Staff
From the Editor Dear AFP Readers,
Editor-in-Chief Dan May ‘11
The last few weeks have seen some interesting developments in American Foreign Policy, including President Obama’s decision concerning troop levels in Afghanistan and the opening of the United Nations climate change summit. Although last month’s issue was largely devoted to the arguments surrounding Afghanistan, this month’s issue is a bit more holistic in its coverage of international affairs and foreign policy, and we hope that you appreciate the diversity of these articles. Our cover story, written by Lucas Issacharoff, details and examines the issue of rising food prices, particularly in less developed countries. Issacharoff argues that the United States could invigorate food security through steps to open and normalize the market, such as the elimination of biofuel and agricultural subsidies, and to alter trade restrictions through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization. In addition, this issue features John Cappel’s forceful argument against President Obama’s decision to discontinue long-term plans for long-range missile defenses. As mentioned above, the UN Climate Change summit in Copenhagen also finds a place in this issue, as David Chen describes why America needs to take a leading role in combating climate change, and why such action may improve Sino-American relations. Finally, it is worth noting that this issue of AFP will be the last with both myself and our Editor-in-Chief, Dan May, at the helm. Dan and I are both confident that AFP will continue along its current upward trajectory toward nothing but the highest levels of analysis, sophistication, and aesthetic design. Dan and I would also like to take this time to thank the lifeblood of this publication, and that is the members of our devoted and utterly professional staff, who put in numerous hours every semester to ensure that each issue of this magazine is an unprecedented success. In addition, we would like to thank our advisory board and the Woodrow Wilson School, the James Madison Program, and the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies for their continued support of our magazine.
Publisher Steve Lindsay ‘12 Managing Editors Vishal Chanani ‘11 Tara Lewis ‘11 Jamie LaMontagne ‘11 Ben Cogan ‘12 Editors Ahson Azmat ‘10 Jon Bradshaw ‘10 ‘10 Heejin Cho Matthew Drecun ‘10 ‘10 Jon Extein Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10 Lucas Issacharoff ‘10 Catalina Valencia ‘10 ‘11 Aaron Abelson Brendan Carroll ‘11 Katherine Gaudyn ‘11 Rachel Jackson ‘11 Addie Lerner ‘11 Elias Sánchez-Eppler ‘11 ‘11 Zayn Siddique ‘11 Eric Stern
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In Deepest Gratitude,
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Steve Lindsay ‘12 Publisher
No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.
Emma Cunningham ‘11
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All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp
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Yanran Chen ‘12, Production Manager Jonathan Giuffrida ‘10 Kelly Lack ‘10 May Li ‘12 Emily Myerson ‘12 Emily VanderLinden ‘13
We hope that you all have enjoyed AFP during this past year and that you continue to read the publication in the months ahead.
American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.
Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim Charlie Metzger Jay Parikh Peter Wang Matt Arons Don Butterworth Jonathan Lin Taman Narayan Jake Nebel Emily VanderLinden Audrye Wong
American Foreign Policy
AFP Cover Story
A merican Foreign Policy December 2009 Volume IX, Issue III ta b l e o f co n t e n ts
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Global Food Crisis Rising Prices and Protectionism Lucas Issacharoff ‘10
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Strengthening Kimberley How to Clean Up the Diamond Trade Lauren Zumbach ‘13
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AFP Quiz
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Missile Defense Realignment A Strategic Blunder John Cappel ‘11
Dan May ‘11
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Global Update
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Beyond Celebrity How Obama Can Remake America’s Image Sam Norton ‘12
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A Leadership Opportunity How the U.S. Should Approach Climate Change David Chen ‘13
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In Context
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Vishal Chanani ‘11
Tara Lewis ‘11
Cold War Ghosts How the U.S. Should Handle Honduras Evan Larson ‘13 After Lisbon The Future of the European Union Lucas Briger ‘12
Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr and Wikimedia Commons
December 2009
Cover Design: Yanran Chen ‘12
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Cover Story
Photo from Wikimedia Commons
An Afghanistan national police officer helps an American soldier while crossing a stream during a patrol of Balik in Afghanistan on June 14, 2007.
Global Food Crisis Rising Prices and Protectionism
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ith the price of grain increasing by 154 percent between 2006 and 2008, food prices have become a pressing issue in the developing world. Despite the global recession, prices rose again in 2009, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization predicts that prices will remain well above the long-term average throughout the decade. The increases in food prices exposed serious deficiencies in the world food market; exporters have abandoned trade and importers are desperately searching for alternatives. Food insecurity in the developing world induces inefficient responses by both exporters and importers, caus-
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Lucas Issacharoff ‘10 ing enormous human suffering due to price spikes and food shortages in importing countries. Importing countries in the developing world and the U.S. should enhance the food security of the developing world by creating an open and predictable market. Such efforts should advance on two fronts. First, the developed world should recognize its distortionary role in world food markets and eliminate biofuel and agricultural subsidies. Second, the U.S. should work through international institutions and with exporting countries to mitigate the price increases in ways that do not hamper trade. The dysfunctional food market
American Foreign Policy
has caused extreme food shortages and political conflict. When food prices spike, the poor and those who feed them cannot afford as much food. The UN’s World Food Program and the U.S. Agency for International Development have announced cutbacks in food aid in response to rising prices, while undernourishment has increased globally by roughly 20 percent since 2006. Rising food prices have also caused political instability in the developing world. In 2009 riots against food and fuel prices left nearly 40 dead in Cameroon, and food-related instability led to the Haiti’s prime minister and Madagascar’s president. The food market faces two obstacles: long-term structural distortions stemming from Western policy, and short-term instability caused by exporting nations. A properly functioning global food market could allow direct investment in the most productive land and let net-importing countries focus on their comparative advantages. While the rise in food prices is partly
