American Foreign Policy November 2011 Issue by American Foreign Policy Magazine

american foreign policy November 2011 Volume XI, Issue II

From the Editor-in-Chief

Staff Editor-in-Chief Taman Narayan ‘13

Dear Readers, Even as the Arab Spring continued in Syria, Iran moved closer to a nuclear bomb, and America added further tension to its fraught relationship with China by opening a new military base in Australia, Europe remained at the center of global headlines in the last couple months. The common currency, once seen by policymakers and intellectuals as the foundation for a united European front, now appears in serious doubt for the first time since its creation. Persistent economic weakness, combined with dangerous levels of public debt, has pushed Italy to the brink, and unlike Greece it is undoubtedly large enough to bring down the Euro with it. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has stepped down, but crippling uncertainty continues to plague investors. In response, Germany and France announced the latest of a number of bailouts, but the response has been tepid. Jacques SingerEmery, in our cover article, echoes a growing chorus of economists in arguing that the European Central Bank must be willing to print money, like America’s Federal Reserve, if the bailout deal is to have meaningful teeth. Meanwhile, Sarah Pak highlights the dangers in Europe’s soliciting of capital from China to support its stabilization fund. As Pak notes, the very fact that this is an issue points to the dramatic shift in relative global power between the struggling United States, which has long been the creditor of the world, and an eager China flush with cash. Christiana Renfro adds some perspective on another major issue: the prisoner exchange between Israel and Palestine that freed Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and thousands of Palestinians. Celebrated by the people in those two countries, the deal may actually end up worsening the prospects for peace. Michael Becker also plays the role of skeptic. Myanmar has been opening up its political processes and releasing prisoners, but Becker argues that the junta is not being genuine and should be pressured to make real reforms to win the international legitimacy it craves. To close out the issue, George Maliha looks at things the U.S. could do to fight Mexico’s drug articles, and Monica Chon previews Libya’s tough road ahead. It has been an honor to serve as the Editor-in-Chief of this publication for the past year. By the time our next issue comes out, I will be in the process of handing the reins over to our next leader, who I am sure will capably lead the magazine forward. The events of the past year, led by the Arab Spring, have the potential to completely reshape America’s foreign policy landscape, and it has been a whirlwind of fun to cover them in real time. Signing off, Taman Narayan Editor-in-Chief

Publisher Matthew Arons ‘13 Managing Editors Adam Safadi ‘14 Rachel Webb ‘14 Rohan Bhargava ‘14 Yun Chung Sweta Haldar Jim Hao Natalie Kim Charlie Metzger Jay Parikh Peter Wang Matt Arons Kristie Liao Jonathan Lin Andres Perez-Benzo Christiana Renfro Daniel Toker Emily VanderLin-

Editors

‘12 ‘12 ‘12 ‘12 ‘12 ‘12 ‘12 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13 ‘13

Audrye Wong Sunny Jeon Valarie Hansen Suchi Mandavilli Amy Gopinathan Jared Isenstein Simon Segert Conleigh Byers Zach Ogle Joanne Im Rahul Subramanian Monica Chon David Zhao Ryan Low

‘13 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘14 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15

Layout

Emily VanderLinden ‘13 Production Manager

Kim Hopewell Adam Safadi Amy Gopinathan Sam Watters

‘13 ‘14 ‘14 ‘15

Mia Rifai Kathryn Moore Joe Margolies David Zhao

‘15 ‘15 ‘15 ‘15

Copy Editors Christina Henricks ‘13 Ben Kotopka ‘13 Editors-in-Chief Emeriti Rush Doshi ‘11 Dan May ‘11 Ben Cogan ‘12

Business Staff

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.afpprinceton.com

Kimberly Hopewell ‘13

Zara Mannan ‘13

AFP Advisory Board

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber: Director, Liechtenstein Institute for Self-Determination Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Christina Paxson: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School

American Foreign Policy

AFP Cover Story

A merican F oreign P olicy

November 2011 Volume XI, Issue II

ta b l e o f co n t e n ts

Rebuilding Stability A New Role for the European Central Bank Jacques Singer-Emery ‘13

Bailing Out the EU The Danger of Chinese Involvement Sarah Pak ‘15

AFP Quiz

Photo Credits: Creative Commons images from Flickr

Taman Narayan ‘13

In This Game, Everyone Loses The Israel-Hamas Prison Exchange Christiana Renfro ‘13

Global Update

The End of an Era America’s Withdrawal from Iraq Regina Wang ‘14

Feigning Reform How to Promote Real Change in Myanmar Michael Becker ‘14

In Context

Renewing the War on Drugs A Firmer Stand Against Mexican Cartels George Maliha ‘13

Post-Gaddafi Libya The Danger of Dwelling on the Past Monica Chon ‘15

Adam Safadi ‘14

Rachel Webb ‘14

November 2011

Cover Image by Joe Margolies ‘15

Europe

Riot Police in Greece using tear gas to break up an anti-austerity protest. Photo from commons.wikimedia.org

Rebuilding Stability A New Role for the European Central Bank

everal months of meetings and rushed aid packages have resulted in the following deal: investors will voluntarily take a 50 percent cut in the face value of their bonds in exchange for more security in their holdings, a higher return, and a shorter maturity. The European government’s “solution” to the Greek debt crisis is a band-aid and not a comprehensive treatment. This is as it should be. No major systemically altering deal should come out of an emergency meeting by Europe’s heads of state to find a workable fix to a single problem. However, this stopgap measure, while meaningful in some respects, could be far more effective if the EU countries stopped protecting their short-term interests and allowed for the European Central Bank (ECB) to support the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) by increasing the monetary base. When the dust settles it is estimated that the adjusted bonds will have a 21 percent reduction in net present value and Greece’s banks, which will

Jacques Singer-Emery ‘13 be taking a 25 billion Euro loss, will be given 30 billion Euros as collateral to insure their solvency. This plan is expected eventually to cut Greece’s debt to 122 percent of GDP. Additionally, to insure that the Italian and Spanish banks do not become insolvent from another bank run, the European Financial Stability Facility is supposed to increase its reserves to 1 trillion Euros. The finalization of this proposal buoyed U.S., European, and Asian markets: shortly afterwards, the Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped 4.91 percent, the DAX 100 3.01 percent, and the Nikkei 1.8 percent. However, the world market’s positive response to the Eurozone’s solution does not mean that European finances are any more secure. While this proposal is a first step in the right direction, the deal does not completely solve the short run problem of Greece’s finances or prevent the spread of the debt crisis. Even with its debt cut by about a fifth, Greece will have a great deal of trouble paying back a sum larger than its GDP. The

