AFP Issue V 2012 by American Foreign Policy Magazine

american foreign policy May 2012

Volume XI, Issue V

From the Editor-in-Chief

Staff

Dear Readers,

Editor-in-Chief Adam Safadi ‘14

As protests continue in many Middle Eastern countries, rallies have also been taking place across Europe for a myriad of reasons. Anti-immigration protestors are playing a large part in European politics, especially the French election. Abraham Chaibi begins this month’s issue by discussing the recent anti-immigrant and antiIslam rallies in Denmark. Despite a fair turnout for these demonstrations, though, he argues what is more important is the presence of even stronger counter-demonstrations which indicate that a shift away from far-right, anti-immigration is occurring not only in Denmark but the rest of Europe. Next, we move to the first part in our Princeton Perspectives interview series. Here, I sit down with Dr. Andrew Arsan, a post-Doctoral Research Associate and Lecturer in the Near Eastern Studies department, in order to talk about the ongoing protests happening throughout the Middle East. I ask him about a wide range of countries, from Tunisia to Saudi Arabia, to try to elucidate why some movements have been more successful than others and what the prospects for the future of these movements are. Sarah Pak turns our attention to the future of the U.S.-North Korea relationship. Here, she contends that the United States needs to reevaluate its approach to North Korea and that relations between the two countries must be normalized so that we can finally end this endless series of negotiations. Along a similar vein, Joe Margolies reviews the recent talks on Iran’s nuclear program being held in Turkey, suggesting that for them to be most effective, the United States and Israel must work together and that, if this happens, then there will be a serious chance for compromise. Alan Hatfield looks at the latest struggles between Sudan and South Sudan and argues that despite international assistance, in order for South Sudan to develop the governmental and economic infrastructure necessary for future success and growth, there needs to be a period of peace between the North and South. Sam Watters analyzes legislation in the United Kingdom which would provide significant power to the British government to gain access to personal information from Facebook and even see Skype conversations in real time. Prime Minister David Cameron has been met with a large degree of opposition, which is due to popular sentiment becoming more opposed to government intrusion in personal lives. Finally, Dillon Smith provides us with an analysis of the upcoming Egyptian presidential elections. As many of the more radical candidates (and ones with connections to the Mubarak regime) have been disqualified, he maintains that the election is really now down to between three people and, no matter which of these candidates wins, he will lead Egypt on the path toward becoming a truly democratic government. Since this is the last issue of the school year, I invite all of our readers to visit us online and on our blog for updates throughout the summer. Also, as this school year ends, I want to congratulate all of AFP’s graduating seniors! It has been a pleasure to get to know and work with you and I wish you all the best for the future.

Managing Editors Rachel Webb ‘14 Sunny Jeon ‘14 Joanne Im ‘15 Rahul Subramanian ‘15 Editors Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim Charlie Metzger Jay Parikh Peter Wang Matt Arons Kristie Liao Jonathan Lin Andres Perez-Benzo Christiana Renfro

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. This publication endeavors to use all Creative Commons licensed images. Please contact AFP if you feel any rights have been infringed. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 3611 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

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Copy Editors Christina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13 Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Ben Cogan ‘12 Taman Narayan ‘13

Sincerely, Adam Safadi Editor-in-Chief

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

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Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

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AFP Cover Story

A merican F oreign P olicy May 2012 Volume XI, Issue V

ta b l e o f co n t e n ts

Rampant Racism Far-Right Extremism in Denmark Abraham Chaibi ‘14

Princeton Perspectives Interview Series An Interview with Dr. Andrew Arsan

Failure to Launch Normalizing Relations with North Korea Sarah Pak ‘15

Global Update

AFP Quiz Adam Safadi ‘14

Ready to Talk Agreeing on Iran’s Nuclear Future Joe Margolies ‘15

The Persistence of Divison South Sudan’s Sustainability Challenged Alan Hatfield ‘15

Photo Credits: scrapetv.com, newsdaily.com

Rahul Subramanian‘15

None of Your Business British Surveillance Measures Face Opposition Sam Watters ‘15

In Context

A Moderate Approach The Egyptian Election and the West Dillon Smith ‘14

Sunny Jeon ‘14

May 2012

Cover Image by Joe Margolies ‘15

Europe

Speaker at English Defense League protest. Image from Flickr.

Rampant Racism Far-Right Extremism in Denmark

number of European groups concerned with the “Islamification of Europe” came together to stage a rally in Aarhus, Denmark on March 31 with the intent of forming a united anti-Islamic alliance to be known as the European Defense League. The choice of Denmark as the site of the rally is not surprising; in the past, both EU reports and academics labeled it as one among the most anti-Muslim nations in Europe. In 2001, the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance published that “people perceived to be Muslim” face significant challenges with discrimination in Denmark. John Andersen, a professor at Roskilde University in Denmark, agrees that Denmark is “characterized by both negative cultural recognition and negative welfare selectivism in relation to Muslim ethnic minority groups in particular.” The rally in Aarhus places Denmark at the focal point of a discussion underway throughout Europe about the EU’s stance towards diversity and inclusion. The current political and social landscape is at a critical point where changes in the view of immigration and Islam

Abraham Chaibi ‘14 are far-reaching, from the increasing strength of moderate parties, to non-state actors, to public discourse and even the law. Although official numbers are not available, estimates show that “200 to 300 people” in support of the rally and around 2500 counter-demonstrators, of whom some 80 were arrested on charges of violence, were present in Aarhus. The significant turnout of counter-demonstrators, mostly members of moderate and center-left groups, suggests that events in Aarhus touched a common thread among the moderates. Denmark is, at last estimate, 3.7% Muslim, a number which cannot account directly for the strength of the counter-demonstrators. The small but tightly-knit Muslim population has faced difficulties in the workplace and in daily life as a result of casual discrimination for many years. News sources such as the Huffington Post and BBC suggest that the response to the rally was intensified due to the fear of far-right extremism following Anders Breivik’s massacre of 77 political and social activists at a youth camp in Norway last year. The perception among moderates is that

American Foreign Policy

nationalism and anti-minority sentiment, with their powerful place in Denmark and surrounding countries, enable violence. Breivik cited the English Defense League, a co-organizer of the rally in Aarhus, as one of his major influences, and this association did not go unremarked. Denmark’s influence on EU policy for race and diversity is largely a result of its government’s representation. The rally and massacre have had the unintended effect of shifting votes away from the far right in Denmark towards more moderate parties. In the past ten years the Danish People’s Party (DPP) has greatly increased its support base to a peak of 25 parliamentary seats in the 2007 election. As the third-largest party, the DPP unsurprisingly presents itself as the head of the nationalist movement in Denmark and has used its strength to push through ever-stricter immigration laws. However, the tide seems to be turning, and in the first election to follow the youth camp massacre in 2011, the DPP lost almost 2% of the total vote, although they remained the third-largest party. The election marks the first defeat of the far right in ten years, and with power shifting to a center-left coalition comes the more or less well-founded hope of a reduction in discriminatory policies. In late 2011, Denmark named its first minority minister, Manu Sareen–who was born and raised in India–to the position of