due to growth in demand from developing nations, the recent drastic price increases owe much to misguided policies. The West’s agricultural policies play a large part in the troubles of the global food market. The primary culprits are agricultural subsidies and biofuel subsidies. While subsidies are supposed to increase output and decrease global food prices, they divert private investment toward Western agriculture and away from underdeveloped countries, where the potential gains in productivity are greater. This counterproductive diversion of resources distorts investment patterns and reduces spare production capacity when prices are high. Biofuel subsidies encourage farmers to shift production away from food and toward ethanol, decreasing the supply of food and driving up prices. The U.S., by far the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn, may soon use half of its crop for ethanol. These subsidies are also wasteful for Western countries. Subsidies are a blatantly inefficient case of special interest favoritism; the government will spend over $21 billion next year on “farm income stabilization.” Biofuel subsidies and regulations have become a boondoggle—estimated to cost the U.S. between $5 billion and $9 billion— that fails to reduce CO 2 emissions. The heart of the problem is the enormous political importance of food prices in developing countries. In countries where food makes up a large part of household expenditures, price increases can be devastating for voters and treacherous for governments. While facing political pressure to reduce food prices, several major food producers, including Argentina, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, restricted exports to ensure adequate domestic supplies. These restrictions further increased the price of food traded on the international market, causing additional pain to importing nations. The trade restrictions have important disadvantages. First, they reduce income to farmers while their products’ prices are high, thus stifling investment and production when greater supply is most needed. Second and more damaging is that importing na-
Cover Story
tions begin to fear that the market will no longer suffice to meet their needs. They rush toward panicked and inefficient responses, particularly those that increase production on their own land. Saudi Arabia, an extreme example, spent billions to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production by turning desert into farmland; the drain on the country’s aquifers and its pocketbook forced Saudi Arabia to abandon the experiments. Both of these trends steer investment toward unproductive land in importing countries and away from fertile land in exporting countries. Saudi Arabia, with enormous oil reserves and
20 percent increase in undernourishment since 2006
40 people dead in Cameroon riots
$21 billion spent yearly on U.S. farm subsidies virtually no water, could export oil and import food rather than try to grow wheat in the desert. Its newest strategy for food security, along with countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea, has been to buy huge tracts of land in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to assure long-term food security in fertile lands. While this may be an efficient investment in certain cases, the opacity and size of the deals has led to complaints of neocolonialism and corruption. Furthermore, this trend demonstrates the strategic disadvantages of global food insecurity for the United States. The developed world must take the first steps to bolster the global food
December 2009
market, by eliminating agricultural and biofuel subsidies to enhance the food security of developing countries. More importantly, the United States must prevent nervous exporters from diverting food supplies inward. The first step is to alter the terms of the World Trade Organization compact to explicitly declare export bans (or extremely high export taxes) to be contrary to the principles of free trade and subject to penalty. While many exporting countries would oppose such a move, they might make this concession if the U.S. eliminates its agricultural subsidies— a long-sought goal that would make their own exports more competitive in return. Removing the subsidies could advance trade talks, since these subsidies were largely responsible for the breakdown in 2008 of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round of negotiations to lower trade barriers. It will be difficult to design international rules sufficiently compelling to overcome the political pressures attendant with rising food prices. Equally important will be policy advice to developing exporter nations to mitigate the effects of price increases as an alternative to market manipulation. As food prices rise, exporting nations gain income overall. The downside for such countries lies in the transfer of income from consumers to farmers. Governments, during times of high-prices, should assess farmers a lump-sum tax and distribute the revenue to the poor. Carefully calibrated redistributive measures could keep countries satisfied. A push for global regulation and policy changes would give less developed countries and their citizens the stability they need for security and economic growth and development. Afp
Lucas may be reached at lissacha@Princeton.edu
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Africa
Strengthening Kimberley How to Clean Up the Diamond Trade Lauren Zumbach ‘13
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n November 5th, the world’s conflict diamond monitoring group announced the controversial decision not to suspend Zimbabwe following allegations of human rights abuses, diamond smuggling, and corruption. Although Zimbabwe is responsible for a relatively small portion of the world’s diamond trade, this was an important test of the global effort to monitor the diamond trade — a test that many would argue the international community failed. The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process relies on self-regulation by the member nations’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kimberley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Human Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems exacerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership. These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and importing firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation. In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allegations of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military supervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compliance with the Kimberley Process’s mini-
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mum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries
“The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.” such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real. Obtaining Kimberley Process certificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a powerful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and ex-
American Foreign Policy
porting nations to evade the rules. Governments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the process. When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented countries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging compliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated. Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The system calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Diamond Council, the industry’s representative, also cannot be held at fault. The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations. This flaw also means that the Kimberley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ opportunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kimberley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds. The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an independent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regulatory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more
Africa
AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Dan May ’11 1. Which country recently required importers to distinguish between West Bank produce that comes from Israeli settlements and produce made by Palestinians? a. United States b. United Kingdom c. France d. Saudi Arabia e. Monaco 2. How many Americans did Pakistani police catch on their way to a terrorist training camp? a. Two b. Three c. Four d. Five e. Sixty-four
A diamond miner in Sierra Leone / Photo from flickr
difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for importers to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less exacting importers and enter the illegal diamond trade. Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consumers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade. The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regulator will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by showing its commitment to stricter regulations.
Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, particularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted authority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both governments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization. Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater revenues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.” Afp Lauren may be reached at lzumbach@princeton.edu
December 2009
3. What European country recently passed a ban on minarets by popular referendum? a. Switzerland b. Germany c. Canada d. Austria e. United Kingdom 4. President Obama announced in a major policy address that he would commit how many additional troops to the fight in Afghanistan? a. 20,000 b. 30,000 c. 40,000 d. 50,000 d. 500,000 5. Based on current planning, how many U.S. troops will remain in Iraq as of August 2010? a. 50,000 b. 75,000 c. 90,000 d. 100,000 e. 500,000
Answers on page 19
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U.S. Foreign Policy
Missile Defense Realignment A Strategic Blunder
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John Cappel ‘11
n mid-September, the Obama administration announced that it would abandon plans developed under former President Bush to place a radar system in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland. As an alternative, the administration announced new missile defense measures designed to be implemented quickly and counter threats in the immediate future. The introduction of these new measures is commendable. But Obama’s abandonment of the original missile de-
fense plan has weakened the American diplomatic position in Europe and provided a political victory for Russia. In announcing the cancellation of the Eastern European missile defense installations, the Obama administration emphasized that it was not abandoning European missile defense entirely, but was instead pursuing an alternative strategy to more effectively address current threats. Long-range missile interceptors are unreliable and frequently ineffec-
tive, and neither Iran nor North Korea appears to be close to developing the long-range missiles the cancelled system would have been designed to intercept. Iran instead possesses short- and medium-range missiles that could pose a threat to Israel and parts of Europe, while North Korea’s current technology poses no threat to Europe. To protect Europe and Israel from any potential strikes by shortand medium-range Iranian missiles, the Obama administration’s new plan will use ship-based missile interceptors and an installation of small ground-to-air missiles in Poland. If the diplomatic ramifications of abandoning the Bush-era missile defense plans are ignored, the administration’s new strategy is logically sound. New installations in Europe are not necessary for improving and testing the currently unreliable technology for intercepting long-range missiles. In addition, constructing,
U.S. Navy Aegis-class destroyers will replace land-based missile defense installations in Eastern Europe. Photo from flickr.
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American Foreign Policy
maintaining, and manning the missile defense sites in Europe would impose a financial burden on the United States for the sake of providing unreliable protection against a threat that does not currently exist. Building missile defense sites now would ensure that the United States would be ready if and when North Korea and Iran develop long-range missiles, but intelligence reports should give the United States enough advance warning to prepare for such an occurrence. The cancelled longrange interceptor sites also failed to address the danger of the technology that Iran currently possesses, so the addition of new capabilities to the missile defense system is commendable. In spite of these pragmatic arguments for an adjustment in European missile defense strategy, the United States’ new strategy is short-sighted and ignores the broader diplomatic implications of cancelling the planned installations. Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO allies of the U.S., hoped that American military installations in their nations would deter Russian aggression in the region. Their desire to secure a material American commitment beyond a treaty obligation is reasonable, particularly in light of the Russian military occupation of territory in Georgia little more than a year ago. Although a Russian attack on a NATO member seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future, Poland and the Czech Republic are rightly concerned with checking the expansion of Russian influence in the region. Conversely, one might argue that cancelling the missile defense sites reduces the need for Russia to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, thereby giving Poland and the Czech Republic less reason to fear Russian encroachment in Eastern Europe. This analysis assumes that Russia is seeking a fixed amount of influence with which it will be satisfied attaining— a thesis with little supporting evidence. Russia’s recent foreign policy has been characterized by an aggressive pursuit of power; actions such as gas shutoffs to Ukraine and the armed incursion into Georgia give
U.S. Foreign Policy
no indication that Russian leaders will be content with some particular amount of regional influence. More broadly, the Obama administration’s new missile defense strategy raises questions about the credibility of American commitments in Europe and around the globe. It signals to other nations the United States’ willingness to change policy in pursuit of its own interests, and indicates that American commitments may weaken with changes in administration. While the Obama plan to include smaller interceptors in Poland may assuage Polish concerns to some degree, it remains to
“The Obama administration’s new missile defense strategy raises questions about the credibility of American commitments in Europe and around the globe.”
be seen if the shift in missile defense policy will make other nations more skeptical of American commitments and less likely to enter into defense agreements. One could argue that revising missile defense policy presented an opportunity for the United States to improve diplomatic relations with Russia and increase the odds of Russian cooperation on other issues, such as sanctions against Iran or supply lines into Afghanistan. But the Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that its missile defense decision was completely unrelated to U.S.-Russian relations, and there is no evidence that the United States has received any concessions from Russia in return. Clearly, an open
December 2009
agreement between America and Russia on abandoning missile defense in exchange for Russian concessions would have carried high diplomatic penalties for both states. Alternatively, it would have been naïve of the administration to change its missile defense strategy and simply hope for a future Russian concession in return. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did say, “if our partners hear some of our concerns, we will, of course, be more attentive to theirs.” This supposed attention to American concerns is unlikely to produce actual policy results, however, given Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance. Simply put, there is no evidence that realigning missile defense policy has motivated Russia to change its positions on issues important to the United States. From a purely military standpoint, the decision to immediately implement missile defenses against short and medium-range missiles is a good strategic outcome. Unfortunately, the decision to simultaneously abandon slower-developing plans for long-range missile defenses was a diplomatic misstep. Abandoning the originally planned sites in Poland and the Czech Republic has not only harmed relations with these NATO allies, but may also make other nations skeptical of American commitments and hesitant to reach agreements with the United States. Moreover, the realignment may reduce the number of complaints from the Kremlin, but is unlikely to help secure any real diplomatic concessions from Russia. Ultimately, the Obama administration’s decision to discontinue the Bush administration’s missile defense program damaged American diplomatic credibility without producing any benefits for the United States. Afp
John may be reached at jcappel@princeton.edu
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A: In HONDURAS, after Rober- B: Over 50 people are killed, and C: In the UNITED STATES, to Michelleti steps aside, Porfirio Lobo wins the general presidential election, defeating liberal candidate Elvin Santos by double-digit margins.
over 20 others go missing, in violence in the PHILLIPINES related to the upcoming general election next year.
Attorney General Eric Holder announces that 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed will stand trial for his crimes in Manhattan, where the attacks took place. Prosecutors will reportedly seek the death penalty.
A
G:
Mahmoud Abbas, President of PALESTINE, announces that he will not seek re-election in January. Abbas has served as president since 2005 and was originally scheduled to step down this past January, but had his term extended for one year.