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government has an extraordinarily poor tax collection system and thus no reliable source of revenue other than debt sales. Because the Euro allowed Greece to borrow more at lower interest rates, the parties in power promised their voters benefits that could only be sustained by selling this debt. But now that this gilded age has passed, Greece has to either collect taxes or cut benefits. Yet, any Greek government that pushes austerity too far would be effectively committing political suicide and dooming their country to a longer and more severe recession. A report by the European Central Bank showed Greece’s output this year will shrink by 5.5 percent, and it has been postulated that the nation will not return to growth until 2013. It will be extremely difficult for Greece to raise its revenue to the point where it can pay off even

“The European government’s solution to the Greek debt crisis is a band-aid and not a comprehensive treatment.”

this fraction of its accrued debt, as doing so would further shrink its economy. This reality will inevitably lead to future problems regarding Greece’s finances. Because a Greek default is a systemic risk to the Euro, economic powerhouses like Germany and France will continue to give Greece the deal of a lifetime. Greece, in turn, will continue to waff le and bargain on these agreements because it does not want to commit to austerity. At the end of the day, Europe will support Greece’s 450 billion dollar debt, because the alternative is to suffer the massive deleveraging that would result from Greece’s failure to pay. However, because it is politically unsavory to just bail Greece out, the larger countries will tiptoe around the issue and try and find other, less efficient, ways for Greece to “pay its own way.” The second part of this deal is supposed to provide the EFSF with enough firepower to prevent larger economies like Spain and Italy from becoming insolvent. Because nations in the EU have already expanded the newly formed authority several times over, however, this new expansion is one that will not take the form of money. The EFSF will be given two new tools: the first allows the EFSF to insure the first losses of any new bonds within the Euro-zone (essentially, any non-catastrophic loss on a newly issued bond, give or take 20%, is now insured by the EFSF); and the second mandate allows the EFSF to create a series of special purpose vehicles financed by other investors and designated to specific counties to prevent the risk from spreading. Yet, these new tools may give the EFSF less leverage than expected. Insurance does not work and is not comforting if every investor knows the institution backing the insured bond cannot reimburse the holder. Additionally, if Germany is not willing to place money in these special purpose vehicles why should Japan or China, who have no immediate stake in the Eurozone? The likely answer is that they will not. Thus, both the preventative measures and the stopgaps for the Eurozone and Greek debt clearly have major f laws in their designs.

Europe

“The EFSF will be given two new tools: the first allows the EFSF to insure the first losses of any new bonds within the Eurozone...and the second mandate allows the EFSF to create a series of special purpose vehicles...designated to specific countries to prevent the risk from spreading.” There was one option that could have lessened the cumulative sting of Greece’s new debts and secured the Italian and Spanish economies. But it was tabled because it would have negatively impacted creditor nations. Specifically, Germany could have given the European Central Bank the ability to print a large number of Euros to support the EFSF. This option is completely within the powers of the ECB, but the ECB’s ability to use those powers is limited by the nations of the Eurozone. The ECB states that its mandate is to “maintain price stability with inf lation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.” If the ECB were to scrap its mandate for a short period of time and inf late the Euro, the rest of the stopgap measure could work. Inf lating the Euro coupled with the haircut would be especially painful for German banks, which hold large amounts of other European debt as well as Greek debt, but it would not force them to deleverage nor would ECB-led inf lation fundamentally change the structure of the Euro zone. A moderate increase in the inf lation rate would slightly lessen the real value of the debt held by the

November 2011

countries of the Eurozone and give the EFSF the firepower necessary to back up its new mandate to insure the potential first losses of new debt issued by countries of the Eurozone. Along with the already accepted measures, inf lating the Euro is a quick and easy answer to the short-term problem of putting the Eurozone on surer footing and making sure Greece can repay the remainder of its debt. The Germans have to realize that this may be the Eurozone’s only way to ensure that this deal does not become a meaningless one. While the German creditor banks may suffer some penalty from this policy of inf lation, these losses will be miniscule compared with the financial meltdown that would occur if Italy defaults on its debt or the Greek deal has to be reworked. Both of these scenarios are not that far-fetched if the Eurozone cannot insure that this deal is supported with something more tangible than the current proposal. Still, the new deal is just a nicely dressed stopgap measure designed to do the bare minimum, make everyone happy, and avoid any major changes. Such a deal would be fine if the stopgaps could effectively insure Greek debt against further default and prevent the crisis from making Italian debt insoluble. Without the support of additional currency, however, the stopgap measures fail to do either. Germany is going to fight an inf lation policy because such a policy would reduce its banks’ returns. Consequently, German interests have placed the rest of Europe at risk of a prolonged crisis that could be greatly helped with just a moderate amount of inf lation. In the long run, the Eurozone will have to change its structure or face an endless cycle of smaller countries abusing their position with the larger. But for the short term, as long as the mentality of trying to “have everyone keep their cake and eat it too” prevails among the leaders Europe, no stopgap measure will ever give the Eurozone economies the breathing space they need to introduce major reforms. Afp Jacques may be reached at jsinger@princeton.edu

Europe

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao at the EU-China Summit. Photo from daylife.com

Bailing out the EU The Danger of Chinese Involvement

ven before the approval of the EU bailout package, representatives from the European Union and heads of state were aggressively courting investments from China. China’s involvement in the EU bailout package should come as no surprise. The United States, Europe’s historical ally and creditor, is in no position to assist, given its own budget issues and stubbornly high unemployment rate. China, on the other hand, has a growth rate of around 9 percent and a $3.2 trillion reserve on hand. Furthermore, Europe represents China’s largest export market, and a decrease in European demand would lead to economic difficulties in China. But despite the alignment of interests, Europe will have to make serious concessions in exchange for an anticipated $140 billion Chinese investment in the newly formed European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). Some of these concessions may be diplomatic, such as turning a blind eye to China’s

Sarah Pak ‘15 human-rights violations, while others may come in the form of removing existing trade sanctions or anti-dumping measures. Most troublingly for EU unity, however, is that China’s activity may inadvertently spark competition between states for investments and ultimately divide EU policy. For some Euro watchers, this arrangement between Europe and China is only the latest example of “the scramble for Europe”. Borrowing the phrase from the 19th century competition between European states to acquire colonies in Africa, skeptics use the term broadly to argue that the surge in Chinese acquisitions of European companies and related investments will undermine European competitiveness. In the words of a French official, “It’s a real war, with highly subsidized companies coming to open markets with unusually low prices and undercutting the competition.” Moreover, this may lead to a split EU policy on China, with “cash-

