for him to supervise my doctoral thesis. He was generous with his time and an inspiring person to work with, even if in this case any attempt to emulate him was out of the question. In my doctoral thesis I tried to defend a version of moral cognitivism ? the idea that a core set of our moral claims are truth apt, true and known to be so ? from the particularly subtle way in which Williams sought to undermine this claim. In working out my response the work of both Charles Larmore and Michael Williams was very inf luential on me. I tried, then, to find an answer to Williams?s sceptical thesis, at which point he published a paper entitled ?Who Needs Ethical Knowledge??. I tried not to take it personally.

6. I n what ways has Williams influenced your views in political philosophy? Interestingly, during his lifetime Williams had very little impact on political philosophy. There is a somewhat rueful footnote to this effect in which he compares the influence of his views to those of his personal friends Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre in order to observe that, compared to them, he had had virtually no inf luence at all. Yet, following Williams?s death, his so called ?political realism? has received a very great deal of attention. In some ways I regret this: Williams, like MacIntyre, was intellectually drawn to foundationalism about justification. That explains why MacIntyre was, in his book After Virtue, disappointed with all moral philosophy since Aristotle. (Williams once jokingly said to me that on Mondays,

Wednesdays, and Fridays he thought MacIntyre?s book was ?completely true? but on the other days he had his doubts about it.) It also explains why Williams?s ambitions in political philosophy are extraordinarily high and centered on the foundational justification of a form of universalism about human rights. His political realism does not seem to me to ?place? Rawls correctly ? Rawls was certainly not a foundationalist ? and to be an accurate critique only of certain forms of political justification in the Lockean natural rights tradition. Even worse, Williams?s most interesting political thought was in the republican tradition, notably his attempt to explain the importance of truthfulness to a liberal political culture in his last book, Truth and Truthfulness. Compared to the forests of trees being cut down to print endless journal pages on political realism, this more interesting work is completely neglected and I think that is unfortunate.

7. I n your book Value and Context (2006), you advocate a for m of liber al r epublicanism. What is liber al r epublicanism? The main holdover from Value and Context to Republic of Equals is the development of an argument that our best overall political theory is liberal republicanism. The name makes it clear that it is a work of intellectual synthesis. The tradition of Roman republicanism, largely developed for us by Philip Pettit, focuses on a third conception of liberty as freedom from domination. The Rawlsian tradition, in the meantime, is our best account of justice. As it happens, Pettit is a consequentialist in ethics, so he cannot take

justice to be a fundamental concept. So he tries to cover as much ground as he can with one value ? non-domination. My own view is that this runs the risk of operating with too few concepts and the natural path forward is to understand how these two accounts ? republican and liberal ? can be complementary to each other. One payoff from this is that we can resolve the question of how egalitarian Pettit?s views are; I argue that, on a liberal-republican interpretation, more egalitarian than he seems to think. Richard Dagger, another republican, has argued that the ideal political economy for a republican is a property-owning democracy and I try to explain why it is no accident that both Dagger and Rawls end up in the same place. 8. I n your 2006 book Value and Context you say that Rawls?s political liber alism pr esupposes a ?mor al background cultur e?. Can you explain what you mean by this? One persistent strand of criticism of Rawls?s work is that he is looking for some kind of Archimedean point outside our actual political culture and yet, paradoxically, his work is also ?too American?. That was the point of the joke about A Theory of Justice representing a form of ?Kantianism in One Country?, a satirical parallel with Czech president Dubczek?s ?Socialism in One Country?. (Dubczek was attempting to develop a more humane form of socialism within the former Soviet bloc before the Russian tanks rolled in to put a stop to it.) One of Rawls?s best readers, Richard Rorty, emphasised that Rawls was a contextualist about justification and not a foundationalist which is the claim I develop at length in Value and Context. It is also worth

bearing in mind that Rawls?s putative ?constructivism? about justice depended on his moral realism. As he puts it in one place: construction needs material to work with that is not constructed. It is a good question, that my friend John Tomasi raised in his first book, what kind of society could set itself the goal of becoming well ordered by justice if we understand justice as Rawls did. It is also true that Rawls?s conception of justice, applied only to what he called the ?basic structure? of society, has what he called an ?educational function?. It will systematically shape the institutions of a society and people?s personal projects. It is tempting to call the relationship between a background moral ethos and Rawls?s institutionalism ?dialectical?, to use an over-worked term. But I do think it is worth articulating the political culture of political liberalism: what it means to have all the citizens of a society put their role as citizen ahead of all their private goals. I think John was right that this is, in some respects, a very demanding ideal. But it does not, I think, discredit it as that which Rawls called a ?realistic utopia? for us in our historical situation. If we are going to address the major challenges we currently face, from climate change, to inequality and the rise of oligarchic power, I think we are going to need this vision ? or something very like it.

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