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H: Following condemnation
from the International Atomic Energy Agency for pursuing a secret uranium enrichment program, IRAN announces its intentions to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants.
American Foreign Policy
I: In ROMANIA, no clear win-
ner emerges from the first round of presidential elections, leading to a runoff between Traian Basescu and Mircea Geoana. However, voters approve a referendum replacing the bicameral legislative system with a unicameral Parliament.
D: Jose Mujica defeats Luis La- E: Herman Von Rompuy, Prime calle in the runoff for presidential elections in URUGUAY. Mujica belongs to the left wing coalition Broad Front, to which current president Tabare Vazquez belongs.
Minister of BELGIUM is selected by European Union leaders to be the first permanent President of the European Council following the passage of the Treaty of Lisbon.
F: In RUSSIA, a suspected terrorist bombing of the Nevsky Express train, leaves over 25 dead and more than 100 others injured. Early responsibility for the attack, though unknown, has been claimed by the “Caucasian Mujahadeen” group.
G LOBAL U PDATE
J: Voters in SWITZERLAND
approve a controversial referendum banning the construction of new minarets in the country, with supporters calling the architectural features signs of “Islamization.” Officials have noted concerns about the message this vote sends to the Muslim world.
K: A massive suicide bombing
in SOMALIA kills 20 people and injures over 60 others. Three ministers of the Transitional Federal Government are among those killed in the attack.
December 2009
L: President Barack Obama of the
UNITED STATES announces that he will send an additional 30,000 troops into AFGHANISTAN and will begin withdrawal within 19 months.
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U.S. Foreign Policy
Beyond Celebrity How Obama Can Remake America’s Image
Sam Norton ‘12 During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama vowed to “restore America’s standing in the world.” With this pledge, he sought to distinguish himself from George W. Bush, who many believed had alienated the United States from the rest of the world during his two terms in office. Thus far, Obama can claim only limited success in turning the tide of international opinion. In part, this is because the alleged damage to the American image done by Bush was not as great as Obama and other Democrats claimed. But in spite of significant efforts to reach out to global audiences, he has yet to make substantial progress in improving ties with America’s allies. His failure suggests that international popularity is a difficult objective to achieve, and one that is not likely to be worth the costs it entails. Rather than seeking this chimerical goal, Obama ought to shift the focus of his foreign policy toward the advancement of America’s security and economic interests. Examining the history of America’s interaction with the rest of the world provides context for the actions of the Obama administration. Hand wringing about America’s image abroad dates back to at least the 1960s, and has intensified in recent decades. Cold War era conflicts, such as the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race, drew massive protests in Europe. In the aftermath of the downfall of the Soviet Union, observers derided the U.S. as a “hyperpower,” a critique that encompassed not only America’s political moves, but also its economic and cultural might in an increasingly globalized, unipolar world. Tensions between the U.S. and its traditional allies mounted in 2002 when Bush announced his intention
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to invade Iraq, a campaign he planned to launch unilaterally once the UN refused to endorse it. European leaders, most prominently Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, denounced America’s behavior as aggressive, echoing a sentiment expressed by an overwhelming majority of European citizens. Yet, as in the past, America’s part-
“To indicate that reversing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, [Obama] sought to portray himself as a global citizen in a way that is perhaps unprecedented in American history.”
ners maintained a schizophrenic attitude toward their benefactor. For all its faults, America offered protection for European countries that had largely demilitarized in the years since World War II. Hence, whenever an outside threat appeared on the horizon, all talk of a post-American world suddenly vanished, and the transatlantic alliance appeared to be just as strong as ever. This was the case in the summer of
American Foreign Policy
2008, when Russia’s invasion of Georgia inspired fear in the hearts of European publics. In response, their leaders quickly modified their stance to reflect closer alignment with the U.S. on issues such as missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic. Even as America saw its ratings decline under Bush in what Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “old Europe,” the story was different elsewhere. The U.S. continued to enjoy favorable relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, who still remain thankful to the U.S. for defeating their former communist oppressors. Several Eastern European nations, most prominently Poland, contributed troops to the U.S. mission in Iraq. Ties with rising powers in Asia, such as India and Japan, improved on Bush’s watch, as demonstrated by a series of joint military exercises as well as a landmark nuclear treaty with India. These bonds appear likely to remain strong even with the recent election of the Democratic Party of Japan, which has occasionally indulged in anti-American rhetoric, but has also announced a commitment of $5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a critical U.S. priority. Humanitarian aid to areas afflicted by poverty, disease, and natural disaster won plaudits among the President’s harshest critics. In Latin America, where populist politicians like Hugo Chavez gained ground throughout the past decade, local issues such as income disparity far outweighed the role of anti-American grandstanding in determining their success. As has been established, America was by no means universally unpopular on the eve of President Obama’s inauguration. Nevertheless, during the campaign, Obama frequently sounded the theme of America’s deteriorating reputation abroad. To indicate that reversing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, he sought to portray himself as a global citizen in a way that is perhaps unprecedented in American history: by emphasizing his multicultural background. He addressed an enormous, cheering crowd in Berlin during a tour of Europe and the Middle East in July 2008, and met with foreign leaders who demonstrated their eagerness to work with him.