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strapped deal-seekers”, like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIGS), simply seeking investments, while “frustrated market-openers” like Germany and France seek a united European consensus to protect domestic firms both in Europe and abroad in China. Especially in the eyes of countries like Germany and France, China’s investment patterns in Europe present a concern. A disproportionately large percentage of China’s global investments are in Eastern Europe (10%) and PIGS (30%) – the traditionally weaker EU economies. Combined with the fact that Chinese firms have been beating out European firms for large publicsector contracts in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, this leads wealthier EU states to eye China’s intentions warily. Undoubtedly, this arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However, the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern. Although EU law forbids state-run companies from bidding for public contracts, many Chinese multinationals that bid for these contracts have close ties to government, maintain a shadow party structure, and most importantly, obtain government

Europe subsidies, which give them a further leg up on their European competitors. Furthermore, Chinese firms can keep costs lower than their European competitors by importing low-cost laborers from China and paying them significantly less. Why is this a problem for European unity? While poorer EU members see only the benefits of discounted costs, wealthier EU members see anti-competitive practices as harmful for domestic firms. Furthermore, when European firms from wealthier nations go abroad, they are frustrated by China’s lack of reciprocity. While European firms are nominally allowed to bid for projects in China, they rarely win, as the rules are skewed almost always to favor do-

“This arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern.”

mestic firms. Therefore, the vast majority of China’s internationally known mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, Olympic stadiums, and bullet trains are administered instead by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC). So while the “market-openers” cry foul and attempt to overhaul existing EU legislation, the “cash-strapped deal-seekers” do not see it in their interest to comply with any policy to change the status quo. To argue that China actively seeks to weaken the EU by reaching agreements with individual member states to create a divisive “China lobby” within the union may be a stretch. China has little to gain from the dissolution of the

EU. Nonetheless, Europe must put its economic house in order, encourage China to open up its market to foreign firms, and finally mitigate the unfair advantages that Chinese firms have while bidding in Europe. To achieve the first goal, the EU must evolve beyond its original intent and become a monetary and a fiscal union. Though this would most likely face serious resistance from many EU states, the debt crisis in Europe today is a direct result of a failure on the part of the EU states to coordinate fiscal policy. It is important to remember while China demands certain conditions for its purchase of euro bonds, this originated from a lack of European coordination that precipitated this disaster. By allowing each state to pursue its own interest independently, each state ended up collectively worse off than if they had coordinated their policies together. Moving towards a fiscal union will benefit the EU in the present by giving investors confidence in EU bonds, and will benefit the EU in the future by making it easier to head off the type of debt crises that we see today, reducing the need for the type of outside intervention that Europe is soliciting from China now. In addition, more regulation will be required to prevent foreign firms from using subsidies to gain unfair advantages in bidding. Since there already exist a myriad of regulation in China, the European Financial Stability Fund suggests that the EU should reciprocate, especially in fields such as defense, critical technologies, media, and education. While Chinese investments have exposed weaknesses in the EU’s structure, these are all manageable issues that, in time, can be resolved. Although the alarmist reports in the media have painted a portrait of newly ascendant China righting past wrongs by reversecolonizing Europe, the truth is that China is neither belligerent nor friendly – it is simply in pursuit of its own selfinterest, and Europe should respond accordingly by strengthening existing ties between states. Afp Sarah may be reached at spak@princeton.edu

November 2011

AFP Quiz Multiple Choice Monthly Taman Narayan ‘13 1. How many bases did the United States have in Iraq at the height of the war? a. 150 b. 505 c. 372 d. 231

2. Experts credit all but which of the following for reducing the famine problem in Somalia? a. Change in tactics by the Shabab b. Increased rainfall c.Electronic payments to cell phones d. Western charities partner- ing with local charities 3. Brazil’s shantytowns are known as which of the following? a. Ghettos b. Barrios c. Vilas d. Favelas 4. Despite high unemployment, Nigeria’s interest rate is how high? a. 17% b. 8% c. 6% d. 12% 5. President Obama decided to do what about the Keystone XL pipeline? a. Allow it b. Postpone making a decision c. Reject it d. Ask Canada

Answers on page 19

Middle East

In This Game, Everyone Loses The Israel-Hamas Prisoner Exchange

an a prisoner exchange of 1,027 men and women ever be considered a victory for both sides? On October 18th, citizens of the state of Israel poured onto the streets and uncorked their champagne bottles in celebration of this calculation, one that had brought back home a symbol of national pride and military strength. Simultaneously, across the West Bank and Gaza, hundreds of Palestinian families tearfully reunited with long-imprisoned loved ones, returned due to that same calculation which, to them, appeared an obvious victory. In the aftermath of the exchange, in which Israel freed Palestinians imprisoned for everything from dissent to violence in return for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Force soldier captured in the July War with Lebanon’s Hizballah, Israeli opinion is divided, but only slightly: according to polls taken immediately after the release, between 74 and 80 percent of the Israeli public support the exchange. Indeed, addressing concerns as to the inequality of the exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted

Christiana Renfro ‘13

from the Talmud: “He who saves one soul, it is as though he saved an entire world.” Meanwhile, Palestinians are jubilant at the prospect of having secured the release of so many, for what they consider so little. It seems that for once, a solution has been brokered in the endlessly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people that somewhat satisfies everyone. Yet the prisoner exchange, seemingly a one-shot, no-strings-attached PR boon for the Israeli government and Hamas alike, will have far-reaching consequences for which neither party is prepared. The exchange, brokered in secret by Egypt between the two parties, failed to engage either the Israeli or Palestinian public in a way that would have given them a sense of future potential for open cooperation. The concept of negotiation between Israel and Hamas has been thrust upon both publics quite suddenly, giving them little stake in the talks or the possibility of others in the future. Moreover, as the initial joy fades, the exchange serves to remind both parties of the tense relationship that created the need to exchange such prisoners— captured in times of conflict, imprisoned

Outside of Israel’s Suporeme Court in Jeruslaem, relatives who lost loved ones in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict hold signs supporting the prisoner exchange with Hamas.. Photo from flickr.com

American Foreign Policy

for political dissent and terrorism—in the first place. Indeed, both sides view this act as one of just compensation rather than one of reconciliation. The impact it will have for both Israeli security prospects and Palestinian aspirations is minimal at best and costly at worst. While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would

“While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would believe such a security risk to be wise.” believe such a security risk to be wise. The deal, after all, releases men and women whose involvement included but was not limited to a 2001 Jerusalem pizzeria bombing, the 2002 “Passover Massacre” in Netanya, and a 2004 shooting attack on the Trans-Israel Highway. To Israelis, these incidents no doubt represent profound threats to their security, and the release of those who committed them seems an odd risk to take considering the importance they place on combating terrorism. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni, among others, has pointed out this discrepancy. Yet while Israeli’s security interests have been imperiled by the prisoner exchange, Palestinians’ aspirations for statehood have been dealt a far greater blow. Even as the release was celebrated by those families whose loved ones had come home, some of whom had been imprisoned since 1987’s first intifada, it was quickly hailed by Hamas themselves as evidence of the need to take more