Minister for Equality and Church and Nordic Cooperation. That Sareen is the first minority minister is a sign that the government is certainly shifting to a more inclusive stance, and his appointment follows the unexpected election of the first female Prime Minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt. The broad-base increasing support for diversity is belied by a corresponding unification of extremist groups. While the organizers of the rally were not expecting a large turn-out, the hope was that the meeting of various far-right leaders would lead to increased unity in future EU policy on immigration and Islam. The far-right groups present at the rally have been at the forefront of raising restrictions on immigration, a trend Denmark has been quick to continue. Denmark has some of the strictest immigration laws currently in place in Europe including a “24 year-old rule” that requires a spouse to be over 24 years old before being legally allowed to immigrate to Denmark. Further yet, in 2010 a points system was instated which requires foreigners who are married to Danes to accrue points through education and civic service in order to apply for citizenship. In the European public discourse on immigration, the distinction between ethnic minorities, religious minorities, linguistic minorities, immigrants and descendants of immigrants has often been blurred. This lack of clarity allowed far-right nationalist parties to connect all of these groups in the blanket notion of “the other” and vilify it. As Karen Wren notes, “there has been growing tension around the concepts of ‘race’ and nation” as a paradoxical result of increasing global and economic integration in Europe. Muslim does not mean immigrant, and for that matter, Muslim does not mean ethnic minority. Islam is a religion, ethnicity is another aspect of identity, immigrant status a legal category. Regardless of these distinctions extremist groups such as the English Defense League, which nominally opposes “militant Islam”, are largely characterized by antipathy towards all immigration. The acceptance of this blanket aggression is weakening, and the counterdemonstrators at Aarhus underlined this point in their banner: “Aarhus for diversity”. Even the interpretation of the law has seen changes as events that challenge its former basis in a culturally homogeneous society force reconsideration. A major issue in any discussion of discrimination or racism in Danish policy is the difficulty of determining the boundary between racism and free speech.

Europe

This controversy came to a head in the 2005 Jyllands-Posten cartoon controversy, where a newspaper printed a series of cartoons with the prophet Muhammad’s image. The images were considered to be sacrilege by Muslims and the act was swiftly followed by protests around the world and boycotts of Danish goods. Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions released a statement in which he clarified that the printing of the images violated no criminal law and “the face of Mohammed” was in no way blasphemous or discriminatory. This disagreement brings to light the challenge of defining when religious sensitivities should be allowed to restrict freedoms. However, it is clear that Denmark’s government ruled in a manner different from most EU countries when it allowed the images to be printed, and it is no stretch to associate this decision with a general apathy towards compromise with their Muslim population. In a February 13, 2006 report, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism described the cartoon incident as an incident of hatred for Islam and the Danish Government’s response as a “trivialization of Islamaphobia at the political level”. In response to this ruling the reconciliation between discrimination and free speech became a prominent social issue. The decision to change the interpretation of the right to free speech was clear when, in

September 2006, the Danish government publicly condemned the youth wing of the DPP for releasing a video depicting members drawing insulting pictures of Muhammad. The rally in Aarhus places Denmark at the pivot of a European dialogue about the EU’s position on minorities and immigration. The recent trends in the Danish election, public discourse and interpretation of the law discussed above lend credence to the hope that tensions will lessen as government policies, both toward the practice of Islam and toward the wider question of immigration, become more moderate. This move towards moderation may have been strengthened by Breivik’s actions in Norway, as well as inflammatory events such as the JyllandsPosten cartoon controversy; however, it is difficult to conceive of the changes quickly overcoming the conservative political momentum instated by the previous far-right government led by the DPP. I only hope that this strong showing of moderate counterdemonstrators can begin to pave the way towards a more accepting form of coexistence for Muslims and other minorities in Europe. Afp Abraham may be reached at achaibi@princeton.edu

Anti-Islamic protest. Image from Flickr.

May 2012

Middle East

Princeton Perspectives An Interview with Dr. Andrew Arsan

Adam Safadi ‘14

For this issue’s Princeton Perspective interview, Dr. Andrew Arsan discusses the revolutionary movements in North Africa and the Middle East. Dr. Arsan is a political, cultural, and intellectual historian of the Arabic-speaking Eastern Mediterranean, with a particular interest in modern Lebanon. A historian by training, he has taught at Birkbeck, University of London, and the University of Cambridge. Among other subjects, he has taught on Western imperialism in the Middle East, French and British imperialism, and Middle Eastern migration. Adam Safadi: The revolutions in Tunisia and Libya have become overshadowed recently in the media by events in Egypt and Syria; yet, conflicts still remain as the transitionary councils try to set up elections. What still needs to be done in these countries? Andrew Arsan: Tunisia is further along the path than Libya, obviously. Libya has had several problems in the post-revolutionary period with trying to restore calm to several areas where problems have emerged between the transition councils and the militias which fought the war against Qaddafi’s forces and with taking arms out of the hands of the militias. Then there are the competitions for power between those who led the armed struggle and those who took up political positions in the opposition. What remains to be done in Tunisia is a difficult question to answer. There are still debates over the constitution and how that should be drawn up and over the political integration of the post-revolutionary state. There are conflicts attached to those discussions obviously, but I think the situation is not as problematic as perhaps in Egypt or Libya, as we’re seeing at the moment. AS: So, would you classify the revolutionary movements in Libya and Tunisia as successful? AA: I think it’s too early to say that they’re successful and it depends on how you define what success is, but Tunisia has seen a relatively peaceful, relatively calm transition to a post-revolutionary period with successful elections and establishing the transitional government. The discussions about the constitution in the post-revolutionary state haven’t been as fraught with conflict as they have been in Egypt,

where the chasm has opened up not just between those who waged the revolution but within the ranks of the revolutionary parties between secular parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. In Libya especially I think it’s too early to say what the outcome will be and in the large part because of the regional differences within Libya.

Forces (SCAF), which in many ways has replaced the Mubarak regime, but also must try to have a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has emerged as one of the most prominent, if not the most prominent, post-revolutionary party. In terms more broadly of the region, it’s difficult to see a regional pattern emerging. The U.S. and other Western governments, and other regional players like Turkey, are very much operating on a caseby-case basis and the clearest instance of this is the difference between the way in which the events in Libya and the events in Syria have been handled by the international community, with very different outcomes.

AS: Egypt has also recently decided to end natural AS: You mentioned the growing rifts within the gas exports to Israel. How do you think the new Egyptian political parties. We have seen several government will alter interstate relations, not only candidates barred from participating in the Egyp- with Israel but with surrounding Arab countries? tian elections, in particular ones that are not favorably looked upon by Western governments. What AA: This is a very recent development, as I unsorts of political factors (both domestic and inter- derstand it, and I think one has seen in the last few months several developments which have national) led to these disqualifications? been alarming to the Israeli government, like the AA: It is important to bear in mind is that those storming of the embassy several months ago. But who caught the news in the Western media were in a sense it’s not necessarily a break from the prethe Salafi candidate and the Muslim Brotherhood revolutionary period—one still sees attempts to use candidates, the Salafi candidate in particular was hostilities toward Israel within the population as ledisqualified because his mother was a U.S. citizen, verage by the regime. I don’t think the peace treaty and these conditions that were imposed caught between Israel and Egypt is actually in question. many of the candidates in the net—and the gov- What is happening is that the question of Egyptianernment was aware that they would catch these Israeli relations and the peace process as a whole is citizens in the net. What is also interesting is that being used by SCAF as a sort of pressure valve in one of the other main candidates who was disqual- the same way as that was used in the past by the ified was Omar Suleman, the former head of the Mubarak administration as a way of exerting conintelligence apparatus and very close to the United trol over the population through ideological maStates and to Mubarak himself. He is seen in ways nipulation, allowing people to focus on that aspect as America’s man, in particular, the American in- of foreign policy rather than on internal discontent telligence’s man in Egypt. So it’s not simply the case and internal problems and issues. of disqualifying those who are polemical to U.S. interests and the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. I think As for Egypt’s role in the region as a whole, some in Suleman’s case we see quite the opposite: it’s an have seen it as an opportunity in a way for Egypt to attempt perhaps not to remold the U.S.-Egyptian regain its position as a main regional player, but at relationship but certainly arose based on the role he the same time, Gulf States in particular have seen played in the pre-revolutionary Mubarak adminis- this as an opportunity to reassert their presence within Egypt economically and politically, especialtration. ly in the gas sector and natural energy sector, in the AS: At least thus far, the relationship between the stock market, and through investment in political U.S. and Egypt seems to be more strained than parties. Rumors are rife, we’re not exactly sure how it was in the past, particularly than it was under it all works out, but the rumors are there that Saudi Mubarak. How do you think the relationship be- Arabia and Qatar have funded political parties. tween Egypt and Western nations will change goAS: In terms of the relationship with Palestine, ing forward? Egypt has reopened its border with Gaza. Do you AA: I think there is political will on both sides, think the relationship between Egypt and Palestine both in Egypt and in the U.S., to try to maintain will shift significantly going forward? that good relationship. The U.S. is coming to the realization that it simply cannot work only with AA: I don’t know that it will shift significantly. Inthe military and the Supreme Council of Armed stead, Egypt is more willing to take a role in facilitat-