The contrast between Obama and Bush became immediately apparently in the first few months of Obama’s presidency, as he began to overturn policies that, in the past, have incited denunciation of the U.S. Fulfilling a campaign promise, he issued an executive order mandating that the Guantanamo Bay prison be closed within a year, a directive that later ran into logistical problems. He renounced the use of torture against terrorist suspects. In speeches to foreign nations, he extended his criticisms of America to include unsavory elements of its history, such as mistreatment of immigrants and minority groups, and heavy-handed interventionism during the Cold War. All of these measures represented an attempt to “reset” America’s relations with the rest of the world. Various missteps, however, have tarnished that campaign. Obama was criticized for being deliberately rude to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, one of America’s closest allies, during Brown’s visit to Washington. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Obama’s goal of achieving peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been set back by his frosty relations with hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has refused Obama’s demand to halt settlements in the West Bank. Discontent with Obama’s foreign agenda has grown in recent months. An article in the German publication Der Spiegel noted that his new approach to international relations has not worked. European powers remain reluctant to provide significant military support for the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. French President Nicholas Sarkozy has been particularly adamant in criticizing Obama’s perceived weakness in negotiations with Iran, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the entire world. China and Russia both continue to exercise their influence as regional powers, and have largely ignored the outreach undertaken by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. How can Obama reverse course in his quest to revitalize America’s image? To begin, he should seize every possible opportunity to find common ground with America’s allies on issues such as human rights. When he decided against
U.S. Foreign Policy
meeting with the Dalai Llama in October, the President aroused suspicions that he would not be as sympathetic to human rights concerns as his predecessors, all of who met with the exiled Tibetan leader during their administrations. His endorsement of the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran, in which citizens took to the streets to protest the fraudulent re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was seen as less than enthusiastic. In this matter, he should take the advice offered by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel—“never let a crisis go to waste”—and apply this doctrine to international affairs. Renewing Bush’s emphasis on development and democracy promotion could also help to reinforce the notion that America is a benevolent hegemon.
only contributes to long-term economic growth, but it also ensures closer ties between nations, and thus reduces the possibility of conflict. If Obama were to repudiate his previous positions and commit to reviving the Doha Round, he would remind the world that America is capable of providing global leadership on these sorts of seemingly intractable problems. But ultimately, Obama must acknowledge that America’s image is a compilation of so many factors, most of them out of his control, that changing it within a short span of time would be an impossible task. Indeed, on some issues, seeking international approval could be detrimental to America’s best interests. Anti-terrorism policy is one example. Measures that have drawn the ire of foreign leaders, including harsh interrogation techniques, extraordi“Obama must nary rendition, and detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, are also an acknowledge that important line of defense against future attacks. America’s image is a The best route to follow lies between the extremes of the Bush era compilation of so many and the early months of the Obama presidency. America’s allies have a lot factors, most of them to offer in the way of diplomatic support and international prestige, and out of his control, that can lend legitimacy to its military ventures. They should not be ignored or changing it within a short marginalized. At the same time, their true concern is security, and if America span of time would be an can no longer ensure their safety, Europeans and others will look elsewhere impossible task.” for protection. Obama needs to balance conciliation with displays of toughness, while employing his personal appeal to rally support for shared causes such as Trade is another area in which human rights and nuclear non-prolifObama could positively impact both eration. If he takes these steps, he will America’s image and interests. Here, he be able to cultivate increased respect has backpedaled from Bush’s pro-free- for America abroad without sacrificing trade stance, imposing tariffs on Chi- its interests. Afp nese tires, inserting “Buy American” provisions into the stimulus bill and the “Cash For Clunkers” program, and allowing agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama to languish in the Senate. Such actions hurt the odds of resurrecting the Doha Round of international trade negotiations, which Sam may be reached at broke down last year. Ever since the snorton@princeton.edu end of World War II, removing barriers to global commerce has been a key goal of the U.S. and its allies. Free trade not
December 2009
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U.S. Foreign Policy
A Leadership Opportunity How the U.S. Should Approach Climate Change
T
hough few are optimistic that the community of nations will reach a substantive international agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen this December, a renewed sense of urgency has prompted much discussion about the future of climate change control. An overwhelming majority of scientists agree that human-emitted greenhouse gases have caused the Earth to warm throughout the past half-century and will continue to raise global temperatures to dangerously high levels if emission rates do not slow. These warnings have created a general agreement among the international community that something needs to be done, but few countries have actually committed to substantive measures. The U.S. is no exception; it, too, has been, choosing to wait for others rather than bear the burden of leadership. As a nation with both the resources and responsibility to reduce carbon output, the US should, instead, lead by example, clearing existing domestic hurdles to fighting climate change. Doing so will motivate the rest of the world to follow suit. Any movement toward reduced emissions cannot ignore the two largest emitters in the world: China and the US. Both industrial powerhouses produce a combined 40% of all greenhouse gases. If neither country is at the heart of climate change efforts from the beginning, global attempts to reduce emissions will be useless. By taking the lead, however, tangible US and Chinese carbon reduction policies will provide the international community with a workable goal. Of the two nations, the US, rather than China, is best positioned to take the lead on climate change. China, then, will do its best to follow the United States. Underdeveloped nations similarly turn towards the US for tangible greenhouse gas emissions reductions, realizing that, without the US, any emission
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David Chen ‘13 reductions on their part will be a drop in the bucket. Without US leadership, an international climate change movement is impossible. If the U.S. leads by example, the rest of the world will follow. The EU has already pushed Washington to set clear emissions reduction targets for the next few years and has pressured President Obama to take a more hard-line approach to climate change; they are on board. More importantly, China, surprisingly to some, has
“Congress should not make legislation contingent upon the actions of other countries, but instead push the cap-and-trade system through, knowing that other nations will then jump on board.”