Israeli soldiers hostage since, clearly, it had proven effective. “The people want a new Gilad!” protesters chanted at a Hamas rally in Gaza City, shortly after the exchange. And while the capture of Gilad Shalit does appear to have paid dividends for Hamas, it has become painfully evident to Palestinians that violent action against the state of Israel only results in increased security measures and repression. Hamas’ citing of this exchange as a success, then, has the potential to derail the non-violent Palestinian opposition to Israel that has become more widespread in recent years. Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy and popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal. Israel and the international community alike generally regard Fatah as the more legitimate Palestinian government; any substantive peace deal, therefore, would necessitate their involvement. Relations between Israel and Fatah, however, are tenuous at best, and an upsurge in violence by Hamas, by taking prisoners or using similar means would most likely reflect poorly on the Palestinian cause as a whole, and therefore Fatah by association. Moreover, historically, this sort of violence has led to increasingly repressive Israeli security measures, which would set Palestinian expectations back substantially. Furthermore, even if Hamas’ rhetoric fails to derail the Palestinian cause, the deal they brokered with Israel has taken the spotlight away from the issues that concern Palestinians the most. While Shalit’s release and the role Hamas played in it has caused a stir in the media, little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the conflict, dizzying in scope and, as of late, unaddressed by either party through negotiation. Any attempts at peace talks have stalled and a UN bid, while symbolically significant, has been doomed to failure. Palestinians continue to exist in an oddly bifurcated, quasi-independent non-state, which they view as imminently threatened by Israel’s persistent creation of “facts on the ground” in the form of illegal settlements. Yet international attention regarding the conflict has been distracted from the unabated settlement construction in East Jerusalem, supported by PM Netanyahu, among others, by a high-publicity event with little implication for the larger issues at stake.

Middle East

Because of the prisoner exchange, this woman’s son would be released. Photo from flickr.com

Some will argue that the joy and relief that both sides have felt in the days following the exchange will promote a mutual spirit of goodwill, inciting reconciliation and future peace. Others argue that the negotiation necessary to cut the Israel-Hamas deal served to break the ice between the two parties, laying a path for future talks. “This is a sign of a good

“Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy of the popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal.” deal,” wrote Uri Dromi, former spokesman for previous Israeli PMs Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, “when both sides walk away equally dissatisfied.” This might have been true if a deal containing any substance had been reached. Yet the fact that talks did not address the underlying issues concerning Palestinian statehood and its implications for Jerusalem—water issues, the return

November 2011

of refugees, and Israeli security, to name a few—does not bode well for any future relationship. Furthermore, neither the Palestinian nor Israeli public saw the talks as as a step on the road to peace: to each side, the deal represented the long-awaited return of men and women, imprisoned by an unjust party for fighting a just cause. Indeed, the Israeli government did not even attempt to portray it as such. “I have brought your son home to you,” Netanyahu announced, upon bringing Shalit to his parents’ home in northern Israel. The bravado and simplicity of his statement brushed aside any acknowledgment of the complexity of the deal he had just made, as well as its implications for his nation and another’s future. For Hamas, the prisoner deal seemed too good to be true. For the Israeli and Palestinian public, it is. If the exchange served any purpose, it was to remind people from both societies of another type of prisoner—the one that they themselves have become, held hostage by directionless leadership willing to make long-term sacrifices for short-term popularity. Afp

Christina may be reached at crenfro@princeton.edu

A: HAITIAN President Michel

Martelly forms a commission to consider plans for restoration of the Haitian security force which was disbanded 16 years ago due to frequent human rights abuses.

B: Demonstrators gather in

EGYPT’S Tahrir Square to protest the military leaders’ addition to the constitution of a provision declaring the military the guardian of “constitutional legitimacy”.

C: Shipments of rice from areas

near the Fukushima nuclear plant in JAPAN are barred following the discovery of high levels of radioactive cesium at a farm 60 km from the plant.

G: Amid renewed bombing by the H: Former PHILIPPINES Presi- I: NORTH KOREA begins allownorth, SOUTH SUDAN seeks foreign investments to rebuild factories shut down since the South gained independence in July.

dent Gloria Arroyo is arrested in the hospital on charges of election fraud. The arrest comes as President Arroyo was trying to flee the country.

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ing Chinese tourists into the country to visit certain historical areas, among them the reported birth place of the “Great Leader” Kim Il-Sung.

D: ITALY’S new Prime Minister E: King Abdullah of JORDAN

F: RUSSIAN President Dmitri

J: A newspaper in SOUTH AFRICA K: Thousands of students and

L: INDIAN PM Manmohan Singh

Mario Monti receives resounding support in a key vote of confidence. He is planning to implement widespread austerity measures to combat Italy’s growing debt.

is censored by a presidential aide who threatened criminal prosecution if it printed a story about now presidential spokesman Mac Maharaj’s connection to a shady arms deal.

becomes the first Arab leader to call on President Assad to step down. His remarks come shortly after the Arab League’s suspension of Syria.

teachers clash with riot police outside the CHILEAN parliament. Protestors are calling for education reform and free public university education.

November 2011

Medvedev signs an agreement with leaders of Kazakhstan and Belarus to create a Eurasian Economic Union which any former Soviet state would be eligible to join.

meets with President Obama to discuss reforming the 2005 nuclear deal which allows U.S. companies to export nuclear materials to India but would hold these businesses responsible in the case of a nuclear accident.