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ing reconciliation and cooperation within the Palestinian community. More broadly, it’s hard to say how things will turn out. AS: Despite movements which successfully overthrew leaders in North Africa and Yemen, we have not seen such in the Levant or the Gulf. Why haven’t strong revolutionary movements grow in countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia? AA: Jordan has seen a wave of social protests that in many ways has the same gripes and same discontent that manifested themselves in other places. I think part of it is mainly the patrimonial grip that the royal family, the monarchy, has on the population and the continued social divide within the population between Bedouin, Jordanians, and Palestinians. In Jordan it’s very much down to the popularity of the royal family, the charisma associated with the royal family. In Saudi Arabia it’s more perhaps the question of resources and the way in which they’ve been distributed through society. In terms of why these movements haven’t taken off, it’s clear in Jordan that there has been some contestation but the regime has tried to keep the lid on things, relatively successfully so far. Things haven’t snowballed in the same way as they have in North Africa. Saudi Arabia is a very different case where things have been very quiet in large part because of regime redistribution of resources and the strength of the regime security apparatus. AS: What would have to change for such movements to gain momentum? AA: It’s difficult to say what would have to change. I don’t know what specifically would be the factor that would really tilt things. It’s clear that if anything, things are more likely to change in Jordan than in Saudi Arabia, just based on prior events. AS: Money and the redistribution of resources, as you mentioned, were large factors in preventing a revolutionary movement in Saudi Arabia. How long do you think the government will be able to keep its people content? AA: Again, it’s a difficult question to answer, but Saudi Arabia has a good track record of very successfully using redistribution of resources to quell the population. Things like al-Qaeda’s presence in Saudi Arabia, which receives a great deal of media attention in the West and equally causes a great deal of anxiety within the Saudi administration, the Saudi security apparatus dealt with very well and quelled it very successfully. It was always a very small movement in terms of numbers, in the low hundreds, which obviously was never anything on

Middle East

the scale of the massive popular upheavals. There is discontent at underemployment and the lack of employment opportunities, but things have to change on both sides. On the side of the population they actually need to take jobs and can’t just depend on this patrimonial system for survival or for comfort; they may need to change their own outlook on Saudi society. AS: We saw also a brief revolutionary movement in Bahrain that was initially subdued with support from the Saudi military. There also was a lack of U.S. support for the Bahraini movement. Why do you think the movement was subdued? AA: The first thing to say is that I don’t think the movement was subdued easily. In the last few weeks and months we’ve seen a revival of demonstrations–again with very rapid regime response to those. But both before the main flashpoints in early 2011 and after, things are still bubbling away on the surface. There’s a much longer history of contestation and tension between the ruling family and the population at large, predating by a long way what happened in early 2011, and also since then there have been periodic revivals. Now, Bahrain very much holds that strategic position within the region, and it’s sort of emblematic of the wider contest which is being played out in the region between Iran on the one hand and the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on the other and I think that very much explains why the State Department on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other, took the positions they did toward Bahrain. AS: Do you think that the Western governments should play a larger role going forward in the revolutionary movements, specifically in Syria?

long? You mentioned the charisma of the royal family in Jordan and the redistribution of resources in Saudi Arabia. Is either of these factors affecting the situation in Syria? AA: In Assad’s case, it’s not so much a question of charisma, and charisma not necessarily in the sense of the personal strength of character of a particular ruler. I don’t mean that by charisma, I mean the symbolic power of the ruling family. I think Hafez [Assad], despite his lack of personal charisma, was able to create an aura around the ruling family which his son has conspicuously been unable to do. That’s not to say that he’s unpopular. He is, or was, popular among sections of Syrian society and seen as young and dynamic. Now why he’s been able to hold onto power so long–the neoliberal policies of the 1990s and 2000s have created some measure of support in the larger cities of Damascus and Aleppo, as well as created a large amount of disaffection elsewhere, and one can very much see this in the regional patterns of the revolution and where the flashpoints have been and where they haven’t been. The countryside as a whole has grown poorer and suffered several crises, in part because of lack of resources—the regime has starved them of resources and taken away its resources from the countryside—and in part also because of things like drought, which have been actually worsened by the chaotic administration and chaotic holding of things such as water resources. But also the level of military strategy the regime has been able to implement, this sort of blitzkrieg policy of going into a city and putting out the fire and then moving out again and moving into another place, rather than engaging pressures across the country as a whole, and through implementing that kind of strategy, he’s been able to keep his forces going in a way that people might not have been able to predict in the early stages of the revolution, where it looked like the forces would be very quickly stretched. The other reason that the Assad regime has survived is external as well. It’s also the confusion surrounding what should be done, whereas in Libya the personal animosity with Qaddafi on the part of many Western leaders predisposed them to handle that crisis very quickly. In Syria, fears about the post-revolutionary outcome, about Syria’s role regionally, and also the exhaustion, as well as elections both in the U.S. and France, all of these have meant that there isn’t the traction that there was with the Libyan case and the will to go into Syria.

AA: I think the question of intervention has been one that’s been on the table for several months, but there are several different ways in which one could conceive of intervention, and the humanitarian road for which the Syrian National Council has been pushing definitely presents more opportunities. There isn’t any political will in the Western capitals, or indeed in the Middle Eastern capitals, for military intervention of the type that one saw in Libya. Military intervention is very difficult to predict in terms of outcomes. As you know, I’m trained as a historian and historians, by vocation, are unwilling to make predictions about the future, but I would say that a military intervention is likely to have negative repercussions of the kind that one AS: Thank you so much for your time. saw in Iraq after 2003. Instead of bringing society together, it’s likely to splinter it even more. AA: My pleasure. AS: I just have one final question then. Why has Bashir Assad been able to hang on to power so

May 2012

Adam may be reached at asafadi@princeton.edu

Asia

North Korean troops prepared to launch the Unha-3 rocket in a failed April 13 test. Image from Flickr.