also shown its willingness to cooperate. Just a day after Obama announced concrete targets on emissions reductions, President Hu Jintao followed up with China’s own pledge. In the coming years, China will have to walk a fine line between environmental protection and economic growth. China has realized, however, that the two are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, intertwined; without limiting the effects of
American Foreign Policy
climate change now, China stands, as all countries stand, to limit long term growth. As the world’s single largest emitter of carbon, China recognizes that it will shoulder much of the blame for—as well as the negative natural effects of—climate change if it does tangibly limit greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. can expect an increasingly cooperative partner in Europe and China on the issue of climate change. In particular, U.S. leadership on climate change has the potential to capitalize on China’s increasing willingness to cooperate on this particular issue by creating a precedent for further opportunities for more extensive bilateral cooperation in the future. The President’s recent tour of Asia produced little progress in Sino-American relations, as both countires failed to agree on issues ranging from human rights to China’s consistent devaluation of its currency. Obama, however, did make small breakthroughs on climate change. The series of practical measures announced during Obama’s meeting with Hu Jintao —including an electric-vehicles initiative and energy efficiency plan—suggest that emissions regulation may be a bridge towards stronger alliances with China. Leadership, however, must come first from the U.S., as Hu Jintao will likely be unwilling to act without assistance and promises from developed countries. There is strong public sentiment in China that the U.S. is urging its economic rival to embrace clean energy only as a means to undermine the Chinese economy. If Washington takes the first step in this regard, however, it can reassure the Chinese by debunking any suspicions that the U.S. is trying to gain an economic advantage over their country. Strong U.S. leadership on climate change will likely result in better relations between the U.S. and China. Another concern that other nations have expressed is that unlike China, a relatively young and still developing industrial power, the U.S. has historically emitted more total climate-altering gasses than any other nation in the world. Therefore, the U.S. has the heavier obligation to take the lead on climate regulation especially since underdeveloped nations, which emit the least carbon, would receive the brunt of climate change’s devastating effects. If the worst offender of climate change is unwilling to step up as the leader, it would be difficult to justify the participation of anyone else.
Obama, as well as the Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, agreed in November that no binding follow-up to Kyoto would be reached in Copenhagen. In reality, what is to be the upcoming failure to act in Copenhagen is just another symptom of general inaction by all countries involved, none of which is willing to make the first move. The U.S. Senate has bound Obama’s hands, refusing to pass the cap-and-trade program unless China and other developing nations make a commitment, too. China and India, on the other hand, will only institute broader and more drastic measures if the U.S. promises substantive emissions reductions. Mutual hesitancy has certainly delayed any prospect of a binding international agreement. For the U.S. to take leadership, Congress should not make legislation contingent upon the actions of other countries, but instead push the cap-and-trade system through, knowing that other nations will then jump on board. Doing so would demonstrate to the world that the U.S. is serious and committed to combating climate change. The Senate, however, has been particularly resistant to addressing climate change. Obama, already entrenched in difficult battles on health care and Afghanistan, may lack sufficient political capital to persuade reluctant senators. As a result, liberals run the risk of having to water down the current bill even farther than it already has been watered down in order to pass something. Any reasonable carbon emissions bill that emerges from Congress will provide the U.S. with momentum that will then lead to a global emissions reduction agreement. Copenhagen will test how receptive the world is to American leadership and a global initiative against greenhouse gas emissions, but environmentalists should not expect much. At best, as former vice president Al Gore notes, “a very significant framework … can still be completed.” Instead, policymakers should place their hopes on the US and push for American leadership in a warming world. Afp
U.S. Foreign Policy
In Context Compiled by Tara Lewis ‘11
“A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms.”
-President Obama, accepting the Nobel Peace Prize and explaining the U.S.’s place in the war in Afghanistan.
“He stole my technique.”
-Iraqi journalist Muntazer al-Zaidi, who in 2008 threw his shoes at former President George W. Bush, commenting jokingly about a journalist who threw a shoe at al-Zaidi.
“The first obligation of a country ... is to save the lives of its countrymen.”
-SpanishPrime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero explaining Spain’s choice to pay Somali pirates a $3.3-million ransom to free a Spanish fishing boat that the pirates held captive for over six weeks.
“The peoples of Europe are welcoming and tolerant: it’s in their nature and in their culture. But they don’t want their way of life, their mode of thinking, and their social relations distorted.”
-French President Sarkozy, defending Switzerland’s recent ban on minarets.
“I believe he is an iconic figure at this point, whose survival emboldens alQaeda as a franchising organization across the world.”
-General McChrystal, to a Senate committee earlier this month, about Osama bin Laden.
“I haven’t requested asylum, I don’t want asylum and I won’t accept asylum.”
-Honduras’ ousted president, Manuel Zelaya, declining to leave Honduras for Mexico as a political refugee, after recently returning from exile.
“How much more culturally specific can you get than Jewish music of Latin America?”
-Director of L.A. Skirball Cultural Center, criticizing the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services for denying a performer a visa to an Argentine band that plays Jewish Klezmer tango music because it did not meet the requirement of being “culturally unique.”