US Foreign Policy

The End of an Era America’s Withdrawal from Iraq

resident Obama announced his plan to withdraw all American troops by the end of this year on October 21, marking the end to a controversial eight-year war. This decision, ostensibly motivated by the failure of U.S. and Iraqi leaders to agree upon the immunity status of American troops in Iraq, also fulfills a campaign promise. While troop withdrawal is part of a legacy of questionable decisions made in Iraq, it also presents an opportunity for America to improve existing relations with the Iraqi people and their politicians. Hours after the ultimatum requiring Saddam Hussein’s departure from Iraq had expired, on March 19th, 2003, President Bush ordered the commencement of the Iraq War. The justifications presented were Hussein’s intention to build weapons of mass destruction and a purported link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the September 11th attacks. Both of these reasons have since been disputed and have rendered the start of the war a contentious issue to this day. By April 9th, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s rule had collapsed, and on May 1, Bush announced an end to major combat in Iraq. Bush’s announcement was quickly proven premature and was subsequently followed by several mistakes and miscalculations. Members of the Bush administration issued orders to purge the government of Baathists and disband the Iraqi army, and the consequences of these decisions immediately became apparent. With the fall of Hussein’s government, American troops faced a new enemy of Baathists, paramilitary fighters, former Iraqi soldiers and foreign militants opposed to American occupation. Counterinsurgency became the newest tactical approach, causing parallels to be drawn between the war in Iraq and the Vietnam War, as U.S. troops were confronted by an enemy who was willing to fight to the death and who often intermingled with civilians. In September 2004, an

Regina Wang ‘14 assault staged by U.S. and Iraqi forces targeting an insurgent stronghold resulted in 38 U.S. deaths and 800 Iraqi civilian deaths in addition to 1,200 insurgent deaths. This effort highlighted the costly nature of the war as gains against the enemy came at high civilian costs. Iraqi civilian deaths peaked in 2006, with estimates ranging

“America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force.” from 1,000 to 3,500 per month. On April 28, 2004, evidence of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib was uncovered, prompting worldwide criticism of the way that the war was being conducted. Two years later, a CNN survey found that 60 percent of Americans opposed the war, the majority of which also favored the withdrawal of at least some troops from Iraq. Partially in response to the public criticism of the war and U.S. strategy, President Bush made several significant modifications to U.S. policy in Iraq. In November 2006, he announced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. In January 2007, the Bush administration implement-

American Foreign Policy

ed a controversial troop surge in Iraq. The increase in U.S. troops and U.S.-led offensives in Iraq, as outlined in the new strategy, led to an increased number of casualties. Indeed, the deadliest strike yet occurred in August of 2007, when coordinated suicide truck bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties. It also proved to be the most costly year for U.S. soldiers, as American casualties reached over nine hundred. Nevertheless, the surge was largely credited with reducing sectarian violence in Iraq. As the situation in Iraq began to stabilize, plans for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces were accelerated. The withdrawal deadline set for the end of 2011 dates back to the Status of Forces Agreement made in November 2008 by the Bush administration. At the time, the U.S. had intended to maintain a residual force of several thousand American soldiers for security purposes. The continued U.S. presence was opposed by varying Iraqi political factions like the Sadrists. Led by the influential Moktada al-Sadr, they advocated armed resistance if American forces remained past the withdrawal deadline. Shortly after taking office, President Obama began the process of reducing troops in Iraq and moving troops to Afghanistan. He announced plans to remove combat brigades by August 2010, a deadline which he honored with the end of combat missions on August 31, 2010. With the reduction of troops in Iraq, President Obama made it clear that an end to the Iraq war was approaching; however, Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued to recommend maintaining troops past the deadline upon Iraqi request. The October 21st announcement to honor previous security agreements and complete troop withdrawal by the end of 2011 came as a surprise to many, as American officials had previously planned to keep a significant force of troops in Iraq under diplomatic immunity. Obama’s decision to honor a prior deadline reflected his desire to fulfill a campaign promise while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of an indefinite American troop commitment. Withdrawing American troops from Iraq certainly has its consequences, as many of Obama’s Republican critics will be quick to contend. A major issue is the potential resurgence of Al Qaeda, which had suffered major defeats after the American troop surge in 2007. On August 15, 2011, a string of 42 apparently coordinated attacks left 89 dead and 315 wounded in a single

day, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia warned of further attacks in revenge for the death of Osama bin Laden. Analysts are particularly afraid of ties re-forming between Al Qaeda and members of the former ruling Baath Party. There is also the fear that without American troop support, the currant Iraqi government will collapse or that in the face of American withdrawal, other countries will attempt to invade Iraq. Iran is one such country that poses a threat to Iraqi security; historically, it has supported aggressive attacks against American troops in Iraq. These concerns, while valid, can overestimate the benefits of maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Even with the presence of American troops, violence continues to occur in Iraq. Many of the insurgents specifically oppose American intervention, creating reason to believe that attacks will decrease with the withdrawal of American troops, as will the justification for Iranian intervention to expel American troops. Furthermore, maintaining 10,000 troops beyond 2011 forces the U.S. into making an indeterminate commitment. Even with plans for diminishing the U.S. presence, 68,000 troops are expected to remain for at

US Foreign Policy

least another year. With troops stationed in Iraq for over eight years, many have grown disillusioned with the benefits of staying. A continued military presence without a set withdrawal deadline can only hurt morale without any tangible benefits for the troops that stay. The parallels between Iraq and Vietnam abound, and rightly so. As in Vietnam, Americans have tired of intervention in Iraq. According to a poll conducted by Washington Post-ABC, 78 percent of Americans support Obama’s decision. The results of the Vietnam War may not have been consistent with America’s expectations, but diplomatic ties and trade relations eventually followed after American withdrawal and the fears of a domino effect proved unwarranted. There may be costs to withdrawing troops, in the form of a weakened and potentially vulnerable Iraqi government, but there are far more benefits. These include bringing troops home, ending an unpopular war, discouraging foreign attacks against American troops, and forging positive relations with the Iraqi people. America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can

only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force. The U.S. is concerned that upon troop withdrawal, Iraq will be vulnerable and that its neighbors will step in and exert soft power to influence Iraq’s government and people. The US can counter this by matching the efforts made by Iraq’s neighboring countries, constructing schools, contributing to infrastructure, and developing favorable trade relations. These strategies will not only improve America’s world image and its influence over Iraqi policies, but in the long run, will provide for a more sustainable method for cultivating longterm influence and positive relationships within the Middle East. The U.S. has spent more than eight years using hard power in an effort to win Iraq over; now it is time to exercise soft power to create a positive working relationship with the Iraqi government and people. Afp

Regina may be reached at rrwang@princeton.edu

American soldier stationed in Iraq. Photo from armyrecognition.com

November 2011

Asia

Feigning Reform How to Promote Real Change in Myanmar

n Sunday, March 20, 2011, hidden amidst the vast sprawl of Jakarta, Indonesia, the Thai politician Surin Pitsuwan conducted discussions with other delegates from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to consider recent developments in Myanmar. Pitsuwan is the Secretary-General of ASEAN, which has publicized its preference for Myanmar to hold the ASEAN Chair for 2014. While Myanmar had appropriately declined the position in 2006 amidst mounting international pressures to liberalize, it now seems hungry for another opportunity. This second chance seems surprising, given that the second clause of the ASEAN Declaration seeks “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law.” Since 1988, the actions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Myanmar’s brutally violent military junta, have shown contempt for these goals. However, recent elections, increased amnesty, and a general thawing of political oppression have undeniably helped the government’s reputation. The tides appear to be turning in Myanmar, albeit slowly. And yet, one cannot help but fear that these moves towards political orthodoxy are just a

Suu Kyi leaving the headquarters of the National League for Democracy. Photo from NYTimes.