Failure to Launch Normalizing Relations with North Korea

he obstacles facing Kim Jong-Un provide not only a litmus test of his political wits (or perhaps the competence of his inner circle), but also give us glimpses of a system in transition. The world’s most isolated regime is a black box of sorts; given a certain input, we can learn to expect a certain output. But even these obser vations leave us none the wiser about the process by which Pyongyang’s decisions are made. With the ascension of Kim Jong-Un, however, all the rules may not be the same. We’re already learning, for example, that China has little sway with the current regime. Despite strong Chinese pressure, Pyongyang went ahead with plans for an ultimately unsuccessful missile launch meant to honor the centennial of Kim IlSung’s birth, an event which even members of the foreign press were allowed to attend. What is perhaps even more fascinating is that the failure of the launch was publically acknowledged through state-run sources. Perhaps, as experts have suggested, maintaining the farce

Sarah Pak ‘15

would have been too hard, given the increasing ubiquity of cellphones in North Korea smuggled in from China (now estimated to be in the range of one million). Others, like Baek Seung-joo of the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, see this as a sign of “subtle change in the North Korean leadership in how they handle these things, something that may be different from the past…It would have been unthinkable for them to admit this kind of failure in the past, something that could be seen as an international humiliation. The decision to have come out with the admission had to come from Kim Jong-un.” But because North Korea is so isolated, it’s difficult to do much but speculate as to how Kim Jong-un might be different from his father. Some conjecture that the younger Kim seeks to break from his father’s distant image – the late dictator is believed to have only spoken a single sentence in public throughout his 17 years in power – and emulate his grandfather, who frequently interacted with the public. Whatever the case may be,

American Foreign Policy

experts are already predicting more nuclear tests to follow. Marcus Noland of the Peterson Institute wrote, “Before the launch, it was probable that North Korea would conduct a third nuclear test; now it is a virtual certainty. Having lost face, Kim Jong-un will be under tremendous pressure to double down in an attempt to reestablish international and domestic credibility.” Andrei Lankov, a North Korean expert at South Korea’s Kookmin University, had a similar assessment, saying, “Internationally, now they have to do a nuclear test, preferably using uranium, just in order to show that they should be taken seriously.” Despite the changes that have come with the new regime, the fact remains that North Korea possesses weapons-grade uranium and uses it to extort demands from its neighbors. With foreign policy being one of the many areas over which presidents are perceived (whether correctly or mistakenly) to have some measure of control, any North Korean nuclear test

“Do the sanctions weaken the regime or ground it more firmly in its resolve to defy international pressure?” could be construed as a foreign policy failure for President Obama. A North Korean nuclear test, coupled with President Obama’s earlier live-mic comments to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and a weak domestic economy, could be the ammunition the Romney camp needs to wage an aggressive campaign. From this perspective, we can expect the current the Obama Administration to do ever ything in its power to prevent more aggressive behavior from North Korea.

But what would be enough to prevent Pyongyang from going for ward with another nuclear test? This is a pivotal question that has yet to be answered satisfactorily in North Korea-U.S. relations, as the current carrot-stick method has seen little success. Sanctions, which represent the main “stick” the State Department wields in discussions with North Korea, have been applied in the past, but to little apparent effect; nor does the main “carrot” (food aid, cash payments) seem to have power, as evidenced recently by North Korea’s missile launch, which was supposed to have been deterred by a food aid agreement that was struck with the U.S. earlier in Februar y. The silver lining is that targeting the funds of the North Korean leadership seems to have at least some effect. A related question is the efficacy of imposing sanctions on the North Korean regime: do the sanctions weaken the regime or ground it more firmly in its resolve to defy international pressure? Some, like Yun Duk-min, a North Korea specialist at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, have suggested that the only way to end the North Korean nuclear program is for the United States to ensure North Korean security and normalize relations, a suggestion that is sure not to have a receptive audience in Washington, at least not before the 2012 elections. The rationale behind this theor y is that North Korea’s nuclear program is a direct reaction to its sense of geopolitical insecurity. Given its border with South Korea and its proximity to Japan and the United States, North Korea’s concern is not an unfounded paranoia. In addition, the hopelessly backward state of its economy gives the regime incentives to go for “quick cash” by proliferating its nuclear technology, rather than investing in infrastructure and capital improvements. This view, however, must be taken with a grain of salt; a fair portion of the blame rests squarely with the greed and avarice

Asia

of the now-three generations of Kims. To expect the North Korean elite to accept a more expansive view of “national interest” and take into consideration the well-being of those other than themselves may be too much to ask. Nonetheless, the lack of serious, public discussion of alternatives to the tried-and-failed carrot-andstick method, and the unwillingness of the Washington intelligentsia even to consider normalizing relations with North Korea seems to be indicative of a failure of both sides to assess the relative costs and benefits of cooperation. Paradoxically, even if both North Korea and the U.S. genuinely seek an end to endless rounds of negotiations, because of mutual failures to communicate, short of regime change in North Korea, we may never reach a meaningful agreement on the state of the North Korean nuclear program. A serious offer to normalize relations with North Korea has two advantages. First, it has the potential to give us greater access to the North Korean leadership and understand and hopefully influence their thinking, and second, it sends a strong signal to North Korea that we do not intend to harm their security. Then, by involving North Korea in more international institutions and programs (and perhaps conducting joint war-games with the North Korean army), we can expose the North Korean leadership to an international system in which they can be active participants. Although exposure to Western culture doesn’t always result in more “westernized” individuals - Kim Jong-Un, one of the handful of North Koreans to be educated abroad, is a perfect example–by opening up more of the North Korean leadership to the international community, there is a greater chance these individuals will then take charge in leading the reforms needed to end the regime.

AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Adam Safadi ‘14 1. Which Liberian leader was found guilty of war crimes during the Sierra Leone civil war? A. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf B. Gyude Bryant C. Moses Blah D. Charles Taylor 2. What is the name of the satellite which Great Britain is launching to the sun? A. SolO B. AstERA C. Victoria D. Eros 3. The Mexican government is investigating corruption charges against which American corporation? A. McDonalds B. WalMart C. General Motors D. Apple 4. In the first round of the French presidential elections, which candidate surprisingly achieved 18% of the vote? A.Marine Le Pen B.Nicolas Sarkozy C.Francois Hollande D.Ségolène Royal 5. Which country just issued a glow in the dark quarter? A. Brazil B. Switzerland C. Russia D. Canada

Afp

Sarah may be reached at spak@princeton.edu

May 2012

Answers on page 19

A: Protests erupt in Montreal,

B: PAKISTAN’s Supreme Court

C: Osama Bin Laden’s eleven

H: Media tycoon Rupert Mur-

I: A JAPANESE court acquits

CANADA over rising university tuition fees. Eighty-five people are arrested.

JORDAN’s Prime Minister Awn Khasawneh resigns six months after taking up the office. Khasawneh took over the post initially in an attempt to bring reform to the government.

finds Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani guilty of contempt for failing to reopen cases against President Asif Ali Zardari but does not recommend jail time.

doch insists that he was not informed of any cover-up at the ENGLISH tabloid magazine “News of the World” during testimony to the Leveson Inquiry investigating the accusations.

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wives are deported from Islamabad to SAUDI ARABIA after nearly a year in Pakistan.

political kingpin Ichiro Ozawa of charges of violating the country’s campaign finance laws in a decision seen as a blow to his foe, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda.

D: ARGENTINA’s Senate ap-

proves the nationalization of the oil company YPF. The decision to deprive Spanish oil company Repsol of its controlling stake in YPF draws strong disapproval from Spain and the EU.

E: The New York Times reports that F: Rating agency Standard and disgraced Chongqing political boss Bo Xilai may have tapped the conversations of prominent central government officials in CHINA, including President Hu Jintao.

J: Thousands of CHILEAN students K: Ecowas, a regional grouping take to the streets to demand education reform, unsatisfied by promises of more funding for education made by President Sebastian Pinera.

of West African nations, agrees to send troops to MALI and GUINEA-BISSAU to monitor transitions to civilian governments in both countries following attempted military coups.

May 2012

Poor’s announces a downgrade of SPAIN’s long-term credit rating to BBB+ from its previous rating of A, citing economic concerns.