David may be reached at dcthree@princeton.edu
December 2009
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South America
Cold War Ghosts How the U.S. Should Handle Honduras
F
ormer Mexican President Porfiro Díaz once lamented “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States.” Although Díaz spoke these words around the turn of the last century, they reflect many Central Americans’ feelings about the U.S. today. Despite the recent upswing in international approval for the U.S. following President Obama’s election, there is still significant skepticism about America’s intentions in Latin America. Many Latin Americans, accustomed to Washington’s imperialistic tendencies in the region, hold the United States responsible for the region’s political instability and lack of development. The United States needs to prove through its actions that the excesses of the Cold War will never resurface, and that it can begin to fully collaborate and engage with Latin America. Today, the United States has an opportunity to take action and redefine its Central and South American policy through its response to the ousting of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. By conditionally acknowledging the new Honduran election and punishing the Honduran military for its actions, the United States can defuse a dangerous situation without evoking the legacy of American imperialism. Although Honduras has had a peaceful democracy for years, it remains haunted by the ghost of the Cold War. During the 1980’s, the United States used Honduras as a staging ground in its efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Washington’s footprint remained even after the Cold War ended. Up until the Zelaya coup, the United States was still providing hefty military assistance to Honduras, the most recent package totaling $16.5 million. Despite Washington’s support, Honduras has remained one of Central America’s poorest countries. Out of an estimated 8 million Hondurans, more than a third live on less than $2 a day. Many commentators saw President
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Evan Larson ‘13 Zelaya’s election in 2005 as a revolt against the oligarchy that still controls much of the country. Zelaya represented the interests of unions and the working class and developed ties to other leftist leaders, including Hugo Chavez and Raúl Castro. He made Honduras a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a purported alternative to free trade deals which has been promoted by Venezuela
“Many Latin Americans, accustomed to Washington’s imperialistic tendencies in the region, hold the United States responsible for the region’s political instability and lack of development.” and Cuba. Predictably, many Hondurans, especially members of the armed forces, felt that the President went too far in his left-leaning tendencies. Zelaya’s attempt to modify the constitution so that he could run for an additional term, a page lifted from Chavez’s book, was the final straw for the conservative establishment. Before long, Zelaya was ousted from power by the military under accusations of an unconstitutional power grab. If anything was undemocratic, though, it was the expulsion of the Zelaya administration. In the early hours of June 28th, soldiers stormed the presidential
American Foreign Policy
palace, kidnapped the President, took his cell phone, and flew him out of the country. He eventually arrived in Costa Rica, where, still in his pajamas, he angrily protested the coup. After a failed attempt to fly back into Honduras, President Zelaya managed to secretly re-enter the country and is currently residing in the Brazilian embassy. An international coalition swiftly emerged to oppose the coup, making old enemies into bedfellows. The United States and Cuba were in agreement that Mr. Zelaya was wrongfully removed from power. The UN and the Organization of American States issued warnings to the new Honduran administration. The Obama administration vocally supported a power-sharing agreement, the San Jose Accords, which would have returned President Zelaya to power before the November election. A deal was eventually made, but it fell through shortly after being finalized. Unsurprisingly, this unity of opinion was short lived. The Honduran election that took place on November 29th exposed rifts in the international coalition that insisted on Zelaya’s reinstatement. The United States recognized the results of the election of conservative candidate Porfiro Lobo, but only Colombia and a few smaller states have followed suit. Other powers with significant regional influence, namely Spain and Brazil, refuse to recognize the results and demand that Zelaya be returned to his post. The decision to recognize the November election could compromise the United State’s legitimacy if not handled correctly. As recently as September, the Obama administration was threatening to reject any vote held without first returning Zelaya to power. Now that the U.S. has reversed course, Obama must maintain his calls for a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk looking the fool. If the administration unconditionally recognizes the vote and fails to punish the people responsible for the coup, it could look like Washington is offering tacit approval for the Honduran military’s actions. This would smack of American imperialism and remind many of past U.S. support for the ousting of leftist leaders. Therefore, President Obama should go through with recognizing the election, but only if necessary conditions are met. First, the election must prove to have been free and fair. If strong evidence of
South America
Hondurans for Democracy Protest outside the State Department calling for the return of Zelaya, Washington, DC, July 28, 2009 / flickr
electoral fraud emerges, the Obama administration should not hesitate to deem the elections illegitimate and withdraw its tentative backing. Second, Lobo should only be recognized as the new head of state if the intimidation of dissident groups ceases. Amnesty International has reported that factions affiliated with the government have unlawfully suppressed Zelaya supporters in preparation for the election. If the Honduran government did indeed hold a clean election and successfully ends the thuggish behavior of some government-affiliated groups, it will merit the recognition of the vote, and the United States should provide it. By making this recognition conditional, the United States can make clear that it only approves of the restoration of the democratic election process, not of the coup. Washington must also hold the perpetrators of the coup responsible. The stream of military aid flowing into Honduras from the U.S. before the coup made the army extremely powerful, and its actions during the coup prove that it has wielded that power irresponsibly. As a punishment for the coup, the United States should cut off all military aid and restore it only once the events of the coup have been thoroughly investigated, as was promised in
the power-sharing deal. Continuing to provide military aid would be a slap in the face of the Hondurans who saw their democratically-elected president whisked away by well-armed soldiers. Washington also provides more than $180 million in miscellaneous aid to Honduras each year. Some have suggested that this aid should be withheld along with military aid, as punishment for the coup. Honduras is extremely reliant on Ameri-
“Obama must maintain his calls for a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk looking the fool.”
can dollars, the argument goes, so shutting off aid could send a powerful message. Withholding the aid, however, would be ill-advised, and would only reflect
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the Cold War mentality that prioritized American interests over foreign lives. The people that have already suffered the most from the coup, the working poor, are those most likely to be affected by a reduction in aid. This could turn people against the United States and would punish the victims of the coup more than its perpetrators. The United States needs to keep in mind the legacy of foreign intervention in Central America as it continues to address the aftermath of the Zelaya coup. Any significant misstep will undoubtedly reinvigorate anti-American sentiments that have been waning in recent months as a result of President Obama’s diplomatic endeavors. By handling Latin America’s first post-Cold War coup in a way that affirms that the war against communism is indeed over, the United States can take further legitimacy away from its critics and foster stable and prosperous ties across Latin America. Then, perhaps, Porfiro Díaz’s words can finally be laid to rest. Afp
Evan may be reached at eklarson@princeton.edu
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Europe
After Lisbon The Future of the European Union
O
n November 3, 2009, the European Union’s Lisbon treaty was at last ratified when the Czech president Vaclav Klaus ended his solitary opposition and signed the pivotal — if contentious—document, eight years in the making. Despite its roots in the 2001 Laeken Declaration’s pledge of a “more democratic, transparent, and effective” Europe, the Lisbon treaty’s passage is marked by some noticeably undemocratic qualities. Dating to its former incarnation as the more federalist “constitutional treaty,” which contained such protonationalistic elements as an EU anthem and a European “bill of rights,” the much-maligned Lisbon treaty was “agreed upon,” despite being rejected by three out of six referendums. Moreover, 10 governments backed down from their own promises of public votes. For the most part, this contention can be dissected as the struggle between the maximalist and minimalist factions of the EU: between those who argue for a more integrated Europe and those who are content with the current supremacy of certain member-states. In light of the relatively small fanfare generated by the treaty’s final adoption, questions remain as to whether Lisbon will effect any palpable change and what it means for Europe’s future on the world stage. The Lisbon treaty aims at further European integration and can be taken as a political statement in support of a more interconnected Europe. For all the substantial political capital used to ensure the treaty’s passage, however, the maximalists have nevertheless won an empty victory. Consider current European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s statement about the opportunity presented by the treaty: “Don’t expect miracles. Lisbon reinforces our capacity to act, but at least as important is our willingness to act.” Nothing better illustrates how politicized and inertial the current state of affairs has become than the highly conservative picks of Herman Van Rompuy, then Belgian Prime Minister, and Catherine Ashton, previously European Commissioner for Trade, to the new posts of European Council
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Lucas Briger ‘12 President and high representative of foreign policy. In one view, this “capacity to act” was strengthened by the treaty’s “streamlining” and “simplification” of EU decision-making.