Michael Becker ‘14

charade to curry ASEAN favor. To hold the Chairmanship would legitimize Myanmar’s suspicious new government and strengthen ties with potential trading partners. At the moment, the Burmese government seems to be superficially liberalizing and using political prisoners as pawns to gain international legitimacy. Meanwhile, its public remains largely oppressed. It is indeed difficult to reconcile basic conceptions of universal human rights and this politically and economically motivated exploitation. The key to optimizing these trends is to gently draw Burmese politicians and generals into enforcing policies that are both forwardlooking and enduring so that the people of Myanmar can benefit from true democracy and freedom of speech. The political clout and economic might of nearby nations like India and Thailand, as well as the United States, puts them in prime positions to do so. One may wonder as to why a martial state like Myanmar might suddenly seek international legitimacy in forums such as ASEAN. Previously, the isolated dictatorship relied almost wholly upon the support of the Communist Party of China. Ever since the Burmese government became first to recognize Mao’s fledgling regime, the nations have maintained a special relationship. Not only has China long been Myanmar’s largest trading partner, it has also provided the junta with weaponry to enforce its rule. Despite this amicable history, protests in Yangon in 2007 prompted Beijing to modestly propose that the Burmese regime impose greater peace and stability. More recently, the junta’s crackdowns on the rebellious Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have sent thousands of Burmese refugees into China’s Yunnan province. This gradual decline of once-unshakable Chinese support, coupled with a new form of government, has forced Myanmar into looking elsewhere –places like India, Indonesia, and Thailand – for support. Such starvation for outside support may have prompted the SPDC to allow for

American Foreign Policy

elections in 2010. However, the government declared Aung San Suu Kyi’s candidacy illegitimate for her criminal record, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) thus boycotted the elections; neutral outside sources have since declared these elections fraudulent. There was, however, a nominal dissolution of militant junta authority. Thein Sein – the Prime Minister under Than Shwe’s junta regime – was illegitimately voted president and maintained many vestiges of the previous administration. And yet, the junta’s decision to release Nobel Peace Prize winner Suu Kyi from 15 years of house arrest seems to indicate a shift in ideology. More encouraging news came last month, when about 200 political prisoners were released according to government promises. This is just the beginning of the mass amnesty that is to eventually free 6,300 of Myanmar’s unjustly imprisoned citizens. Released dissidents remain cynical, however, given that around 92% of political detainees remain behind bars. In these tumultuous times in Burmese politics, even good news is confusing news. Is this truly an ideologically motivated thawing of political oppression, or simply the military apparatus’ scheme to win the ASEAN Chairmanship and international legitimacy? It would therefore be unwise – naïve even – to begin bestowing praise on the government of Myanmar. After last year’s fraudulent elections the second-highestranked diplomat of Washington’s Burmese embassy, Kyaw Win, defected from his post in protest; in order to protect his family from potential political violence, he sought the American government’s asylum. He explained his motives in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which he boldly claimed that “senior military officials are consolidating their grip on power…oppression is rising and war against our ethnic cousins is imminent.” Such internal experience ought not be ignored, especially in light of Myanmar’s erratic tendency to enact superficial reforms only to follow them up with violent crackdowns. Despite initial tolerance of the peaceful protests in 2007, protestors were soon quashed by brutal violence on behalf of the junta. Are we to expect Suu Kyi and her supporters to disregard such novel freedoms and superficial signs of progress, despite the tireless years they have spent in its pursuit? Should the NLD not exploit the government’s current willingness to reform for ASEAN Chairmanship while they still

can and push for a liberal democracy from within? Unfortunately, it seems as though the Burmese power apparatus is still hesitant to permit such internal forces to have so strong a voice. A better way might be to take advantage of Myanmar’s desperation for an improved international reputation and to allow encouragement to come from outside the country. It is therefore imperative that surrounding nations strike a delicate balance between praise and dissatisfaction. India, for instance, had publicly supported democratic movements in Myanmar; however, when the riots of 2007 were violently quashed, India fell silent. Due to a desire to keep border tensions and resource flow secure, Delhi issued a statement saying they would let Myanmar’s people come to democracy unimpeded. Unsurprisingly, neighboring powerhouse China also neglected to enforce human rights standards. Such behavior is intolerable; developed nations must not neglect such abuses of basic human rights for the sake of commerce. Indian officials must change their tone from apathetic to indignant; the United States must aid their cause of imposing liberalization by engaging the Burmese in diplomacy, rather than in lopsided commerce. The international community must coax the Burmese into continuing these reforms, while also asserting that they ought not be for the sole purpose of temporary appeasement. Thein Sein and the new bureaucrats have sought to gain favor from their fellow ASEAN members through the deliberate thaw of military rule and the liberation of Suu Kyi. Such actions, however, will only gain them the temporary spotlight of the globally criticized ASEAN. Through conditional engagement, we can lure Burmese politicians into acceptable behavior. The Burmese government’s desperation for international recognition and commerce, as well as its citizens’ poverty, puts it in a highly vulnerable position. Now that the most basic steps have been taken to democratize, the international community must bring these fledgling reforms to fruition. Regardless of the regime’s actual motives, if the international community crafts an optimistic albeit realistic attitude towards these changes, we can make incredible changes on behalf of the oppressed Burmese public. Afp Michael may be reached at mjbecker@princeton.edu

Asia

In Context

Compiled by Rachel Webb ‘14 “President Obama supported the [Libyan] uprising, correct? I gotta go back and see. I got all this stuff twirling around in my head.”

Herman Cain, Republican presidential hopeful, answering

a question posed by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Editorial Board

“If the Nigerian government can’t solve the problem, and the violence continues, then this virus will spread across the countries of west Africa and central Africa, emboldening the group and boosting its membership, making it a well-established part of al Qaeda”

Shehu Sani, President of the Civil Rights Congress, commenting on the recent upsurge of violence committed by Boko Haram, a radical Muslim sect in Nigeria

“It’s hard to see how he would recover his legitimacy after killing almost 4,000 of his countrymen.”

Emile Hokayem, senior fellow for regional security at the Bahrain office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, evaluating Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s political prospects

“That possibility (of a new relationship between Myanmar and the US) will depend upon the Burmese government taking more concrete action. If Burma fails to move down the path of reform, it will continue to face sanctions and isolation.” President Obama, announcing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s trip to Myanmar

“We have had a very good discussion between very good friends. There are many things on which we are in absolute agreement.”