L: Prominent Cambodian envi-

ronmental activist Chut Wutty is shot and killed in an encounter with Cambodian police while protesting illegal logging. Authorities report that one policeman was also killed in the incident.

Middle East

Ready to talk Agreeing on Iran’s Nuclear Future

n mid-April, amidst increasingly harsh sanctions that severely dampen its economic viability, the Middle Eastern country of Iran finally assented to sit down with diplomats from the United States and other influential nations to discuss a compromise on its developing nuclear program. Iran’s willingness to participate in diplomacy came more than a year after the last attempts at negotiation ended in relative stalemate. Frustrated with the amount of time it has since taken for Iran to respond to repeated calls for discourse, President Obama has described these talks as Iran’s final opportunity to resolve the situation diplomatically. Fortunately, there is an unprecedented amount of hope that these new rounds of negotiations can succeed. Saeed Jalili, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and the country’s chief diplomat in nuclear talks, announced before negotiations began that Iran was willing to offer “new initiatives” to its interlocutors, indicating that these deliberations have unprecedented potential to end the current deadlock. He subsequently determined the talks to be “productive,” and agreed to engage in another conference in May, contributing hope to the U.S. president’s goal of achieving sustained dialogue. There remains, however, one obstruction to the prospect of reaching a successful deal with Iran. Not every country that must be onboard for any sustainable arrangement was actually involved in the talks. The nations invited to the negotiating table are the “P5+1” countries of the United Nations Security Council This group, comprised of the U.S., the U.K., Russia, China, France, and Germany, does not include Israel, another party integrally involved in any lasting

Joe Margolies ‘15 settlement with Iran. Israel’s leadership under prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently demanded firmer concessions on Iran’s part than other countries have requested, and Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak has suggested an intention to take military action to disable Iranian nuclear facilities if Iran proves unreceptive to calls for cessation of nuclear development. Therefore it is not only the major players in the Security Council and Iran who must be in concord, but Israel as well. Nothing can be more dangerous to the lasting result of these

“An unprovoked bombing could lead to an outbreak of violence between governments or increased support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations...”

negotiations than for the fundamental players in the situation to act independently of each other. The central reason for the P5+1 to coordinate terms with Israel is the same one that ultimately drives the talks themselves: to avoid anyone taking military action against Iran. An attack from any power, with the U.S. and Israel being the most likely candidates, would be extremely ill-advised, and foreign policy experts in the U.S., including Princeton professor AnneMarie Slaughter, are overwhelmingly opposed to the idea. Any preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would most likely come from Israel, and could lead to disastrous consequences.

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The arguments for Israel to refrain from using brute force are manifold. First, an attack would be totally impractical. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure can be destroyed to some extent (the Fordo plant near Qom is built into a mountain), but the drive and knowledge to enrich uranium cannot necessarily be dispatched so straightforwardly. Any attack would only slow Iran’s progress, not halt it. This is especially problematic because an engaged Iran would simply become more hostile and therefore more dangerous. If Iran is attacked – deal or no deal – the country would become more embittered against all nations seen as a threat, especially Israel and the United States, which is consistently associated with the actions of its only democratic ally in the Middle East. With this hostility would come greater secrecy regarding uranium enrichment. U.S. intelligence, already spotty, could cease completely to be accurate and any reassurance achieved by diplomatic discourse would be totally undermined with no long-lasting stability gained in return. Further, and possibly most importantly, an attack would likely turn the people of Iran decisively against the West. Protests in 2009 and outcry over Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reelection indicate that Iranians are by no means overwhelmingly supportive of their unstable leaders, who are notorious abusers of human rights. This mistrust is good for the U.S., which benefits when Iranian anger over severe sanctions is directed not at powerful Western nations, but at the frustratingly unyielding government in Tehran, seen to be sitting idly by while allowing economic misfortune to befall its people and to be alarmingly unreliable, as the economic hardship has led to murmurs of infighting between Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah. The growing group of moderate, secular Iranians has the potential to change the path of Iran toward a more stable and favorable future. If Israel attacks Iran, however, it would only cause progressive Iranians to discard their sympathy for the West and rally around their dangerous leaders against the Jewish state and its American ally. It would be all too

Middle East easy for conservative Iranians to link an attack now with bitter memories of the CIA-backed coup that overturned Iran’s democratically elected government in the 1960s. Finally, an attack could potentially destabilize the entire region. The Middle East is rife with antiIsraeli and anti-American sentiment. An unprovoked bombing could lead to an outbreak of violence between governments or increased support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, especially since bombing Iran would require Israeli bombers to trespass within the airspace of numerous unsympathetic Middle Eastern nations. Nonetheless, if Israel feels threatened enough by the state of Iran’s nuclear development, it is likely to take martial action, no matter how risky, to protect its security interests in the immediate future. Israel main-

“A sustainable resolution must include both provisions for Israel’s safety and victories for Iran....when the U.S. sits down at the table, it must bear Israel’s needs in mind if it expects to see its goals met over the long term.”

tains that any enrichment of uranium is undesirable, but remains most concerned about enrichment beyond the extremely low purity levels necessary for power generation. Consequently, it is in the best interests of all parties involved for Iran to discontinue its enrichment of uranium to any point proximate to weapons-grade. Iran could continue to work toward its power generation goals, unshoulder the burden of its economic sanctions, and remain free of assault. Israel’s fears of a nuclear Iran could be to a greater extent allayed, and the U.N. Security Council

Saeed Jalili, Iran’s chief cuclear negotiator, speaks to the media . Photo from csmonitor.com

could dial down its fears of regional instability. Such an outcome, however, can be achieved diplomatically only if everyone is on the same team. Therefore, although Israel must necessarily remain absent from the talks themselves (in presence and in name) due to Iran’s unwillingness to participate in deals with the Jewish state, it must work together with its allies to agree upon sustainable diplomatic goals. When the U.S. sits down at the table, it must bear Israel’s needs in mind if it expects to see its goals met over the long term. That being said, a sustainable resolution must include both provisions for Israel’s safety and victories for Iran. The only way to resolve this issue for all parties through diplomacy involves allowing Iran limited nuclear freedom, but drawing the line at enriching uranium beyond the 20% limit that suggests weaponization. Israel has said that it would support Iran’s keeping a limited supply for power and medical research, but not its amassing a large stockpile. Such a limit also serves the interests of the United States, and negotiators would be wise to advocate such a plan in next month’s talks. In order to best deter a Israeli attack, the P5+1 should

May 2012

also press Iran to allow UN representatives to inspect nuclear facilities on a regular basis. Such concessions would greatly improve Israel’s peace of mind and would probably be feasible if the UN agrees to relax the sanctions that have begun to take their toll on Iran’s economy. Terms of negotiation never take place in a vacuum, and in ongoing talks with Iran, the most important extrinsic factor for the P5+1 to consider is Israel. Iran is finally ready to make a serious attempt at diplomacy and Western powers are ready to deal. If Israel gets on board, there is finally a real chance for conversation and compromise. A military strike would obliterate this chance without providing an alternative guarantee of security, and would only make the situation more difficult. To avoid working at cross purposes, the U.S. and Israel must work together behind the scenes and ensure that whatever agreement Western powers reach with Iran will be favorable for everyone and provide the greatest chance for lasting peace and stability. Afp Joe may be reached at jhmargol@princeton.edu