“This contention can be dissected as the struggle between the maximalist and minimalist factions of the EU: between those who argue for a more integrated Europe and those who are content with the current supremacy of certain member-states.”
In the past, one of the European Union’s main challenges had been its chronic inability to produce a foreign policy consensus among its 27 member states. In the vacuum of any overarching focus, its foreign policy conformed to the whims of specific members. The treaty’s creation of an EU president and foreign policy representative purports to address this problem. Furthermore, the use of frequently paralyzing unanimous votes has been abandoned in favor of majority rule in many policy areas, including migration, criminal justice, and judicial-police joint action. Additionally, Lisbon changes the voting mechanism in some zones to assign votes to member states based on their populations. In contrast, some critics rightfully question the potentially troublesome sweeping powers of “co-decision” awarded to the stillunfamiliar European Parliament. These include approval of European Commission president and ministers along with partial oversight of the EU budget. The European Parliament now wields influence that is, theoretically, almost equal to the European Council. Many see this as a disaster, pointing to the fact that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are out of touch with their constituencies. Relatively few Europeans vote for MEPs, and, as a recent article in The Economist noted, many Europeans do not even know who represents them. From farm subsidies to immigration, some fear that the Parliament will initiate an ill-advised legislative voting spree on narrow democratic mandates. An already prickly co-existence between the Czech President Vaclav Klaus/ flickr
American Foreign Policy
Europe European Council and the Brussels-based European Commission will now be tested by the accommodation of another, even more unaccountable body. Despite supposed policy improvements, no guiding European foreign policy exists. With the lackluster appointments of Belgium’s Van Rompuy and Britain’s Lady Ashton, EU leaders have confirmed that they are content to exert influence only within Europe, rather than on the world stage. The EU has missed a unique opportunity to utilize the Lisbon treaty to redefine a global Europe, which was—in theory—its most significant aim. Business continues as usual, with balance-of-power concerns and the prioritization of national interests leaving the EU with only a secondary role in world affairs. Granted, Mr. Van Rompuy is an avid Atlanticist, but as he has been prime minister of Belgium for less than a year, it is doubtful that he will “turn heads” in Washington, Beijing, or Moscow the way that a more prominent figure like Tony Blair could have. As British Tory leader David Cameron has observed, Van Rompuy is not “president of Europe.” He is a narrower, “chairmanic” figure rather than a promising sign of unified European diplomacy. It was Van Rompuy’s modest stature that garnered him the outsized support of Germany and France. Lady Ashton was chosen for similarly dull reasons. When asked why she was selected, French president Nicolas Sarkozy replied, “It was felt a woman should hold a big EU job, because a center-left politician was needed to ‘balance’ Mr. Van Rompuy and be-
cause ‘our British friends’ wanted the post.” In fact, Lady Ashton was, at best, only the third choice of her own government. To be fair, Mr. Van Rompuy and Lady Ashton had both performed admirably in their previous roles. But this was neither the time nor the place to pick two relatively inexperienced political unknowns for the most public of EU positions, a weak start for a “new” Europe. Some Euro-conservatives argue that a minimalist interpretation of the Lisbon treaty will actually benefit Europe. They would also argue against appointing a celbrity figure as either president or foreign minister because neither position is directly elected. As Financial Times columnist Gideon Rachman notes, “Ordinary Europeans would be justified in asking by what right the unelected Mr. Blair [for instance] speaks for them.” Yet Mr. Rachman also observes that European unity tends to crumble at moments of international crisis, indicating the necessity of Lisbon’s integrative measures. In principle, the treaty’s main objective was to endow Europe with the political heft to match its status as the world’s largest economy. In all likelihood, it is hard to envision America and China, or even India and Brazil, really respecting Mr. Van Rompuy and Lady Ashton. It is even less likely to imagine Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin doing so. During the South Ossetian War, Mr. Putin reserved no respect for even the European Union itself; its lack of a collective security or defense policy made it impossible for Europe to enforce its demands that Russian troops withdraw. In an international
political landscape shaped by power interests, Europe needs the fullest potential of the Lisbon treaty to avoid becoming an international afterthought. Instead, this missed opportunity will cement the status quo of EU foreign policy being diluted by national governments. As Henry Kissinger once famously—if anecdotally—observed, “Whom do you call when you want to talk to Europe?” While Europe searches for its voice, it will remain a spectator in a G2 world molded by America and China, as enunciated by British foreign secretary David Miliband. Admittedly, the European Union has been considered a triumph of diplomacy, having stabilized the Continent and made war unimaginable. In one sense, though, the European project’s success has led to the present difficulty of deciding how to project its considerable politicaleconomic weight abroad. Europe, with the exhaustion following the Lisbon treaty and the lack of future direction it provided, will only gain international respect if it can harness the treaty’s potential and work toward a more maximalist EU. Afp Lucas may be reached at lbriger@princeton.edu Answers to the quiz on page 7: 1. B 2. D 3. A 4. B 5. A
President Obama at a joint bilateral meeting with President Vaclav Klaus and Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek at Prague Castle/ flickr
December 2009
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Out of a Job?
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