Britain’s David Cameron, on his Berlin talks with Angela Merkel

“It’s not that the results changed on the way (to be counted), it’s that the absolute power of the councils overseeing the polls did not allow any challenges.”

Roberto Bendana, president of We Make Democracy, a local pro-democracy group in Nicaragua that has disputed President Daniel Ortega’s re-election Sources: New York Times, Time, Reuters, Al-Jazeera, Associated Press, CNN.

November 2011

US Foreign Policy

US-Mexico drug tunnel joining warehouses in Tijuana, Mexico and Otay Mesa, California. Photo from National Post.

Renewing the War on Drugs A Firmer Stand against Mexican Cartels George Maliha ‘13

he upsurge in drug-related violence in Mexico vividly illustrates the type of war that the United States and Mexico will have to continue waging against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). As clashes between government forces and drug lords in Colombia helped close the Caribbean smuggling routes to the United States, Mexico has increasingly trafficked (and produced) the drugs that fuel America’s addiction. Success in Mexico, therefore, could cut off an important illicit trade route and weaken the organizations that have terrorized the Mexican population and infiltrated their government. The nearly daily reports of casualties, however, testify to the difficulty of the struggle and the level of commitment that will be required by both the United States and

Mexico to defeat the DTOs. Already, 40,000 have died in the current violence, with few signs of abating. A stable and prosperous Mexico represents a national security interest to the United States. The United States must therefore assist Mexican officials in purging government corruption, reforming the legal system, and providing the training and intelligence resources required to combat these violent organizations. With the severe weakening of Columbian drug cartels, Mexico emerged as the most viable route for large-scale drug trafficking into the United States. This near monopoly on the drug trade has enriched Mexican DTOs and has allowed them to funnel bribes to American and Mexican officials. Drug proceeds of over $20 billion have been used to launder funds and

American Foreign Policy

purchase the weapons and equipment that DTOs use to fight the Mexican military, battle other armed gangs, and even dig the infamous smuggling tunnels across the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, foreign powers such as Iran have taken advantage of the chaos to contract DTOs, most recently in the failed assassination attempt of the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Moreover, while a significant portion of the American population has suffered from drug addiction for decades, the DTOs increasingly fuel a Mexican drug problem since they pay some of their workers’ wages in drugs. There are a number of measures that can be used to crack down on Mexican DTOs that have been operating with impunity across the region. The United States and Mexico have already begun to make strides in directly cracking down on the DTOs, but reforms and programs must be continued and improved to preserve gains . The “Mérida,” “post-Mérida,” and other American aid programs to Mexico have provided Mexican officials with the essential matériel and other equipment required to combat

the DTOs. These programs are also working to build a strong and stable civil service in Mexico by retraining legal and law-enforcement officials in modern procedures and techniques. A number of legal reforms in Mexico must be accelerated in order to combat DTOs as effectively as possible on home soil. Institutional reforms are working to move Mexico more toward an adversarial, transparent legal system with police forces that can both collect evidence and capture criminals. Overcrowding in prisons and multiyear pre-trial waiting periods should be addressed because it denies prisoners their rights and it exposes potentially innocent individuals to abuse and deprivation. The longer incarceration times also provide criminals an opportunity to escape, make it more likely for evidence to be lost or stolen, and increase the difficulty of convicting individuals. Mexican and American officials can also help increase the 1% conviction rate for drug-related crimes in Mexico by expanding extradition programs that separate dangerous drug lords from their criminal networks by transferring them to the United States, where they are tried and properly punished for their crimes. While these kinds of reforms will assist in the long-term, immediate action must be taken against DTOs. Although the Mexican public and officials are generally suspicious of placing American troops and resources on the ground, equipment transfers and training for Mexican military and police forces are required to bring order back to the streets. The two nations have increasingly shared intelligence in recent years, and these programs must be expanded and maintained. For instance, American intelligencegathering satellites can detect drugrunning tunnels under the border, and pilotless drones can track smugglers trying to cross the border. Indeed, increased border patrols, especially so-called “parallel patrols” in which Mexican and American forces patrol their respective side, have proven effective in stopping the flow of drugs into the United States. While these types of patrols have been piloted in some parts of Arizona, they should be extended to include the high-flow

US Foriegn Policy

areas south of California and Texas as well. While Mexico and the United States continue to move in the right direction in pursuing reforms, it is essential to prevent drug-enforcement programs from becoming abusive toward civil society. Expanded intelligence gathering by both the United States and Mexico has alarmed some privacy rights organizations as having the potential to invade citizens’ rights. In addition, many concerned Mexicans are worried about the continued involvement of the military in traditional policing functions, and the issue is primed to become a topic

“Drug proceeds of over $20 billion have been used to launder funds and purchase weapons and equipment that DTOs use to fight the Mexican military...” of debate in the 2012 Mexican presidential election. In fact, the military may also be overstepping its bounds in public displays of force. Specific regulations must be adopted if they are to limit military involvement in traditional policing functions, and a system of redress for alleged violations should be instituted. The military has traditionally eradicated drug fields and other forms of drug production, but this mission has been increasingly overshadowed by the bloody fighting with the DTOs on the streets. As soon as Mexican federal police forces are trained properly and corrupt officers purged from their ranks, the military should return to its supportive role and withdraw from police communities around the country. Continuing violence has burdened the Mexican people with constant fear and has damaged the Mexican economy. Because Mexico is the thirdlargest trading partner of the United States, its economy is highly inter-

November 2011

twined with that of the U.S. Already, the violence has stopped and reversed foreign investment in some of the hardest-hit areas. While President Calderón’s infrastructure and social initiatives aim to build drug-free communities, continued conflicts between the DTOs and the Mexican government will further harm industries and keep tourists away from resorts for years to come. Without visible and lasting stabilization, Mexico can hardly expect to attract further foreign investment. It is true that any long-term solution to these problems will necessarily involve tackling the demand side of DTOs’ operations as well. There are two primary approaches in accomplishing this: legalization of drugs or assistance for drug users. Legalization of drugs, as has been proposed by President Felipe Calderón and others, would be the more radical step but carries significant costs of its own. Regardless of the presumed merits, it is extremely politically contentious and unlikely in the short-term. It may be more practical to continue discouraging drug use and treating drug users in order to gradually deprive cartels of their clients, but this is a slow process. The focus for now should thus be on supply side solutions. The drug problem has been a persistent cause of conflict in the U.S. and Mexico for decades. The recent crackdowns in Mexico present an opportunity to push harder and destroy the massive flow of illegal substances into the United States. Mexican military forces, law enforcement, and government officials must receive the vital support required to defeat the cartels. If the United States continues its assistance, Mexico will keep progressing toward the DTO-free nation that the Mexican people deserve. Ultimately, these efforts will curb a significant source of crime and corruption in both nations—and improve lives on both sides of the border. Afp