Africa

people’s resolve for independence grew over the following decade, resulting in full independence by 1956. he ersistence of ivision Yet, before full independence could be realized, revolt in the south outh udan s ustainability hallenged developed into outright rebellion in 1955, witnessing the full escalation of Alan Hatfield ‘15 North-South tensions into the First Sudanese Civil War. Over the next 17 ast July 9, nearly six decades years, a collection of student groups, dom” along with a primarily indigof internal conflict in Africa’s enous South Sudan composed mostly local militias, and southern tribes largest nation gave birth to would fight under the banner of the of traditional animists, Christians, the continent’s newest nation, and non-Arabic speakers. This comSouthern Sudan Liberation MoveSouth Sudan. According to a referenment, demanding autonomy that plex amalgamation of tribal society dum in January of 2011, South Sudahad previously been granted de facto with sedentary Egyptian-influenced nese voters overwhelmingly endorsed urban populations along the Blue and under British administration. After separation from Sudan, known prilengthy combat between an energized White Nile Rivers in Northern Sudan marily in the United States as a recent was one of the most restive territories south and a central government fachotbed of humanitarian crisis and tionalized along Marxist-anti-Marxist in the British Empire. Witnessing a conflict, primarily in Darfur. Yet, the lines, mediation by independent particularly brutal revolt of fanatipast nine months have been testing Christian church councils brought cal followers of the Mahdi, a selffor the young, underdeveloped nation, declared Islamic Messiah figure, that an end to hostilities in 1972 with the as ongoing tensions along the border Addis Ababa Agreement. Finally, after was finally crushed in 1889 and led with its northern neighbor threaten the deaths of half a million people, the to the death of then-British goverto draw South Sudan once again into vast majority of whom were civilians, nor Charles Gordon, the region was conflict and away from its process of the South was guaranteed a semi-aunational development. tonomous administrative region with Tensions have escalated over designated powers, and the majority “Yet, before full of SSLM troops was absorbed into the the past few weeks due to a series of clashes along the roughly demarcated Sudanese armed forces or organized independence could be as local militia forces. border separating the North and South, a border highly contested by However, the perceived continurealized, revolt in the ation of aggression by government both governments. Although remaining at low intensity, the attacks appear forces in the South would eventually South developed into break open a fragile decade of peace, to follow a typical retaliation-focused pattern of response. The two governplunging the country into civil war, outright rebellion in once again along almost identical ments look to present each other with a steadfast, aggressive face in the lines. The new powerful economic 1955.” dynamic of oil was introduced to midst of ambiguity concerning yet unnegotiated policies, namely concernthe mix when large deposits were ing citizenship laws, disputed territodiscovered, mostly in the southern known for the resolve of the antiry, border villages, and most crucially colonial ethnic Sudanese against their autonomous region territory and its Sudan’s petroleum resources. border regions with the north, in the previously Ottoman Turkish, then Despite the economic and polate 1970s. Islamic elites in KharEgyptian, and then British rulers. litical ramifications of contemporary toum successfully pressured president Yet, throughout occupation, the conflict between the two entities, Gaafar Nimeiry into declaring Sudan British Governor-Generalship essenthe nations’ history sheds light on a tially administered the territory as two an Islamic state, essentially declarcomplex and unending regional divide separate entities, the Muslim North ing the southern autonomous region aggravated by its colonial history. A null and void. Once the north began and the Christian South. Because territory historically diverse in terms tension between the two communities to make moves to consolidate control of language and culture, it exists as a over the South’s extensive oil deposits, had always been present historically, single entity today due to its invasion the perceived belligerence shattered the two communities remained fairly by the British Empire in 1882 at the what tentative trust in Khartoum had politically autonomous, prompting height of the European colonial land two separate regional referendums on been built over the course of a degrab in Africa. The North, with its cade. Once again, a diverse group of Sudanese independence and British traditionally close linguistic, religious, withdrawal in 1953. After playing a predominately Christian and animist and cultural ties to Arab Egypt, was South Sudanese organized into the central role in British campaigns to included in the “Sudanese Condomin- combat Italian advances in East Africa Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, ium of Egypt and the United Kingwhich fought the central government in early World War II, the Sudanese

’ S

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Africa for the independence of the South over the next 22 years, well into the first decade of the twentieth century.

“ The South will naturally be a hopeful departure from the infamous northern regime and holds major potential... ” By 2005, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the two sides, led by the initiative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a cooperative diplomatic effort consisting of neighbor nations such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti. After the 2005 death of John Garang, longtime South Sudanese leader throughout the Second Civil War, leadership in peace talks was transferred to Salva Kiir Mayardit, a fellow rebel who would go on to become current president. These agreements outlined the structure of profit sharing of oil revenues between the North and South as well as an established framework for the South to explore independence. A referendum on independence was scheduled for 2010 and subsequently resulted in South Sudan’s independence by July of last year. Since that time, the South Sudanese have been focused on developing effective rule of law over a territory severely neglected by Khartoum and consequently extremely underdeveloped in terms of both human and economic capital. Despite the assistance of international aid and advisors, the security situation in the country has remained fragile at best, with the central government still at war with a host of armed groups operating within the majority of its territory. Thus, the recent escalation of tension between the two Sudans threatens to further undermine the development of South Sudan at its most crucial stage of

development. In recognition of this fact, the international community has recently addressed concern for the stability of the region with the potential of a return to war. In a March 28 statement, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to reports of (North) Sudanese bombing runs as “evidence of disproportionate force on the part of the government in Khartoum,” a statement reflective of the strained relations between the U.S. and the government of designated international criminal Omar al-Bashir over the Darfur conflict and monstrous human rights violations in more concentrated regional conflicts. Indeed, the South will naturally be a hopeful departure from the infamous northern regime and holds major potential both economically and politically as a young democracy. Yet, without a sustained period of peace and stability there, no amount of foreign aid or assistance will be able to develop the requisite infrastructure for a self-sufficient petroleum sector and prevent further collapse into either domination by the North or regional tribal supremacy. Thus, effective mediation is necessary to give the young country a relevant political and diplomatic voice. In the midst of the Arab Spring, the traditional Western-directed diplomatic response may not be the most effective. With heavy Chinese involvement in the direct pumping and processing of Sudanese oil, the United States risks sending an aggressive sign by directly positioning itself at odds with Khartoum and in support of the South. Existing tension over China’s continuing acquiescence to Sudanese campaigns against ethnic minorities in South Kordofan and Darfur warrants discretion, lest the Sudanese conflict become justification for further disagreement among member nations of the UNSC over current issues such as the conflict in Syria, mostly from the Russia-China corner. Rather, regional participation may provide a viable alternative, whether from other African or North African nations or potentially other mediators active in the Arab Spring, such as Qatar or the United Arab Emirates.

May 2012

The IGAD nations, being the most directly affected by spillover from the Sudan conflict, seem to be optimal candidates for taking an extensive and constructive role in engaging both Sudanese governments in facilitating agreement concerning remaining disputed territories and the petroleum question. Yet, despite past attempts at regional involvement, including a scheduled deployment of 10,000 peacekeeping troops to Somalia in the mid 2000s, individual IGAD member states face numerous obstacles that threaten to impede the organization’s overall capability. Without a feasible end in sight for Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions and a now twenty-year absence of functioning government in Somalia, relatively stable member nations such as Kenya are likely to focus efforts on other regional cooperative bodies, such as the East African Community. The persistence of these internal issues continues to compromise IGAD’s potential as an effective mediator in the conflict. The conflict between the Sudans should be a pressing one for the international community, in need of preventative diplomatic action before decades of conflict are renewed between the North and South. A concerted effort, primarily involving regional neighbors, would be optimal, yet continuing internal instability implies a more collaborative effort with nonregional nations providing advisory assistance. Regardless, outside nations will have to distance themselves from involvement that may misconstrued as a conflict of interests while at the same time demonstrating a true desire to resolve the divide between Juba and Khartoum. Time is of the essence, as a young South Sudan risks losing a peace long fought for, yet still on shaky ground. Afp

Alan may be reached at ajhatfle@princeton.edu

Europe

None of Your Business British Surveillance Measures Face Opposition

espite the recent barrage of proposed legislation concerning piracy, the specter of state surveillance and data mining has fallen out of the minds of many Americans. A law recently proposed in the United Kingdom has renewed the debate over the rightful limits of state surveillance. If implemented, the Communications Capabilities Development Programme (CCDP) would ease the access the British government has to data concerning phone and e-mail communications and expand this access to include information pertaining to individuals’ messaging through applications such as Facebook and Skype in real time. The proposed legislation would also require that telecommunications companies retain information concerning communications between citizens, which they often delete after a certain period of time, in addition to providing the British government greater access to it. Such an extreme expansion of state surveillance is unprecedented in the United Kingdom. Despite government justifications that the proposed legislation merely streamlines the process of accessing information that theoretically may be accessed to aid in opposing terror and crime, many have decried the move as a dangerous step toward an increasingly intrusive and unjust security state. Most vocal among the opposition have been civil rights groups. A critic of the legislation, activist Shami Chakrabarti, stated that the measure “increases the amount of surveillance without adding safeguards,” which removes protections from the the government creating expansive profiles of individuals specially monitored on the basis of their regular contacts and the websites they routinely access. International organizations beyond civil rights groups are also opposing the proposed legislation, as conversations spread that the European Commission may find the proposal to

Sam Watters ‘15 run contrary to policies concerning the protection of data and privacy online. Opposition from international bodies such as these is not unheard of in the United Kingdom’s relations with Internet surveillance, as past legislation has been decried by various rights groups and even challenged by the European Commission. Another key source of opposition comes from within the government, with liberal politicians wary of a British government gaining unfettered access to its citizens’ online activities. President of the Liberal Democrats Tim Farron has even stated “we are prepared to kill them” and “if we think it’s a threat to a free and liberal society, then there’ll be no question of unpicking them or compromising.” When the previous Labour government proposed similar legislation expanding Internet surveillance in 2008, politicians strongly opposed and ultimately defeated the suggested legislation. The battle against Internet surveillance has even expanded beyond Parliament, and the Internet has “fought back” in the form of vigilante “hacktivist” groups such as Anonymous. The organization launched various DDOS attacks, a popular method of online attack in which a website is temporarily taken down through an overloading of the server, against several British government websites, including the websites of the Ministry of Justice and the office of the British Prime Minister. Anonymous launched this attack to protest what it perceives as “draconian surveillance proposals” and even tweeted about its actions throughout the attack. In the past, Anonymous has launched similar attacks against countries seen as infringing on the free Internet, ranging from autocracies such as Syria to democratic nations such as the United States. In the face of these allegations, British Prime Minister Cameron has stated that “we need to stand back and

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look at the big picture… government, prime ministers, have a responsibility for national security.” Though he affirmed the government’s commitment to respect civil liberties, he implored the public to be mindful of the fact that “where there are gaps that need to be plugged, we need to plug those gaps,” referring to communication methods such as Skype that the government cannot currently monitor with ease. Despite vehement opposition, Conservative leaders seem very hesitant to allow the CCDP to be altered. Mr. Cameron is, however, exhibiting a certain willingness to work with opposing politicians and has taken steps to reassure his opponents that “there is still time to deal with everybody’s concerns.” Pressing the necessity of the CCDP in combatting terrorism and organized crime, Mr. Cameron has stated: “There are some significant gaps in our defenses, gaps because of the moving on of technology.” Mr. Cameron is of course referring to the diminished use of telephones as a mode of communication, replaced by the rise of online messaging, with which current surveillance legislation has not fully dealt. Government officials, however, seek to reinforce the message that the proposed legislation will not give them access to the content of messages exchanged between individuals. Rather, it requires that telecommunications companies retain all information concerning the time and destination of all messages and searches. In short, the British government claims it would not be concerned with what one is saying, but when and to whom one says it. But the CCDP comes coupled with another controversial proposal that would expand secrecy within the British court system. This conjoined proposal would greatly restrict the amount of intelligence information revealed in courts by allowing ministers, not judges, to decide whether a court case should be presented in secrecy; if a minister were to decide to conduct the hearings in secrecy, evidence would be delivered with the absence of the defendant. Justice Secretary Ken Clarke stated the importance of this proposal developed from the United Kingdom’s recently fraying relationship with American intelligence agencies, which are nervous about the amount of intelligence information that could be potentially disclosed in cur-

rent British courts. Mr. Clarke defends the proposal, confiding that “sometimes national security demands that you have to give a guarantee of complete confidentiality to third party countries.” Despite this justification, the proposal has also come under an immense amount of heat from opposing liberals and libertarians, notably the Liberal Democrat Deputy to the Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. Despite his extensive defense of the proposed pieces of legislation and the need to expand security, Mr. Cameron faces opposition from all sides concerning the CCDP. International organizations, both focusing on social rights and political policies, condemn the legislation. Many politicians within the British government itself call for a thorough discussion and revision of it before considering its passage. Through “hacktivist” organizations, the Internet itself seems to be taking a hostile stand in opposition to the bill. Nick Pickles of Big Brother Watch, an organization that watches for potentially invasive and dangerous state surveillance policies, worries that “not only is this going to carry a serious price for civil liberty, but it might not actually improve public safety.” The United Kingdom is certainly not alone in finding itself in a clash between a state pursuing surveillance and a population yearning for privacy, as other Western states, particularly the United States, fume in their own cyber controversies. It seems, however, that Mr. Cameron has found himself entirely cornered by opposition from a diverse chorus of perspectives. The Queen’s speech in the coming month will further elaborate on the proposed legislation, indicating any potential change in the government’s view of the law and hopeful compromise. Regardless of what the speech may entail and what finalized legislation may eventually result, it seems that those in favor of increased surveillance measures may no longer encounter a political climate amicable to their goals. The voices calling for transparency and freedom are drowning out those calling for security. Afp

Europe

In Context

Compiled by Sunny Jeon ‘14 “Confirmation… that Mr. Taylor was one of those who bore greatest responsibility for the crimes…”

Brenda Hollis, Chief Prosecutor of Special Court for Sierra Leone, on the guilty verdict of war crimes and crimes against humanity of former warlord and Liberian president, Charles Taylor.

“Despite assurances from the government, there has been no meaningful progress on the ground. This is unacceptable.”

UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon, on the Syrian government’s failure to carry out the peace plan from early April, after an

escalation of violence between Syrian forces and antigovernment fighters

“The days are gone forever when our enemies could blackmail us with nuclear bombs.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un

asserting military power and independence in a public speech after the failure of a rocket to commemorate the 100th birthday of Kim Il-Sung, North Korea’s founder

“Our goal is an enduring partnership with Afghanistan that strengthens Afghan sovereignty, stability and prosperity…” Gavin Sundwall, the American Embassy spokesman in Kabul, after the announcement of an agreement that pledges American support for Afghanistan for a decade after the withdrawal of US combat troops in 2014.

“Geopolitics today cannot afford to be a zero-sum game; a thriving China is good for America and a thriving America is good for China.”

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a naval academy in early

April, in response to recent Chinese developments including a decrease in purchases of Iranian oil and compliance with the US on security issues in Syria and North Korea.

“Freedom is better than non-freedom.” Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, echoing his campaign promise from four years ago during preparations to serve as prime minister after Mr. Putin’s return to presidency

Sam may be reached at swatters@princeton.edu

Sources: New York Times, BBC News.