George may be reached at gmaliha@princeton.edu

Middle East

Libyan citizens celebrating Gaddafi’s death. Photo from ibnlive.com

Post-gaddafi libya The Danger of Dwelling on the Past

uammar el-Gaddafi, the much-despised dictator of Libya for over forty years, met his violent end in October in a seemingly fitting death. Now that the leader of the feared regime is gone, the Libyan people are faced with the task of starting over and picking up the pieces of the Libya that Gaddafi tore apart. This will be no easy task. Up to this point, the myriad rebels and militia groups have been united by their desire to liberate Libya. Now that that purpose has been achieved, they will need a new driving motivation going forward: a motivation that will determine the amount of successful progress in post-Gaddafi Libya. If a desire for retribution dominates the future of Libya, the country will not escape its past. Constructive, positive dialogue between the interim government and the rebels is the key to the successful establishment of a new government in Libya. The death of Gaddafi was cause for

Monica Chon ‘15 both great celebration and scrutiny. Although Gaddafi was supposed to be captured alive and brought before the International Criminal Court, his captors apparently ignored this and killed him, presumably in the height of anger towards the former dictator. The video of his capture shows him being dragged through the streets, the autopsy of his body shows that he died of a gunshot to head, and rumors that he was sodomized before death are rampant. The fact that the Libyan militias did not allow Gaddafi the dignity of a fair trial shows that a fierce desire for retribution was just as strong as the desire for liberty during the struggle against the dictator. This resentment towards Gaddafi’s regime, while justified, is dangerous in that it prevents Libya from focusing on its future. With Gaddafi out of the picture, the future of Libya is uncertain, and the presence of militias is only adding to the chaos. The lack of a strong central authority has already hurt many Libyans, especially

American Foreign Policy

those who had loyalist ties during the revolution. A Human Rights Watch report stated that militias in Libya continue to target “loyalist” towns and pro-Gaddafi supporters in an unlawful and inhumane manner, even post-Gaddafi. The report determined detainee torture to be equal to that carried out during the height of the Gaddafi regime. For example, in the loyalist town of Tawergha, the organization interviewed many residents only to find that the rebels were arbitrarily arresting, beating, and otherwise abusing former regime sympathizers, causing many to flee

“Up to this point, the myriad rebels and militia groups have been united by their desire to liberate Libya. Now that that purpose has been achieved, they will need a new driving motivation... ”

out of fear. Testimonies from citizens detail deaths of innocent Tawergha residents from torturous beatings by rebel captors who are seeking revenge in ways that are counterproductive to progress in Libya. Nevertheless, the future of Libya is not completely bleak. Libya as well as the international community can perhaps put their faith in the new leader of Libya’s interim government, the National Transitional Council, Prime Minister Abdurraheem el-Keib. Holding dual citizenship in the United States and Libya, el-Keib has lived in America since 1975, receiving a PhD from North Carolina State University and holding a long-term teaching position at the University of Alabama as a professor of engineering. Recently, in a hopeful sign for democracy in Libya, el-Keib was elected to his Prime Minister position by members of the National Transitional Council after the former head of the NTC, Mahmoud Jibril, remained true to his promise to step down after the capture of Sirte, the last loyalist holdout. El-Keib is a nationalist., which bodes well for Libya’s future, as he can lead the NTC to make nonpartisan decisions that are best for Libya as a whole, rather than give in to demands from various rebel groups. In charge of overseeing the progress of Libya in its transitional period, the NTC and el-Keib must work together with the militias and rebels to bring peace and stability to Libya. Libya does not need a quick democratic panacea that has election booths up and running right away, but rather a low-key recovery and healing process that involves open communication between the desires of the rebel groups and the hopes of the new interim

Middle East

government. The danger of jumping on the bandwagon of democracy purely for democracy’s sake is that the Libyan people and the country will not be ready for such an abrupt change. It is likely that the various rebel and tribal groups in Libya will feel slighted or disillusioned with democracy in Libya, especially since there are competing visions of how the new Libyan government should operate. This could lead to rejection of Libya’s democracy, inter-tribal competition, and ultimately escalation to civil war. Thus, before democracy can be successfully instituted in Libya, certain groundwork steps must be taken to guarantee Libya’s stable future. First and foremost, both the NTC and the rebel groups must work together to arrest forces loyal to Gaddafi that continue to cause uprisings while firmly insisting on maintaining fair criminal trials for those arrested. Those loyalists who accept the fall of the old regime and the new future for Libya should be incorporated into the progression of Libyan politics, not ostracized by rebels. While the NTC may extend a hand of partnership to different rebel groups to help capture those who are still Gaddafi supporters, it must insist on conducting a lawful and fair trial for those arrested. Meanwhile, the NTC and the rebel groups must also open dialogue on the drafting of a new constitution for Libya, which is crucial in defining how the new government and society of Libya will operate. The last constitution of Libya was created in 1951 but became defunct when Gaddafi took power. A new constitution that clearly delineates human rights, just laws, and a democratic system of govern-

ment will help Libyans ground themselves in a concrete sense of the future as well as dictate the law for rebel groups. Libya can gain a lot by looking towards Tunisia —the country that instigated the “Arab Spring” movement —and its recent first democratic election since the ousting of its feared ex-leader Zine alAbidine Ben Ali. The high participation rate in the Tunisian election, estimated to be around 90% of registered voters, coupled with the relatively peaceful Election Day, sets a great example of how to establish a fair and respected democratic system. However, Tunisia’s road to election day has been fairly bumpy, as citizens disagreed over the role of Islam in government and became disillusioned with the lack of improvement of socioeconomic problems. Libya and the NTC have the chance to learn from some of Tunisia’s struggles by working to gain the public trust early on and placate the Libyans expecting a rapid improvement of political and socioeconomic issues in Libya. It will take time to heal a shattered Libya. The rebels must not let a desire for revenge overshadow goals for democratic progress. The success of Libya is crucial not only for the next generation of Libyans but also for providing inspiration to the citizens of other “Arab Spring” countries who are currently in the midst of a struggle for their own liberty and democratic government. Democratic progress, however, will take a great deal of effort and time. For now we can only hope that Libya does not dwell on seeking retribution but instead chooses to focus on its future. Afp

Monica may be reached at mchon@princeton.edu

AFP Quiz Answers Multiple Choice Monthly 1. B 2. A 3. D 4. D El-Keib attempting to pacify Libyans demanding jobs and back pay. Photo from vancouversun.com

November 2011

5. B

Been Out of the News?

Write it for AFP www.afpprinceton.com