May 2012

Middle East

A Moderate Approach The Egyptian Election and the West

n a move that sent shock waves throughout the Arab world, on March 31st, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt announced that it would put forth a candidate for the presidency. This flies in the face of the Brotherhood’s earlier promise not to field a candidate, and undermines the credibility of its stated aim to not dominate Egypt politically. The vast following and disciplined organization that the MB built during decades of opposition has helped to solidify its position as the most powerful political force in Egypt. As many Egyptian commentators predicted, the Brotherhood convincingly won the country’s first parliamentary elections earlier this year, thus setting off panic that the movement would gain control of the Presidency, resulting in effective one-party rule. To allay local (and international) fears about their intentions, the Muslim Brotherhood thereafter promised not to field a candidate for the presidency, and to seek to build a coalition. All this changed following the Brotherhood’s announcement. As the New York Times puts it, the MB’s “candidacy is likely to unnerve the West and has already outraged Egyptian liberals, who wonder what other pledges of moderation the Brotherhood may abandon.” Khairat el-Shater, the well-respected chief strategist and financier of the movement who was chosen as the original candidate, was disqualified

Dillon Smith ‘14 along with 10 other candidates on legal grounds. His replacement, Muhammad Mursi, is head of the brotherhood’s political party and considered a moderate like el-Shater. And yet the announcement that the Brotherhood would field a candidate set off a wave of criticism throughout Egypt and, tellingly, within the Brotherhood itself, showing that the movement is not as unified as its leaders would like the Egyptian people to believe. A spokesman for the group in Europe resigned, saying the Brotherhood looked like “liars.” Of course the MB does not portray Mursi’s candidacy in such a manner. They insist that the U-turn was forced upon them, that “the revolution was slipping from our hands,” to quote an MB official speaking to Al-Jazeera. More precisely the movement is concerned about the ongoing clashes between the Brotherhood, who hold the majority in Parliament, and the senior generals of the Egyptian military, the country’s powerbrokers for the past 30 years. The MB has demanded that the military-appointed cabinet that has been in power since December be sacked and authority given to civilians in Parliament. The generals have refused. They have rejected any transition of power until they have assurances that their economic interests (for the most part crony capitalism) will be protected. Many in Egypt saw

Egyptians lined up this year to help the Muslim Brotherhood win parliamentary elections. Photo from theblaze.com

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the disqualification of el-Shater (among others) as proof that the Mubarak-era power structures (directed by the generals) remain firmly in place. The PR arm of the Brotherhood has thus portrayed Mursi’s candidacy as a response to the threat of the generals retaining power. However, especially given the recent tumultuous disqualification of 3 of the frontrunners, a Brotherhood victory under Mursi is anything but assured. He faces two significant opponents. The first, Amr Moussa, is a popular former foreign minister under Mubarak and head of the Arab League. Of the 3 current frontrunners, he is the only one not in the Islamist camp, and is thus likely to attract much of the vote of Egypt’s secular-minded liberals. He is world-renowned as a statesman and well-known in Washington for his diplomatic work. He is also popular at home, especially for his confrontational stance towards Israel and the United States (he gained notoriety after a song called “I hate Israel and I love Amr Moussa” became a pop hit in 2001). However his past service to the Mubarak regime will be a sticking point in the campaign, as the more conservative candidates try to portray him as the quintessential establishment man. But his campaign experience to date suggests that he is still a serious contender for the Presidency. Mursi also faces opposition from the leader of a quasi-insurrection in his own party, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh. Aboul Fotouh was formerly the top reformist within the Muslim Brotherhood, but was ousted from the group last year when he announced his intentions to launch his own presidential bid, for violating the Brotherhood’s vow to abstain from the race (which it of course later violated by fielding el-Shater and Mursi). The 60-year-old doctor is popular with young Egyptians, especially those youth in the MB who have grown tired of the group’s hierarchical structure. “He will get many of the votes that were going to go to Shater and Abu Ismail as many will not be convinced by Mursi, who has been away from the Egyptian media in the last period,” said Nabil Abdel Fattah, a political scientist. He has been well-known in the Egyptian political scene since the 1970s, where as leader of Cairo University’s Student Union, he confronted President Anwar Sadat in a public debate and openly criticized his policies. He was in and out of jail throughout the

Middle East

Muhammad Mursi is the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate for president. Photo from urbanchristiannews.com.

80s and 90s, and served on the 16-member Guidance Bureau of the Brotherhood from 1987-2009. In a sign of the changing times, he was one of the foremost advocates for liberalism and democracy within the MB, championing, for example, the rights of women and minority groups. He is ready to present a serious challenge to Mursi’s relatively more conservative version of Islamism.

“And yet the announcement that the Brotherhood would field a candidate set off a wave of criticism throughout Egypt and, tellingly, within the Brotherhood itself, showing that the movement is not as unified as its leaders would like the Egyptian people to believe.” What does all this mean for the U.S., the International Community, and for Egypt? For the Western world the answer is quite clear. Given that the election com-

mission disqualified three of the most conservative and potentially politically dangerous candidates, the serious contenders left standing are all relatively moderate. Each of them would likely pursue sensible economic policies that would get the country back on its feet, and, more importantly, would pursue a level-headed foreign policy moderately friendly to U.S. interests. It is likely that Mursi will have to tack to the right to rein in the ultra-conservative Salafi vote, but given his previous moderate political positions, a repressive and orthodox Islamist presidency seems unlikely. For Egypt itself, the answer is less clear. Although strictly within the legal bounds of the Electoral Commission’s authority, disqualifying 3 of the top contenders (on relatively minor infractions) has generated a great deal of resentment within the country, especially among those on the more conservative side of the spectrum. Although frightening to many outside observers (and liberals within Egypt), the Brotherhood and its political brand of Islam clearly represent a broad swath of the Egyptian people (given how well they did in the parliamentary elections). Any attempts to hinder their progress or put them back into their Mubarak-era cage will fuel unrest and accusations that the military is trying to retain power. For the generals themselves, the disqualification is a blow, given that their favored candidate, Omar Suleiman, was knocked out along with the rest. The only people happy with the current situation are Egypt’s liberals, who can now rest easier knowing that whoever the President may be, he will not try to pursue a hardline, anti-minority (read Christian) agenda. As to how the elections themselves

May 2012

will play out, it’s anybody’s guess. If Mursi is able to mobilize enough of the Islamist support (in addition to that of the scorned Salafists), he will have a serious shot at the Presidency. However, his long absence from the political limelight will be a major liability, with only a month to go before voting day. Aboul Fotouh, on the other hand, has had the whole year to campaign and get his name out, and if Egypt’s more moderate Islamists decide that they like his politics and charisma better than Mursi’s, the Brotherhood will have to perform an awkward about-face and hope to welcome back to its fold a scorned member. Moussa (and especially his background with the Mubarak regime) is the wild card. Out of the 3 candidates, he has by far the most experience governing rather than sitting in opposition, and were he to win, Egypt would be in proven good hands. However, he clearly has nothing to do with the Islamist movement, and would have to stick to the center (which he has so far done) in order to secure the presidency. Overall, however, observers in the U.S. must remember what a fantastic victory this election is for the Egyptian people as a whole. The thought that the Brotherhood could compete in a free and fair election in any capacity would have been nigh-unthinkable only two years ago, and it is truly a testament to the tenacity of the Egyptian people that they have reached this decisive point. As for the election itself, U.S. observers can mostly sit back and watch the show, content in the knowledge that whichever of the 3 candidates wins the election will lead Egypt back to the center of the Arab world and into the fold of friendly, democratically-elected governments. Afp

Dillon may be reached at dillons@princeton.edu

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